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The research aims to reconstruct why, how, and with what effects the 
Italian State promotes its film industry, in a comparative perspective 
with France. Chapter I reconstructs the Italian and French States’ history 
as promoters of cinema and how progressively other government levels 
became relevant in the matter. Chapter II focuses on the film industry 
organization today; it considers how the industry has been 'shaken' by 
the disruptive market entrance of the global digital providers and the 
outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic, and how it is affected by State's 
regulation. Chapter III reconstructs the action of the two States aimed at 
promoting the industry through economic aid. Chapter IV analyses how 
they promote cinema through regulating the behaviour of audio-visual 
media service (AVMS) providers—both the linear (traditional 





In his programmatic speech to the Senate before the confidence vote, 
Italian Prime Minister Mario Draghi highlighted how «it would be a 
mistake to protect all economic activities indifferently», and that «the 
choice of which activities to protect and which to guide towards change 
is the difficult task that economic policy will have to face in the coming 
months»1. In a country trying to recover from a deep sanitary and 
economic crisis, there is the need to make choices. The State should direct 
public support to those sectors able to generate economic and social 
growth in the long run and drive the country towards the goals today at 
the heart of the national and European political agenda. 
The audio-visual sector is an interesting case study of an industry to be 
financed—investigating why and how to do it. Indeed, said industry has 
intense relations with many other markets:  an (either positive or 
negative) shock there spreads significantly to the rest of the economy. 
This connection explains why audio-visual is the Italian industry that 
boasts the highest multiplier, second only to the construction sector’s 
one2: for every demanded euro of audio-visual services and products, 
production in the entire Italian economy grows almost double, i.e., of 
1.98 €3.  
The most recently available data show that, in addition to the 61,000 jobs 
it directly generates, the audio-visual industry induces 112,000 jobs in 
other sectors4. Moreover, it employs more under-50s workers than the 
 
1 DRAGHI, M., Programmatic speech to the Senate, February 17th,  2021 («sarebbe un errore 
proteggere indifferentemente tutte le attività economiche…la scelta di quali attività proteggere e 
quali accompagnare nel cambiamento è il difficile compito che la politica economica dovrà affrontare 
nei prossimi mesi»). 
2ANICA and CENTRO STUDI CONFINDUSTRIA, Industria italiana del cinema e dell’audiovisivo:  




national average: 77% against 73%5. Considering the only production 
department, it appears that a quarter of the employees of the audio-
visual industry are under-306. This is significant for Italy, the European 
country that holds the sad record of the highest percentage of young 
people neither in employment nor in education or training7. Even the 
percentage of females working in the audio-visual industry is above the 
national average: 39% against 36%8––another significant evidence, 
considering that Italy is among the European countries with the lowest 
women’s employment rate9. 
However, the audio-visual industry is not only a great economic engine: 
it also produces a relevant cultural impact, more challenging to measure 
and express in quantitative terms. Audio-visual works represent means 
of artistic expression, education, and social communication. They 
‘mirror’ and ‘shape’ societies10, orienting their values and behaviours as 
they take part in creating the national identity. They also participate in 
defining the perception of a country abroad and, for this reason, may 
contribute to attracting foreign businesses and investments and 
developing tourism. 
Despite the audio-visual industry's capacity to generate a significant 
impact for the entire country system, the State's support in its favour 
caused little attention among the Italian legal scholars. Not much 
research is available on the matter. This work attempts to address this 
lack of analysis and generate greater interest in the topic. It focuses on 
the Italian State as a promoter of cinema—the segment of the audio-




7 EUROSTAT, Statistics on young people neither in employment nor in education or training, 2020. 
8 ANICA and CENTRO STUDI CONFINDUSTRIA, Industria italiana del cinema. 
9 EUROSTAT, Women’s employment rate increasing, but remains lower than men’s, 2020. 
10 As noted by the EUROPEAN COMMISSION, in its Communication on State aid for films and 
other audiovisual works (2013/C 332/01). 
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seek to reconstruct why, how, and (in the limits that befit a jurist) with 
what effects the Italian State promotes its film industry, in a comparative 
perspective with France.  
France, the cinema's birthplace, is used as a benchmark comparative 
country because it occupies a recognized place in this sector. Indeed, it 
has gained a reputation for the unique and complex system of State 
support devised over time and is a reference for non-French film 
operators and policymakers. Despite being presented as in a continuous 
crisis—and therefore in need of always-increasing support—data 
suggest that the French one is the most profitable European film 
industry. Indeed, it achieves the best results in the metrics traditionally 
used to understand the film industry’s health: the number of films 
produced and their average cost; the admissions and gross box office 
(GBO) in cinema theatres; the national market share; the number of 
theatres and screens; the extent of internationalization (number of co-
productions and circulation capacity of national films abroad), and the 
participation and prizes in film festivals. 
Given the lack of legal literature and the awareness that the mere 
analysis of laws gives a limited knowledge of reality, this work was built 
keeping a constant dialogue with audio-visual operators, experts, and 
representatives of the State's promotion action11. I am deeply grateful for 
their support, which I have often perceived as an expression of a desire 
to contribute to developing scientific research on this topic; poorly 
analysed by scholars, it has often generated interest and discussion 
within public opinion, mainly based on the limited knowledge made 
available by the medias.  
When answering the question 'what do you do?' in these years of 
research, rarely my most varied interlocutors have not expressed their 
opinions on the matter. They have often highlighted the erroneous object 
of the State promotion action. Some have argued that the Italian State 
finances too niche works that have little-to-no demand, which often even 
comes from the wealthiest and more educated part of the society— that 
 
11 Among them: Claudia Angrisani; Ernesto Apa; Matilde Bernabei; Nicola Borrelli; 
Francesca Cima; Carlo Degli Esposti; Giovanni Gangemi; Simone Gialdini; Iole Maria 
Giannattasio; Giorgio Greppi; Nicola Maccanico; Francesca Medolago Albani; Daniela 
Monterossi; Alberto Pasquale; Chiara Sbarigia; Riccardo Tozzi; Bruno Zambardino.  
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is to say, the State action generates a regressive redistribution effect. 
Others have claimed, on the opposite, that the State finances too 
'commercial' films, arguing that public money should neither support 
operators that do not need help because of their strength, nor operators 
that do not deserve aids because their works do not have any ‘artistic’ or 
‘cultural’ merit. 
The desire to generate cultural and economic impact makes the State 
action in cinema promotion particularly challenging and thus liable for 
criticisms. Questions that would be appropriate to any general business-
support action by the State become particularly pressing in the case of 
the film industry. What balance should be chased between supporting 
large companies to continue producing successful products and helping 
the small and medium-sized ones to enter the market and grow? And 
what about the trade-off between specific support for a few and 
generalized support for many? Or between the need to not compromise 
the industry's freedom—therefore following the market's direction—
and that to 'orient' it consistently with the goals of State cultural policies? 
In the case of the film industry, the answers to these questions determine 
the balance between the necessity to promote the sector's industrial 
growth and the one of increasing cultural pluralism.  
The first need calls for support to companies likely to generate many jobs 
and large expenses, have good return on investments and financial 
solidity, and compete at the international level. Hence, the goal to 
promote the growth of the sector's industrial basis implies strengthening 
the already strong operators. The second goal—cultural pluralism—
requires instead the State to 'alter' the directions the market would 
autonomously take, extending the support to many operators, and in 
particular the most fragile ones. The State, to guarantee the diversity 
(and the 'quality') of the supply, should enable the realization of films 
whose making would otherwise be difficult on the free market, thus 
supporting productions with cultural merit and helping the new 
entrants’ access. 
Once having replied to the several questions related to aids’ targets, a 
problem of policy assessment arises. The lack of monitoring data on the 
impact of the Italian State aids to the cinema—a lack actually concerning 
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the overall Italian State support to the industrial sectors12—can be 
perhaps explained, among others, by the difficulty to apply to a cultural 
industry the rules generally outlined to measure the impact of State 
incentives to a generic sector13. How to measure the actual achievement 
of cultural goals? What are the possible indicators to verify the 
supported industry's ability to contribute to the affirmation of national 
identity, the regeneration and social inclusion, and the country's civil 
and cultural growth? Precisely because of these complexities, this 
research adopts a multidisciplinary approach, combining the analysis of 
the limited law literature available with the sources of industrial and 
political economics and film culture.  
Concerning the law, this work touches many branches. First, the study 
of the State's action promoting cinema cannot disregard the 
constitutional law principles. The Constitution provides indeed the legal 
basis for the State action—its art. 9(1) establishes that public powers 
should promote the development of culture—and indicates what the 
primary goal of the promotion should be and how it should occur. 
Indeed, art. 9(1) must be read in conjunction with art. 33(1), declaring the 
art's freedom. There had been an extensive debate about balancing these 
two dispositions: how can State-driven culture development not conflict 
 
12 As pointed out, among others, by GIAVAZZI, F. ET AL., Rapporto alla Presidenza del Consiglio: 
Analisi e raccomandazioni sui contributi pubblici alle imprese, 2012. 
13According to economic theory, public aids are efficient in the presence of several 
conditions. First, there must be a market failure: the market should be unable to achieve 
socially desirable goals on its own. For example, this can happen if the market equilibrium 
in the absence of public incentives generates a sub-optimal production of a particular good; 
the well-being of society as a whole would improve if a greater quantity of that good were 
produced. Two other conditions are needed for the incentive to be efficient. First, the 
incentive produces benefits (for example, increased employment and productivity) higher 
than costs. Among the costs to consider, those incurred by the public administration to 
manage the incentive and by the industry to interact with the public administration. Other 
costs come from the business devoting itself not only to its entrepreneurial activity but also 
to obtaining the incentive, with a possible reduction of the overall economy's growth. 
Second, the incentive must have an additional effect: it must finance activities that the 
industry would not carry out in the absence of incentives or that it would carry out to a 
more limited extent. See, among others, GIAVAZZI, F. ET AL., Rapporto alla Presidenza del 
Consiglio, but also BELLINI, N., Stato e industria nelle economie contemporanee, Donzelli, 1996. 
 24 
with the need for the same culture to self-determination14?  However, 
said question has, over time, been resolved in the sense of the two 
dispositions «integration in a statement of a unitary nature [...]: that is, 
in the affirmation that the democratic State should protect the free 
development of culture»15. In essence, art. 33 would indicate how the 
public intervention should occur (without compromising the natural 
evolution of culture) and the first reason for the intervention itself16. The 
public power must ensure that the negative freedom of expression—i.e., 
the abstract, potential freedom of expression guaranteed by the absence 
of State limitations—can be compensated by the positive one—i.e., the 
effective ability to express themselves17. Therefore, the promotion of 
culture should act as a mean to make effective the right of access to and 
to produce culture, ensuring a 'substantive' rather than merely 'formal' 
equality—as required by art. 3 of the Constitution. 
As well as aspects of constitutional law, the study of the State promotion 
of cinema leads to deal with European law issues. The Member States do 
 
14 The extensiveness of the debate stemmed from the experience of fascism, which had 
shown how State incentives for culture may end up in making cultural expressions an 
instrument for pursuing State’s interests. On the influence that the experience of fascism 
had on the subsequent formulation of constitutional principles relating to the relations 
between politics and culture, among others: S. MERLINI, La “politica culturale” della 
Repubblica e i principi della Costituzione, in Diritti, nuove tecnologie, trasformazioni sociali. Scritti 
in memoria di Paolo Barile, Cedam, 2003, 507 ss. The author points out that these principles 
represent above all the rejection of a model, precisely the one proposed by fascism. 
15 Cit. SPAGNA MUSSO, E., Lo Stato di cultura nella Costituzione italiana, Morano, 1961, 56 
(«integrazione in una enunciazione a carattere unitario [...]: cioè, nell’affermazione che 
l’ordinamento statale democratico attraverso la loro accettazione tutela lo sviluppo libero della 
cultura»). 
16 As clearly pointed out by AINIS, M., Cultura e politica. Il modello costituzionale, Cedam, 
1991, 114, «A public action in the culture field is needed to make culture free. This means 
that in the founding fathers’ opinion, cultural expression is not free, without the support 
of public administration» («l’intervento pubblico sulla cultura serve a renderla libera. Ciò 
significa che a giudizio dei costituenti l’espressione culturale non è libera, senza il supporto 
dell’amministrazione pubblica»). 
17 A clarification of the two possible ways of understanding the concept of freedom is due 
to Norberto Bobbio. He highlighted how the evolution from the negative to the positive 
conception occurred in correspondence with the transition from a liberal doctrine to a more 
markedly socialist one (BOBBIO, N., Politica e cultura, Einaudi, 1955, 272 ss.). 
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not have indeed 'full sovereignty': to comply with the EU competition 
law, national systems of cinema promotion must respect the European 
rules on State aids—rather light in the context of culture.  
The analysis also involves administrative law—think of the 
organizational structure of the State promotion and the procedures for 
the aids’ granting. It also leads to deal with fiscal law, which is at the 
heart of the State promotion of cinema. This is true for Italy, which grants 
the most funding through fiscal incentives, and even for France. Here, 
taxation encourages the localization of shooting in France, favour private 
investments and is at the basis of the complex working of the fund 
managed by the Centre National du cinéma et de l'image animée (CNC). 
Finally, the public law of the economy is relevant, in particular to verify 
whether and in what terms State action to promote cinema differs from 
that to promote other industrial sectors without an equally evident 
cultural dimension. The analysis will point out that the action of the 
Italian State of cinema promotion does not appear to be too far from that 
of promoting industry in general—as regards both the tools used and 
the limits of the intervention. 
The work is organised into four chapters. Chapter I reconstructs the 
French and Italian States’ history as promoters of cinema and how 
progressively other government levels have become relevant in the 
matter. It starts from France to then analyse Italy. Such a separation is 
due to the difficulty of telling the history of the two States as promoters 
of cinema together: the historical periods in which the most significant 
changes occurred and the circumstances that led to them sharply differ 
in the two countries. However, these days, common phenomena are 
shaking the effectiveness of the equilibria gained over time in the two 
countries: first, the appearance and continuous growth of global digital 
platforms; second, the crisis generated by the Covid-19 pandemic, which 
had strongly affected the audio-visual industry by freezing projects in 
the shooting phase, shutting cinemas  down, and cancelling festivals and 
events—pushing some enterprises to the edge of bankruptcy. These two 
events generated the need for an evolution of the State support by 
requiring modifications and enhancements of the traditional 
instruments, and even by establishing new forms of support. 
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The other government levels have progressively become relevant for 
two reasons. First, higher government levels began to scrutiny the State 
measures of cinema promotion at the end of World War II (WWII). The 
promotional measures were inconsistent with the principles of free trade 
and services established at the European and international levels. 
Whether cultural products and services should be treated differently 
from other goods and services became the object of a complex and 
lasting debate. In this context, upon particular pressure from France, the 
concept of 'cultural exception' emerged and later evolved in that of 
'cultural diversity', somehow excluding cultural matters from the wind 
of liberalisation. Second, since the second half of the 20th century, 
European and territorial autonomies' actions of support were added to 
the State's ones. Therefore, today various regulatory levels coexist in 
impacting the same policy area in both countries, making it relevant to 
understand whether they overlap or coordinate. 
Chapter II focuses on the organization of the film industry today. It 
reconstructs the current state of the production, distribution and 
exhibition phases, highlighting the different players and interests 
involved and how the State's regulatory activity affects them. Indeed, 
the film industry's organization does not depend only on its operators’ 
free decisions: the two States limit their economic freedom to pursue the 
collective interest of the promotion of culture. Some of the issues raised 
in this chapter may seem relevant to audio-visual operators' internal 
business relationship only, by no means related to the State and the 
public sector. However, how those internal relationships are organised 
strongly affects whether or not the State's objectives can be achieved. The 
behaviour of private operators is essential to the very realization of the 
goals pursued through the State promotional legislation—as noted since 
1971 by Donatello Serrani, who criticizes the juridical literature's one-
sided view on public aids, focusing very much on public power, public 
administration and State, and very little on private operators18.  
 
18 SERRANI, D., Lo stato finanziatore, Franco Angeli, 1971, p. 171 («A chi guardi 
panoramicamente la letteratura giuridica che, in Italia, si è occupata degli ausili pubblici a privati 
non può sfuggire l’impressione che essa ha avuto, ed ha tuttora, una visione sostanzialmente 
unilaterale del fenomeno. Visione unilaterale nel senso che nei discorsi dei giuristi sugli ausili c’è 
molto potere pubblico, pubblica amministrazione, Stato e molto poco soggetto privato. Il quale 
rimane sempre sullo sfondo, la sua posizione nel rapporto risultando estremamente sfumata, come 
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Chapter III analyses the State's actions to promote the industry through 
economic aid. First, the range of the State's actions is presented, i.e., the 
limits they should respect to comply with the European Commission's 
principle for protecting competition within the internal market. The 
focus then shifts to the two States' administrative organization in 
promoting cinema and the origin of their resources devoted to the sector; 
and to the types of support instruments adopted. The analysis will show 
that each instrument is in charge of limiting the problems opened by the 
others, and that France and Italy found a different balance between the 
necessity to promote the growth of the sector's industrial basis and that 
to increase cultural pluralism. 
Chapter IV analyses the State's actions to promote cinema by regulating 
AVMS providers' behaviour. Since the years of the public broadcaster 
monopoly in France and since the 1990s in Italy, the two States have been 
requiring providers to meet content and investment quotas in national 
and European independent production. This way, the two States ensure 
financial resources and opportunities for distribution to national works. 
Also, by shifting cinema support from direct public intervention to 
providers' intermediation, the States seek to keep the film industry more 
close to the market: providers are likely more committed than ministerial 
commissions in funding products successful with the audience. The 
analysis of the quota instrument will be technical, because of the nature 
of the instrument itself is technical. However, such a technicality is not 
an end in itself: the details of the Italian and French legislation on quotas 
conceal precious indications on how the two States promote their film 
industries by regulating the behaviour of providers. 
The whole research will show that France has devised a very 
sophisticated system to promote its film industry over time. However, 
the analysis will rarely suggest adopting the French instruments to 
address the yet-to-be-solved problems that affect Italy. In most cases, 
there is no reason to suppose that the French means could prove effective 
in Italy, uprooted from the French institutional architecture.  
 
se—in molti e rilevanti casi—la sua presenza e il suo comportamento fossero solamente eventuali e 
non essenziali alla realizzazione stessa del fine pubblico che sostanzia l’attività di ausilio»).  
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Chapter I – The history of the State as a 
promoter of cinema and the rising relevance 
of other government levels 
 
1. Overview  
This first chapter is about the history of the French and Italian States as 
promoters of cinema and how progressively other government levels 
became relevant in the matter. It appears difficult to understand the 
system in place today without knowledge of yesterday.  
The analysis is carried out in a way that first the case of France is 
presented (par. 2), then that of Italy (par. 3). This is because it proved 
challenging to tell the history of the two States as promoters of cinema 
together. Indeed, the historical periods in which the most significant 
changes occur and the circumstances generating them differ in the two 
countries. 
Both the States initially addressed the cinema sector with mere security 
and public order intent, adopting a safety and censorship framework. 
They began to develop a promotional legislation at the end of World War 
I (WWI), given the crisis of the national film industries. Initially, the aim 
was only to limit the competition from abroad by restricting the import 
of American films. Over time, measures of direct support in favour of 
the national film industries appeared.   
The French State developed its system of cinema promotion slowly. Its 
main features were established—based on a previous extensive activity 
of study and reflection (par. 2.1.) — at the end of WWII (par. 2.2.). First, 
an independent agency under the authority of the Ministry of culture 
was put in charge of elaborating and implementing State actions 
concerning cinema. Second, the principle that who benefits from today's 
works should contribute to financing future creation was established. 
Subsequent legislation will confirm these two principles, continuously 
adapting them only to address technological and market evolutions (par. 
2.5.). They still exist today and make the French system the most envied 
by European cinematographic operators. 
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The Italian system of cinema promotion on the other hand, was 
developed by the fascist regime, which led to refined mechanisms of 
support, strictly linked to means of control over contents (par. 3.1.). After 
the liberalization, the Republican legislator adopted a system based on 
the same measures invented during fascism, only repealing their most 
authoritative features (par. 3.2.). 
During the 1950s-1960s (par. 2.3. and par. 3.3.), both States began to pay 
attention to the cultural and artistic dimension of the sector. In addition 
to promoting the economic growth of the film industry, they sought to 
favour the emergence of new talents and the realisation of works 
considered worthy and filled with cultural and artistic merit.  
The '80s and the '90s represented the period of the greater distance 
between France (par. 2.4.) and Italy (par. 3.4.). The outbreak of private 
broadcasters generated a process of progressive fall in cinema theatres' 
admissions in both countries. The French State promptly reacted: thanks 
to complex and sophisticated regulation, it transformed television from 
the main cinema's enemy to its leading new promoter.  On the other side, 
the Italian legislator did not intervene to regulate the relationship 
between cinema and television. Perhaps to staunch and mask this 
absence, it exponentially increased the funding for the film industry, 
leading to a collapse of the system in the early 2000s.   
Hence the Italian 2004 reform, by which the State tried to empower 
producers, some of who were not risking their capital, but rather betting 
with public money. However, not all of the good intentions pursued 
were achieved, and disincentives arose (par. 3.5.). A new turning point 
occurred in 2016, when an organic reform about all the aspects of the 
relationship between the sector and the State was adopted, showing the 
emergence of a first-time long-term overall vision (par. 3.6.). 
To these days, the effectiveness of the equilibriums gained over time are 
shaken by the same phenomena both in Italy and France: the emergence 
of global digital operators, in continuous and exponential growth, and 
the Covid-19 pandemic (par. 4). 
Over time, the State ceased to be the only public actor relevant in the 
matter of cinema promotion. First (par. 5), higher government levels 
began to scrutiny the State measures of cinema promotion at the end of 
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WWII. The promotional measures were inconsistent with the principles 
of free trade and services that were being established at the European 
and international level. Whether cultural products and services should 
be treated differently from other goods and services became the object 
of a complex and lasting debate. In this context, upon particular pressure 
from France, the concept of ‘cultural exception’ emerged and later 
evolved in that of ‘cultural diversity’, somehow excluding cultural 
matters from the winds of liberalization. Still today, the Italian and 
French States can adopt measures to support their national film industry 
because of a ‘consent’ granted by the European and international 
governments levels. 
Second (par. 6), since the second half of the 20th century, EU and 
territorial autonomies actions of support added to the State’s ones. 
Therefore, various regulatory levels coexist, impacting the same policy 
area in both countries, making it relevant to understand whether they 





2.1. The broadening of State intervention: from public order 
to promotion 
The French State developed its system of cinema promotion slowly. The 
first measures related to cinema date back to the end of the nineteenth 
century and had fiscal and safety goals. As far as the firsts are concerned, 
cinema exhibitors had to pay the poverty tax, a 10% addition to the price 
of tickets levied to finance hospitals by the health and social security 
services19. Safety rules on the entrepreneurs of cinematographic20 were 
adopted following the catastrophe of Bazar de la Charité21, which made 
the public authority aware of the risks posed by the projection of moving 
pictures.  
Soon enough, rules on censorship were added to those for safety. 
Following the projection of the filming of a quadruple capital execution 
in the town of Béthune, the Ministry of the Interior established that film 
screenings could only take place after authorization from the mayors22. 
To ensure uniform decisions throughout the country, the Decree of  July 
1919 on the «control of cinematographic films» established a centralized 
system of preventive censorship. According to it, «no films, other than 
those reproducing facts or current events, can be shown in public if they 
 
19 See ABEL, R., Encyclopedia of early cinema, Routledge, 2004, p. 257. 
20Among the other things, exhibitors were required to unwind the film into a slitted metal 
case; prevent spectators from smoking; keep at hand two buckets of water, etc. See ibidem. 
21 A charity bazaar organized in 1897 in Paris and in which 120 people died in a fire caused 
by a projectionist. 
22 By a circular of January 11th, 1909, the Minister stated his instructions in these words: «I 
believe it is essential to radically ban all public cinematographic shows of this kind, likely 
to provoke demonstrations disturbing public order and tranquillity» («J’estime qu’il est 
indispensable d’interdire radicalement tous spectacles cinématographiques publics de ce genre, 
susceptibles de provoquer des manifestations troublant l’ordre et la tranquillité publics »). Thus 
reported, among others, by TRIOLLET, C., Censure et Cinéma en France, Lettmotif, 2020, p. 27.  
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and their title have not been approved by the Minister of Public 
Instruction and Fine Arts»23.  
The French State ceased to address the sector with a mere control 
attempt and began to protect it at the end of WWII—when «the first 
battle in the Franco-American war over culture erupted»24. The national 
film industry was in crisis, weakened in terms of resources, facilities, and 
capitals—and the United States (US) was producing many movies that 
were ‘invading’ the national market. 
Like other European countries, France tried to protect its national 
industry by introducing the instrument of quotas. Initially, they 
represented a merely numerical restriction on the number of American 
films that could be imported into the country. Later, the instrument was 
further refined, requiring the US to import and distribute a French film 
for every seven movies exported to France25.  
Interestingly, quotas were adopted despite the opposition of theatre 
exhibitors, who were screening a large number of very profitable 
popular American films26. The opposition also came about because many 
movie theatres were built during this period, and the small number of 
French films produced could not meet the subsequent increase in 
domestic demand. However, quotas continued to be used for a long 
time. They were repealed only at the end of WWII. At that moment, 
French doors indeed opened to American films in return for a proportion 
 
23 «Aucun film cinématographique, à l’exception des films reproduisant des faits ou des événements 
d’actualité, ne peut être représenté en public, si ce film et son titre d’ont obtenu le visa du ministre 
de l’Instruction publique et des Beaux-arts ». Thus reported, among others, by PITHON, R., "La 
censure des films en France et la crise politique de 1934”, Revue historique 1 (1977): 105-130, 
p. 108. 
24  WALKLEY, S. E. To what extent can France continue to defend the cultural exception in the 
digital age?, University of Warwick, 2016, p. 126. 
25 Decree of February 18th , 1928. 
26 MESSERLIN, P. and PARC, J., "The real impact of subsidies on the film industry (1970s–
present): lessons from France and Korea", Pacific Affairs 90.1 (2017): 51-75. 
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of France’s war debt being cancelled27. Still, while accepting not to 
restrict American imports, France specified minimum quotas for French 
films to be screened in national theatres (one week each month)28. 
The appearance of sound films triggered other protectionist measures in 
the early 1930s. In 1932, France limited the possibility of projecting 
foreign films in their original language (they could be shown only in five 
theatres in Paris and five in the provinces). At the same time, it 
prohibited the import of foreign films already dubbed into French and 
limited the number of import visas for dubbing them in France29. 
In addition to quotas and dubbing instruments, the legislator did not 
adopt other significant measures in this phase. However, during the 
Popular Front’s years (1936-1938), an intense activity of study on the 
reasons for the crisis of the national cinema grew, starting a reflection on 
the State’s role on the matter.  Several parliamentary study reports were 
made, including the Petzche Report of 1935 and that of Guy de Carmoy 
of 193630. This way, France inaugurated an approach that will be 
 
27 See the Blum-Byrnes Agreement, a document dealing with film issues annexed to the 
Washington Agreement of May 28th, 1946, which aimed at settling the debt owed by France 
to the USA. 
28 The French failure to secure better terms provoked massive public protests by French 
film operators. They claimed that the established quotas were not proportionate to the 
volume of production of the growing French film industry. They noted that the on-going 
increase in the number of French films produced would have necessarily come at the great 
cost of reducing their screen time. It is exactly what happened, with producers and 
exhibitors trying to squeeze a number of French films in an ever-smaller space, thus rapidly 
removing films from screens to make room for other works. Eventually, negotiations on 
quotas were reopened and the 1948 Caffery-Schuman Agreement will increase to five 
weeks every quarter the screen-time quota for French films. For the whole discourse, see 
WALKLEY, S. E., To what extent, p. 83.  
29 For more information, ULFF-MÖLLER, J., Hollywood's film wars with France: film-trade 
diplomacy and the emergence of the French film quota policy, University Rochester Press, 2001, 
pp. 122 ff. 
30 The first one, which brought to the attention of the government the financial crisis of the 
national film industry, expressed the need to centralize in a single service the attributions 
related to the cinema dispersed in various ministries. Indeed, it considered such 
fragmentation of competencies one of the main reasons for the ineffectiveness of the first 
forms of State intervention. The report proposed entrusting the management of a national 
film support fund to a comité technique, made up of representatives of both the professionals 
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consistent over time and is still relevant today for the national film 
industry:  when faced with a problem, the State instructs the drafting of 
a study report, which is presented to the Parliament and that grounds 
the legislative changes adopted. 
In his programmatic speech of 1937, the Minister of Education Jean Zay 
enumerated the causes for the crisis of French cinema, based on the data 
resulting from the previously mentioned reports31. First, the lack of 
administrative centralization represented a crucial issue. Indeed, in this 
first phase, the cinema depended on three different ministries 
simultaneously32, and the coordination of the Presidency of Council was 
more theoretical than real33. Other causes were the financial deficit of the 
market34, the overabundance of foreign productions, the excessive 
taxation—which made French cinema «le cinéma le plus imposé du 
 
and the State. The committee should also have been in charge of analysing the film 
industry and publishing an annual report on it; making recommendations to the heads of 
the film industry's companies and giving advice to the government on ‘cinematographic 
matters’. The subsequent Guy de Carmoy Report, a sort of counter-offensive of 
professional organizations, reaffirmed the problem of a lack of central action. However, it 
did not share the conclusions of the Petsche Report: it proposed the establishment of a 
single professional body that did not include any State participation. It envisaged 
entrusting the administrative authority only in a somewhat subsidiary way, where the film 
profession itself would not have managed to find an agreement. For further information 
on the reports: BERTIN-MAGHIT, J. P., De l’exception francaise, in Le front populaire et le cineḿa 
français, ed by Cre ́ton, L. and Michel, M., The ́ore ̀me 27, Presses Sorbonne nouvelle, 2017, 
pp. 73-77.  
31 Ibidem. 
32 The General Directorate of Fine Arts of the Ministry of National Education for the 
administrative matters; the Ministry of Foreign Affairs the purchase of foreign films and 
for the exhibition of French films abroad; and the Ministry of Trade for the issues related 
to film exportation. 
33 BELLUCCI, L., Cinema e aiuti di Stato nell’integrazione europea: un diritto promozionale in Italia 
e in Francia, Giuffrè, 2006. 
34 According to the Petsche Report, there were only 75 M French-speaking spectators 
worldwide, while the spectators of Anglo-Saxons films were 225 M. In 1933, of the 137 
foreign films screened beyond the Atlantic, only 17 came from France. Thus reported by 
BERTIN-MAGHIT, J. P., De l’exception francaise. 
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monde»35—and the inability to find enough financing. For this reason, 
producers were used to undertaking the preparation of films despite 
having obtained only a small part of the necessary resources. Finally, the 
widespread fraud of exhibitors, who were adopting ‘price wars’ and 
favouring foreign productions (despite quotas), was also among the list 
of reasons for the crisis.  
After three years of discussion, in March 1939, the Government 
presented the Project of Law Zay. The outbreak of war did not make it 
possible to adopt its measures: the project remained so. However, Zay’s 
proposal and the study reports on which it relied became the 
foundations of the regulations adopted by the subsequent legislators. 
First, that of the brief authoritarian experience of Vichy (1940-1944): the 
measures taken at that time were still limited36; however, «Vichy worked 
unwittingly to achieve part of the Popular Front's 'program', at least its 
projects […] Vichy has more prolonged/resumed than contradicted the 
film policy of its exact ideologically opposite.»37. Second, even the 
legislator of the post-WWII period relied on Zay’s proposals. It 
 
35 In spite of modest reductions in 1935, the various administrative taxes were responsible 
for reducing exhibitors' revenues by nearly 40%. See ibidem. 
36 The main innovations during the Vichy era were the centralization of the administrative 
structure in charge of the cinema and the establishment of greater control over the 
operators' activities. New support measures were also introduced. Among them: grants to 
production companies having already realized films of an educational or patriotic nature, 
contributions in the form of loans, and forms of preferential access to credit. Indeed, Law 
no. 2110/1941 of May 19th authorized the Credit National Bank to use State funds to grant 
to production companies loans of particularly favourable rate (5%, repayable over three 
years). This way, the State ceased to only discriminate on US imports and began to create 
measures to support domestic films directly. Unlike what happened in Italy during the 
Mussolini regime, the Vichy one did not establish public bodies acting as economic 
operators in the film industry. The propaganda of the regime was realized mainly by 
private companies run by people close to the government. For more information on the 
Vichy era, see BELLUCCI, L., Cinema e aiuti di stato, pp. 114 and ff., and PERLO, N., Le droit 
public du cinéma en Italie en France, Presses Universitaires d'Aix-Marseille, 2012, pp. 119 ff.  
37 BERTIN-MAGHIT, J. P., De l’exception francaise («Vichy travailla sans vouloir à la réalisation 
d’une partie sinon du “programme” du Front populaire, du moins de ses projets […]  On peut dire 
en effet que dans les grandes lignes Vichy a beaucoup plus prolongé ou repris la politique de son 
exact oppose idéologique du film qu’il ne l’a contredite»). 
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established the key features of the French State system of cinema 
promotion, on which the contemporary framework still relies. 
 
2.2. The aftermath of WWII: establishing the pillars of the 
contemporary cinema promotion  
In the post-WWII period two innovations were made: the creation in 
1946 of the Centre National du Cinéma (CNC) (i) and the establishment in 
1948 of the taxe spéciale additionelle (TSA) (ii). This way, two fundamental 
principles were introduced. First, the public body in charge of regulating 
and financing the film industry sector is an independent agency. Second, 
most of the resources funding the film industry come from taxing the 
operators who benefit from the distribution of films.  
i. The CNC. The CNC, in charge for elaborating and implementing 
government policies on cinema, was established in 194638 as a separate 
agency under the authority of the Ministry of Information. It was formed 
by the merger of the public and private bodies of cinematography 
created during the Vichy Government. Indeed, Vichy had limited the 
dispersion of competences among many entities by centralizing the 
administrative organization in charge of cinema in a two-headed 
system39.  
The merger of the public and private bodies explained the initial double 
nature of the CNC, both corporate and administrative. Its governance 
reflected this dual-status; it was made of a general directorate supported 
by two collegial bodies: the Conseil Paritaire, in charge of expressing the 
positions of the cinema professionals, and composed by representatives 
 
38 Law no. 2360/1946 of October 25th. 
39 The public body had been established in 1942 and assigned to all the functions exercised 
by the ministries during the Third Republic (Law no. 476/1942 of April 11th). Called 
Cinema’s Service in the beginning, it was later replaced by the General Directorate of 
Cinema (Law no. 581/1942 of May 30th). Instituted a few years later (Decree of December 
2nd, 1942), the private body had replaced professional groups and trade unions and been 
in charge of framing the sector’s activities and foreshadowing future regulation. In the 
beginning, it was represented by the Organizing Committee of the Film Industry. At the 
end of the WWII, the Committee was repealed and replaced by the Professional Office of 
Cinema. 
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of producers, distributors, exhibitors, and technical industries, as well as 
of trade unions; the Conseil Administratif, entrusted with defending the 
general interests, and made up of representatives from the various 
administrative departments concerned. This way, during the first years 
of the CNC, the State and the professionals shared cinema governance. 
However, starting with the repeal of the Conseil Paritaire in 1953, the 
CNC’s administrative character progressively increased, to the 
detriment of its corporate nature. Consequently, the organization started 
to function more and more like a traditional administration, and cinema 
policies returned more systematically to the State. Nevertheless, such an 
evolution did not provoke the disappearance of the professionals’ 
instances in the CNC’s decision-making process. 
Interestingly, following the evolving perception of the role of cinema, 
the CNC moved from one ministerial authority to another during its first 
years of existence40. In the years the CNC was founded, cinema was 
politically conceived as a form of information, not to say propaganda—
a perception inherited from the war years, that explains why the CNC 
was attached to the Ministry of Information. Only one year after, the 
legislator entrusted the CNC to the Ministry of Youth and Arts and 
Letters41. Such a connection lasted only a few months and was too 
fleeting to testify a new political vision—even if the legislator expressly 
refers in several points to ‘cinematographic art’42. The CNC was then 
placed under the authority of the Minister of Industry and Trade in 
194743. Following the new conception developed by André Malaraux of 
the binary value of cinema, the CNC was finally attached to the newly 
formed Ministry of Cultural Affairs in 195944. Indeed, there was a 
turning point in French policies in those years: the State began to pay 
attention to the artistic and cultural dimension of the sector, besides the 
economic one. 
 
40 As noted in Étude 309,  in Lamy Droit des médias et de la communication, Lamy, 2007, p. 309-
12. 
41 Decree no. 627/1947 of April 5th. 
42 As noticed in Étude 309, pp. 309-12. 
43 Decree no. 2157/1947 of November 13th. 
44 Decree no. 212/1959 of February 3rd. 
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ii. The TSA. Two years after the establishment of the CNC, the legislator 
adopted the Law «of temporary aid for the film industry»45, that 
provided the resources by which the CNC could develop its action.  
Aimed at coping with the crisis of national cinema and Hollywood’s 
domination, the Law introduced a tax on box office receipts for a three-
years period. Instead of entering the general government budget, the 
TSA’s proceeds were absorbed by a special fund (the Fonds de soutien), 
managed by the CNC. The latter used the resources thus gained to build 
new theatres and improve the safety, hygiene and technical conditions 
of existing ones, and to support the production of new films. The aid for 
production was called ‘automatic’ because the amount that producers 
received for their next film depended on the box office’s success of their 
previous film.  
Interestingly, the US sharply criticized the establishment of the TSA—
introduced to be temporary and then made permanent by subsequent 
legislation46. They noted indeed that the tax was levied on cinema 
owners based on their income with no consideration for the nationality 
of the films projected, while only French producers had access to the 
support mechanism. Since most of the box office revenue was coming 
from American films, the mechanism turned Hollywood—so far, the 
main enemy of French cinema—into its main supporter. Indeed, an 
exhibitor could project nothing but American films and still be required 
to pay a percentage of its income into the Fund supporting the French 
film industry. As one writer will observe, «without the United States and 
their sources of direct or indirect financing, there would already be no 
French cinema»47. 
 
45 Law no. 1474/1948 of September 23rd. 
46 See art. 1 of Law no. 53-684/1953 of August 6th, which replaced the 1948 fonds special 
d’aide temporarire with the fonds de développement de l’industrie cinématographiqe. 
47  FOREST, C., Economiés contemporaines du cinéma en Europe: L’improbable industrie, CNRS, 
2001, p. 38. 
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2.3. The ‘50s: focusing on the artistic and cultural dimensions 
of cinema 
During the 1950s, there was a turning point: «le deuxième temps de la 
politique du cinéma»48. Under the guidance of André Malraux, France 
began to devise measures aimed at satisfying many non-economic 
criteria, including access to theatres in rural areas and support of quality 
filmmaking, while continuing to strengthen the sector’s industrial base49. 
The transfer of the CNC’s governance from the Ministry of Industry to 
the newly formed Ministry of Culture was emblematic of the new trends. 
A first attention to the cultural and artistic dimension of cinema was 
expressed in 1953, when the legislator made permanent the fund 
temporarily introduced in 1948. On that occasion, in addition to 
introducing measures to empower producers50, the legislator provided 
that a minimum percentage of the CNC’s fund (10 M of francs) had to be 
used to finance «films francais de nature à servir la cause du cinéma francais 
ou à ouvrir des perspective nouvelles à l'art cinématographique ou à faire 
connaitre les grands thèmes et problèmes de l'Union francaise»51. 
Following the same path, in 1959 the legislator introduced the advances 
on receipts (avance sur recette)52, loans without interests that represent a 
 
48 BENHAMOU, F., Les Dérèglements de l'exception culturelle. Plaidoyer pour une perspective 
européenne, Seuil, 2006.  
49 For further information about this period, VEZYROGLOU, D. and PÉTON, G., La politique 
française du cineḿa au moment du rattachement du Centre national de la cineḿatographie au 
minister̀e des Affaires culturelles, 1957-1962, in Le cinéma: une affaire d'État. 1945-1970, ed. by 
Vezyroglou, D., La Documentation Français, 2014, pp. 27-57. 
50 Unlike the 1948 framework, the producer had to justify a personal financial investment 
of at least 10% of the film’s budget to be eligible for support. Moreover, the 1953 law 
established that producers could not use State automatic aid to produce a new film if there 
were not yet satisfied privileged creditors from the previous work. 
51 Art. 10 of Law no. 648/1953. 
52 Art. 7 of Decree no. 733/1959 of June 16th. For more information about the genesis of the 
advance against receipts, see GIMELLO MESPLOMB, F., La qualite ́ comme clef de voûte de la 
politique du cineḿa: retour sur la genes̀e du reǵime du soutien financier seĺectif a ̀ la production, in 
Le cinéma: une affaire d'État, pp. 57-75. 
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cornerstone of French cinema that continues to this day53. Like its 
predecessor of 1953, the advance on receipts was designed to enable the 
support of films considered worthy because of their artistic and cultural 
value by committees chaired by the President of the CNC and made up 
of prominent cultural figures. Given funding decisions depended on the 
judgments of the committee members’, and thus were not automatic, the 
advance was called a ‘selective’ aid.  
The new instrument was meant to balance the automatic aid, that had 
proven to create disincentives if adopted in the absence of other 
instruments. Indeed, it rewarded the producers of commercially 
successful films, enabling them to make new films, without taking into 
account  the quality of their activity. Moreover: the films of first-time 
directors were de facto rejected from the system54.  
In addition to the advance on receipts, the legislator also introduced the 
rating ‘cinema d’Art et d’Essai’ in those years and the State began to 
recognize tax reductions to theatres projecting mainly films with  
particular artistic and cultural value. In addition to the percentage of art 
films screened, the other criteria for official designation as an art-house 
theatre were the number of visits by filmmakers, the number of debates 
among critics, distribution of pedagogic materials, etc.55.  
To conclude on the 50s, it is worth noticing that another significant 
innovation was the codification of the legislation on cinema adopted up 
to that time: from 1956, the reference text became the Code de l'industrie 
cinématographique56, which changed its name over time, until it acquired 
the current one of Code du cinéma et de l'image animée (CCIA). 
 
 
53 See par. 5.1.2. of Chapter III. 
54As noted by BENHAMOU, F. "Entre économie de marché et économie 
administrée." Esprit 10 (2006): 63-74, p. 66. 
55 For further information, PINTO, A., L’Art et essai ou la « politique de la qualite ́» dans les salles 
de cineḿa (1949-1961), in Le cinéma: une affaire d'État, pp. 185-194. 
56 Decree no. 158/1956 of January 27th.   
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2.4. The ‘80s: the outbreak of private televisions 
In the 1980s, there was a new turning point. The private television 
outbreak happened in those years, exacerbating the process of 
progressive fall in theatres’ admissions, which already began during the 
years of public broadcaster monopoly. France promptly intervened to 
counteract this trend: it tried to transform television, the new main 
cinema’s enemy, into its leading new promoter—as it did in the past 
trough the adoption of the TSA with the USA, the French cinema’s 
‘traditional enemy’. Indeed, the legislator subordinated the assignation 
of broadcasting frequencies, a scarce resource at the time, to the 
compliance with several commitments for television to promote 
cinema57.  
First, in 1984 the legislator required private televisions to pay to the CNC 
a tax proportionate with their revenue (the tax on televisions’ services, 
TST)58.  As noted, « Until the early 1980s, the TSA was more than 
adequate to fund the various programmes operated by the CNC. 
However, with cinema attendance falling to around half the level seen 
in the previous decade as a result of a decline in the standard of French 
cinemas and more people preferring to stay at home and watch 
television, the amount raised was no longer sufficient to support the 
 
57 This way, the State extended to private televisions the rules already applied to the public 
broadcaster. Indeed, France’s attempts to regulate television to protect cinema date back 
to the 1970s, when the public broadcasting monopoly was still in place—the Office de 
Radiodiffusion-Télévision Française (ORTF). The relevant text is the Cooperation Convention 
signed on March 26th, 1971, by the Minister for Cultural Affairs and the ORTF’s General 
Director, to be applied between 1972 and 1975. The Convention required ORTF to abide by 
several rules. First, ORTF was required not to directly compete with theatres: it could not 
devote more than 10% of its broadcasting time to films, and it had to reduce their 
broadcasting during the days and times usually devoted to cinema. Second, ORTF had to 
transmit, among all the movies broadcasted, «the highest possible number of the French 
films», i.e. not fulfil its palimpsests with mainly American films, but contributing to the 
promotion of national culture. Finally, the ORTF was asked to contribute with 5M of francs 
per year to the funding of the film industry, and to increase by 10% annually the price paid 
to broadcast movies. Refer to COMMISSION DES AFFAIRES CULTURELLES. Avis n° 67 presenté 
au Sénat par M. George Lamousse sur le projet de loi de finances pour 1973, 1972. 
58 See art. 36 of the Finance Act for 1984 and Act Law no. 1179/1983 of December 29th. 
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industry»59. Moreover: the introduction of a tax on the broadcasters’ 
revenue appeared to be the most appropriate way to supplement the 
CNC's Fund. As televisions were gaining resources from the distribution 
of cinematographic works, they had to take part in financing movies too, 
as theatres were already doing. Note how the TSA and the TST 
combination resulted in French cinema being financed by its two rivals: 
US cinema, its traditional main enemy, and French television, its new 
one. 
Second, the legislator inserted in the 1986 Act Law «Freedom of 
Communication»60, the Title «Development of cinematographic 
creation». Its art. 70 established the core principle on cinema promotion 
by televisions. First, it reiterated that televisions broadcasting 
cinematographic works must contribute to their funding, principle 
implemented by introducing investment quotas. This way, televisions 
began to directly invest a percentage of their revenues in the creation of 
new films, besides indirectly financing them through the TST payment.  
Second, art. 70 established several rules that limited the editorial 
freedom of televisions. They could not broadcast more than a fixed 
number of movies each year; broadcast movies in days and times in 
which usually people attended theatres; broadcast movies before a 
specific amount of time had elapsed from their first day of theatre 
distribution. Finally, televisions had to reserve the most of their 
transmission time to French and European works. The goal was to 
prevent them from supplying most programming with American films61.  
During the 1980s, the State also amplified its support to the film 
industry. It increased the amount of automatic and selective aids and 
established new bodies to encourage private investment in the sector: 
the Institute for the Financing of Cinema and the Cultural Industries 
(IFCIC) in 1983 and the Companies for the financing of the film and 
 
59 WALKLEY, S. E. To what extent, p. 102. 
60 Act. Law no. 1067/1986 of September 30th. 
61 See. DANARD, B. and LE CHAMPION, R., Les programmes audiovisuels, La Découverte, 2014, 
p. 22. 
 43 
audio-visual industry (SOFICA) in 1985—still existing today62. The State 
also transferred substantial resources to theatres in these years, 
encouraging their modernization to make them competitive against 
television. Finally, the French efforts to maintain a flourishing film 
industry included also seeking means of reviving theatrical attendance: 
by developing initiatives of cinema education within schools, the State 
tried to raise the demand for cinema and even to enhance the demand’s 
quality 63. 
 
2.5. New millennium, new phase (deferment) 
Between the late 1980s and early 2000s, there were no significant 
innovations. The State mainly adapted its film policy to accommodate 
changes in the sector, continually extending the typology of actors taxed 
and funding the CNC programs to cover the new forms of distributions 
of audio-visual works in light of technological evolution. This way, the 
system’s fundamental principle has remained unchanged: who profits 
from today’s works should contribute to financing the future creation.  
While the legislator has enlarged the types of operators taxed, the CNC 
expanded those of supported activities, thus ensuring the redistribution 
of the sums collected among the new contributors. Indeed, the CNC’s 
Fund has progressively began to support works other than those 
intended for cinema theatre. In 1986, the Fonds de soutien was renamed 
the Compte de soutien financier de l'industrie cinématographique et de 
l'industrie des programmes audiovisuels, given the CNC began to subsidy 
both film and television production. In 1994, the CNC extended the 
support to the DVD/Blu-Ray and then also to the works intended for the 
Internet. In 2009, it took the name of Centre National du Cinéma et de 
l’image animée, thus testifying the extension of its scope of activities64. 
 
62 See par. 5.2.2. of Chapter III. 
63 For more information, BUCHSBAUM, J., Exception taken: How France Has Defied Hollywood's 
New World Order, Columbia University Press, 2017, pp. 196 ff. 
64 Ordinance no. 901/2009 of July 24th, modifying the CCIA. 
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During the second decades of the 2000s, France entered a new phase, still 
ongoing. As shown, since the 80s, the State has made televisions the 
main funders of the national film industry. This occurrence has begun to 
look troublesome. The amount of televisions’ investment in the creation 
of new films is proportionate to their income. Since their income is 
decreasing, the resources for the new creation are shrinking as well (- 20 
% in the last 6 years65). This situation is because of televisions’ difficulty 
adapting to market changes and reacting to competition from the new 
foreign digital operators. Some of the latter are global players with 
growing market shares and a financing capacity incomparable with 
French televisions. However, despite their increased importance, they 
are still not fully subject to cinema promotion obligations. 
All the regulatory changes recently adopted in France and those 
currently under discussion have a twofold intent. First, to ease the 
constraints on traditional televisions, so that they can return to a growth 
situation, and compete more easily with new entrants. Second, they aim 
at increasing the obligations for digital operators, making them the new 
leading supporter of national cinema. This way, besides equality, the 








65 COMMISSION DE LA CULTURE, DE L'E ́DUCATION ET DE LA COMMUNICATION, Avis n° 143 
presenté au Sénat par M. Jeŕeḿy Bacchi sur le projet de loi de finances pour 2021, 2020, p. 14. 
 45 
3. Italy 
3.1. Cinema and Fascism 
Like the French one, the Italian State firstly addressed cinema merely 
with regards to security and public order66. As with other industrial 
sectors, the Italian State began to promote the film industry only in the 
years after WWI67, when the early predominance of European cinema 
fell, and Hollywood became the new centre of filmmaking.                  
The Italian measures took the contours of proper promotional legislation 
during fascism68. The first significant law was adopted in 192769, under 
 
66 Initially, the industry was subject to the general public security rules (Law no. 3270/1858 
of November 13th). According to them, a license released by the local prefectures was 
necessary to carry out all entertainment activities. The legislator established a specific 
censorship system for cinema only in 1913, when provided for the first time that all films 
must obtain a State authorization before being screened (Law no. 785/1913 of June 25th and 
Royal Decree no. 532/1914 of May 31st). Interestingly, such a special form of censorship 
was established under the request of film producers: they pointed out that the general rules 
affected legal certainty, as films received unequal treatment depending on the 
geographical area of projection. Consequently, they called for the establishment of a single 
central office in charge of examining all films and granting the authorization. The Italian 
Film Union also offered to bear the office operation costs by paying a fee proportional to 
the footage of the examined film. This explains why the Minister of Finance proposed the 
law instituting cinema censorship, presented as a fiscal measure. 
67 Indeed, it was mainly at the end of the WWI that the Italian State began to adopt 
measures to promote national industries, while the legislation of support between the 
Unification of Italy and WWI had not been particularly rich (if one excludes the case of the 
railway industry). See SERRANI, D., Lo Stato finanziatore, pp. 31 and 32. 
68 An extensive scientific literature on the relationship between fascism and cinema is 
available, focused on both the supportive legislation and the censorship one. See, among 
others:  ARGENTIERI, M., L'occhio del regime, Bulzoni, 2003; CANNISTRARO, P. V., "Il cinema 
italiano sotto il fascismo”, Storia contemporanea 3 (1972): 413-463.; CANNISTRARO, P. V., La 
fabbrica del consenso: fascismo e mass media, Laterza, 1975; CARABBA, C., Il cinema del ventennio 
nero, Vallecchi, 1974; GILI, J.A., Stato fascista e cinematografia: repressione e promozione, 
Bulzoni, 1981; MANETTI, D., Un'arma poderosissima: industria cinematografica e Stato durante 
il fascismo, 1922-1943, Franco Angeli, 2012; ORSI BATTAGLINI, A., L’intervento economico 
statale per il cinema, in Intervento pubblico e liberta ̀ di espressione nel cinema, nel teatro e nelle 
attivita ̀ musicali, ed. by Istituto per la documentazione e gli studi giuridici, Giuffrè, 1974, 
pp. 3-121. 
69 Act no. 1121/1927 of June 16th. The fascist provisions in favour of cinema adopted before 
1927 were modest, to be mentioned only for completeness purposes. First, the Royal Decree 
 46 
the insistence of cinema operators, who were calling for economic 
encouragement from the State70. Like France, Italy tried to protect the 
national industry by limiting the competition from the US through the 
introduction of quotas—generating many protests form theatre 
exhibitors, interested in screening many more profitable popular 
American films (like their French colleagues). However, while France 
used quotas to limit the importation of foreign films, Italy used them to 
ensure a minimum percentage of national films programmed in cinema 
theatres. According to the institute of programmazione obbligatoria 
(mandatory programming), Italian exhibitors had indeed to allocate 10% 
of the daily projection time to national movies during the period 
between October 1st and June 30th of each year.  
Through this first tool, the fascist State proved ready to grant aid in 
return for a certain degree of control over contents and expressed values. 
To benefit from the mandatory programming, a film had to meet 
«sufficient requirements of artistic dignity and good technical 
execution»71. The committee responsible for censorship was in charge of 
verifying that these standards were met. The result was the institution 
of a refined State mechanism that provided opportunities for initiatives 
in the cinematographic sector in exchange for a product consistent with 
 
no. 606/1920 of  May 13th, which established the Council for the cinematographic 
industries within the Ministry of Industry, Trade and Labor. Composed of representatives 
of cinema operators, it was in charge of giving opinions, making studies and proposals in 
the field of cinema’s promotion. Second, the Royal Decree no. 1883/1921 of December 4th, 
which endorsed the Ministry of Industry to award each year a gold medal, among the 
different companies active in the film sector, to the one that «will have produced, during 
the year, the longest films… duly approved… and with the lesser percentage of cut footage. 
In the case of parity, preference will go to the company that will have dealt with 
educational, patriotic or propaganda topic» («avrà prodotto, durante l’anno, il più lungo 
metraggio di pellicole…debitamente approvate…e nello stesso tempo avrà avuto in correlazione la 
minor percentuale di metraggio tagliato. A parità di condizioni sarà preferita la ditta che avrà 
trattato argomenti istruttivi, patriottici o di propaganda dell’arte e per l’economia italiana»). 
70 MANETTI, D., Un'arma poderosissima, p. 60. 
71 Art. 5 of the Law («sufficienti requisiti di dignità artistica e di buona esecuzione tecnica»). 
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the interests of the regime: the legislation to support movies and the one 
to censor them became organically and inseparably tied together72.  
In addition to the mandatory programming, intensified overtime73, the 
legislator then established another measure to limit competition from 
the US: the dubbing fees74. Foreign producers were prevented to dub in 
their countries the film they wanted to distribute in Italy. They were 
compelled to dub them in Italy  and to pay a dubbing fee of IT L 25,000 
per movie. According to some, such an approach was also driven by the 
appealing possibility to ‘control’ the dialogues and make them conform 
to the fascist ideology75. 
However, neither compulsory programming, nor dubbing fees 
succeeded in discouraging the import of American films76. A suggestive 
hypothesis is that the fascist State did not achieve a severe opposition to 
the US production as a conscious choice: the regime found the spread of 
American cinema convenient, considering it more capable than the 
national films to exert a numbing effect upon the critical consciousness 
of the population77. In fact, fascism was mostly interested in movies of 
evasion and entertainment (the so-called ‘telefoni bianchi’)—such as the 
American ones. The functioning of the censorship system seems to prove 
this evidence; the State did not use it to push filmmakers to celebrate the 
governments and its values, but mainly to promote the realization of 
 
72 See, ARGENTIERI, M., L'occhio del regime, p. 76, CARETTI, P., Diritto pubblico 
dell'informazione: stampa, radiotelevisione, teatro e cinema, Il mulino, 1994, p. 257 and ORSI 
BATTAGLINI, A., L’intervento economico statale per il cinema, p. 11. 
73 Law no. 1414/1933 of October 5th and its implementing Royal Decree no. 1301/1934 of 
July 20th required indeed exhibitors to project an Italian movie for every three foreign films 
screened; in any case, they had to show at least three national films per quarter in the 
period from October 1st to June 30th. 
74 Law no. 1414/1933. 
75 MANETTI, D., Un'arma poderosissima, p. 76. 
76 Thus reported, among other, by ORSI BATTAGLINI, A., L’intervento economico statale per il 
cinema, p. 20. 
77 Ibidem. 
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optimistic and happy-ending movies—besides avoiding the diffusion of 
critics to the regime. 
In the thirties, State intervention began to be refined: to the measures 
aimed at limiting foreign competition, the State added the first of direct 
support to the national industry. Initially, they included the contributi 
sugli incassi, automatic payments for film production based on a film’s 
box office success. However, introduced in 193178, they were repealed 
only two years after and replaced by the quality awards79. The latter 
were selectively attributed to films considered to have «qualities of 
artistic dignity and technical execution» by a committee composed of 
representatives of the fascist power. This way, the aid ceased to be 
mainly based on market trends80, rewarding those more able to satisfy 
the audience’s demand; it began to be anchored on State discretionary 
assessments. 
The replacement of automatic contributions by quality awards reflected 
the beginning of a new phase, which can be identified as the ‘Freddi 
years’. With clear and authoritative ideas about what the relationship 
between the State and the cinema should be, Freddi tried to ‘intervene 
in the film production from the inside’—still, only partially succeeding.  
Under his proposal, the regime created a centralized body responsible 
for State policy concerning cinema: the General Directorate for Cinema, 
established in 1934 within the Under-Secretary of State for Press and 
Propaganda. Freddi, appointed as the new institution’s first general 
director, had expressed the need to create «a unified and totalitarian 
body, in charge of directing—without the possibility of escaping—all the 
cinematographic activities, and having the authority, competences, and 
instruments to regulate, inspire, direct, control and, when necessary, 
reward or punish all forms, events, initiatives, and results of the Italian 
cinema»81. Such a central body was meant to supervise the entire Italian 
 
78 Law no. 918/1931 of  June 18th. 
79 Royal Law Decree no. 1414/1933 of October 5th. 
80 The adverb ‘mainly’ is used because automatic aid could benefit only films considered 
having «sufficient requirements of artistic dignity and good technical execution». 
81 FREDDI, L., Il cinema, L’arnia, 1949, p. 48, vol. I («Un organismo integrale e totalitario, a cui 
facessero capo senza possibilità di evasione tutte le attività del cinema e che avesse l’autorità, la 
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film industry, overcoming the previous situation, in which «the State 
had been concerned with the fate of Italian film production and had 
sought to provide generous and timely provisions to it. The industry, 
although benefiting from State measures, had acted instead 
autonomously, completely detached from the interests of the nation, 
absolutely indifferent to all the duties inherent in the matter and arising 
from the aids received»82. According to Freddi, it had become necessary 
to allow the State to intervene in the film production from within, to be 
part of the cinematographic work from the very beginning83.  
Following these convictions, during Freddi’s years there was an attempt 
to create a ‘State cinematography’. The State did not limit itself to 
promote the industry but entered directly in it through State bodies 
active in all the phases of films’ life cycle.  In addition to the already 
existing Luce Institute84, several other institutes thus became operational 
 
competenze e i mezzi per regolare, ispirare, dirigere, controllare e, quando necessario, premiare o 
punire tutte le forme e tutte le manifestazioni, tutte le iniziative e tutti i risultati rientranti nel 
campo della cinematografia italiana»). 
82 Ibidem, p. 217 («In sostanza lo Stato si era dimostrato preoccupato delle sorti della produzione 
cinematografica italiana e aveva cercato di provvedere con disposizioni generose e tempestive; 
l’industria invece, pur beneficiando dei provvedimenti dello stato, aveva continuato ad agire per 
contro proprio, completamente avulsa dagli interessi della nazione, assolutamente indifferente a 
tutti i doveri inerenti alla materia trattata e derivanti dagli aiuti ricevuti»). 
83 «As an industry whose activity directly involves the dignity, responsibility and moral 
interest of the State—and not only the moral, given the vast state contributions granted—, 
it is necessary for the State to intervene directly, embedding the solution of the 
authoritative and severe sign of his will and control. The State—any State—must control 
(explicitly or indirectly, depending on its nature) this formidable social weapon […]».  
Ibidem, p. 44, vol. I  («Trattandosi di un’industria la cui attività coinvolge direttamente la dignità, 
la responsabilità, l’interesse morale -e non soltanto morale, per i vasti contributi concessi- dello 
Stato, era ormai necessario che lo Stato intervenisse direttamente, imprimendo alla soluzione il 
segno autorevole e severo della sua volontà e del suo controllo. Lo Stato -qualunque Stato- ha il 
dovere di controllare (in modo esplicito o indiretto, a seconda della sua natura) quest’arma sociale 
formidabile [..]»). 
84  The Luce Institute took origin from the private group Film Education Union, created in 
1923 to produce educational films. From 1924, it began to receive State funding, being 
progressively placed under government control. It had propaganda purposes, being in 
charge of the monopolistic production of documentaries and newsreels celebrating 
Mussolini. Since 1926, all exhibitors were compelled to screen a Luce newsreel or 
documentary before every projection (art. 1 of Royal Decree no. 1000/1926 of April 3rd). 
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in this period (such as the National Film Industry Association—
ENIC85—and Cinecittà86).  
However, the ambitious attempt to create a totalitarian cinema was 
arranged but never actually put into practice: for Mussolini there was no 
need to make the film industry a State monopoly. Under the pressure of 
cinema operators, he opted for a hybrid system. Private enterprises were 
allowed to shoot and exhibit films outside the State-owned circuit, 
provided they operated under the regime’s tight control87. Moreover, it 
does not seem that the State asked filmmakers to celebrate its values 
during Freddi's years; it continued indeed to mainly require them to 
 
85 The ENIC, a joint-stock company whose capital was subscribed by the Luce Institute, 
was set up in 1935. Its primary responsibility was to manage theatres, but it was also 
involved in films’ production (activity reduced with the creation in 1941 of the company 
Cines) and distribution. For a short period, it had a monopolistic competence regarding 
the purchase, import, and distribution of foreign films. For more information, PERLO, N., 
Le droit public du cinéma, pp. 147 ff. and BELLUCCI, L., Cinema e aiuti di stato, p. 68. 
86 Cinecittà was created in 1937 and was initially privately owned  (by the producer Carlo 
Roncoroni and other financiers). The government entirely purchased it only in 1938. 
Contrary to Freddi’s wishes, Cinecittà mainly rented its equipment and scenarios to 
outside production companies instead of producing its own films. 
87 See, among others: ORSI BATTAGLINI, A., L’intervento economico statale per il cinema, pp. 55 
ff.; CANNISTRARO, P. V., "Il cinema italiano sotto il fascismo", p. 432; TORRI, B.,“Il gruppo 
cinematografico pubblico”, Città & Regione (4) 1979, p. 40. Note that the State 
cinematographic bodies were not wound up in the post-war era: unions and professionals 
managed to ensure their survival. They maintained that they represented the capital 
structural unit able to favour the Italian film industry's renewal and contain the 
overwhelming power of the American one. However, despite being significant from an 
economic standpoint, State measures supporting these bodies were isolated and 
contradictory, unable to promote their restart. Indeed, overwhelmed with debts, they 
almost always bore the weight of a disproportionate workforce compared to the effective 
tasks, and often functions. These conditions lead to the dismantling of the public system 
lead by ENIC and to the creation of the Ente Autonomo di Gestione per il Cinema, called upon 
to set a framework concerning the public participation in the film industry (Decree of the 
President of the Republic no. 575/1958 of May 7th). For more information about the State 
cinematographic bodies, see, among others: ZACCARIA, R. “Cinematografia (disciplina 
amministrativa)”. Digesto delle discipline pubblicistiche (1989); ZACCARIA, R., Le strutture 
pubbliche della cinematografia in Italia, in Intervento pubblico, pp. 155-225.; FRAGOLA, A., La 
legislazione italiana sulla cinematografia: aggiornamento al 1° gennaio '82, Alberto Carisch, 1982; 
BARBATI, C., Istituzioni e spettacolo: pubblico e privato nelle prospettive di riforma, Cedam, 1996. 
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incentivize a process of social relief through a positive and reassuring 
representation of Italian life and interpersonal relationships88. 
Besides the creation of the General Directorate for Cinema and that of 
State cinematographic bodies, these years were characterized by an 
increase in State resources, leading to the majority of private producers 
being placed under the regime’s requirements89. In addition to 
increasing the obligations to screen national films90 and the entity of 
dubbing fees91, the regime launched a dedicated credit system for the 
cinema92, as it also did for several other sectors93. In 1935, it established  
indeed within the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro a special section for film 
credit, in charge of managing a fund financed by the State and the Bank 
to grant direct loans with convenient interests to film production. A 
committee composed mainly of representatives of the Fascist power had 
to examine the loans’ requests, taking into account «the peculiar 
characteristics, above all ethical, of the film»—besides the film 
companies’ economic and financial soundness. 
 
88 As noted by BELLUCCI, L., Cinema e aiuti di Stato, p. 121 («fatta eccezione per alcuni film di 
propaganda, anche in seguito a questo mutamento il regime non domanda agli autori di celebrare i 
suoi fausti, ma un certo quietismo; chiede di favorire il processo di distensione sociale, tramite una 
rappresentazione positiva e rassicurante della vita italiana e dei rapporti interpersonali»). 
89 Thus reported by CANNISTRARO, P. V., "Il cinema italiano sotto il fascismo.", p. 433 and 
434. 
90 Law no. 1083/1935 of June 13th extended the obligation to the entire year and to all the 
exhibitors, while it was first applied only to the theatres of first and second vision 
established in the most important cities. The following Ministerial Decree of July 15th, 1937 
modified the proportion to be respected between the number of Italian and foreign film 
projected (from 1 to 3, to 1 to 2) and increased the number of Italian films to be shown each 
quarter (from 4 to 5). 
91 Law no. 861/1937 of April 29th raised the tax from IT L 25,000 to 50,000 for each foreign 
film. 
92 Law no. 1143/1935 of June 13th and its Royal implementing Decree no. 2504/1935 of  
November 14th. 
93 During this period, indeed, the State, in addition to reorganizing the credit system for 
the agricultural sector (1927), launched a dedicated credit system for, among others, public 
utility companies (1924), the shipping sector (1928), and the touristic one (1937). See 
SERRANI, D., Lo stato finanziatore, p. 37.  
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In 1938, the Government promulgated the so-called Alfieri Law94, under 
the name of the Minister for Popular Culture at the time. Its adoption 
marked the end of the hegemony of Freddi, who resigned from the 
direction of the General Directorate for Cinema shortly after95. The 
approach of the Alfieri Law was indeed ‘liberal’—as the reintroduction 
of the contributions to productions96, i.e. measures not based on State 
discretionary assessments97, seems to prove. Still, a significant political 
control apparatus continued to complement such a ‘liberal openness’98. 
To conclude on this period, it is worth noting that the fascist initiatives 
allowed for an expansion of the economic dimension of the Italian 
cinema, whose presence in the European and world market significantly 
increased compared to that of the 1920s. In 1925, Italian production 
represented 1.8% of the European and 0.4% of the world ones. In 1938, it 
respectively represented 12.3% and 4.3%, reaching 23.6% and 8.2% in 
1942. The film industry experienced an economic expansion phase 
within Italy: spectators, cinemas, and investments all increased99.  
 
3.2. After the Liberation: dismantling and rebuilding the 
promotion schemes 
The first text on the matter of cinema after the liberation, a 1945 Decree100, 
appeared as «a trumpet blast, a hymn to freedom»: the first article bursts 
 
94 Law no. 458/1938 of January 18th, converting Law Decree no. 1061/1938 of June 16th. 
95 See MONTINI, F. and NATTA, E., Una poltrona per due: Cinecittà tra pubblico e privato, Effata 
Editrice, 2007, pp. 18 ff.; PERLO, N., Le droit public du cinéma, p. 166, and WAGSTAFF, C., 
Italian neorealist cinema: An aesthetic approach, University of Toronto Press, 2007. 
96 As said, they had been introduced in 1931 and repealed shortly after. 
97 For an analysis of the Alfieri Law, BELLUCCI, L., Cinema e aiuti di Stato, pp. 92 and ff. 
98 For an exhaustive list of all the controls to which production companies were subjected, 
see ORSI BATTAGLINI, A., L’intervento economico statale per il cinema, p. 47. 
99 See MANETTI, D., Un'arma poderosissima, pp. 160 ff. 
100 Lieutenant Legislative Decree no. 678/1945 of October 5th. 
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like «a cry of victory»101, stating that the activity of film production is 
free. 
In addition to the most authoritarian measures adopted by fascism102,  
the Decree abolished the majority of the support instruments103. This 
way, it testified to the perception that cinematographic ‘freedom’ occurs 
if the State does not intervene. Fascism’s long authoritarian experience 
made it difficult to imagine State support without the risk of creating a 
State culture, compliant with the government’s interests. Interestingly, 
in those years, despite the presence of limited funding, the damages to 
film studios and the lack of technical equipment, the Italian production 
knew a new and energetic vital impulse, delivering works of art such as 
“Rome città aperta”, “Sciuscià”, “Paisà” and “Ladri di biciclette”, which get 
an enthusiastic recognition around the world104. 
 
101 CHIARINI, L., Cinema quinto potere, Laterza, 1954 , p. 44 («il primo provvedimento dopo la 
liberazione […] sembra uno squillo di tromba, un inno alla libertà. Dopo un preambolo lungo una 
pagina di riferimenti a decreti, leggi e regolamenti dal 1923 al 1943, tutto il «ventennio», irrompeva 
l’articolo primo come un grido di vittoria […]»). 
102 Among them: the obligation to obtain a ministerial authorization for the exercise of 
production activities; that for exhibitors to screen Luce’s newsreels and documentaries; 
that to present film screenplays to the censorship committee before shooting—while the 
censorship on films already realised was confirmed. 
103 First, the Decree repealed the compulsory programming and dubbing fees—following 
the desire of the American winners to pour their films onto the Italian market. As a result, 
American cinema ‘invaded’ Italy in those years. If between 1945 and 1950, 400 American 
films a year had been on average distributed in the country, they became about 5000 at the 
beginning of the ‘50s (see CORSI, B., Con qualche dollaro in meno: storia economica del cinema 
italiano, Editori Riuniti, 2012, p. 43). Second, the Decree also repealed the measures of direct 
promotion of the national industry. The only instruments confirmed, albeit exceptionally 
and temporarily, were the automatic contributions to production and the credit system.  
104 As noted, neorealism fully corresponds to the limited production possibilities of the 
Italian cinema at that time. Directors turned their films on the road, overcoming the 
difficulties and the insufficiency by the thrust of a reality rich in human values and 
tragically exploded after the long period of fascism and the lack of freedom of expression 
that had characterized it. See BIZZARRI, L., “Cinema senza industria”, Il Ponte 8-9 (1957): 
1370-1388, p. 1371 («Nell’immediato dopoguerra, i cineasti italiani, reagendo al lungo periodo della 
dittatura fascista e alla mancanza della libertà d’espressione che l’aveva caratterizzata, si dedicarono 
alla ricerca di nuove e valide forme di espressione, sotto la spinta di una realtà esplosa tragicamente 
e ricca di valori umani. Il neorealismo corrisponde pienamente alle limitate possibilità produttive 
della nostra cinematografia in quel momento: mancavano solidi finanziamenti, le attrezzature erano 
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Starting in 1947, the State gradually reconstituted a system of support105. 
It was based mainly on the institutions and measures invented during 
fascism, freed only of their most authoritative features. First, the 
legislator inherited a centralized administrative structure: it established 
the Central office for Cinematography, in charge of coordinating all 
public actions related to the film industry. It was set within the 
Presidency of Council, and thus within an eminently political body.   
Second, the legislator took over the contributions to production and the 
credit system106, and also the dubbing fees and the compulsory 
programming. In the beginning, all national films were able to benefit 
from the compulsory programming107. Therefore, the support was meant 
for the entire industry, without any sort of content requirement. 
However, the principle that only works with «sufficient requirements of 
artistic dignity and good technical execution» could be admitted to the 
benefit was soon reintroduced. It was established by the 1949 ‘Andreotti 
law’—under the name of the Undersecretary to the Presidency of the 
Council in charge of directing the Central office for Cinematography at 
the time108. To temper the exhibitors’ pressing opposition109, the 
 
scadenti, i teatri di posa dovevano essere riorganizzati: non restava che girare sulla strada, 
superando le difficoltà delle ricostruzioni sceniche e l’insufficienza delle attrezzature»). 
105 The laws by which the legislator reconstituted a support system were three: Law no. 
379/1947 of May 16th, Law no. 958/1949 of December 29th and Law no. 897/1956 of July 
31st. 
106 Indeed, exceptionally and temporarily established by the 1945 Decree, the credit system 
and the contributions to production were confirmed and further refined. Concerning the 
latter, producers received a payment equal to 10% of their films’ box office. In the 
beginning, the producers of films considered of «special artistic value» according to a 
technical committee (composed of both public officials and film industry representatives) 
could also receive an additional payment of 8% of the film’s box office  (art. 7 of Law no. 
379/1947). The 1956 law unified the percentage of contributions to production to a single 
extent of 16%. However, while eliminating the additional payment for films with special 
artistic value, the law introduced quality awards of a fixed amount for producers of 
particularly meritorious works. 
107 Art. 7 of Law no. 379/1947. 
108 Art. 18 of Law no. 958/1949.  
109  ORSI BATTAGLINI, A., L’intervento economico statale per il cinema, p. 83.  
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legislator recognized them 20% of the tax rights collected on tickets sold 
for films admitted to compulsory programming (so-called abbuoni)110.  
As far as the dubbing fees are concerned, they acquired a new 
configuration. Non-national films spoken in Italian could be projected in 
Italian theatres only after the payment of IT L 5,500,000 to the special 
section for cinema within the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro111. The payment 
represented a deposit: the sum was repaid after ten years, without 
interest. Given that a modest deposit was of no obstruction to the 
currents of importation, the goal was no longer to hinder the distribution 
of foreign films. The instrument rather became a form of direct support 
to national production; the amounts deposited were indeed used to 
finance a special fund to grant loans to national production.  
To conclude on this period, note that according to some, in addition to 
the administrative structure and the instruments of support, the 
legislator also took back from the fascist apparatus the existence of a link 
between the instruments of support and those of control112. The 
persistence of an authoritative approach seems to be testified by the 
‘timid’ reinstatement of the censorship on screenplays: the legislator 
established indeed that it was up to the producers to submit the script to 
the State approval113. Moreover: in this period, despite the entry into 
force of the Italian Constitution, whose art. 21 affirms that censorship is 
admissible only to prevent the diffusion of films contrary to sexual 
decency, cases of censorship little compatible with a democratic 
configuration continued to occur114. 
 
110 Art. 14 of Law no. 958/1949.  
111 Art. 29 of Law no. 897/1956.  
112 Among others, see BRUNETTA, G. P., Il cinema italiano contemporaneo: Da “La dolce vita” a 
“Centochiodi”, Laterza, 2014, p. 26, according to whom in this phase the State continued to 
use the instrument of selective support to control content productions («il meccanismo dei 
premi continua a essere un formidabile strumento di controllo e alleanza tra governo e industria»).  
113 Art. 14 of Law no. 379/1947 of May 16th. 
114 For instance, the case of “Umberto D” by Vittorio De Sica, telling the tales of a man whose 
pension erogated by the State is insufficient: Andreotti defined it «a disservice done to the 
country» («un pessimo servizio reso alla patria») and invited the director to adopt «a healthy 
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3.3. The establishment of the Ministry of Culture and the 
1965 Corona Law 
In 1959, the General Directorate of Entertainment within the newly 
established Ministry of Tourism and Entertainment acquired the State’s 
competencies related to the film industry115. This way, the absolute 
authority of the Presidency of the Council on cinema ceased. To assist 
the new Directorate, the legislator gradually set up many advisory and 
consulting bodies comprising experts, representatives of other 
administrations, and concerned categories. Such an approach (common 
to State organisation promoting other industrial sectors116)  made the 
administrative apparatus «elefantiaco»117, weighing it and compromising 
its activities. 
The State also adopted a new law: the ‘Corona law’118, from the name of 
the Ministry of Tourism and Entertainment at the time, that reformed 
the rules regarding State intervention in the film industry more 
consistently with the Italian Constitution. Promulgated in 1965, the 
Corona law became the reference text of the sector for almost forty years.  
Its first article declared that the State while recognizing the «economic 
and industrial importance» of cinema, considered it «a means of artistic 
expression, cultural development, and social communication». Like 
France, Italy began to pay greater attention to the artistic and cultural 
dimensions of the cinema. However, the Corona Law ended up 
confirming support measures for the entire industry, while introducing 
new corrections to grant greater aid to productions considered worthy, 
artistically and culturally speaking. According to some, the space left to 
the selective instrument remained limited because Italian operators were 
 
and constructive optimism» («un ottimismo sano e costruttivo»). See ANDREOTTI, G., "Piaghe 
sociali e necessità di redenzione”,  Libertas 28 (1952), 5 ss.  
115 Art. 2 and 5 of Law no. 617/1959 of July 31st. 
116 As noted by SERRANI, D., Lo Stato finanziatore, p. 63. 
117  ORSI BATTAGLINI, A., L’intervento economico statale per il cinema, p. 92. 
118 Law no. 1213/1965 of November 14th. For its comprehensive analysis, see PEREZ, R., “La 
nuova disciplina della cinematografia”, Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico (1966): 978 ss. 
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suspicious of the evaluations carried out by public bodies; marked by 
the experience of fascism and the following Andreotti’s ‘regime’, they 
knew that political interests and clientelism could quickly transform a 
means of promoting quality into an instrument of abuse and 
discrimination119. 
First, the Corona Law confirmed the mandatory programming, which 
could benefit only films of «sufficient artistic, cultural, or spectacular 
qualities»120. Exhibitors who only screened films eligible for compulsory 
programming continued to benefit from the abbuoni. However, the 
benefit was higher for exhibitors charging low entry prices or screening 
films either with the certificate of quality121, or realized explicitly for 
children. The object was to compensate exhibitors for the increased risk 
they faced by screening this type of film, likely to be less commercially 
successful but considered commendable by the State. 
The legislator continued to recognize contributions proportionate to the 
films’ box office. However, the payment was no longer reserved to the 
production companies: directors and authors of screenplays could 
benefit from a percentage. In order to cope with the disadvantages of 
this aid, which ended up rewarding the very films that make the highest 
profits, and therefore those less in need of support, the legislator 
established 80 prizes of IT L 40 M122. They awarded films admitted to the 
compulsory programming and that had received the certificate of 
 
119  PERLO, N., Le droit public du cinéma, p. 289, who reports that the space left to the selective 
instrument by the Corona Law was limited compared to that provided by the Project of 
Law Zanchi of 1963, which had been strongly criticized by the association representing the 
film industry. 
120 See art. 5. The existence of these requirements was assessed by the 'Committee of 
Experts', made up of cinema operators and public officials appointed by the Ministry of 
Tourism and Entertainment after consulting the ‘Permanent Commission for 
cinematography’ (art. 46). The Commission, set up within the Ministry and composed of 
representatives of various ministries and the cinema sector, was in charge of examining 
the film industry's general problems (art. 3). 
121 Art. 8. The certificate of quality was issued by the Minister under the advice of the 
Committee of film experts (art. 48). 
122 Art. 9. 
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quality. In this case too, directors and authors received a percentage of 
the aid. 
With regard to credit, the legislator abolished the dubbing deposit, 
increased the endowment fund of the autonomous film credit section, 
and established new special funds. Among these, the one granting loans 
to films inspired by artistic and cultural purposes and produced with the 
economic participation of authors, directors, and actors. It also 
established that the Ente Autonomo di Gestione per il Cinema could take 
care of the printing of the copies of these films and their distribution 
costs123. 
By means of all of these instruments, the State granted considerable 
resources to the national film industry. The results in the short term were 
remarkable, with a sharp increase in Italian productions and a growth in 
the market shares of national titles124. «However, it was an ephemeral 
success, devoid of industrial bases and a strategic vision of the future 
structure of the media»125. Soon television would appear, and the cinema 
would face a deep crisis. 
 
3.4. The ‘80s and the ‘90s: costs without reforms 
During the ‘80s and ‘90s, the French and Italian approaches were the 
most dissimilar. Like in France, in Italy the outbreak of television and 
private broadcasters generated a progressive fall in theatres’ admissions. 
However, the Italian legislator, whether incapable or careless, provided 
no answers. Despite the transformations in process and the heated 
debate, it intervened neither to regulate the relationship between cinema 
and television (i), nor the cinema industry (ii).  
i. The relationship between cinema and television. The relationship 
between cinema and television already evolved over the course of the 
monopoly of the State’s owned Radiotelevisione italiana (Rai). At first, it 
 
123 Art. 12. On the Ente Autonomo per il cinema, see footnote n. 87 of this Chapter. 
124 CUCCO, M. and MANZOLI, G., Il Cinema di Stato, Il Mulino, 2017, p. 23. 
125 Ibidem, p. 23 e 24 («Si trattava però di un successo effimero, privo di basi industriali e di una 
visione strategica del futuro assetto dei media»). 
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came down to a «mutual indifference» (1955-1965), then it turned into a 
«more dramatic competition» followed by «the beginning of a limited 
form collaboration» (1965-1975)126. The liberalization process led to «a 
sort of step back in the caution that was usually applied to Italian 
cinema»127, and caused instead the two media to overlap. 
With no broadcasting laws, the situation was chaotic until the emergence 
of a duopoly dominated by Rai and the private television Fininvest in 
the late 1980s. Televisions engaged a front-facing competition with 
cinemas, broadcasting many films (mainly American), sometimes even 
before their first release in theatres128. During the years of Rai’s 
monopoly (1954-1976), public television used to broadcast a hundred 
films a year on average129. In 1977 that share exceeded 200 films, reaching 
400 in 1981 and about 1,300 in 1987. If in 1955 the representative Italian 
used to go to the cinema 16 times a year, he or she went to theatres only 
twice in 1985. Immediately after the end of the monopoly, there were 
6.476 operating theatres, compared to the 3,249 active ones at the 
beginning of the 1990s. Moreover, even though televisions were 
distracting spectators from theatres and taking advantage of the 
distribution of cinematographic works, they were not contributing to 
finance new films130. 
The legislator will establish the first basic rules on the position of 
televisions vis-à-vis the cinema only in 1990, with the ‘Mammì’ Law131, 
given the need to transpose the principles laid down by the EEC in the 
 
126 Cit. MACCHITELLA, C. and LOPEZ, G., Cinema e televisione: quale futuro?, in Sogni, industria, 
tecnologia, mercato, ed. by Alberto, A. and Macchitella, C., Marsilio, 2005, pp. 167-180, p. 167 
and 168.   
127 BARBERA, A., Cavalcarono insieme: 50 anni di cinema e televisione in Italia, Mondadori Electa, 
2004 («L’avvento delle televisioni private cambia di colpo tutte le regole del gioco, portando alla 
moltiplicazione indiscriminata dell’offerta filmica e facendo compiere una sorta di passo indietro 
rispetto alle cautele con cui il cinema era stato trattato in precedenza»). 
128  PERLO, N., Le droit public du cinéma, pp. 343. 
129 For these data, see MONTELEONE, F., Storia della radio e della televisione in Italia: un secolo 
di costume, società e politica, Marsilio, 2013, p. 483 ss. 
130  MACCHITELLA, C. and LOPEZ, G., Cinema e televisione, p. 168. 
131 Law no. 223/1990 of August 6th.  
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meantime132. On that occasion, it will provide for a minimum time period 
to separate the first release of films in the theatre and their television 
appearance; it will also require televisions to broadcast a minimum 
percentage of national film and to participate in their funding133.  
ii. The cinema industry. As far as the film industry is concerned, the 
rules introduced in 1965 continued to hold—although they had proved 
to be effective when the media landscape was very different. Perhaps to 
staunch and mask the absence of both a reform of the State promotional 
system and a regulation on the relations between cinema and television, 
the government exponentially increased the funding for the film sector 
in the ‘80s. Instead of the often advocated ‘reforms without costs’, Italy 
faced ‘costs without reforms’. 
There were a plethora of funds, whose objectives often overlapped, since 
they financed the same activities134. To the already existing funds (whose 
endowments were increased), the legislator added a fund for the 
adaptation/renewal of cinema theatres135 and another one for the 
promotion of Italian cinema abroad136. Act Law no. 163/1985 of April 
 
132 See par. 6.1.1. of this Chapter. 
133 Law no. 223/1990 of August 6th. Note that the Mammì Law will establish the prohibition 
to broadcast movies forbidden to minors during peak hours, when minors are more likely 
to watch them. This provision will strongly affect the rules of film production and also 
compromise the integrity of several works. In order to sell their works to broadcasters at a 
good price, distributors and producers will distort films to be presented to the ministerial 
committee in charge of rating, removing the parts likely to lead to bans on minors. Indeed, 
the price that televisions are willing to pay to broadcast a film depends on how much they 
can earn from the sale of advertising space during its transmission. Obviously, revenues 
are limited in the case of programs that cannot be broadcasted during peak hours. Since 
this period, it will also emerge « […] the tendency of all TV networks to eschew films with 
thematic and linguistic excess which may not be appreciated by sections of the television 
public» (BARILE, P. and RAO, G., "Trends in the Italian mass media and media law”, 
European Journal of Communication 2 (1992): 261-281, p. 274). 
134 As noted by PERLO, N., Le droit public du cinéma, p. 450. 
135 Law no. 378/1980 of July 23rd. 
136 Law no. 182/1983 of May 10th. 
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30th also introduced new fiscal measures in favour of the film industry137 
—thus following the tendency, already applied in the incentive systems 
for other industrial sectors, to adopt indirect aid, easier to manage.  
The 1985 law seemed to anticipate an organic reform. It introduced a 
significant change: to overcome the dispersion of State support in favour 
of the general entrainment sector, it established the Unified Fund for the 
Performing Arts (‘FUS’), meant to incorporate all the existing funds 
dedicated to cinema, opera, music, dance, theatre, drama and circus. In 
the intentions of the 1985 legislator, this innovation was meant as part of 
a broader reform framework to be implemented through subsequent 
laws. However, the Law of 1985, the mother law of entertainment, did 
not produce daughter laws. 
The following cinema Law of 1994138 was certainly not a comprehensive 
reform of the 1965 Corona Law; it only produced a series of amendments 
and additions139, with two main innovations. First, it abolished the 
obligation to show national films in cinema theatres and recognized 
special tax incentives to the exhibitors that autonomously reserved a 
percentage of their projection time to the Italian production140. Second, 
the Law innovated the film credit system141: it recognized for the first 
time that institutions other than the Banca Nazionale del Lavoro could 
participate to the credit;  this way, it overcame the monopoly of the first 
and opened to competition. To help overcome the difficulties in 
 
137 First, it established the tax shelter—a tax exemption of 70% of the operators’ profits used 
to produce new Italian films or restructure, renew, and technologically improve theatres 
(art. 7). Second, the Law introduced a fiscal mechanism to promote funding from outside 
the film industry: it provided for a tax exemption of the amounts donated to public and 
non-profit associations operating in the entertainment sector (art. 12). 
138 Law no. 153/1994 of March 1st, converting Law Decree no. 26/1994 of January 14th. 
139 CARETTI, P., Diritto pubblico dell'informazione, p. 295 («Anziché di fronte ad una compiuta 
riforma della vecchia legge del 1965 siamo dunque di fronte ad una serie di modifiche e integrazioni 
della medesima […]»). 
140 Art. 24(4). It recognized an exception from the entertainment tax to the exhibitors who 
reserved at least 25% of their transmission time to national film in each quarter. The 
amount of the exemption was set according to the ‘artistic and cultural quality’ of the films 
screened: the more significant the quality, the higher the fiscal benefit. 
141 Art. 14. 
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accessing credit for films of ‘national cultural interest’, the 1994 law also 
established the new Guarantee Fund142. If the producers were unable to 
repay the loan received through the films’ proceeds within two years, 
then the State intervened and covered 70% of the loan (90% in the case 
of films of first and second-time director). The producer who did not 
repay the remainder within five years, was unable to receive any other 
loan or State benefit for the following three years. 
The operation of the guarantee fund was sharply criticized because 
likely to take any responsibility off both the bank and the cinema 
operator while transferring the entrepreneurial risk to the State143. Given 
the possibility of relying on a substantial non-repayable public 
contribution, credit institutions and producers were not risking their 
capital but gambling with State’s money. Therefore, the Law did not 
incentivize them to make a careful assessment of the risk of the projects 
they invested in—as proven by the very poor performance of the cultural 
interest films144. The Guarantee Fund’s mechanism could have been 
justifiable for high risk films struggling to find resources on the free 
market, but with cultural and artistic ambitions. However, it appeared 
inadequate because adopted for the great part of the works. This way, 
the majority of funding supported projects not bound to make 
repayments to the State145. 
 
142 Indeed, the 1994 Law made the distinction between films that were of 'national 
productions' and of 'national cultural interest', establishing different supportive regimes 
for each of them. The firsts were those made by a company that was registered, held the 
majority of its capital stock, did most of its business, and paid taxes in Italy. The seconds 
were those thus considered by the newly established 'Advisory Committee for Cinema', in 
charge of establishing the classification by considering the artistic talent involved. 
143 See, among others: CUCCO, M. and MANZOLI, G., Il Cinema di Stato, and SALVEMINI, S., Il 
cinema impresa possibile. La sfida del cambiamento per il cinema italiano, Egea, 2002, pp. 132 and 
ff. 
144 According to CUCCO, M. and MANZOLI, G., Il Cinema di Stato, p. 45, 94% of the films of 
cultural interest financed by the State between 1994 and 2002 did not even make up for the 
amount invested in their production. Moreover:  11% of these films have not been 
completed or have not found a distribution channel.  
145 For data on the matter, see TETI, E., COLLINS, A., and SEDGWICK, J., Government Failure: 
The Ineffectiveness of Italian State Subsidies to Film, in Handbook of State aid for Film, Springer, 
2018, pp. 333-365, p. 341. 
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By all of the instruments referred, and in the absence of structural 
reforms, «the State resources allocated to films of national cultural 
interest increased significantly during the 1990s […], leading to a 
collapse of the system in the early 2000s […]»146—when the ‘Urbani 
Decree’ was adopted147. 
 
3.5. The early 2000s: shifting the focus from worthy films to 
worthy film companies 
As mentioned, the 1994 Law did not help to consolidate the industrial 
dimension of the cinema, since it did not promote the development of its 
operators’ entrepreneurial capacity. Under its application, State funding 
had mainly been non-repayable, directed at projects unable to achieve 
positive market results. At the end of the ‘90s, the opinion that the 
system was in need of a reform was increasingly shared.  
As noted, two events symbolically underlined this evidence148. First, in 
June 2000, the Association of Independent Authors and Producers (API) 
called for lowering State’s contributions to 50% of a film production cost 
and for the funding to be granted only to producers who already 
gathered the remaining 50%. The goal was to limit welfarism and 
increase the weight of private investment, in order to drive companies 
in the film industry to act in accordance with a market-oriented logic. 
Second, in February 2004, the Ministry of Culture convened 
representatives of the various cinema categories and informed them that 
State resources to film production were over. They were supposed to be 
partly self-supporting through the repayment of loans, which was often 
not the case. To temporarily address the problem, the Government 
adopted the ‘Save the cinema’ Law Decree, which exceptionally 
allocated € 80 M to the industry149 —while waiting for the Urban Decree 
to become operational. The latter deeply reformed State funding for 
 
146 CUCCO, M. and MANZOLI, G., Il Cinema di Stato, p. 27. 
147 Legislative Decree no. 28/2004 of January 22nd. 
148 CUCCO, M. and MANZOLI, G., Il Cinema di Stato, p. 45. 
149 Law Decree no. 72/2004 of March 22nd. 
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cinema150. The main idea was to continue support the sector but taking 
into consideration the merits of the production company, besides those 
of the projects. 
State aids to film production continued to be automatic and selective. By 
the first, the State aimed at promoting the general development and 
economic growth of the film industry, stimulating the activities of those 
able to achieve positive commercial results151. Selective aids, to take into 
account the artistic and cultural merits, consisted of contributions to 
films of cultural interest, quality awards152, and aid to screenplays153.  
The main innovation concerned the contributions to films of cultural 
interest. First, the Decree limited the maximum percentage of public 
funding at 50% of the film cost (raised to 90% for films by first-time and 
second-time directors)154. Also, it subordinated the funding to the 
 
150 For an in-depth analysis of the mechanisms established by the Urbani Decree, see 
CUCCO, M. and MANZOLI, G., Il Cinema di Stato, pp. 54 and ff., and CARETTI, P., Diritto 
pubblico dell'informazione, pp. 303 and ff. It is worth noticing that some provisions of the 
Ubrani Decree were declared contrary to the Italian Constitution. The Constitutional Court 
noted indeed that they had been adopted in the absence of a necessary prior consultation 
with the State-Regions Conference. Therefore, they were contrary to art. 117 of the 
Constitution, under which the promotion of culture is a matter of concurrent competition 
between the State and the regions (see footnote 211 of this Chapter). See Judgment of the 
Constitutional Court of July 19th, 2005, Case no. 285. 
151 Automatic aids continued indeed to be ‘success-linked subsidies’ given to companies 
based on the box office results of previous productions. Producers were required to use 
the aid to repay the loan previously gained by the State and to produce other films. See art. 
10 of the Urbani Decree and the implementing ministerial decrees. 
152 They were awarded by the General Directorate for Cinema to films selected by a jury 
appointed by the Ministry and made up of five eminent personalities of culture. They were 
given to no more than 14 films per year and amounted to €250,000, to be divided between 
the producer, the director, the author of the screenplay, the cinematographer, the art 
director, and the film editor. See art. 13(9) and art. 17(3) of the Urbani Decree, and its 
implementing ministerial decrees. 
153 They were recognized to a maximum of 20 film projects per year of particular cultural 
or social importance. The contribution could not be more than €35,000 per title, to be 
divided between the screenplay author and the production company. If the production 
company did not undertake the project within two years, the funding was withdrawn 
(except for the percentage granted to the author). See art. 13(8) of the Urbani Decree. 
154 Art. 13(2). 
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producer’s acquisition of the remaining resources155. This way, the 
legislator tried to overcome the previous welfarism, dismissing the role 
of the State as the only risk-taker. Second, the State introduced a 
reference system, consisting in evaluating the success of the activities 
previously carried out by the producer and the cast involved in the 
project156. It aimed at reducing the arbitrariness of the committees in 
charge of selecting which films to fund, whose decisions had often 
generated criticism on the use of public resources. Provided that a 
certain degree of subjectivity remained, the introduction of objective 
parameters to be taken into account greatly reduced it.  
Moreover, the reference system’s main idea was to anchor the financial 
support not only to the quality of the idea but also to the possibilities of 
its actual realization, distribution, and ability to meet an audience. To 
this extent, the spirit of the Urbani Decree had been rather revolutionary: 
it intervened in a country where the formal celebration of the films’ 
artistic value disguised a worrying lack of attention to the 
entrepreneurial and economic structure of their production and 
distribution157. 
However, some of the good intentions were not achieved. State funding 
continued to be non-repayable during the application of the Urbani 
Decree158. Such a result may have depended on the limited production 
budget of the titles funded. The economic history of cinema shows that 
the products with the greatest chance of success are those that have had 
 
155 Ibidem. 
156 Art. 8 and the implementing ministerial decrees. More precisely: as to the producer, a 
ministerial committee was in charge of verifying: i). the quality of its previous films 
(measured by their participation in festivals and prizes won, etc.); ii). the stability of its 
activity (number of years of activity, of films already produced and released in the theatres, 
level of repayment of State loans, etc.); iii). its commercial capacity (average box office of 
its previous films and revenues from their rights sold abroad etc.). Concerning the project, 
the committee was in charge of assessing, besides the script quality, the past performance 
of the technical and artistic team involved in the film (participation to festivals, awards 
won, economic performance, etc.). 
157 CUCCO, M. and MANZOLI, G., Il Cinema di Stato, p. 59.   
158 For the data, see ibidem, p. 81. 
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high production and marketing budgets. Despite this, the films’ unit 
average cost was rather low during the application of the Urbani Decree, 
while the number of produced films increased159. The legislator limited 
State funding to 50% of the film’s cost and pushed producers to find 
additional funding from the private sector; however, it did not take 
sufficient action to make this path viable160.  
To conclude about the Urbani reform, it should be noted that the 
reference system produced disincentives, since it ended up rewarding 
mostly the same operators. To reach higher scores, producers resorted to 
actors and authors who had already participated in festivals, won 
awards, and taken part in successful films161. This way, the system 
helped those who already had success, i.e., the ones presumably having 
more opportunities to find sources of financing in the market on their 
own.  
This way, the State generated a conservative effect, that reduced the 
incentives to innovate and diversify, in turn jeopardizing the emergence 
of new talents: a result in stark contrast to the constitutional ratios for 
public support to culture.   
 
3.6. The first organic act: looking for a new approach 
In 2016, the Italian State adopted the Act Law no. 220/2016, showing a 
long-term overall vision for the first time. The reform did not only 
update the 2004 film support regulations to cope with the changes that 
occurred over time and the arisen problems. It more broadly acted in a 
coordinated way on the whole system of State rules affecting the sector, 
 
159 See fig. 11, in par.  5 of Chapter II. 
160 In the beginning, the State established only one instrument to favour private 
investments: the product placement (see footnote n. 252 of par. 3.1. of Chapter II). The State 
will seek to attract further private resources with the 2008 Finance Act, which will 
introduce new fiscal benefits (see par. 4.2 of Chapter III). 
161  CUCCO, M. and MANZOLI, G., Il Cinema di Stato, p. 62.  
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seeking to give the Italian film industry «a more functional and less 
wasteful regulatory framework»162. 
The 2016 Act reformed direct and indirect State aids, the system of 
AVMS providers programming and investment obligations, that of film 
censorship (transformed into a system of content classification to protect 
minors exclusively163), and even the system of working relations in the 
film and audio-visual sector. More generally, the legislator has been 
concerned with redefining the scope of responsibilities and functions of 
ministries, related bodies, and independent institutions involved in the 
film industry’s governance as a whole. Aware of regulating a sector that 
evolves faster than others considered its special connection to 
technology, the Act has mainly established the fundamental principles, 
requiring secondary sources of their declination. This approach has 
generated criticism: some claimed that this way of proceeding would 
have deprived the Parliament of the possibility of making important 
choices164; others noted that the high number of secondary sources 
would have been likely to generate antinomies165. Still, one should 
recognize that the approach adopted has the merit to allow to change the 
rules when deemed necessary easily. This is an important result 
considered that the audio-visual sector evolves faster than others 
because of its special connection to technology. 
Concerning the State promotional action, the main innovation is that the 
support has been extended to the entire audio-visual sector—as was 
already the case in France. In addition to works intended for cinema 
theatres, the aid became available for those intended for television and 
the internet, and even to video games.  This way, the State showed 
 
162 TETI, E., COLLINS, A., and SEDGWICK, J., Government Failure, p. 345. 
163 See GIUSTI, M.  "Dalla censura alla classificazione delle opere: il cinema dà l’addio a 
madama Anastasia?." Rivista trimestrale di diritto pubblico (2020): 515-542. and RAMAJOLI, M. 
"Cinema e libertà: dalla censura preventiva al movie rating sistem." Aedon 1 (2018). 
164 ZAFFANELLA, A. “Il sostegno finanziario dello Stato al cinema e la disattesa attuazione 
della “Costituzione culturale””. Rivista dei media 1 (2018): 332 ss.  
165 CONTALDO A. and PELUSO F. «Il settore cineaudiovisivo alla luce delle recenti normative 
anche secondarie: un primo focus di orientamento sulla riforma c.d. Franceschini». Diritto 
d’autore 2 (2018): 147 ss.  
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awareness that the merits of a product are now less dependent on the 
commercial practices adopted to enhance it on the market166.  
Another significant change is the establishment of the new ‘Fund for the 
development of investment in the film and audio-visual sector’, which 
overcame the multiplicity of different financing sources. It functions 
based on a mechanism aimed at generating a link between the level of 
the annual State expenditure and the film industry’s turnover. However, 
its actual endowment cannot be inferior to a pre-established amount. 
Interestingly, a minimum percentage of the new Fund should be 
devoted to funding initiatives of cinema education within schools167: the 
State seeks to raise the demand for the product supported, and even to 
enhance the quality of the demand. 
To conclude on the major innovations, the 2016 reform established that 
each year an impact evaluation of the newly established measures must 
be carried out and presented to the Parliament by the Ministry of 
Culture168 (as well as an annual report of the Independent Antitrust 
Authority on the state of competition in the film distribution 
department—the AGCM169). It shows awareness that only the ex post 
evaluation can tell if the choices taken were appropriate and should 
therefore continue to be followed. Such a novelty should overcome—at 
least with regards to the film industry—one of the main problems that 
have generally characterized the Italian State's intervention in support 
of the industry. As noted in 2012, «the only available assessments of the 
incentives granted in decades of public transfers to businesses are the 
result of either academic work or analysis by the Bank of Italy. It is 
significant and worrying that there are no (except for very rare cases) 
evaluations by the administrations that provide and manage the 
 
166 Proof of that is the fact that most of the Italian leading production companies engage 
both in the television and cinematographic sectors (see for instance Wildeside, Palomar 
and Cattleya); on top of that, some of them also produce web series (Indigo Film) and 
operate in commercial and branded content works (Indiana Productions). 
167 Art. 27, lett. i). 
168 Art. 12(6).  
169 Art. 31(4). 
 69 
incentives; it suggests that the evaluation does not enter the decision-
making process in which new aids are assigned»170. 
 
4. The shared contemporary challenges: the upheavals 
caused by the OTTs and the Covid-19 pandemic 
(deferment) 
In the contemporary era, both the Italian and the French film industries 
have been shaken by the disruptive entrance on the market of the AVMS 
non-linear providers (i) and the outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic (ii). 
i. The AVMS non-linear providers 
The AVMS non-linear providers have revolutionized a series of working 
dynamics cemented for decades. Known as Over The Top (OTT), these 
providers are the Transactional Video-On-Demand (TVOD, online 
services where the user pays for a single content, such as iTunes of 
Apple), the Subscription Video-On-Demand (SVOD, subscription-based 
online services, such as Netflix, Amazon Prime and Disney+) and the 
Advertisement Video-On- Demand (AVOD, free online services with 
advertisements, as YouTube).  
In fast and continuous growth, OTTs players changed the traditional 
paradigms of the audio-visual industry. First, while each actor had a 
specific identified role (author, producer, publisher, distributor, etc.) in 
the creative chain in the past, some OTTs have concentrated many 
 
170 GIAVAZZI, F. ET AL., Rapporto alla Presidenza, p. 21 («Le uniche valutazioni disponibili degli 
incentivi concessi in decenni di trasferimenti pubblici alle imprese sono il risultato o di lavori 
accademici o di analisi della Banca d’Italia. È significativo e preoccupante che non esistano (tranne 
rarissimi casi) valutazioni da parte delle amministrazioni che li erogano e li gestiscono, il che 
suggerisce che la valutazione non entri nel processo decisionale in cui si assegnano nuovi 
contributi»). The same problem is also highlighted in ONIDA, F. and VIESTI, G., Una nuova 
politica industriale in Italia: investimenti, innovazione, trasferimento tecnologico, Passigli editori, 
2016, p. 53, where it is noted that, among the limits about the Italian State industrial policy, 
there is the lack of «una continuativa capacita ̀ di valutazione dei processi e dei loro effetti, che 
possa portare ad imparare dall’esperienza e a migliorare continuativamente nel tempo. […]per 
ottenere risultati da politiche industriali cosi ̀ sofisticate, ma anche cosi ̀ importanti, non basta 
disegnare un bando e allocare finanziamenti perché ́ tutto funzioni. Occorre una volontà ̀ politica 
costante nel tempo e una sofisticata capacita ̀, necessariamente centrale, di accompagnamento, 
analisi, raccordo, valutazione […]».  
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different functions within the same entity, thus revolutionising the 
traditional equilibria. Moreover: OTTs have freed the audience from the 
constraints of television programming schedules, and have proven to be 
able to continuously improve and tailor their services on their users’ 
tastes. The big SVOD operators (such as Netflix171 and Amazon172) 
celebrate indeed their capacity to gain an in-depth knowledge of their 
customers’ practices, hence having a significant competitive advantage 
over traditional market players. 
In addition to the traditional paradigms of the industry, OTTs are also 
affecting the State action of cinema promotion. Indeed, some of their 
characteristics have rendered obsolete and ineffective some support 
instruments devised by national legislators over time. Moreover, for a 
 
171 Netflix was founded in 1998 by computer mathematician Reed Hastings. Initially, it was 
a service of physical rental of DVDs and VHS sent based on online orders—the first step 
to constructing a database that indicates customers' preferences, helping the company 
recommend products to them. Soon it was transformed into an unlimited subscription 
service. Only in 2007, the SVOD service added to the rental of films. Progressively, in 
addition to the distribution chain, Netflix has integrated itself vertically and has begun to 
produce original content. The first outcome were the two series "Lilyhammer" (2012) and 
"House of Cards" (2013). With a deep knowledge of its audience's preferences, Netflix 
realised two seasons of "House of Cards" right away, breaking the norm of releasing a pilot 
to assess a product's potential before undertaking the realization of additional episodes. 
With the release of "House of Cards", Netflix broke another unwritten rule: consistent with 
the policy of giving greater flexibility to its audience, it released the first season of the show 
at once—whereas so far, between one episode and the other, there had usually been one 
week—thus inaugurating the binge-watching practice. For an analysis of Netflix history 
and its functioning mechanisms, see, among others: COLLIN, A, NETFLIX & Cie - Les 
coulisses d'une (r)évolution, Armand Colin, 2018, JENNER, F. M., Netflix and the Re-invention 
of Television, Springer, 2018 and MARRAZZO, F., Effetto Netflix: Il nuovo paradigma televisivo, 
Egea, 2016. 
172 The SVOD service of Amazon is Prime Video. It is included among the advantages 
recognized to who pays the yearly subscription to the membership program Amazon 
Prime, launched in 2005. Note that the audio-visual is the only area in which Amazon, 
traditionally a distributor, comes up with the supply chain to produce its programs, thus 
entering into competition with its suppliers. Since 2010, Prime Video started distributing 
its original content, on top of releasing works from other production companies, indeed. 
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long time, some of these players have undermined the application of the 
promotional laws of many countries.   
In several European countries, legislators require providers to 
participate in production funding, either through contributions to 
support national funds or through direct investments in contents. Here, 
these compulsory contributions represent the very pillar of State support 
policies; indeed, they cover a large proportion of the funding for film 
production.   
Some of the OTTs are known to operate in those and other countries 
while establishing themselves in one country only, the one with lighter 
financial obligations and that do not require this type of compulsory 
contribution. It is the case, for example, of Netflix, operating in the 
majority of the European countries, albeit having been headquartered 
for a long time only in the Netherlands; Amazon Prime Video, based in 
Luxembourg, and Google Play, based in Ireland.   
It is the so-called practice of ‘jurisdiction shopping’, by which providers 
look for the optimal location, or even for a delocalization from the 
country of ‘natural’ establishment. In this way, they can exploit the most 
favourable jurisdiction concerning the regulatory conditions to supply 
the economic activity they exercise and are able to escape the more 
stringent requirements of the many other States in which they 
nevertheless provide their services. Indeed, according to the reasons of 
the internal market, providers must respect only the law of the country 
in which are established, as harmonized by the law of the EU, and not 
all the laws of the countries in which they provide their services—as 
established since 1989173.  
This way, Italy and France, which are among the countries which 
imposed stricter requirements than the harmonization EU standards do, 
have seen several aspects of their regulation circumvented by the new 
operators. At stake is national lawmakers' ability to maintain industry 
players' commitment to national production funding. 
This evidence, however, is being overcome. Among the other reasons, 
this is because the European law, since 2018, has provided for a 
 
173 See footnote 194, in par. 6.1.1. of this Chapter. 
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derogation from the country of origin principle. This way, it has allowed 
the Member States to impose an investment in the creation of new 
European works to audio-visual operators that target their audiences 
without being established there. Moreover, Netflix is establishing 
secondary offices in European countries further to the Netherlands. 
i. The outbreak of the Covid-19 pandemic 
In addition to the presence of global and delocalized digital operators, 
the French and Italian systems of cinema promotion have recently been 
'shaken' by the Covid-19 pandemic. It generated the need for stronger 
support from the States, which increased funding, and also adopted new 
dedicated measures—including, in Italy, a TVOD service distributing 
Italian cultural products whose physical enjoyment had been 
compromised174.  
Indeed, the outbreak of the pandemic and the subsequent containment 
provisions have strongly affected the two film industries, with the  
freezing of projects in the shooting phase, the closure of cinema, and the 
cancellation of festivals and events, pushing some enterprises to the 
edge of bankruptcy.  
Concerning some aspects, the pandemic has proven to be an opportunity 
in Italy. Indeed, it has tragically shown how Italian workers of the 
entrainment and performing art sectors could not access fundamental 
social security tools, such as unemployment benefits, sickness, and 
maternity. Indeed, they were not adapted to the non-traditional business 
models and forms of employment in the sector. In light of this, the Italian 
State—while trying to ensure the recovering of the sector—has adopted 
the Law Decree no. 73/2021 of May 25th, which has reformed social 
security instrument for cultural and creative industries, leveraging the 





174 The project, ‘Itsart’, was promoted by the Ministry of Culture and the Cassa Depositi e 
Prestiti and realized through the involvement of the already existing TVOD service Chili. 
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5. State promotion of cinema under scrutiny at higher 
government levels—from cultural exception to cultural 
diversity 
At the end of the WWII, the measures of cinema promotion adopted by 
the national States began to fall under the scrutiny of superior 
government levels. They were at odds with the principle of free trade of 
goods and services that were being established both at the European and 
international level.  France played a fundamental role in the matter. It 
fought more than any other country for the idea that cultural products 
and services should be treated differently from the non-cultural ones. 
This way, it contributed to the emergence of the concept of cultural 
exception, then evolved into that of cultural diversity. Still today, said 
concept justifies State measures of cinema promotion, admissible 
because of a 'consent' granted by superior government levels.  
The 'trade versus culture' debate began in the forum of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)175. Adopted in 1947, the GATT 
aimed at removing obstacles to physical products trade through three 
principle: most favoured nation, market access and national treatment. 
The cinema industry received special status and explicitly derogated 
from this last principle, that consists in preventing the countries from 
adopting any program that would increase the competitiveness of a 
domestic product at the expense of a foreign one, thus prohibiting the 
 
175 The scientific literature on this debate is extensive; see, among others: BERNIER, I., Trade 
and Culture, in The World Trade Organization: Legal, Economic and Political Analysis, ed. by 
Appleton, A. E. and  Plummer, M. G., Springer, 2005, pp. 2331-2377; BUCHSBAUM, J. 
Exception taken; BURRI, M., The European Union, the World Trade Organization and Cultural 
Diversity, in Cultural Governance and the European Union: protecting and promoting cultural 
diversity in Europe, ed. by Psychogiopoulou, E., Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, pp. 195-209; 
BURRI, M., Trade versus Culture: The Policy of Cultural Exception and the WTO, in The Palgrave 
handbook of European media policy, ed. by Donders, K. et al., Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, pp. 
479-492; FOOTER, M. E. and GRABER, C. B., "Trade liberalization and cultural policy", Journal 
of International Economic Law 3.1 (2000): 115-144; SCHÉRÉ, L., "The Culture War: A Look at 
the Cultural Exception Principle in International Trade Law", Fordham International Law 
Journal 40 (2016): 565-582; WALKLEY, S. E. To what extent. 
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granting of advantages to national industries not also available to the 
foreign ones176.  
Indeed, despite US lobbies against trade restrictions and upon particular 
pressure from France, the GATT ended up including Article IV, 'Special 
Provisions Relating to Cinematograph Films'. Being «the sole exception 
in the GATT to the principle of national treatment»177, this article 
authorized the contracting parties to temporarily maintain the obligation 
for cinema's exhibitors to reserve a minimum proportion of the total 
projection time for films of national origin. The general ban on 
quantitative restrictions on imports, such as contingent quotas, was 
instead preserved, and all other forms of protection were prohibited. 
However, the GATT came into being as a provisional agreement 
articulating only basic rules; the organization pursued its aim of opening 
up domestic markets through the 'negotiation rounds', during which the 
areas of intervention were extended. The 'trade versus culture' debate 
became significant during the Uruguay Round. Launched in 1986 and 
concluded in 1994, it mainly attempted to extend the principles of free 
trade to services, applicable under GATT only to goods178.  
During the Uruguay Round years, a similar debate (should cultural 
products and services be treated differently from other goods and 
services?) was active within the European Economic Community (EEC). 
In principle, State aids to the cinema should have been fall in the general 
 
176 Concerning instead the two other principle: that of the most favoured nation prevented 
the countries to offer preferential trade privileges to one nation and not to others; that of 
market access obliged GATT members to increase access to domestic markets over time 
and not to reduce access below that time limits. For more details, BUCHSBAUM, J. Exception 
taken, pp. 75 ff. 
177 BALASSA, C., An “economic” approach toward the trade and culture debate: The US position, in 
International Cultural Policies and Power, ed. by Singh, J., Springer, 2010, pp. 84-100, p. 86. 
178 The round would have ended with the Marrakesh Agreement, which would have 
established the World Trade Organization (WTO), adopted a new version of the GATT, 
reached for the first time an agreement on trade in services, the General agreement on trade 
in services (GATS), and adopted the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual 
Property Rights (TRIPS). 
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prohibition of State aid—affirmed since the Treaty of Rome of 1957179. As 
audio-visual works were already traded between countries, national 
aids could affect trade and distort the competition between the Member 
States. The audio-visual works that received support were likely to 
develop a competitive advantage over those that do not. However, since 
the Treaty of Rome, the EEC tried to balance the internal market and 
competition policy goals with other public interests and established 
exceptions to the general ban on State-aid. The culture was included 
among these exceptions by the Maastricht Treaty of 1993: it introduced 
in Art. 87, which contained the ban on State aids, the new letter d): 
according to it, «aid to promote culture and heritage conservation» are 
compatible with the internal market, provided they do «not affect 
trading conditions and competition in the Community to an extent that 
is contrary to the common interest»180. This way, the EU partially shared 
the French argument that State aids to cinema do not create a significant 
distortion of competition within the internal market, since European 
films are rarely in competition with each other, but rather with North 
American films; and that, in any case, «the circulation of films in the 
European Union is only possible if they can, in the first place, exist on 
their national market»181. 
Beyond recognizing to Member States the possibility to maintain forms 
of aid to their national film industries, the Maastricht Treaty provided 
for the first time the EU with a subsidiary competence in the cultural 
 
179 Art. 87 of the Treaty of Rome. 
180 The conditions under which State aid «do not affect trading conditions and competition 
to an extent that is contrary to the common interest» have been clarified over time by the 
European Commission during its examination activity. See par. 2 of Chapter III.  
181 AMIEL, O., Le financement public du cinéma dans l'Union européenne, Presses Universitaires 
d'Aix-Marseille, 2006, who is quoting CNC, Rapport du groupe de travail sur le cineḿa face au 
droit de la concurrence, 2003. Note that the reasoning developed by the EU since 1993 is the 
same of today. According to the Commission Communication on State aid of 2013, the 
presence of films coming from the different Member States is essential to «ensure that their 
culture and creative capacity can be expressed, and the diversity and richness of European 
culture reflected». To this extent, State support is fundamental: «left purely to the market, 
many of these films would not have been made». This is because of a combination of the 
high investment required and the European audio-visual market's weaknesses. Among 
these, the fact that European audio-visual works have a limited audience and that most 
European audio-visual players are small-medium size enterprises. 
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field. Indeed, it recognized the EU the power to carry out actions to 
support, coordinate, or supplement the Member States activities in the 
field182. This way, the EU obtained a title to conduct a joint action to 
defend the Member States’ measures of cinema promotion during the 
Uruguay Round. Therefore, after having established a cultural exception 
within its internal market, the EU flighted for the same principle to be 
applied internationally.  
However, the EEC was not entirely united in this approach initially. 
Germany and Britain were somewhat reluctant, while France was very 
proactive. It managed at the end to shape the EU discourse concerning 
Hollywood's dominance of the audio-visual industry—to the extent that 
during the Uruguay Round years, the EU added protectionist measures 
for the European products on top of those already active in the Member 
States for national works183. 
During the European (French)-American battle on trade versus culture, 
the two sides stressed both economic and ideological reasons in favour 
of their arguments. The cultural proponents sought to exempt any 
cultural product or service from the principles of the negotiated WTO 
Agreements. However, the audio-visual one was the sector that 
generated most concerns, «to the extent that the term 'culture' became 
synonymous with the word 'audio-visual'»184.  
The relevance given to the film industry seems to come both from other 
cultural services being less tradable and from the sensitivities in the 
media sector being the highest. Despite the small value in economic 
terms of the French audio-visual industry at the time, the perception of 
the ability for films to convey ideals and value conferred great public 
importance to the sector. France claimed the public's right to benefit 
from a diversified supply, including the most 'fragile' and less-
demanded products, stressing the risk for a laissez-fair approach to lead 
to the lack of the national and European films and to an 'invasion' of the 
 
182 Art. 128(2) of the Maastricht Treaty of 1993. 
183 See par. 6.1.1. of this Chapter. 
184 FOOTER, M. E. and GRABER, C. B., "Trade liberalization and cultural policy" , p. 119. 
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American ones185. This phenomenon might have ended up as a form of 
‘cultural imperialism’, regarded as an attack on European ideals186.  
The American negotiators dismissed the French concern about a 
potential loss of identity and interpreted the French position as an 
attempt to economically protect its national market by hindering access 
for US films, due to their higher capacity to intercept consumers' tastes 
and demand. According to the US, opening up to competition would 
have strengthened European filmmakers by forcing them to make 
successful films and to learn how to raise funds for future productions. 
However, the French were not interested in dismantling a regime that 
had ensured funding and reduced failure risk. The US showed a 
different conviction on how to safeguard the rights of the audience. 
What the market offers freed from restrictions corresponds to that which 
there is a demand for. What is not provided by the market in the absence 
of State incentives should disappear because not requested by 
consumers.  
There were many possible solutions to solve the conflict. First, to exclude 
the audio-visual industry from the final agreements through a cultural 
exemption187. Second, to bring the audio-visual industry into the GATT 
under certain conditions. Third, to include no reference to culture at all. 
 
185 Indeed, even with the protectionist measures whose maintenance was debated, there 
was already a significance and growing US trade surplus with Europe in the film industry 
According to the data reported by BUCHSBAUM, J. Exception taken, p. 86, the Europeans saw 
their domestic market share of theatrical revenue drop from 30% to 16% in the decade 
before the Uruguay Round (1982-1992), while the US share in the top five European 
markets (France, Germany, Italy, Spain, Great Britain) rose from 70% to 83%. 
186 BUCHSBAUM, J., Exception taken, p. 60, reports that Jacques Delors, President of the 
European commission, during the Assises européennes de l'audiovisuel, said: «culture is not 
a piece of merchandise like others... we cannot treat culture as we treat frigidaires or even 
cars. Laissez-faire, the market, they are not sufficient. Thus, one can say without hypocrisy: 
no protections and no laissez-faire. To our American friends, who just several days before 
these Assises have brought action through Gatt […], I would like to pose simply one 
question: do we have the right to exist? Have we the right to perpetuate our traditions, our 
patrimony, our languages?».  
187 As it happened in 1992 with the Canada-US Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA), which 
granted a broad ‘cultural exemption’ to Canada—namely the right to maintain quotas, 
government subsidies, tax incentives, and other similar measures. For more information 
on the CUSFTA, see SCHÉRÉ, L., "The Culture War”, pp. 580 ff. 
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This latter is the solution that ultimately prevailed: cultural products are 
neither explicitly included, nor excluded, and the sector's status 
remained undefined. It was still asserted, even if vaguely, that culture is 
different from other goods and services. 
Not explicitly allowing for measures promoting culture put the industry 
under the constant pressure of further liberalizations, and caused the 
cultural exception proponents to look for solutions outside the WTO188. 
Indeed, in the early 2000s, the discourse moved within the United 
Nations Educational, Social and Cultural Organization (UNESCO), and 
eventually led to the adoption of the Convention on the Protection and 
Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions in 2005.  
This way, the debate has undergone a substantial transformation, 
moving from the cultural exception's rhetoric towards the slogan of 
cultural diversity. The latter was considered by various activists and 
policymakers a better-sounding expression. Instead of giving the idea of 
defending national protectionist prerogatives, cultural diversity would 
argue for a larger perspective on culture, upholding a gentle cultural 
hybridity against the threats of standardization represented by US mass 
cultural production189. 
The Convention identifies cultural diversity as a positive response to 
cultural standardization and affirms «the sovereign rights of States to 
maintain, adopt and implement policies and measures that they deem 
appropriate for the protection and promotion of the diversity of cultural 
expressions on their territory» (art. 1, let. h)––thus implying the legality 
of State aid to national cinemas. The cultural exception thus becomes the 
instrument through which to pursue the new objective of cultural 
diversity190. 
 
188  As noted by BURRI, M., Trade versus Culture, p. 485. 
189 BUCHSBAUM, J., Exception taken, p. 160. 
190 As declared during a discussion on the WTO at the National Assembly by Catherine 
Trautmann, French Minister of culture at the time: «The notion of cultural diversity does 
not replace that of exception. There is neither a semantic shift concealing an occult reality, 
nor an abandonment. Quite simply, these two notions are not placed on the same level. By 
cultural diversity, it is a question of clarifying the aim pursued in the negotiation. The 
cultural exception is the means, in my view non-negotiable, of achieving the objective of 
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However, although succeeding in demonstrating the broad international 
consensus on cultural diversity as a desired goal, the UNESCO 
Convention did not result in a new cultural trade regime. Its article 20(2) 
establishes indeed that «nothing in this Convention shall be interpreted 
as modifying the Parties' rights and obligations under any other treaties 
to which they are parties». 
  
6. Cinema promotion at the non-State level 
The State has historically been the first level of government to promote 
the film industry; however, it is not the only one anymore: progressively, 
regional and European support added to the State one.  
In addition to partially allowing the Member States to support their 
national film industries and fighting for the maintenance of such a 
support at the international level, the EU provides indeed its own 
programs of aid. Their goals appear less challenging than the State ones, 
since they are less composite: the main one is to allow a better circulation 
of the audio-visual products from the different Member States, both 
within Europe and outside. 
Local support appears less challenging than the State one, too, again 
because of the goals pursued. Unlike the State, territorial autonomies 
promote the film industry mainly to obtain local economic development, 
not being interested in the artistic and cultural ‘merits’ of the products 
actually supported.  
 
 
cultural diversity […]» («La notion de diversité culturelle ne se substitute pas à celle d’exception. 
Il n’a ni glissement semantique dissimulant une realite occulte, ni a forntiori abandon. Tout 
simplement, ces deux notions ne se placent pas sur le meme plan. Par diversité ulturelle, il s’agit 
d’escpliciter la finalite pouruivie dans la negociation. L’exception culturelle est le moyen, a mes yeux 
non negociable, d’atteindre l’objectif de la diversite culturelle […]»). Thus reported by WALKLEY, 
S. E., To what extent, p. 16.  
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6.1. Promoting cinema at the European level 
The Treaty of Rome of 1957 contained no provisions for culture. After 
all, it was an economic document, which came with provisions of free-
market orientation, encouraging a reduction in State intervention. 
However, the need for European action in the cultural field has been 
recognized over time191. As anticipated, the EU received a legal basis for 
cultural actions by the Maastricht Treaty of 1993; its art. 128(2) called 
upon the EU to carry out actions to support, coordinate, or supplement 
the action of the Member States. This way, while legitimizing the EU 
action in the cultural field, the Treaty reconfirmed the continued 
primary competence of the Member States.  
Basically, the Member States' cultural autonomy should be guaranteed 
because the EU can neither replace national audio-visual policy 
activities, nor compete with them. The EU is authorized to intervene 
only on actions that cannot be performed optimally by the Member 
States, because they are unable to achieve certain goals on their own, 
and/or because the EU intervention would ensure added value—still, 
only if the consequences of inaction are undesirable. 
Still today, by virtue of articles 6 and 167 of TFEU, the EU has a 
subsidiary competence in the cultural field, based on which it promotes 
the sector in two ways192: by making the behaviour of audio-visual media 
services providers consistent with the European audio-visual industry 
growth goal (par. 6.1.1.); and by providing the industry with direct 
financial aid (par. 6.1.2.). 
 
191 This is in line with what happened with regard to the general industrial sector; indeed, 
it has progressively become evident how « the purely «negative» action consisting in the 
removal of barriers was not sufficient and that more positive action was needed in the 
Community to make it possible to fully integrate European industry and fully exploit the 
continental dimension». See DASTOLI, P. V. and VANNUCCINI, S., L’Europa e le politiche 
industriali, in Una nuova politica industriale in Italia, 2016, pp. 21-32, cit. p. 22 («Il bisogno di 
una politica industriale europea e ̀ emerso tuttavia quando e ̀ diventato evidente che l’azione 
puramente «negativa» di rimozione di barriere non era sufficiente e che occorreva un’azione piu ̀
positiva nella Comunita ̀ per rendere possibile la piena integrazione dell’industria europea e lo 
sfruttamento pieno della dimensione continentale»). 
192 For a comprehensive read on European Media policies, DONDERS, K. ET AL., The Palgrave 
handbook of European media policy.  
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6.1.1. Regulating AVMS providers to ensure the growth of the 
European industry (deferment) 
European indirect promotion through regulatory actions date back to 
1989, when the EEC adopted the ‘Television Without Frontiers’ (TSF) 
Directive193—which is still today (albeit modified and currently under 
the name of ‘Audio-Visual Media Service’ Directive) the pillar of 
European audio-visual policy. 
The Directive was adopted before the entry into force of the 1993 
Maastricht Treaty, and therefore in a time when the EEC lacked a 
competence in the cultural field. The EEC adopted indeed the Directive 
based on the economic value of the sector, under arts. 57(2) and 66 of the 
Treaty of Rome: it classified television broadcasts as services and 
intervened to ensure their free circulation194.  
 
193 Directive 89/552/EEC of October 3rd, 1989. The nickname «Televisions Without 
Frontiers» was inspired by the name of the Italian television program «Games without 
frontiers», previously hosted by Ettore Andenna, then a member of the European 
Parliament and a proponent of the Directive. See PELLICANÒ, F., La tutela delle opere europee 
e della produzione indipendente, in La regolamentazione dei contenuti digitali, studi per i primi 
quindici anni dell’autorità per le garanzie nelle comunicazioni (1998-2013), ed. by Apa, E. and 
Pollicino, O., Aracne, 2015, pp. 347-380, p. 347.  
194 Although the Court of Justice had recognized the principle of free movement of 
television services since 1974 with the ‘Sacchi case’ (Judgement of the Court of April 30th, 
1974, Case no. 155/73), the different rules in force in the Member States were hampering 
the creation of a common broadcasting market. The Directive thus sought to harmonize 
those aspects of national legislation that may have represented obstacles for intra-
Community trade. It introduced minimum standards (regarding advertising, teleshopping 
and sponsoring, protection of minors, etc.) by which any television program could freely 
circulate, provided it fulfilled the Directive’s requirements. That is, as long as television 
programs complied with the law of the originating Member State, as coordinated by the 
Directive, no obstacle, no restriction on reception nor retransmission could be put forward 
by the receiving Member State—with the exclusion of exceptional cases. It is the country-
of-origin principle, without which the single market would not exist: suppliers providing 
services in different Member States must comply only with the law of the country in which 
they are established—as harmonized by the EEC law—and not with those of all the 
countries in which they provide services. However, the Directive only lays down the 
minimum rules needed to guarantee the freedom of transmission in broadcasting. Member 
States may require providers under their jurisdiction to comply with more 
detailed/stringent rules, provided their accordance with the EEC law (art. 3 of the 
Directive). For more details on the country of origin principle, CAGGIANO, G., Paese di 
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The Directive did actually more than just favouring the development of 
a common legal framework to guarantee the free circulation of audio-
visual services. The aim was not only creating a single European audio-
visual market, but also making it large and strong: as a Recital of the 
Directive affirms, «of sufficient size for television productions in the 
Member States to recover necessary investments». 
To pursue this goal, the EEC sought to increase the demand for 
European works by requiring televisions to broadcast a minimum 
percentage of them. It also sought to develop new resources for the 
European production by allowing the Member States to require the 
broadcasters under their jurisdiction to help finance European works 
produced independently from broadcasters. The target was to 
discriminate against the non-European countries, «which clearly meant 
the US, as its programs or films were the only ones threatening to 
compete with European works»195. Indeed, the Directive was adopted 
when public service broadcaster monopolies were abolished and private 
televisions appeared, generating an increasing demand for content, 
mostly satisfied with cheaper US works196. Therefore, during the 
Uruguay Round’s years, the EEC added to the State aid to national film 
industries measures supporting the European industry as a whole. Not 
surprisingly, the establishment of quotas for European works generated 
many criticisms from the US, which objected against the protectionist 
nature of the instrument197. 
 
origine, libera circolazione e giurisdizione, in La nuova televisione europea: commento al “Decreto 
Romani”, ed. by Zeno-Zenovich, V., Maggioli, 2010, pp. 33-47. 
195 BUCHSBAUM, J., Exception taken, p. 65. 
196 DE VINCK, S. and PAUWELS, C., Beyond Borders and into the Digital Era: Future-proofing 
European-level Film Support Schemes, in European Cinema and Television: Cultural policy and 
everyday life, ed. by Bondebjerg, I. et al., Palgrave Macmillan, 2015, pp. 102-123.  
197 The USA invoked indeed the 1974 GATT, alleging its infringement by the provision of 
quotas. The EEC rejected the claim. First, it replied that television programs were not 
subject to GATT, since they are not services but goods. Second, it affirmed that the ultimate 
aim of quotas was to promote European culture and identity and not realize mere 
economic protectionism. Therefore, already at that time, in defending its decision, the EEC 
essentially invoked the concept of cultural exception—even though it was not yet 
competent in the cultural field. The scientific literature on the American criticisms 
following the adoption of the TSF Directive and on the EEC reply is extensive; for more 
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Over time, the EU legislator amended the 1989 Directive on several 
occasions. However, still today the European legislator use quotas to 
push providers active in Europe (both traditional televisions and digital 
platforms) to participate promoting European productions. 
Unlike the EU promotion through investments, the one realized through 
regulation affected the French and Italian State systems of cinema 
promotion, since national laws should implement the principles 
established at the European level. Therefore, European rules on the 
matter will be extensively analysed in Chapter IV, devoted to the Italian 
and French State system of quotas for European and national works. 
 
6.1.2. Investments in activities undervalued by the State 
The European instruments of direct support date back to the end of the 
‘80s. They are two: Eurimages and Media. The first, introduced in 1988, 
is the cultural support fund of the Council of Europe198, financed by the 
contributions of the countries’ members and the repayment by the 
beneficiaries of the aid of the loans received199. Media was instead 
introduced in 1991; in 2014, it ceased to exist as a stand-alone programme 
and was integrated into Creative Europe, the European Commissions' 
framework programme for supporting cultural sectors. Following the 
principle of subsidiarity, both Eurimages and Media were established to 
stimulate activities that individual States would not be able to carry on 
 
details, see, among other: BUCHSBAUM, J. Exception taken; DONALDSON, J. D., "Television 
without frontiers: The continuing tension between liberal free trade and European cultural 
integrity", Fordham International Law Journal 20 (1996): 120-160; ROSS, B. L., "I Love Lucy, 
but the European Community Doesn't: Apparent Protectionism in the European 
Community's Broadcast Market", Brooklyn Journal International Law 16 (1990): 529-560; 
WALKLEY, S. E. To what extent. 
198 As it is well known, the Council of Europe is an international organisation that differs 
from the EU; the fund managed by the Council of Europe is addressed in the same 
paragraph about the support provided by the EU for interest of simplification. 
199 Note that, since 2020, the support takes the form of non-refundable grants when the 
amount received by the recipient project is under € 150 000.  In the case of higher amounts, 
the aid continues to take the form of soft loans, repayable on the basis of the revenues 
generated by the supported project. See the Resolution adopted by the Committee of 
Ministers on September 9th, 2020 amending the Resolution  setting up Eurimages of 
October 26th, 1988. 
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with greater efficiency and effectiveness and to offer types of assistance 
undervalued at the national level, seeking to foster an added value.  
The weaknesses of the European market are historically located outside 
the production phase, the activity traditionally most supported by the 
Member States. European players produce an ever-expanding number 
of films yearly, with numbers that dwarf the US output200. The main 
problem is that the audience for the European films is narrow. First, the 
number of national viewers is limited, since the majority of European 
countries are much less populated than the US and the countries whose 
audio-visual markets are on rise (China, South Korea, Japan, India and 
Mexico). Second, the national limited audiences is not compensated by 
encountering foreign audience: it is difficult for European films to cross 
national borders and circulate in other Member States and outside EU. 
European films are released in only four European countries on 
average201, while US films tend to be released in 10 European countries 
on average202, and the most successful of them manage to encounter a 
global audience.  
Since its origin, Eurimages has aimed to offset the weaknesses of the 
European industry by increasing its possibilities to find markets beyond 
national and European borders. To this extent, Eurimages uses circa 90% 
of its resources to provide loans without interests for the creation of 
independent European co-productions203. Indeed, co-productions 
circulate almost twice and generate three times as many admissions as 
purely national productions204. This seems to occur for at least two 
reasons. First, co-productions have a natural transnational aspect. 
Second, they usually have more backing in terms of economic resources: 
 
200 See CREATIVE EUROPE MEDIA, Media Monitoring Report 2017: Reaching audience across 
borders, 2018, p. 7.  
201 Ibidem. 
202 Ibidem. 
203 For the concept of independence, see par. 3.2. of Chapter II. 
204 EUROPEAN AUDIOVISUAL OBSERVATORY, Film production in Europe: production volume, co-
production and worldwide circulation, 2017, p. 3. Although co-productions accounted for only 
24.2% of overall film production volume in Europe over the period 2010-2015, they 
generated 50.3% of overall attendance for European films during the same period. 
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official co-productions205 are entitled to the benefits granted to national 
films in each of the countries participating in the co-production. This is 
particularly significant when considering that the average production 
cost of a European film is €M 3,2206, while an American film costs 
between $M 80 to $M 85—a figure than can triplicate or even 
quadruplicate in the case of blockbusters207.  
The Media programme also aims to increase the capacity of circulation 
of European works. Since its origin, it has provided support for a wide 
range of activities. Among them, training programs to promote the 
acquisition and improvement of skills and competences by audio-visual 
professionals, knowledge sharing and networking initiatives; 
development, distribution and promotion of European works (for 
example by facilitating their access to professional audio-visual trade 
events, markets and international festival); promotion within Europe of 
non-national European works (for example by supporting a European 
cinema operators’ network screening a significant proportion of non-
national European films); programs of technological improvement. In 
any case, more than a half of the Media’s budget is devoted to 
international distribution. 
When considering the persisting fragmentation and lack of cross-
borders circulation of European films, one can doubt the impact realized 
by Eurimages and Media: «[…] while the seeds of pan-European 
awareness may have been sown, claiming that Media and/or Eurimages 
have contributed to the realization of a European single audio-visual or 
film market would be stretching it too far»208. These results could stem 
from the fact that the budget of Eurimages and Media is limited 
compared to the scale of the European audio-visual industry209. 
 
205 They are those realised accordingly to the European Convention on Cinematographic 
Co-Production of the Council of Europe, signed in 1994 and updated in 2017. 
206 EUROPEAN AUDIOVISUAL OBSERVATORY, Fiction film financing in Europe: a sample analysis 
of films released in 2017, 2019, p. 6. 
207 CUCCO, M., Economia dei film. Industria, politiche, mercati, Carocci, 2020, p. 30. 
208 DE VINCK, S. and PAUWELS. C., Beyond borders and into the digital era, p. 106. 
209 See footnote n. 245 of par. 3.1. of Chapter II. Note that, among the reasons why the 
Eurimages funding are limited there is the fact that the self-fuelling mechanism of the fund 
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However, the situation would have been probably worse in absence of 
Eurimages and Media: if they did not succeed in significantly 
augmenting the circulation of European works, they probably helped to 
prevent it from shrinking even more.  
 
6.2 Promoting cinema locally: an opportunity for economic 
development 
The State no longer has exclusive competence in film promotion even 
within national borders. In France, the legislator has established that all 
levels of governments (State, regions, departments, and municipalities) 
should participate in developing culture since the beginning of the ‘80210. 
In Italy, art. 9 of  the Constitution entrusts with the task of promoting 
culture the ‘Republic’, term that encompasses all government levels. It 
follows that the promotion of culture, and therefore of cinema, is a task 
directed to all of them. More precisely, it should be considered a matter 
of concurrent legislative competences: State laws are in charge of 
determining the fundamental principles of cinema promotion, while the 
Regions have the power to promulgate specific laws applicable in their 
territory211. 
 
did not properly take place: the works that receive funding are not always able to pay back 
what they obtained. CUCCO, M., Economia dei film, p. 177.  
210 Act Law no. 8/1983 of January 7th. Note that, however, there are no specific regulatory 
provisions relating to the local support to the film and audio-visual industry, not even in 
the CCIA. In their absence, local aids to the film industry fall within the common 
framework governing economic intervention by local authorities, established in the Code 
général des collectivités territoriales (CGCT) See LE ROY, M., “Cinéma”, JurisClasseur 
Administratif 267 (2019), and INSPECTION GÉNÉRALE DES FINANCES and INSPECTION 
GÉNÉRALE DES AFFAIRES CULTURELLES, Évaluation de politique publique: le soutien à l'économie 
du livre et du cinéma en region, 2017. 
211 This is because of Title V of the Constitution, which provides the detailed distribution 
of competences between the State and the Regions (as amended by Constitutional Law no. 
3/2001 of October 18th). Indeed, under its art. 117(3), the cultural activities are a matter of 
concurrent competences, and the Constitutional Court established that the ‘cinema’ 
(matter not expressly regulated) should be considered part of them. See Judgment of the 
Constitutional Court of July 21st, 2004, Case no. 255 and 256. However, note that the State 
had recognized to the Regions some competences in the audio-visual sector before 2001.  
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Given their competences on the matter, both the French and Italian 
regions progressively began to provide aid to the film industry. Today, 
in most cases they look at the sector as a potential economic opportunity 
rather than a tool for cultural development. Indeed, the main goal they 
consider in promoting cinema is attracting national and international 
productions to their territories to obtain local economic development 
and growth. 
The economic benefits arising from the presence of film productions are 
many: the expenditure on local goods and services made by the film 
crew; the impact on domestic employment; the development of 
professional competencies; the promotion of the region’s image and 
cultural heritage, increasing the international brand awareness of the 
country, in turn fostering tourism212. Given these results can occur while 
supporting any kind of audio-visual work, the regions have anticipated 
the State rapidly adopting measures of support for all types of products: 
not only the cinematographic ones, but also those used to be considered 
for a long time less 'meritorious', such as tv series, works for internet and 
commercials. 
The Italian and French regions have progressively devised two 
instruments to attract productions in their territories: Film Commissions 
and direct film funds. The film Commissions were established on the 
 
212 It is the 'movie tourism' phenomenon, which occurs when an audio-visual product gives 
visibility to a territory and stimulates people to visit it. According to CUCCO, M., Economia 
dei film, pp. 212 and ff., Italian Regions' tend to overestimate the perception of such a 
phenomenon: although it exists, it happens in limited cases (in Italy, the most important 
ones occurred from the television series "Il commissario Montalbano", "Don Matteo", "Elisa di 
Riovmbrosa" and the films "La passione di Cristo", "Benvenuti al sud" and "Chiamami col tuo 
nome"). The author points out that the over-dimensioning of the movie tourism 
phenomenon risks creating disincentives. Among these, the refusal to make regional 
locations available for the shooting of works unsuitable for generating tourist effects 
because likely to spread a negative image of the region. Think of the controversies raised 
by the film "La bella addormentata" by Marco Bellocchio (2012) and the series "Gommorra-La 
serie" (2014). The first, inspired by the story of Eluana Englaro, led to a temporary closure 
of the Friuli-Venezia Giulia Film Commissions. According to the Regional Council of the 
Friuli, the Film Commission was responsible for supporting the production of a film that 
links the region's image to the issue of euthanasia. The second provoked many debates for 
associating the image of Naples with organized crime. Hence, the reiterated refusal of local 
governments to grant the locations needed for filming, overcome only after a long 
negotiation with the production company. 
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early ‘50s’ US experience and are usually public offices operating within 
local administrations213. They do not provide production companies 
with direct funding, rather having the role of production facilitators. 
They provide indeed both in pre-production and during shooting time 
free support of a logistical nature, usually regardless of any qualitative 
evaluation of the projects helped214.  
In addition to the Film Commissions’ services, some regions have also 
progressively began to support production companies that choose their 
territory as a location with direct funding,  normally given without 
qualitative assessments. However, the production company must 
respect several conditions: among others, a minimum percentage of 
shooting must be realized in the region; a minimum percentage of 
workers must be local; the local expense made by the production 
company must be superior to the received aid. These conditions are 
grounded on the idea that the aid should ensure a positive local 
economic impact, which should in turn be verifiable and accountable—
granting a positive final balance for the region. Film Commissions works 
differently: they provide support to anyone, under the uncertain hope 
that the aided productions will spend in the territory more than the Film 
Commission costed to the local administration. 
 
6.2.1. The coordination (or lack thereof) with the State 
In France, there has always been an attempt to coordinate the activities 
of audio-visual support carried out by the local authorities and the State. 
The first Regions' action in the industry, which dates back to the mid-
 
213 CANOVA, L., FABBRI, T., MEDOLAGO ALBANI, F. and VERSACE, A., L'evoluzione del sostegno 
pubblico all'audiovisivo, in L'industria della comunicazione in Italia. 1987-2008: le trasformazioni 
dell'industria della comunicazione in Italia, Guerini e Associati, 2008, pp. 275-302, p. 278. 
214 Among the services Film Commissions offer, there might be a discharge of 
administrative paperwork for shooting or possible authorizations needed; grading and 
fees negotiation for hotels/restaurants/set catering; crew offices and working spaces; 
assistance in location scouting etc. 
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80s215, was developed under the State's stimulus. Given the crisis of the 
French film industry after the outbreak of private televisions, the State 
intervened to multiply the sources of cinema funding. In addition to 
creating new instruments to incentivize private investments216, it 
recognized to territorial autonomies the power to adopt initiatives to 
support the sector. Compared with private investors, territorial 
autonomies were more likely to ensure the State with greater control 
over the use of resources and higher capacity to align the initiatives to 
its goals. In essence, the actions of territorial autonomies in this first 
phase were products of State programmes217. Progressively, territorial 
autonomies stopped to merely apply ministerial circulars and became 
capable of determining and implementing their own form of support, 
becoming real public partners of the central State in cinema promotion. 
Still, while French regions acquired more autonomy, coordination with 
the central State continues to exist. 
Regarding the activities of the Film Commissions (called commissions 
locales or bureaux d 'accueil des tournages) central coordination is ensured 
by the Commission Nationale du film France, which is the first entity that 
foreign productions interested in shooting in France should address218. 
It is a non-profit-making association under the Ministry of Culture’s 
authority, financed by the CNC219. Forms of coordination with the 
central State are also provided for the regional funds. The coordination 
 
215 Indeed, the first regional Funds were set up in 1985 (Aquitaine) and 1986 (Midi-
Pyrénées). See COUR DES COMPTES, Les soutiens à la production cinématographique et 
audiovisuelle : des changements nécessaires, 2014, p. 40, footnote no. 51. 
216 The SOFICA and the IFCIC, see par. 2.4. of this Chapter. 
217 For the whole discourse, refer to PERLO, N., Le droit public du cinéma, p. 411 and ff. The 
support was mainly granted to theaters, cinema promotion activities and education 
programmes. 
218 The Film France’s role of ensuring coordination among the activities carried out at local 
levels is clearly reflected in its governance: its board of directors includes representatives 
of central and local administrations and institutions (such as the CNC, several Ministries 
and associations of territorial autonomies); qualified professionals, such as film and 
television producers; representatives of the network of local film commissions. See the 
Film France’s Statute. 
219 CNC, Bilan, 2019, p. 270. The Commissions locales normally receive funding by the CNC 
only during their first three years of existence, instead. 
 90 
is guaranteed by the Conventions de coopération cinématographique et 
audiovisuelle, adopted since the ‘90s and whose achievement is necessary 
for local-self goverments to obtain State contributions to their funds. The 
agreements, that last three years, must be realized between each 
territorial autonomy involved and the State, represented by the CNC 
and the Regional Directorates of Cultural Affairs (DRAC, the services of 
the French Minister of Culture in each region of France)220. The 
agreements aim to structure a coherent support policy based on the 
specificities of each local area, engaging all French levels of government 
in a systematic consultation and exchange of information221. They 
indicate the types of aid adopted by the local government, their amounts 
and the conditions of eligibility, and the CNC’s and DRAC’s economic 
contribution to the local funds222.  
Concerning the matter of coordination, the Italian case is different. As in 
France, the support provided by territorial autonomies has increased 
overtime. Italian regions’ interest on the matter was initially limited, and 
they offered some financial help just to local festivals, film reviews, and 
film libraries. They began to broaden the range of their action at the end 
of the ‘90s, when they noted that the audio-visual production could have 
significant impact on local economy, in addition to intangible cultural 
 
220 The DRAC began to take part in the agreement since 2000. Before their presence was not 
necessary, since the CNC had its own regional delegations.  
221 As affirmed by the CNC, Bilan, 2019, p. 269, the agreements are an instrument of 
dialogue, negotiation, and execution of joint actions. They have a triple concern: coherence 
of the undertaken actions, transparency, and traceability of the deployed funding. 
222 Since 2001, the CNC contribution to regional funds is based on a pre-established 
mechanism concerning aid to production. Provided that the regional fund has an 
endowment not inferior to a certain amount, the adopted ration is «1 euro of CNC for 2 
euro of the region». In short, for every two euros devoted by the region to film production, 
the CNC provided the regional fund with one euro. However, there is an established limit 
to the contribution of the CNC to production activities, set at a maximum of € 2 M each 
year. Concerning aids for activities other than production, the contribution of the CNC 
depends on a case by case. For more information, see COUR DES COMPTES, Les soutiens à la 
production cinématographique, pp. 40 and ff., and INSPECTION GÉNÉRALE DES FINANCES and 
INSPECTION GÉNÉRALE DES AFFAIRES CULTURELLES, Évaluation de politique publique.  
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benefits223. The institution of film commissions224 and film funds225 have 
progressively led to the relocation of the productions' activities, 
historically settled almost exclusively in Rome for films and in Milan for 
televisions and advertising. Indeed, Italian producers and directors have 
seized with increasing reactivity the opportunity to use new and various 
locations with both logistic and economic incentives. 
Despite the great vivacity of the local actions, the phenomenon 
developed with totally spontaneous and poorly coordinated methods 
and processes. Indeed, the local film funds and Film Commissions were 
developed without a clear regulatory framework and without a proper 
connection with the central State, implying the risk of unproductive 
overlaps and compromising an efficient use of public resources226—a 
trend that generally belongs to Italian industrial policies227. 
 
223 CUCCO, M., Economia dei film, pp. 205 and 206. 
224 The first film commission was founded in Emilia Romagna in 1997 and currently almost 
all regions have one. They have different juridical and organizational forms. Most are 
foundations of participation that operate thanks to a fund financed by the constituent 
members (among which is always the region, often municipalities and provinces), 
following the guidelines lines they established; others are offices within the region—in this 
case, they tend to be a direct extension of the regional councillors to tourism, culture, or 
productive activities; others are in-house companies, regional agencies, or private 
associations that have an agreement with local and regional authorities. The most 
important Italian film commission are grouped into a national association, the Italian Film 
Commission, which in charge of carrying out a dialogue to define shared solutions. 
225 Film funds have been developed since 2003; the first case is that of the Friuli-Venezia 
Giulia (CANOVA, L. ET AL, L'evoluzione del sostegno pubblico all'audiovisivo, p. 289). In the 
majority of the cases the funds are managed by the film commissions their self, and not by 
the territorial autonomies that instituted them—as it tend to happen in the other European 
countries. 
226 For further information, Il senso del cinema e dell’audiovisivo per i territori, 2013, research 
report carried out by the Fondazione Rosselli for the Institute Luce-Cinecittà with the 
supervision of the General Directorate for Cinema.  
227 See CAMPANINI, L., Dimensione e caratteristiche aggregate degli incentivi alle imprese in Italia, 
in Una nuova politica industriale, pp. 33-36, cit. p. 34 and 35 («L’intervento multilivello che 
caratterizza la politica industriale, in modo via via piu ̀ pervasivo, comporta talvolta misure in 
sovrapposi- zione e con effetti di reciproco spiazzamento […]Sembra mancare un comune quadro di 
riferimento di strategie e obiettivi unitari e con- vergenti»)  
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A partial change of paradigm occurs with the 2016 Act. The latter 
maintains a centralist approach, unlike what happens today in many 
other industries supported by the public sector228. However, it officially 
acknowledges the fundamental roles acquired by the regions in 
supporting the audio-visual sector. Indeed, it recognizes Italian regions 
as effective 'places' for the audio-visual sector's government229 and 
provides basic rules to ensure forms of coordination and avoid 
ineffective overlapping230. Still, nothing is specified about the 
'competition' between regional funds and State’s ones. This confirms the 
parallel nature of local and central aids. However, such a stratification 
of funding between different government levels should be at least 
monitored by the new National Coordination of Film Commissions231. It 
operates within the General Directorate for Cinema (DGC) of the 
Ministry of Culture, and it is composed by the Cinema General Director, 
a representative of the Film Commission of each region or province, and 
a representative of each region or province that finances at least one film 
commission. The institute is in charge of carrying out analyses and 
proposals to harmonize and make more effective the State and regional 
actions; monitoring the outcome of territorial policies; and proposing 
coordinated actions to promote Italian production abroad.  
 
228 As noted by AVERARDI, A., ”Gli ausili pubblici al settore cinematografico tra eccezione 
culturale e regole di mercato”, Munus 1(2019): 259-287, p. 282. 
229 See art. 4 of the 2016 Act, dedicated to the role of the regions in the audio-visual sector. 
230 See Decree of the Minister of Culture no. 63/2018 of January 25th, which specified the 
provisions established by art. 4 of the 2016 Act. It provides some guidelines and parameters 
that the regions should follow. First, it calls for the goals and definitions adopted by the 
territorial autonomies to be consistent with the 2016 Act. In short, the State wants the 
regions to consider the aid that exists at the central level and the definitions established by 
the State, while implementing their forms of support. Second, the Decree establishes that 
the regions should respect the publicity and transparency principles in allocating funds, 
pursue the simplification and rationalization of procedures, ensure certainty in the timing 
of aid disbursement, and monitor and control the use of resources. 
231 As noted by SAU, A., "La legge n. 220 del 2016: quale spazio per le autonomie locali?", 
Aedon 1 (2018). The new institute has been established by the Decree no. 63/2018. 
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Chapter II – Players, interests and State 
regulation in today’s film industry 
 
1. Preliminary remark  
This chapter focuses on the organization of the film industry today. It 
takes into account how the industry has been 'shaken' by the disruptive 
entrance on the market of the global digital providers and the Covid-19 
pandemic, as well as how it is affected by the regulatory activity of the 
State.  
Indeed, the film industry's organization does not depend only on the free 
decisions of its operators: the Italian State (like the French one) limits 
their economic freedom in order to pursue the collective interest of the 
promotion of culture referred to in art. 9 of the Italian Constitution. This 
is in accordance with the following art. 41. of the Constitution, which 
recognizes that «private economic enterprise shall be free» (par. 1), but 
also provides that «it may not be carried out against the common good» 
(par. 2), and that «the law shall provide for appropriate programmes and 
controls so that public and private-sector economic activity may be 
oriented and coordinated for social purposes» (par. 3) 232.   
Some of the issues raised in this chapter may seem relevant to the 
internal business relationship of audio-visual operators only, by no 
means related to the State and the public sector. However, how those 
internal relationships are organised strongly affects whether or not the 
objectives of the State can be achieved. The behaviour of private 
 
232 This way, the Constitution seems to assume that the social destination of the economic 
activity is not guaranteed in the absence of State intervention (as noted by GALGANO, F. 
"La libertà di iniziativa economica privata nel sistema delle libertà costituzionali." Trattato 
di diritto commerciale e di diritto pubblico dell’economia, ed. by Galgano, F. (1977): 516 ss., p. 
514: «la norma costituzionale mostra qui di muovere dalla premessa che, in mancanza di programmi 
e di controlli, che la indirizzino e la coordinino, non può dirsi garantita la destinazione sociale 
dell’attività economica»). Therefore, it seems to  suggest that the State can carry out an 
«operational planning» of private economic activity to direct it towards social utility 
purposes («pianificazione operativa», expression used by BALDASSARRE, A. “Iniziativa 
economica privata”. Enciclopedia del diritto, XII (1971): 582-609, pp. 582 and ff., p. 598). 
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operators is essential to the very realization of the goals pursued through 
the State promotional legislation—as noted since 1971 by Donatello 
Serrani,  who criticizes the juridical literature’s substantially one-sided 
view on the phenomenon of public aids, focusing very much on public 
power, public administration, and State and very little on private 
operators233.  
 
2. Questioning the tradition: current quakes in the three 
phases of a film life cycle (deferment)  
The traditional scheme identifies three interrelated phases in the film 
industry’s organisation, chronologically ordered: 
1. production, which consists of all the activities aimed at creating 
a film (par. 3);  
2. distribution, which deals with the promotion of the film and its 
placing in cinema theatres;  
3. and exhibition, during which the film is actually released in 
theatres and meet the public for the first time. Indeed, according 
to the traditional scheme, the cinematographic work is the one 
distributed in cinema theatres first, only appearing on other 
distribution channels after a certain time is elapsed. 
The laws on cinema promotion of the Italian and French States 
incorporate this premise: in order to obtain State aids to the cinema, a 
work should be ‘mainly’ intended for the distribution in theatres (par. 
4); if this is not the case, the applicant should apply for other types of 
aids, such as those for television or web works—similar to those for 
cinema but less conspicuous. 
However, the principle that cinema theatres should be the first 
exploitation channels of cinematographic works is currently under 
discussion for both practical and conceptual reasons (par. 5). Among the 
practical, the evidence that the current state of the distribution and 
exhibition sectors makes access to cinema theatres difficult for many 
films funded by State aid to the cinema in Italy. Among the more 
 
233 SERRANI, D., Lo stato finanziatore, p. 171. 
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conceptual reasons, there is the argument that linking the definition of 
cinema to theatre exploitation is an approach that confuses the product 
with the vehicle that brings it to the public.  
Such an argument emerged following the strategies of SVOD providers. 
Some of them combine the entire traditional audio-visual value chain 
within the same company: production, distribution, and consumption. 
Among the contents they produce, there are not only series but also 
feature films. Although not conceived for theatres and directly 
distributed online, some of these films have been considered 
'cinematographic' by a part of the industry; they managed to participate 
in cinematographic festivals and awards network.  
The Covid-19 pandemic has accelerated the on-going transformations, 
exacerbating the debate; due to the forced closure of theatres, the Italian 
and French State allowed producers and distributors to seek agreements 
with online platforms and televisions’ distributors, instead of 
postponing releases. This way, although having been financed through 
State aid to the cinema, some films were directly distributed in first view 
online and on TV. 
 
3. The production phase and the drawbacks of a ‘small-
is-good’ approach 
As anticipated, the first phase of the film industry is the production one, 
which consists of all the activities aimed at creating a film234. In Europe, 
this phase is the one in which the largest number of audio-visual 
companies are active. In Italy, more than 72% of the audio-visual 
companies operate in the production sector (6.85% in the distribution 
 
234 It can be broken down into four sub-stages: development, pre-production, production, 
and post-production. During the development phase, the film project's idea is developed 
into a screenplay and the producer can estimate the film's budget, evaluating the expected 
costs and the likely return on the investments, resulting in a go/no-go decision. In the case 
of a positive decision, the process continues in the pre-production stage, during which 
most of the time the producer raises funds for the realization of the film. The pre-
production stage is followed by the production one, during which the film is shot, and by 
the post-production stage, in which the editors cut and edit the film, adding sound, visual 
and special effects, voice-overs, songs, music scoring, colour correction, and other details. 
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department,  and 20.58% in the exhibition one)235. Possibly because the 
production phase tends to be organized around single projects and is not 
subject to barriers to the entrance236. 
Many Italian and French production companies are undercapitalized 
(i.e. small in size, employed, and turnover), with low investment 
potential, difficulty in risk management, and unable to operate 
according to a medium-long-term strategy237. By elaborating the data 
reported in 2020 by the Italian Audio-visual producers association 
(APA) concerning the Italian case238, it appears that 72% of the 
production companies have a turnover of less than €100,000 per year; 
only 1,8% of them have an annual turnover of more than €5 M239. 
Moreover: more than 95% of enterprises employ no more than ten 
people; only 0.8% of them have more than 50 employees. 
The ‘fragmentation’ of the production department is partly due to the 
fact that the cultural purpose of the State action led to traditionally 
granted aids for the implementation of specific projects rather than as 
structural support for companies. In other words, the European States 
 
235 See UNIVERSITA ̀ CATTOLICA and PTSCLAS S.P.A, Valutazione di impatto della legge cinema e 
dell’audiovisivo. Anni 2017-2018, 2019, p. 61. 
236 BAGNASCO, A. M., Il settore cinematografico, in I mercati dei media 2019, ed. by Ardizzone, 
A. et al., FrancoAngeli, 2019, pp. 43- 115, pp. 58 and ff. 
237 For Italy, see ibidem; for France, BOUTONNAT, D., Rapport sur le financement prive ́de la 
production et de la distribution cineḿatographiques et audiovisuelles, 2018. 
238 See APA, Rapporto statistico nazionale core filiera audiovisiva (cinema e televisione), 2020.  
239 Note that most of their revenues of the production department do not come from 
cinematographic works but from other types of audio-visual contents. In 2019, the three 
top companies active in the film and audio-visual production sector were Cattleya, 
Wildside, and Palomar.  Audio-visual series generated €89 M out of the €110 M Cattleya’s 
total revenues. Even in Wildside's case, most of the revenue came from television 
productions (€69,471 M), followed at a proper distance from the cinematographic ones 
(€7,010 M). As a confirmation of the current trend, the TV/Fiction production represented 
the predominant business area also for Palomar. See TORLASCHI, V. “Produzioni: facciamo 
i conti”. Box office: il mondo del cinema e il suo bussiness (2020), pp. 16 and ff. 
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have focused more on the meritoriousness of specific work rather than 
on that of the companies in charge to carry them out.  
This approach is consistent with the European Commission's principle 
that State aid must benefit cultural products240, and the presence of many 
companies should also reflect positively in the culturally diverse output. 
However, the focus on single meritorious work risks compromising the 
consolidation of the audio-visual companies and the sector's industrial 
basis, drifting towards a natalist policy of enterprises and medium-low 
budget films, having a limited capacity to penetrate abroad and 
sometimes failing to find a public even in the country of origin241. 
The most important Italian production companies, those that seek to 
compete at an international level, show the exigence of industrial 
strengthening. Indeed, in recent years the market of Italian production 
companies—which new players continue to join—has grown along two 
evolution lines: the aggregation between national companies; the entry 
of foreign groups that aim at an extended and increasingly global 
 
240 See par. 2 of Chapter III. 
241 See BAGNASCO, A. M, Il settore cinematografico, p. 48. However, the limited international 
penetration of Italian films does not depend only on many companies' undercapitalization. 
There are several reasons why Italy is the last country among the most important European 
markets in terms of national films' international box office results. The UK achieves the 
best results (mostly due to films realized in collaboration with the American Studios, 
however), followed by France, Germany, and Spain. Actually, Italy exports a higher 
number of films than Spain; however, the average international audience reached by 
Italian films abroad is half than the Spanish ones. The first reason is that Italian movies 
have an intrinsic shortfall compared to the other big markets. France, Germany, UK, and 
Spain share their language with other European and/or extra European countries, 
therefore exporting their work with greater ease. Italy instead can only rely on the Italian 
speaking area of Switzerland. Second, the movies with high commercial international 
success tend to be art-house films dealing with 'universal' values, and Italy produces many 
comedies strongly tied to the local context, having as leading characters national television 
celebrities. However, even when considering art-house films, the primary market for 
Italian works is the domestic one. The films of the Italian director Luca Guadagnino 
represent a peculiar case. They generally obtain modest success in Italy and a great one 
abroad. In the case of "Call me by your name", only $3,2M out of its total revenues ( $41,8M) 
came from the distribution in Italian theatres (ibidem, p. 236). For more information on all 
the discourse, SCAGLIONI, M., Cinema made in Italy. La circolazione internazionale 
dell'audiovisivo italiano, Carocci, 2020. 
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control242. This second trend could prove to be problematic in the long 
term: it could result in transferring to foreign companies the ownership 
of works produced in Italy––and thanks to the Italian State funding.  
Think of the highly successful Italian series “Montalbano”: the risk is that 
the commercial benefits deriving from its exploitation will enrich, 
instead of the Italian society Palomar, the French group Mediawen243. 
Another characteristic of many European production companies is that 
they do not operate in phases other than production, i.e. in the 
distribution and the exhibition departments.  On the matter, the 
European case is very different from that of the Hollywood studios, the 
most common producers from the US, all headquartered in Los Angeles 
(Columbia, Paramount, Universal, Walt Disney, and Warner Bros). One 
of the reasons for their success is that they have all been involved in 
vertical integration processes: through purchases and mergers of 
companies, they began to operate in  other sectors beyond production. 
This way, the studios increased their control over the economic 
environment in which they operate, eliminating/containing the costs of 
negotiations between the different phases of a film's life cycle.  All the 
films they produce manage to be distributed and released in cinema 
theatres without encountering obstacles, given that these results do not 




242 In 2014, the Italian Leone Film Group acquired the Italian production company Lotus. 
In 2015, the British Fremantle Media acquired the Italian company Wildside. In 2015, the 
Italian animation company Rainbow purchased fellow animation company Bardel 
Entertainment, and in 2017 Rainbow acquired a majority stake in Iven S.p.A., which owns 
the production company Colorado Film. In 2016, the Italian production companies 
DryMedia and Magnolia SPA merged into a single entity, Banijay Italia. In 2017, the British 
ITV Studio acquired a majority stake (51%) in Cattleya. The French Federation 
Entertainment did the same concerning Fabula Pictures in 2018. In 2019,  it was the turn of 
Palomar: French Group Mediawan took a majority stake (72%) in it. 
243 See the previous footnote. 
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3.1. Funding production: public and private resources  
To realise their films, Italian and French producers have multiple 
funding sources. Sometimes they can find themselves in a pre-financing 
economy rather than in an exploitation one, recovering their investments 
before the film is actually produced and distributed. This state of affairs 
raises concerns about the potential risk that producers merely focus on 
a logic of continually making new films, being uninterested in their 
works' commercial success. However, this risk seems to be less 
significant than it may appear. The economic failure of a film may not 
lead to losses in the short term for producers. However, it generates 
losses in the long one, making it more difficult to find resources to 
produce new works. This is also true for public resources, as the entity 
of some State aids granted to producers depends on the success of their 
previous film; moreover, the entity of other State aids is based on the 
film production costs, which decrease if private investments decrease.  
Once clarified this crucial point, it is possible to present the different 
funding sources for cinematographic works. In Europe, the most 
significant are the public ones, that accounted for 26% of total financing 
in 2019244. They include those coming from the Council of State and the 
EU—quite limited actually245; from national States; and territorial 
 
244 EUROPEAN AUDIOVISUAL OBSERVATORY, Yearbook 2019/2020: key trends, 2020, p. 8. 
However, the same study shows that there are notable differences among individual 
countries. The weight of direct public funding decreases with increasing market size and 
vice versa. Direct public funding represents only 21% of total financing in France, UK, 
Germany, Spain and Italy; it accounts for 43% in medium-sized and 54% in small sample 
markets. In general, films with a budget of up to €3 M depend on a higher degree on direct 
support. Those with higher budgets finance their production with proportionally higher 
percentage of pre-sales and broadcaster investments.  
245 Eurimages has a total annual budget of approximately € 27.5 M and Media funds for 
2014-2020 was € 820 M, i.e., € 108M per year. This accounts for just 0.1% of the overall 
European audio-visual production value, estimated at almost € 134 B in 2015 (Creative 
Europe Media Monitoring Report, p. 19). However, Media Funds have been significantly 
increased for the period 2021-2027. Focusing on the Italian case, the elaboration of the data 
reported overtime by ANICA, Tutti i numeri del cinema italiano, shows that in the years 2013-
2018, Media and Eurimages contributed to Italian cinematographic productions through € 
0.2 M and € 1.8 M per year, respectively. These numbers represent just 0.08% and 0.7% of 
the overall funding for the national film production. 
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autonomies246. Concerning Stare resources, note that production is the 
phase that has traditionally obtained the most support247. This for two 
reasons. First, production in Europe is generally the most expensive 
phase248. Second, the production phase is the one in which the nature and 
quality of the film are determined: it is the most appropriate phase in 
which to intervene for a State pursuing cultural purposes249. 
Among the private resources, the most important are the resources of 
the producer himself (18% of the total financing in 2019250) and the 
resources from the pre-sale of the film's distribution rights (15%251). 
 
246 In Italy, between 2013 and 2018, the Regions contributed with an average of € 7.8 M per 
year to the production of 100% Italian or coproduced with Italy cinematographic works. 
This way, the Regions covered on average 9% of the annual costs in this regard (elaboration 
by the author of the data provided overtime by ANICA, Tutti i  numeri del cinema italiano). It 
is not easy to assess the percentage of the cost of production of cinematographic works 
covered by French Regions. However, it is clear that the resources provided by the French 
regions to the overall audio-visual sector, and those provided by the State to encourage the 
regions' commitment, are growing. The overall commitments established in the 17 
agreements realized by the Regions and the State amounted to €158 M in 2019. Of these 
€158 M, €33.4 M were provided by the CNC, € 9.1 M by the DRAC and €115.7 M directly 
by the regions. In the last fifteen years, the State's commitment (CNC+DRAC) increased 
fourfold (it was €10.1 M in 2004). Over the same period, local and regional authorities' 
commitments increased threefold (it was €35.5 M in 2004). All partners combined, 
commitments increased 3.5 times between 2004 (€45.6 M) and 2019 (€158 M). See CNC, 
Bilan, 2019, pp. 270 and 271.  
247 Note that the particular attention given to the production phase is not only a State 
approach. Concerning Italy, one can say the same about the regions, which do not fund the 
distribution phase. Since they are not co-producers and do not hold the film's rights, they 
do not obtain economic advantage from the more extensive circulation of the films 
supported (if one excluded the film tourism effect). Furthermore, supporting distribution 
would mean granting resources that would be spent outside the local territory, in contrast 
with the regional logic of cinema support. See CUCCO, M., L’architettura di politiche a sostegno 
dell’export cinematografico, in Cinema made in Italy, pp. 55-75, p. 59. 
248 It is different in the US, where the distribution budget of the blockbusters can sometimes 
be higher than the production one (CUCCO, M., Economia dei film, p. 42). 
249 As noted by CUCCO, M., L’architettura di politiche a sostegno dell’export cinematografico, p. 
58. 
250 EUROPEAN AUDIOVISUAL OBSERVATORY, Yearbook 2019/2020, p. 8.  
251 Ibidem, which also shows that the significance of pre-sales as a financing source increases 
with the market size. Pre-sales tend to carry most weight in large markets, where they 
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Although the film does not exist in this stage yet, it may already have 
been sold to distributors, indeed. These cases mainly happen when 
distributors believe that the work is promising because of highly 
successful actors, for example. The pre-sale practice, risky for 
distributors, is very convenient for the producer, ensuring the film 
access to the distribution market. Other possible private resources are 
those coming from one or more co-producers, from the practices of 
product placement252 and crowdfunding253. 
Finally, producers can benefit from private resources invested in the film 
industry because of the State.  First, private operators sometimes invest 
in the sector because of a State encouragement action (such as the offer 
of tax incentive programs or State guarantee).  Second, both Italy and 
France require AVMS providers under their jurisdiction to invest a part 
of their revenues to fund the production of new national and European 
works—thus implementing European rules254. In the past, these 
obligations only applied to traditional televisions (whose investments 
account for 24% of total financing in Europe in 2019, representing the 
second major source of funding after public resources255). Today, digital 
platforms are also asked to meet investment quotas.  
Through all the sources of funding listed, European players produce an 
ever-expanding number of films yearly, with numbers that dwarf the US 
output (figure 1). The 'big five' (France, UK, Germany, Italy, and Spain) 
produce the vast majority of them (fig. 2). 
 
accounted for 17% in 2017, compared to only 10% in medium-sized and 6% in small sample 
markets. 
252 Also known as embedded marketing, product placement is a marketing technique 
where a production company incorporates into a film references to specific brands or 
products (such as automobiles or consumer electronics) with specific promotional intent 
and in exchange for compensation. Commonly adopted since the 1980s in the US, product 
placement has become a common form of funding also in Europe since the 2000s, when 
the European and national legislators legitimized it. It was before prohibited to protect 
consumers.  
253 Usually realized through the internet, crowdfunding consists of raising many small 
amounts of money from many people. 
254 As anticipated in par. 6.1.1. of Chapter I and will be further explained in Chapter IV. 
255 EUROPEAN AUDIOVISUAL OBSERVATORY, Yearbook 2019/2020, p. 8.  
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Source. Annual reports of the European Audiovisual Observatory of Strasbourg (EAO) “World 
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Fig. 2. Number of films produced by the big five during the period 2010-2018 
Source. Annual reports of the EAO “World Film Market Trends” 
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3.1.1. The potential of funding cinema through web-based giants  
As just mentioned, investment obligations apply to both linear and non-
linear providers. Moreover, by derogating to the country-of-origin 
principle, the European legislator has allowed the Member States to 
apply investment quotas also to providers that target their territories 
without being established there256. This way, international digital 
platforms active in Europe are prevented from eluding their duty to 
promote local independent productions. The forced involvement in the 
production of independent257 European and national content of 
operators such as Netflix and Amazon appears simultaneously a 
precious source of opportunities and a reason for disquiet and concerns.   
First of all, their involvement should ensure significant resources for 
creating new works, compensating for the reduction of the resources 
invested by traditional televisions. The level of investment of each 
operator is based on the level of its revenues. Those of broadcasters 
dropped during the pandemic, despite their increased audiences; 
indeed, the drop had to do with the contraction of advertising spending, 
which is not linked to the audience's level but to that of economic 
prosperity258.  On the contrary, the revenues of the paid VOD market 
(SVOD and TVOD) skyrocketed during the lockdown, which 
exacerbated their trend of fast and continuous growth. Indeed, in 
Europe, the VODs’ turnover has multiplied thirty times over the course 
of ten years: their revenues increased from €388.8 M in 2010 to € 11.6 B 
in 2020259. The SVODs mainly drove this trend, exploding from €12 M of 
 
256 See par. 4 of Chapter IV. 
257 For the concept of independence, see par. 3.2. of this Chapter. 
258 For more information about the all Europe, EUROPEAN AUDIOVISUAL OBSERVATORY, The 
European audio-visual industry in the time of COVID-19, 2020. For the specific case of France, 
CONSEIL SUPÉRIEUR DE L’AUDIOVISUEL, Effets de la crise sanitaire sur le secteur audiovisuel, 
2020. 
259 EUROPEAN AUDIOVISUAL OBSERVATORY, Trends in the VOD Market in the EU28, 2021. 
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revenues in 2010 to € 9.7 B in 2020, with a compound annual growth rate 
of 95% ––while the revenues of TVODs rocketed from € 377 to €1.87 B260.  
Although the VOD market is booming in Europe, non-European players 
still dominate it: the growth is mainly driven by global tech companies 
of the American entertainment industry (while European companies 
excel in the traditional sectors, such as television). The major operators 
are Netflix and Amazon, which still own a significant part of the SVOD 
European market (respectively 39% and 29% of the subscribers, and 55% 
and 19% of the revenues261)—as fig. 3 and 4 show.  However, the 
equilibrium is set to evolve through the consolidation of new players.  
Today the situation appears indeed much more fluid than just a few 
years ago, with European media groups launching their services and 
new international operators entering the market. Among them, Disney+, 
which raised more than 60 M of subscriptions in its first nine months, a 




262 See PASQUALE, A., L’audiovisivo ai temi della pandemia: chi perde, chi vince, chi (forse) 
pareggia, in Cinema & Covid... Ieri, oggi... E domani?, Bianco e nero, Edizioni Sabinae, 2020, 
p. 47. 









Fig. 1 SVOD revenues  by company in Europe 
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Besides likely bringing new significant resources, the forced 
involvement of global SVOD operators in the production of national and 
European works might represent an occasion for European and national 
authors to enter a global market. In the past, it was essential to realize a 
coproduction to market a product beyond national borders. Today, it is 
enough to sell a French or Italian work to operators such as Netflix and 
Amazon to reach a substantial part of the globe263. Moreover: producing 
for global digital platform might represent an occasion for national 
operators to trying out little-explored genres. Think of the fantasy series 
by Netflix Italia "Luna Nera" (2019) and "Curon" (2020).  
At the same time, the forced involvement of global digital operators 
generates several concerns from national authors and producers, and 
consequently from the State, that seeks to protect them. First, some 
SVODs—following the model of the vertically integrated majors—tend 
 
263 The OTT market as a whole (SVOD, TVOD and AVOD) allows, on average, European 
cinematographic works to reach three additional territories than the cinema releases 
footprint. EUROPEAN AUDIOVISUAL OBSERVATORY, Yearbook 2019/2020, p. 21.  
 












Fig. 4  SVOD subscribers by company in Europe 
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to acquire all the commercial exploitation rights of the work they 
contribute to funding, thus depriving producers of the possibility of 
exploiting their works in different markets. 
Second, the way the contents offered by SVODs are fruited is likely to 
generate suffering from authors and directors. Consider the case of 
Martin Scorsese, asking Netflix consumers not to watch his film "The 
Irishman" on mobile phones, and the triumphant statement that 
announced that 26 M of subscribers watched 70% of the film––a result 
that certainly would not be considered ‘triumphant’ in the case of 
theatrical distribution, being hard to imagine a traditional distributor 
who rejoices that only one out of three spectators left cinema theatres 
during the screening of its film264. 
Finally, concerns stem from the use that Netflix makes of algorithms, 
which seems likely to reduce the diversification of the demand (and 
therefore of the supply)—a fundamental goal for the State action of 
cinema promotion. Indeed, OTT analyse user data not only to produce 
what their customers demand but also to learn which products to 
recommend them, relying on their previous consumption. This 
mechanism risks ending up in a 'vicious loop' that pushes consumers to 
watch products on a pattern of similarity and consistency, likely to 
compromise the public's inclination to novelties.  
Indeed, the ability of OTT to increase the diversity of supply is somehow 
questionable today. The initial belief was that they could have ensured 
a greater diversity of contents because of their business characteristics 
and unlimited space. This belief was consistent with the ‘long tail 
theory’265. Its premise is that goods with low demand or low sales 
volumes can collectively make up a significant market share, which 
sometimes rivals or exceeds bestsellers and blockbusters. Millions of 
small products add up to large businesses, shortly. According to the 
theory, digital businesses could successfully tap into the 'long tail' 
 
264 Thus reported by QUINTON, J. M. “Ce que le XXe siècle nous enseigne sur Netflix”, Slate (2020). 
265 For more information on the long tail theory, refer to ANDERSON, C., The Long Tail: Why 
the Future of Business is selling less of more, Hachette Books, 2006.  
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market, thanks to the reduction in costs for storage and distribution 
offered by the digital era. Applied to the audio-visual sector, the long tail 
implies that an online retailer can afford to sell films that few people 
know about or are interested in.  
However, there seem to be more concerns than evidence regarding the 
long tail theory to this day. Among the concerns, the evidence that this 
model can function only if the expenditure for audio-visual 
consumption increases as a whole, or the fact that the grouping of 
content can have an important side effect, namely the loss of value of the 
content itself and its tendency to drown in the pile much more easily266. 
The accumulation of titles, the flexibility on prices that tend to 
depreciation, risk making the value attributed to single products 
 
266 Indeed, «The behaviour of a large number of buyers indicates a flight from the 
abundance […] risks associated with the profusion and the difficulty of making choices»—
as notedy by BENHAMOU, F., Les deŕeg̀lements de l'exception culturelle, pp. 259 e 260 («Le 
comportement d’une large part des acheteurs dénote une fuite devant l’abondance […] risques liés 
à la profusion et la difficulté d’opérer des choix»). The possible perverse effect of 
overabundance—i.e. its ending up in reducing choices instead of expanding them—seems 
to show that the degree of diversity offered, i.e. the menu of choices that actors can 
potentially benefit from, does not go hand in hand with the degree of actual diversity, i.e. 
the ‘quantity’ of diversity actually present, whatever the obstacles that prevent from 
enjoying it (on the matter, see VAN DER WURFF, R. and CUILENBURG, J. V., "Impact of 
moderate and ruinous competition on diversity: The Dutch television market", The Journal 
of Media Economics 14.4 (2001): 213-229). It seems to be the reason why BENHAMOU, F., 
Ibidem, pp. 271 e 272 , affirms that «there is a tension between promoting diversity through 
means of protection, which may lead to confinement in tradition, and openness to cultural 
exchanges, which may lead to a partial loss of cultural identity. Diversity reveals an 
original ambiguity: diversity, which is the basis for the protection and promotion of local 
products, implies a certain closure, even though diversity, known as the possibility to 
access the widest variety of products, would seem to encourage openness». («Il y a une 
tension “entre promotion de la diversité sous la forme de protections, au risque de conduire à des 
formes d’enfermement dans la tradition, et ouverture aux échanges culturels, au risqué de la perte 
d’une part de l’identité culturelle. La diversité revêt une ambiguïté originelle: la diversité, 
fondement de la protection et de la promotion des produits locaux, implique une certaine fermeture, 
tandis que la diversité, conclue comme la possibilité de l’accès à la plus large variété de produits, 
inciterait à l’ouverture»). Interestingly, in the awareness of the consumers’ difficulty to make 
choices in a context of abundance, Netflix is seeking to enlarge the number of its users in 
France by launching a linear channel, Direct. It offers the same content available on the 
platform, but it is organized in a palimpsest form: users watch what is scheduled when 
they access the service. 
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volatile, thus generating the opposite effect of the long tail model: 
instead of giving value to niche products that risked staying in the 
obscurity, the overall offer is devalued. To avoid this sort of risk, in the 
last years some operators have shown reduced interest towards the 
accumulation of titles and the ostentation of a rich catalogue in favour, 
on the contrary, of offering refined products exclusively, like original 
productions and films that have not been released in theatres267.   
3.2. Enhancing freedom and diversity: the special attention 
to independent producers   
The last aspect to consider with regard to the production phase is the 
distinction between independent producers and producers that depend 
on AVMS providers. Indeed, the Italian and the French States provide 
most of their funding to independent producers, as the EU also does268.  
The European legislator establishes the key elements concerning the 
definition of an independent producer, providing three criteria that the 
Member States should take into account while providing such a 
definition269:  
1. the first criterion is the ownership of the production company: an 
independent producer cannot be connected or controlled by an 
AVMS provider, which should not to hold too large a share of the 
production company's capital; 
2. the second criterion is the number of programmes supplied to the 
same provider: a producer cannot be considered independent if it 
supplies the almost totality of its products to the same provider; 
 
267 For all these concerns on the long tail theory, see CUCCO, M., Economia del film, p. 137 
and ff. 
268 For an analysis of the definition of an independent producer adopted in countries other 
than Italy and France, see EUROPEAN AUDIOVISUAL OBSERVATORY, Mapping of national rules 
for the promotion of European works in Europe, 2019. For a historical background of the 
concept of independence in the audio-visual industry, see EUROPEAN AUDIOVISUAL 
OBSERVATORY, The promotion of independent audio-visual production in Europe, 2019. 
269 See Recital 71 of the AVMS Directive. Note that the European legislator provided such 
criteria only in 2010. Indeed, neither the 1989 Directive nor the subsequent ones define 
what an independent producer is. 
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3. the third criterion refers to the ownership of the secondary rights, 
i.e. the rights to exploit a work throughout other exploitation 
channels and in other markets beyond the initial distribution by the 
AVMS provider. The latter should indeed cease after a certain time 
and/or number of retransmissions. Consequently, AVMS providers 
cannot meet their investment quotas in independent production by 
acquiring the ownership of the works they contribute to financing; 
they should acquire only a license to exploit them. 
By these three criteria, the EU legislator wants to avoid the consolidation 
of vertical and integrated relationships between producers and AVMS 
providers investing in national production. Such an approach certainly 
makes the market weaker—given the inability of not vertically 
integrated producers to autonomously access the distribution market. 
However, it should ensure the players' heterogeneity and freedom, 
avoiding the market to be characterized only by a few large production 
companies connected to the AVMS providers and producing the 
contents said providers require. The players' heterogeneity and freedom 
should, in its turn, ensure the development of less standardized 
production and preserve rich and diversified creations270. This way, the 
final benefit should be of consumers. 
 
3.2.1. Independence between Italy and France  
The definition of independence is challenging at the moment271. The 
thorniest issue concerns the ownership of secondary rights. Indeed, the 
acquisition of content and its control over time and across different 
geographical areas represents one of the major challenges to the today’s 
 
270 Indeed, «the underlying assumption is that the diversity of the audio-visual players 
ensures that of the products»—as noted by BENHAMOU, F., Les dérèglements de l'exception 
culturelle, p. 229 («L’hypothese sous-jacente est que la diversité des structures conditionne en 
retout celle des produits eux-memes»). 
271 For the definition of independence in European countries others than Italy and France, 
see EUROPEAN AUDIOVISUAL OBSERVATORY, The promotion of independent audio-visual 
production in Europe, 2019. 
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competition. It is essential to find a balance between the interests of 
producers and those of providers.  
On the one hand, it is necessary to avoid producers being deprived of 
the possibility to exploit their works. This concern animated the Italian 
legislator, which recently included for the first time the ownership of 
secondary rights among the criteria to be taken into account to define 
independence—in an unsatisfactory way, however (i.). On the other 
hand, it is necessary to avoid the opposite scenario, i.e. an excessive 
limitation of the providers’ right to exploit the independent works they 
financed. This concern is current in France, where the legislator 
traditionally regulates in detail the rights on independent works that 
broadcasters can acquire in a way considered by many parties too 
unbalanced in favour of producers (ii.).  
The issue of secondary rights is currently highly debated also because 
some global digital platforms tend to retain the entire rights’ ownership 
of the works they distribute—as anticipated. Such an approach could 
prove problematic for the other players. Producers would not gain 
revenues from selling the work to other providers if one of them held it 
exclusively; providers different from global digital platforms would not 
have the possibility to distribute the work; finally, consider the position 
of consumers: not everyone subscribes to a service such as Netflix; even 
those who do not should have the opportunity to see the work.  
i. The Italian case. Before 2017, the Italian legislator defined the 
independence of producers taking into account only two out of the three 
criteria established by European Law: the ownership of the production 
company and the number of programmes supplied to the same 
broadcaster; no reference was made to the ownership of secondary 
rights272.  
 
272 See art. 2, par. 1, lett. p) of the version of the Legislative Decree no. 177/2005 of July 31st, 
the Consolidated broadcasting act ( ‘Tusmar’), before the reform realized by the Legislative 
Decree no. 204/2017 of December 17th, adopted based on the delegation granted by art. 34 
of the 2016 Act («Gli operatori di comunicazione europei che svolgono attività di produzioni 
audiovisive e che non sono controllati da o collegati a emittenti, anche analogiche, o che per un 
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Nevertheless, since 1998 the legislator recognized such rights and 
established some rules on the matter. It stated that the repartition of the 
exploitation rights needed to be regulated by the private autonomy, 
through codes of self-regulation of the providers. However, it limited 
the scope of the contractual autonomy by putting the Italian 
Independent Regulatory Authority of the audio-visual sector (AGCOM) 
in charge of laying down some criteria to be respected by the codes273. It 
also provided a principle that AGCOM needed to respect while 
establishing the criteria, namely the proportion between the extension of 
broadcasters' exploitation rights and their financial contribution to 
realizing the work concerned274. Besides establishing the criteria, 
AGCOM was also responsible for controlling that providers' code of 
practice complied with them.  
Despite this protection, Italian independent producers claimed that 
broadcasters tended to buy the almost totality of their works' 
exploitation rights. Such an approach prevented producers from 
profiting from their works on alternative markets, making them unable 
to consolidate their business and generating a sub-capitalization 
phenomenon275.  
 
periodo di tre anni non destinino almeno il 90 per cento della propria produzione ad una sola 
emittente, anche analogica»). 
273 Art. 3(4) of Law. no. 122/1998 of April 30th regulated for the first time the issue of 
secondary rights. It established that «Independent producers are granted quotas of 
residual rights resulting from the temporal limitation of the rights acquired by 
broadcasters, following the criteria established by the Communications Guarantee 
Authority». This way, it implied that providers had to comply with quota obligations by 
leaving residual rights to independent producers. AGCOM implemented this provision 
first with resolution no. 185/2003 and then, in light of the change in the technological and 
market framework, with resolution no. 60/2009. For more information on the provisions 
on residual rights and the regulations adopted by AGCOM before the 2017 reform, see: 
PELLICANÒ, F., La tutela delle opere europee e della produzione indipendente, p. 371 ss.; 
SAMMARCO, P., La produzione audiovisiva europea, in La nuova televisione europea, pp. 59-72.; 
COGO, A., “I diritti residuali”.  Annali italiani del diritto d'autore, della cultura e dello spettacolo 
(2010):  215-243. 
274 The Authority established the criteria with resolution no. 30/11/CSP, approved on 
February 3rd, 2011. 
275 AGCOM, Indagine conoscitiva sul settore della produzione audiovisiva, 2015. 
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Given this state of affairs, the Italian legislator, while reforming in 2017 
the rules on the providers' participation in national and European 
production276, took the opportunity to update the definition of 
independent producers, including the ownership of secondary rights 
among the requirements to be taken into account277. However, such a 
requisite is indispensable only if other provisions are not met (see table 
(tab.) 1). 
In addition, the State does not establish what secondary rights actually 
are. It still considers them a matter for free negotiation between 
producers and providers278. Hence, the concern of Italian producers: 
since the ownership of the not-defined secondary rights is not 
indispensable for a producer to be considered independent, the risk 
remains that large digital platforms will fulfil their obligations to invest 
in independent production by acquiring the entire ownership of the 
exploitation rights on the financed works. Moreover: the risk is that 
broadcasters, to remain competitive, will follow the same approach. 
It is true that the Italian State provides significant financial aids to those 
who can qualify as independent producers. This way, independent 
producers should have a greater negotiating capacity at the discussing 
tables with broadcasters and platforms, expecting to maintain rights on 
their works: AVMS providers understandably expect to acquire the 
independent works' entire ownership if they are their leading investors; 
it should not be the case if producers—thanks to the State—manage to 
significantly participate in the funding of the work. However, it is not 
sure that the approach of the Italian State will prove effective: producers 
 
276 See par. 3.2. of Chapter IV. 
277 The new definition is established by art. 2, par. 1, lett. p), of the Legislative Decree no. 
177/2005 (Tusmar) and will be further specified by the AGCOM. Indeed,  art. 44quinquies, 
par. 1, lett. a) of the Tusmar establishes that it is up to said Authority to specify the 
definition. At the moment, the principles established by the AGCOM are not still 
operational. The relevant provision is art. 3 of Annex B to AGCOM Resolution no. 
421/19/CONS of October 17th, 2019, which is, however, still subject to public consultation. 
It should amend the regulation adopted by deliberation no. 595/19/CONS, already 
amended by deliberation no. 24/19/CONS.  
278 Note that providers are no longer required to comply with the criteria established by 
AGCOM, since they have been repealed. 
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might accept a divestment of their rights in exchange for the purchase of 
their works at a particularly advantageous price. The risk would be an 
enrichment of the individual (the producer) rather than of companies, 
which are those that generate welfare and jobs and therefore legitimize 
the support of the State. Hence, the evidence of what is said at the 
beginning of this chapter: for the public interest to be realized, a certain 
private behaviour is necessary.  
Finally, it is worth nothing that Italy, through the 2017 reform, added 
additional criteria to those dictated by the European legislator. Indeed, 
it provides that cannot be considered independent who plays a 'merely 
executive' role, i.e. who does not maintain managerial independence and 
freedom to dispose of its production (tab. 1)279. 
ii. The French case. The French case (looked at with envy by Italian 
producers) is different. The French definition aimed at ensuring both 
what in France is called the ‘capitalistic independence’, i.e. the 
independence of the production company from the provider, and the 
‘commercial independence’, i.e. that of the work from the provider (tab. 
1)280.  
The ‘capitalistic independence’ occurs when the producer is not linked 
to the provider in a way likely to establish a lasting community of 
interest. Under the ‘commercial independence’ principle, the producer 
must instead hold secondary rights’ ownership; they are precisely 
regulated by the law, which establishes the rights that providers can 
retain and for how long (tab. 1). These principles make the definition 
very protective for producers and demanding for providers to employ 
independent productions. They significantly limit the extent, duration, 
 
279 See art. 6-ter of the scheme of AGCOM Resolution. 
280 In France, the fundamental principles regarding the concept of independent production 
are established by arts. 71 and 71-1 of Act Law no. 1067/1986. The first concerns the 
independence in the cinematographic sector, the second that in the audio-visual one. Both 
articles provide that Council of State’s Decrees shall lay down detailed provisions. 
Concerning the definition of independence in the cinematographic sector, the relevant 
provisions are arts. 6 and 36 of Decree no. 747/2010 of July 2nd; arts. 8 and 23 of Decree no. 
416/2010 of April 27th; art. 21 of Decree 793/2021 of Jun 22th. For the definition of 
independence in the audio-visual sector, the relevant provisions are arts. 15 of Decree no. 
747/2010, 15 of Decree No 416/2010 and 21 of Decree 793/2021.  
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and territoriality of the rights providers can acquire on the works they 
had had to fund under the law281.  
This is why broadcasters claim that the revenues generated in the event 
of successful work are negligible: the consequences of commercial 
failures are significant: they do not have the possibility of mitigating 
them by exploiting the works overtime or across territories and media. 
Simultaneously, the revenues generated in the event of successful work 
are negligible, still because its exploitation rights are exceedingly narrow 
and overly limited in time. According to many, what was justified 
yesterday by the need to promote a strong production sector, is no 
longer justified today, the situation of producers having improved vis-
à-vis broadcasters282.  
All that given, it was proposed to limit the definition to that of capital 
independence without establishing principles concerning the 
contractual negotiations on the distribution of rights. It was meant to 
refer to professional agreements or private negotiations between 
individual providers and producers 283—as in Italy. However, the 




281 In the audio-visual sector, some claim that the overly short time of their rights could 
lead, for example, to no longer having the rights to the first seasons of a television series 
while broadcasting the next. 
282 For all the discourse, see COMMISSION DES AFFAIRES CULTURELLES ET DE L’ÉDUCATION, 
Rapport d’information présénté par Mme Aurore Bergé en conclusion des travaux de la mission 
d’information sur une nouvelle régulation de la communication audiovisuelle à l’ère numérique, 
2018, p. 78 ff. 
283 See, among others: AUTORITÉ DE LA CONCURRENCE, Avis 19-A-04 du 21 février 2019 relatif 
à une demande d’avis de la Commission des affaires culturelles et de l’éducation de l’Assemblée 
nationale dans le secteur de l’audiovisuel, 2019, p. 98 («la définition d’œuvre indépendante doit être 
revue et limitée a ̀ la notion d’indépendance capitalistique, afin de permettre que les éditeurs 
finançant l’œuvre puissent négocier directement avec le producteur l’ensemble des droits de 
diffusion […]») and COMMISSION DES AFFAIRES CULTURELLES ET DE L’ÉDUCATION, Rapport 
d’information, p. 115 (Proposition 26: «Maintenir, dans la loi, le principe d’un taux de recours a ̀ la 
production indépendante, en limitant sa définition a ̀ l’absence de lien capitalistique et en laissant 
plus de place aux accords professionnels ou de gré ́ a ̀ gré ́ pour la définition des droits et des 
mandats»). 
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Tab. 1 The definition of independence in Italy and France 
Italy France 
Producers have to meet these two 
conditions to be independent: 
a) they must carry out an activity 
of audio-visual production;  
b) there must be no relationship 
(including control or affiliation) 
with AVMS providers.  
In addition, they have to fulfil one 
out of two of the following 
requisites:  
c) they must be a secondary rights 
holder; 
d) no more than 90% of their 
production may be allocated to 
the same       provider for three 
consecutive years (to be 
calculated considering the total 
revenues the producer obtains 
as a remuneration for the 
services offered to the 
provider). 
Since it represents one of two 
requirements that must occur 
alternatively, the ownership of 
secondary rights is not 
indispensable for a producer to be 
recognized as independent. 
Provided it fulfils the first two 
conditions (a and b), the producer 
has to own the secondary rights (c) 
only if it allocates more than 90% of 
its production to the same provider 
for more than three consecutive 
years (d). 
A cinematographic producer is 
independent of a provider if:  
a) the provider does not hold, 
directly or indirectly, more than 
a certain percentage of the 
production company’s share 
capital or voting rights ––
depending on the type of 
providers;  
b) the producer does not hold, 
directly or indirectly, more than 
a certain percentage of the 
provider’s share capital or 
voting rights ––depending on 
the type of providers;  
c) the shareholder or group of 
shareholders do not control the 
providers and the producer at 
the same time. 
A cinematographic work is 
independent if its terms of 
exploitation meet the following 
conditions:  
a) the broadcaster has not acquired 
the rights stipulated in the pre-
acquisition contract for more 
than two broadcasts. The 
duration of exclusivity of these 
rights does not exceed 18 months 
for each broadcast. Concerning 
non-linear providers: if the 
exploitation rights are acquired 
exclusively, their duration must 
not exceed 12 months; in 
addition: the non-linear provider 
must not hold, directly or 
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In any case, a producer cannot be 
considered independent if it plays a 
'merely executive' role. It is merely 
executive the producer who does 
contribute less than 5% of the total 
cost of the work and who does not 
carry out the following minimum 
activities: choosing the story and 
acquiring the related rights to 
realize and exploit the work; 
entrusting of the task of drafting the 
script; carrying out of inspections to 
identify the shooting locations; 
selecting key talents, such as actors 
and director, and the other leading 
members of the cast; elaborating and 
controlling the budget plan. 
 
indirectly,  any producer shares 
and must not personally take or 
jointly share the initiative and 
the financial, technical, or artistic 
responsibility of the film's 
realization;  
b) the provider does not hold, 
directly or indirectly, the 
secondary rights or marketing 
mandates for the work for more 
than one of the following means 
of exploitation: 
1) in France, in theatres;   
2) in France, in the form of 
DVD/Blu-ray;  
3) in France, on a television 
service other than the one it         
operates; 
4) in France and abroad on an 
online communication 
service other than the one it 
operates;  
5) abroad in theatres, in the 
form of DVD/Blu-ray and 
on television services. 
However, if the provider devotes 
more than 85% of the pre-acquisition 
and co-production expenses to the 
development of independent 
production, the ownership of 
secondary rights may relate to two of 
the exploitation terms mentioned 
above, but without allowing those 
defined in 3) and 5) to be combined. 
Source. For Italy: art. 2, par. 1, lett. p), of the Tusmar and art. 3 of Annex B to the scheme of 
AGCOM Resolution no. 421/19/CONS of October 17th, 2019. For France: arts. 71 and 71-1 of 
the 1986 Act Law and its implementing Council of State’s Decrees, and EUROPEAN 
AUDIOVISUAL OBSERVATORY, The promotion of independent audio-visual production in 
Europe, 2019. 
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4. Exploitation of the cinematographic work and the 
State rules  
Once produced, the cinematographic work should continue its life cycle 
in the distribution phase. The  'system of windows' regulates the order 
in which the different distribution channels follow one another and the 
time that must elapse between the availability of the work on one 
channel and its appearance on the next284. 
This regulation aims to maximize the film's profits, taking advantage of 
the possibility to offer it at different times, prices, and modalities to 
intercept a demand heterogeneous in preferences and purchasing 
power.  First, the system should avoid that those willing to pay more still 
consume the film in a cheaper version. A consumer ready to pay a 
cinema ticket price should not see the movie at home by renting a DVD, 
for example. Second, the windows organization should ensure that even 
those with a limited capacity of expenditure or who are less interested 
in the film consume it, thanks to the offer of cheaper fruition modalities.  
The sequence of windows is generally ordered on a scale of decreasing 
economic importance to meet these goals. This is why cinema theatre is 
the first distribution channel, traditionally: it is considered the one that 
produces the highest per capita revenue in the shortest time. According 
to the sequence typically adopted in Europe285, the following channels 
are home entertainment ones. First, the physical channel (DVD and Blue-
ray), second, the digital one (TVOD). Then, the distribution proceeds to 
pay-tv, followed by the SVOD. Lastly, the exploitation of the works ends 
in free television and the AVOD. 
 
284 For an in-depth examination of the principles underlying the release windows system, 
see RANAIVOSON, H., et al., Analysis of the legal rules for exploitation windows and commercial 
practices in EU member states and of the importance of exploitation windows for new business 
practices —A study prepared for the European Commission, 2014, and PASQUALE, A., Finestre 
aperte o finestre chiuse?, in Netflix e oltre, ed. by Pasquale, A.,  Bianco e nero, Edizioni Sabinae, 
2019, pp. 51-62. 
285 See EUROPEAN AUDIOVISUAL OBSERVATORY, The theatrical – TVOD window. A sample 
analysis, 2019. 
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If the windows' sequence relates to their capacity to produce revenues, 
their optimal exclusive duration depends on the impact that the 
distribution on one channel may generate on the following. If consumers 
perceive the different channels as substitutes, the success of a channel 
risks eroding the revenues of the others; if they perceive them as 
complementary, the success of a film on one channel may strengthen its 
success in other markets. The first hypothesis suggests adopting a long 
interval between the different windows, preventing close or 
simultaneous releases. The second supports the adoption of 'closer' 
windows instead286.  On average, the cinema window has an exclusive 
duration of  3/5 months in Europe287. Consequently, the exploitation of 
a film on channels other than theatres can begin only several months 
after its first theatrical release. 
Not everywhere the film industry autonomously regulates the issue of 
windows.  In the past, the European legislator established rules on the 
matter288. To protect cinema theatres, the TWF Directive of 1989  imposed 
a two-year holdback period between the first release of a film in cinemas 
in one of the Member States and its broadcasting on TV. However, the 
Directive recognized rights-holders and broadcasters the possibility of 
derogating from the two years through an agreement. This possibility 
soon became the rule: waiting for two years turned out to be a loss of 
opportunity both for producers, since films lasted on average in theatres 
only a few weeks, and for broadcasters, willing to pay higher amounts 
 
286 Note that even the need to limit piracy may suggest adopting close windows: if the time 
that elapse between the presence of work on a channel and its appearance on the following 
is very long, the probability that piracy anticipates the legal offer increases.  
287 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Analysis of the legal rules, p. 5.  
288 For a detailed analysis of the main European regulatory steps on the windows topic, 
see: EUROPEAN AUDIOVISUAL OBSERVATORY, Media Windows in flux. challenges for audiovisual 
media chronology, 2008; GIUSTI, M. "Le finestre cinematografiche in Italia e in Francia al 
tempo di Netflix." Aedon 3 (2019); MANSANI, L., “Le finestre di utilizzo delle opere 





to distribute films earlier. In light of this situation, in 1997, the EU ceased 
to impose a form of media chronology and began to consider it as a 
matter to be regulated by private autonomy. Still today, the AVMS 
Directive,  replacing the TWF one, follows the same approach. 
However, this development did not compromise the Member States' 
possibility of introducing a system of windows via national legislation. 
The TWF Directive at the time and the AVMS Directive today aim to 
achieve only the minimum harmonization needed to ensure the free 
movement of audio-visual services; the Member States retain the right 
to require providers under their jurisdiction to observe stricter rules. 
Free to decide autonomously, the States did not follow a common path. 
It is possible to identify three models. In the first, which includes most 
countries, national legislators have not imposed any constraint, 
considering windows a matter to be settled through agreements between 
the audio-visual professionals. In the second model, operators have to 
respect rules on windows in order to obtain public funding for cinema. 
It is what happens in Italy and Germany, Austria, the Netherlands, and 
Switzerland. In the third model, adopted by only a few States, the law 
regulates the system of cinema windows for all operators, not only those 
benefiting from State funding. It is the case of France. 
 
4.1.  The link between windows rules and State aid in Italy  
Until recently, the film industry itself entirely regulated the system of 
windows in Italy289. The State established rules on the matter of windows 
only in 2018, when it modified the requirements according to which 
works can qualify as cinematographic and hence access public funding 
 
289 Actually, in the past, the Italian State had regulated the issue of cinema windows. It 
adopted the first rule on the matter in 1990: to comply with EEC's Law, the Mammì Law 
no. 223/1990 established that two years should elapse from the first release of a film in the 
theatres and its appearance on TV. However, broadcasters were allowed to distribute a 
film after only one year if they had co-produced it. In any case, the parties could derogate 
from the rules through agreements. Subsequently, following the indications from the EEC, 
the Italian State left the matter to the free autonomy of the parties. 
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for cinema290. The State established indeed that all works funded by State 
aid to cinema must be distributed first in theatres and cannot circulate 
simultaneously or in a short time in other channels291. 
The principle that a work funded by State aid to the cinema should have 
a theatrical distribution already applied. The 2016 Act defines the 
cinematographic work as the one mainly intended for theatres, 
providing that the detailed definition shall be laid down by a Decree of 
the Minister of culture292. The choice to prohibit the work's simultaneous 
or close distribution on other platforms was instead a novelty—not 
required by the Decree previously into force293.  
The State introduced these prohibitions to respond to the disagreement 
of exhibitors. They complained against the adoption of distribution 
strategies inconsistent with the market practice of windows 
autonomously respected by the industry, traditionally (fig. 5). The casus 
belli is the film "Sulla mia pelle” by Alessio Cremonini, produced by 
Netflix and financed by State aid to the cinema. After having been 
presented at the 75th Venice International Film Festival, the film was 
distributed simultaneously in cinemas and online on Netflix. This way, 
Netflix violated the market rule that requires about three years between 
 
290 See Decree of the Minister of Cultural Heritage and Activities no. 531/2018 of November 
29th. 
291 The Decree establishes two further requirements that must be applied jointly so that the 
work can qualify as cinematographic. First, the work must be «conceived, designed, 
produced and distributed, from an artistic, technical, productive, financial and 
promotional viewpoint for priority viewing in cinemas». Second, the work must be 
programmed in cinemas for at least 60 single screening within three months from the first 
release. In the specific case of documentaries and short films, the minimum screening 
threshold is reduced to 15 in the three months period. 
292 See art. 2, par. 1, lett. b), of the 2016 Act. 
293 See Decree no. 303/2017 of July 14th. It, defined cinematographic works as those 
«conceived, designed and produced, from an artistic, technical, productive and financial 
viewpoint, to be used mainly for public viewing in cinemas». In particular, it recognized 
the cinematographic nature of a work in the presence of at least one of the following 
requirements: a) the work was distributed in at least 20 cinemas for at least seven 
consecutive days; b) the work participated in one of the film festivals, national or 
international, identified by the regulations in force; c) the rights of the work were sold for 
its cinematographic distribution in at least one non-Italian speaking foreign country. 
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the release of a film in cinemas and its appearance on SVOD platforms 
(fig. 5).  
As a response to the disagreement of exhibitors, worried that such 
distribution strategies were likely to compromise the traditional social 
role of theatres and erode their revenues, the State modified the 
definition of cinematographic work within the scope of State funding. It 
established that all works funded by State aid to the cinema must be 
distributed first in theatres and cannot circulate on other channels before 
105 days from their first theatrical release—a time period consistent with 
that of the traditional practice of the industry(fig. 5), this way made 
binding trough law.  
However, the State, on the same occasion, provided two exceptions in 
which the holdback period of 105 days can be reduced294. The first 
concerns films scheduled for no more than three days, other than Friday, 
Saturday, Sunday, and public holidays. Such films are the 'event films', 
which do not aim at massive and widespread distribution in theatres. 
According to the Decree, they can circulate on other channels after only 
ten days from their first theatrical release. The second exception is 
designed instead for works that, despite having planned a medium-
sized release, do not find a sufficient audience to postpone exploitation 
on other platforms295. Thy can circulate on other channels after only sixty 
days from their first theatrical release. However, to benefit from the two 
exceptions and not lose State aids, the operators must respect a 'strict' 
principle: during the programming period at the cinema, the future 
availability of the works on other channels cannot be advertised. 
Therefore, although with a clear historical anti-Netflix genesis, the 
Italian rules do not penalize SVOD providers: they can realize 'event' 
releases in theatres and take advantage of the exception that allows for 
shortened windows. Still, they are in any case allowed to distribute the 
films online in the times they prefer simply renouncing to State aid for 
cinema (yet they are free to access those for other audio-visuals).  
 
294 Art. 2, par. 1, lett. b), 2), i) and ii) of the Decree no. 531/2018. 
295 More precisely, the works concerned are those programmed in less than 80 theatres and 
that got less than 50,000 spectators after the first 21 days.  
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According to an estimate presented by the associations of the sector296, 
the majority of the Italian films should be able to take advantage of the 
shortened windows provided by the exceptions, while the general rule 
should have a limited scope of application: it should be applied only to 
about a quarter of Italian films; however, they are the ones that together 
produce 90% of the box office generated by national productions  (Tab. 
2) . 
 
This estimation shows that the State rules on windows have a double 
ratio. On the one hand, they push the industry to overcome the 
traditional rules concerning the less profitable films. Since they manage 
to stay in theatres only a few weeks (even a few days in some cases), the 
State wants to avoid that they have to wait a long time before circulating 
 
296 Based on Cinetel data, the associations carried out an analysis of the Italian films 
distributed in cinemas between January 1st, 2017, and October 31st, 2018. The analysis 
showed that of the 434 Italian films distributed in that period (all funded by the State), only 
a hundred films exceeded 50,000 admissions in the first three weeks of programming. 
However, these films generated 90% of exhibitors' revenue on Italian titles. See AGCM, 
Relazione annuale sullo stato della concorrenza nel settore della distribuzione cinematografica, 
2019, p. 27. 
 
 
 ALL FILMS “EVENT FILMS” UNSUCCESSFUL FILMS 
Duration of the theater-
only window 
105 days* 105 days* 60 days** 
Duration of the theater-
only window 
Around 1 out of 4 Italian 
films 
 
(90% of box office 
revenues produced by 
Italian films) 
 
Around 3 out of 4 Italian films 
*Same as previous market practices; **Lower than previous market practices 
 
Tab. 2 Rule and exceptions on cinema windows in Italy, with estimation of the number of the 
involved films. 
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elsewhere. It would mean losing the promotional effect of the theatrical 
release, and therefore reducing the films' potential profitability. On the 
other hand, the Italian rules seek to 'block' the most profitable Italian 
titles in theatres, thus responding to the demand of exhibitors. However, 
note that the most profitable films distributed in Italy do not have to 
respect the exclusive cinema windows. Indeed, the rules apply only to 
works that benefit from State aids to the cinema, i.e. only to the Italian 
ones297. The American titles, those that generate the most of the box 
office298, are not subject to them. 
However, despite the limited scope of application of the general rule and 
the fact that the exceptions are to be welcomed, Italian rules raise some 
concerns. In addition to being based on an unproven assumption299  and 
liable to encourage piracy300, they are likely to restrict the competitive 
pressure. Indeed, they limit the operators' freedom in their content 
distribution—as highlighted by the AGCM.  The limitation of 
competition is clearly to the detriment of consumers: the rules do not 
consider the interests of the final recipients of the film in enjoying it 
wherever they want, whenever they want. However, the limitation of 
competition may paradoxically end up damaging even theatres in the 
long terms. The competitive pressure exerted by the OTTs led indeed to 
the realization of virtuous initiatives by exhibitors. «In particular, those 
[…] aimed at valorising and diversifying the experience of the consumer 
in the cinemas (in terms of reception, comfort, cleanliness, quality of the 
audio, and video) form the other modalities of fruition»301.  The 
transformations underway could turn into a valuable opportunity for 
renewal. Seizing these opportunities is more difficult once the law 
 
297 Indeed, State aids regulated by the 2016 Act are provided only for national works. The 
only measures that apply to foreign films are the international tax credit, aimed at 
attracting film and audio-visual investments to Italy (see par. 5.3.2. of Chapter III).  
298 See fig. 11, in par. 5 of this Chapter. 
299 See the following par. 4.4. of this Chapter. 
300 Indeed, the exclusive cinema windows may induce those who do not have close 
availability of theatres to illegally source films for whose consumption they are unwilling 
to wait. 
301 See AGCM, Relazione annuale, p. 32. 
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crystallizes the rules and they are unable to evolve according to the 
market agreement freely. 
However, note that the Italian State established rules only about the time 
that must elapse between films' availability in theatres and elsewhere. 
All other windows continue to be regulated by market practice (fig. 5) 
and are free to develop autonomously. 
 
Source. AGCM, “IC41-Indagine conoscitiva sul settore audiovisivo”, 2016,                                                        
and “Relazione annuale sullo stato della concorrenza nel settore della distribuzione 
cinematografica”, 2019 
According to the commercial practice developed over time, the first 
distribution channel is cinema theatre. After the first theatrical release, 
the film is distributed on home video channels. They include 
purchases/rentals both through physical support (DVD/Blue-Ray) 
and online (Electronic Sell-Through, EST). They are non-term 
channels: after an initial period in which the availability of the film is 
exclusive, home-video sales and rentals continue in parallel with 
television exploitation. After about 4-6 months from the first theatrical 
release, the films is distributed by pay-per-view TV offers and by 
TVOD. These windows usually are non-exclusive and have a limited 
duration, typically of three months.  The following channels are pay 
and free TV, which tend to be exclusive. The former (pay-TV) starts 
typically 6-12 months after the first release of the work in cinema, the 
Fig. 5 Commercial market practice on cinema windows in Italy. 
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latter (the free one) after about 24 months.  The exploitation continues 
on the SVOD, a window typically placed in the third year after the first 
release of the film and maintained for variable periods—exclusive or 
not depending on the agreements. Finally, exhausted the previous 
windows, and in any case 4-5 years from the first release in cinema at 
the latest, the film is part of the distribution company's library and is 
subject to different types of use. 
 
4.2. The link between windows rules and the AVMS 
providers’ investment obligations in France 
The French case is very different. Even in France, the works that benefit 
from State aids for cinema should be intended for theatrical 
distribution302. However, once released in French theatres, all films, 
whether or not funded by State aid to the cinema, are obliged to respect 
the chronologie des medias, which regulates the sequence and duration of 
all the exploitation channels of a film following its theatrical release. 
In the past, the State entirely regulates the chronologie des medias303. To 
implement the evolution of European law and the principle of 
preference for self-regulation, it subsequently limited the scope of 
regulation. It began to directly regulate only the time that must elapse 
between the screening of a film in theatres and its distribution via 
DVD/Blu-ray304. An agreement between the representatives of the film 
industry's professional organizations regulates the other windows. 
However, the principles of the agreement are binding. By a ministerial 
decree, the State gives legal force to them and extends their application 
to all operators305. This way, even those who did not participate in the 
drafting of the rules must observe them. 
 
302 See art. 211-5 of the Regulation on State aid adopted by the CNC and attached to the 
CCIA. 
303 The general principles were established by the 1986 Act, which provided that secondary 
sources of law should lay down detailed provisions. 
304 See art. L. 231-1 of the CCIA.   
305 See arts. L. 232-1, L. 233–1, L. 234-1 and L. 234-2 of the CCIA. 
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The French  chronologie des médias is peculiar also because it aims to push 
AVMS providers to increase their investment in the national and 
European film industry: the sooner a provider distributes a 
cinematographic work, the higher its investment obligations. The 
agreement currently in force was adopted in 2018, precisely because of 
the need to find a new balance in the support to film production by the 
different types of AVMS providers—as well as to make the different 
windows shorter and more flexible, thus adapting the system to the 
evolution of consumption patterns306.  
The agreement previously into force dated back to 2009, before the 
disruptive entry on the French market of the global digital players 
(Netflix, for example, began operating in France in 2014). Since these 
players today have a financial capacity incomparable with that of 
traditional operators, the new agreement seeks to stimulate their 
investments in national and European production. It offers indeed 
SVOD providers that agree to increase their contribution to the national 
film industry reduced holdback periods to exploit films on their 
platforms.  More precisely, the 2018 agreement307 overcome the principle 
that SVOD could offer a cinematographic work on their platforms only 
three years after its first screening in cinemas. The term of 3 years 
continues to apply only to 'non-virtuous' operators. It is reduced to 30 
months for 'average virtuous' operators and 17 months for the 'very 
virtuous' ones (tab. 3). However, the conditions provided for SVODs to 
take advantage of these reduced terms (which continue in any case to be 
very long) appear burdensome and cumbersome (tab. 3). The 
'opportunities' do not seem a compelling incentive to stimulate their 




306 See COMMISSION DE LA CULTURE, DE L’E ́DUCATION ET DE LA COMMUNICATION. Rapport 
d’information presénté par Mme Catherine Morin-Desailly sur la chronologie des me ́dias, 2017. 
307 For an in-depth analysis of the 2018 agreement, see: LE ROY, M., “Nouvelle chronologie 
des medias: une évolution précaire”, Légipresse (2019): 170-174; MONTELS, B., "Un an de 
droit de l ‘audiovisuel”, Communication Commerce électronique 6 (2019). 
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Until June 2021, Netflix and other operators could easily undermine the 
effectiveness of the intervention ––only apparently likely to penalize 
web giants. Indeed, since the rules on the chronologie des medias apply 
only to films released in cinemas, operators such as Netflix ––that are not 
only distributors but also producers of original content––could easily 
overcome them by simply skipping theatrical release and distributing 
their films directly online. This is why the French response to the 
technological upheavals appeared substantially rigid in the windows 
mater, expression of an anachronistic protectionist approach. 
However, foreign SVODs are today obliged to fund French 
cinematographic works ––intended as those primarily distributed in 
theatres. Indeed, the French State reformed the investment obligations 
of non-linear providers and extended them even to operators that target 
the French audience without being established in France308. This way, 
some of the conditions that SVOD had to respect only to take advantage 
of shortened windows have become compulsory. 
Hence, the need for a reform of the windows system: once SVOD are 
obliged to fund French cinematographic works, they should have the 
possibility to exploit said works under acceptable times. Moreover, 
beyond the regulation concerning SVOD, even the other windows 
regulated by the 2018 agreement are still excessively rigid, inadequate 
for today's film industry—even if made shorter and more flexible 
compared to 2009309 (tab. 3).  
Given the essential need for reform and the industry's difficulties to 
reach a shared solution, the State set a deadline for the renegotiation of 
the professional agreement. If this deadline passes without an agreement 
 
308 See par. 3.1. of Chapter IV. 
309 According to MARC LE ROY, “Nouvelle chronologie des medias”, p. 172, «The new 
media timeline contains no revolution. In reality the long awaited agreement brings about 
only limited evolutions, which merely prolong an old system» («La nouvelle chronologie des 
médias ne contient aucune révolution. En réalité l'accord longtemps attendu n’apporte que des 
évolutions limitées qui ne font que prolonger un systéme ancien»). 
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being reached, the government will temporarily determine the length 
and terms of release windows that are not established in law310.  
 
Under the current agreement, only ‘non-virtuos’ SVOD can offer a 
cinematographic work on their platforms only three years after its first 
screening in cinemas.  
To take advantage of the intermediate window of 30 months, SVOD 
providers must conclude an agreement with the professional 
organizations of the film industry. Simplifying, this agreement should 
establish at least the following conditions: a) the destination by the 
provider of at least 21% of its previous yearly turnover to the funding of 
European works, including at least 17% to the funding of the French 
ones; b) the destination of at least 60% of its catalogue to European 
works, including 40% to the French ones; c) the reservation of a 
‘substantial’ part of the catalogue’s home page to these works; 4) the 
payment of a contribution to the CNC.   
To use the shortest 17-months windows, SVOD players have to: a) sign 
an agreement with the professional organizations of the film industry 
providing the platform's commitment to  pre-finance, finance (in 
 
310 See art. 28 of the Ordonnance no. 1642/2020 of December 21st.  
*If the film made less than 100,000 admissions in theatres during the first four weeks 
**If the film made less than 200 admissions in theatres during the fourth week 
 












window Second window 
«Virtuous» 
operators 
Ordinary term 4 8 17 17/30 22 44 
Derogation* 3 6 15 15/28 20 42 
«Non virtuous» 
operators 
Ordinary term 4 18 24 36 30 44 
Derogation* 3 16 22 34 28 42 
Previous terms 
(2009 agreement) 
Ordinary term 4 10 24 36 30 48 
Derogation** 3 8 22 36 22 48 
 
Tab. 3 The French media chronology: a comparison between the 2018 and the 2009 agreements. 
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accordance to a clause of diversity) and distribute European and French 
works; b) pay a contribution to the CNC; c) sign an agreement with the 
CSA; d) not  exploit a work exclusively for more than five months, in the 
case other providers (free-to-air services or ‘mediumly virtuous’ SVOD) 
pre-financed or purchased the same work.  
In addition to increasing OTT's contribution to the film industry, the 
2009 agreement was amended to make the different windows shorter 
and more flexible, thus adapting the system to the evolution of 
consumption patterns. Only the DVD/Blu-ray's window has been 
confirmed: the rule continues to be that a cinematographic work can be 
distributed through these physical media only after four months from 
the first day of the work's distribution in theatres. All the other windows 
have been shortened.  
Pay-tv channels having an agreement with the film industry' 
organizations can distribute films eight months after their first screening 
in the theatres (instead of after the tenth). If they do not respect specific 
commitments regarding the diffusion of works of original French and 
European expression and the financing of the sector, the window is 
extended to 18 months. Pay-tv without an agreement with the film 
industry's organizations can broadcast cinematographic works after 17 
months (instead of 24). The term is increased to 24 months if the 
broadcasters are ‘not virtuous’. Free TV and non-cinema pay-tv 
channels are instead allowed to broadcast films after 22 months if they 
invest at least 3.2% of their turnover in European film production. 
Otherwise, they will have to wait 30 months. In the case of works that 
have not been purchased by pay-tv for a second broadcasting or by 
SVOD providers, the period of 22 months is reduced to 19 months. This 
provision aims to avoid periods in which works are not available on any 
channel (conditions which could encourage piracy). Finally, for AVOD 
platforms, the new term is of 44 months (instead of 48).   
Finally, the current agreement provides for larger flexibility for the 
exploitation of titles with limited success. All windows are reduced by 
about two months if the distribution concerns films that during the first 
four weeks of programming have made less than 100,000 admissions in 
the theatres. The agreement of 2009 provided instead for a reduction of 
windows only in the case of films that had made less than 200 
admissions during the fourth first week at the cinema. 
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4.3. The two approaches and the unproven assumption lying 
behind both: are theatres and online platforms really 
substitutes? 
Despite being both among the few European States to regulate windows, 
Italy and France adopt different approaches. Italy requires only a 
minimum time to elapse between the release of a film in cinemas and its 
circulation on other channels. The sequence of the other windows and 
their duration remain unregulated: they can freely evolve according to 
the industry's practices. Moreover, the Italian rule has a limited scope of 
application, since the 105-day principle applies to a quarter of Italian 
films only: thanks to the exceptions, the less profitable Italian titles can 
benefit from shortened windows, thus circulating quickly through other 
channels. France directly regulates just the elapsed time between the first 
release of a film in the theatre and its circulation by DVD/Blu-ray. 
However, it gives force of law to the rules established by the industry on 
the matter. This way, French law regulates both sequence and duration 
of all the windows of cinematographic works. The rules apply to every 
film distributed in theatres, whether or not it received State aids.  
It is interesting to note that the different approaches grounding 
exceptions in the two countries show a different conception of the State's 
role. The Italian rules apply only to works that benefit from State's aid 
for cinema: operators are left unrestricted if they renounce to use public 
resources for cinema. In France rules apply erga omnes, following a 
specular principle: the higher the operators’ contribution to the industry, 
the lower the State’s constraints. The legislator established indeed a 
complex system of incentives that rewards active support to the national 
and European industry. 
Both the Italian and French rules currently in force were adopted in 
response to changes in the industry that followed the entry of new 
operators with disruptive technologies. Italy adopted towards digital 
providers an approach that guarantees flexibility, despite the apparent 
protectionist premises. On the opposite, France does not appear willing 
to update its policy on windows. It is rather trying to integrate digital 
players into a system based on rules from the 1980s. Such an approach 
could prove to be ineffective, but France's attempt to defend its 
traditional schemes can be understood when considering that they have 
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always led to satisfactory results for the national film industry and the 
solidity of the cinema theatres market311. The new players entered indeed 
in an efficient, strong and well-regulated system. Still, the State is aware 
of the need to review the rules to find a balance between the interests of 
traditional operators and those of the SVOD providers. 
Despite their differences, the Italian and French systems show the same 
concern: they are both based on an unproven assumption. With the 
prohibition to distribute the cinematographic work simultaneously—or 
within a short time—in theatres and elsewhere, the two seem to assume 
that theatres and other channels (online platforms in particular) are 
perfect substitutes. As intuitive as it may be, this view does not find 
empirical confirmation to date. There appear to be no analysis showing 
that those who attend cinema theatres would stop doing so if films were 
simultaneously available online or elsewhere. On the contrary: a study 
on the American market shows that the biggest cinemagoers are also the 




311 See fig. 7, in this paragraph. 
 
 Number of cinema admissions in one year 
 






















From 1 to 3 hours 39% 30% 18% 15% 
From 4 to 7 hours 28% 33% 30% 26% 
From 8 to 14 hours 18% 20% 26% 28% 
15 o more hours 15% 18% 26% 31% 
 
Number of responses 460 511 323 439 
 Hourly streaming 
media 7 hours / week 8 hours /week 10 hours / week 11 hours / week 
 
Source: EY for National Association of Theatre Owner, “The relationship between movie theatre 
attendance and streaming behaviour”, 2018 
 
Tab. 4 Relationship between annual movie theatre attendance and weekly streaming. 
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Consider the case that gave rise to the protest that led to the Italian rules. 
We do not have official data on the total box office receipts from "Sulla 
mia pelle"—defined as ‘surprising’ by the newspapers, despite the 
limited number of theatres in which it was available, given the refusal of 
many exhibitors to show it. The only official data available is that the 
film, during its first weekend at the cinema, grossed an average of € 2,381 
per copy. Such a result is significant, being in line with the average one 
of the first fifty Italian films in 2018 in terms of the box office (fig. 6). In 
the case of "Sulla mia pelle", such a result occurred despite the dual 
distribution channel.  
 
 
It may be that the controversy over this film's distribution, as well as the 
strong social impact of the story it tells312, might have contributed to 
promoting its viewing in cinemas. But it also may be that, for some 
consumers, the experience of going to the cinema is not replaceable with 
 
312 The movie, which later won four prestigious Italian cinematographic prices (the ‘David 
di Donatello’), is about the last days of Stefano Cucchi, a young roman boy who died 






Avg. of the top 50 Italian movies by revenues in 2018
Distributed copies in the first weekend Revenues per copy in the first weekend
Source: elaboration by the author data provided by ANEC in its “CineNotes” 
 
Fig. 6 Comparison for average revenue per copy and number of distributed copies during the first 
weekend between “Sulla mia pelle” and the top 50 Italian movies by revenues in 2018. 
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other modes of fruition. This could explain why some works gained a 
big success at the cinemas even though consumers were aware that the 
same works would have been available soon on less expensive channels. 
It is what happened with the theatrical release of the first episodes of the 
third season of the television series "Gomorra", and even with the series 
"De André-Principe libero"—screened at the cinema to promote their 
subsequent distribution respectively on Sky and Rai. 
Following the Covid-19 pandemic, there are new helpful data to shed 
more light on the substitutability between different types of 
consumption. Indeed, given the forced closure of theatres, both Italy and 
France allow for works funded by cinema aid to be directly distributed 
on other channels313. Moreover: the Italian State reintroduced the 
exclusive cinema window at the reopening of theatres but temporarily 
reduced its duration from 105 to 30 days314. Therefore, the industry 
adopted (and is still adopting) experiments with alternative release 
strategies, the best way to further increase the knowledge of the impact 
of the different methods of release on the actors concerned315. 
 
313 For France, see art. 911-2 of the Book IX of the CNC’s Regulation. Actually, the French 
State adopted two different solutions: one for the films already in theaters at the moment 
of the beginning of the lockdown; one for films whose release was planned after. 
Concerning the firsts, art. 17 of the Emergency Law no. 290/2020 of March 23rd allows the 
President of the CNC to reduce the official period of four months between the release in 
theatres and the distribution via DVD/Blu-Ray.  The producers of the second type of films 
were instead recognized the right to ask the CNC President to distribute their works 
immediately on TVOD services without returning the already obtained State aid to the 
cinema. For Italy, see the Ministerial Decree of May 4th, 2020, which allowed operators to 
distribute directly online or in television works funded by cinema aid. It is worth notice 
that, before the entry into force of said Decree, the rules on media chronology generated a 
competitive advantage for US films compared to the Italian ones. Since the rules apply 
only to titles that gained State funding to the cinema, only Italian films could not meet the 
public during the first period of forced closure of theaters; the American ones managed to 
be immediately distributed online or on television.  
314 Indeed, all Italian cinematographic works distributed in theatres between May 2021 and 
December 2021 can be distributed online or on television after 30 days of their first 
theatrical release (see the Ministerial Decree of April 4th, 2021). This way, the Italian State 
seeks to ensure a more fair competition between Italian and foreign films. 
315 For more information about the peculiar distribution strategies adopted during the 
pandemic and their results, Aa. Vv., Cinema & Covid... Ieri, oggi... E domani?.  
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Some of the data already disclosed seem to reinforce the hypothesis of 
the lack of a substitutability relationship. Some products designed for 
cinemas did not have a significant success online. It seems to be the case 
of the much-awaited “Mulan”, directly diffused on Disney+ through a 
hybrid distribution strategy316. Cinema theatres may still be the most 
attractive medium for some visually rich products and only theatre 
exploitation likely allows to amortize the cost of production of big-
budget American blockbusters. This could be the reason why some 
American distributors decided to postpone the distribution of long-
awaited titles, waiting for the reopening of theatres rather than opting 
for online distribution. Other films released simultaneously online and 
in theatres achieved positive results on both the channels. It is the case 
of “Wonder Woman 1984”, released on the HBO platform Max and in 
American theatres. Despite the double distribution, the film grossed 
unexpected amounts at the box office—at least for pandemic times, 
considering that only 35% of cinema theatres were reopened and 
operated at limited capacity317. 
The results of the European exhibition market provide further evidence 
of the unlikelihood of the substitutability phenomenon. Of course, 2020 
was a tragic year (figs. 8 and 9): being people confined to their homes 
and cinemas closed, exhibitors have been strongly hit by the crisis318. The 
European box office remained small even after the first re-opening. 
Among other reasons, this was because of the lack of appealing titles: the 
pandemic caused a shortage of American titles in the worldwide market, 
 
316 Indeed, the film was made available to subscribers to the SVOD platform Disney+ only 
under the payment of an extra. As noted by NIOLA, G., Gli studios hanno ancora bisogno delle 
sale?, in Cinema & Covid... Ieri, oggi... E domani?, p. 34, it is impossible to know precisely the 
results of “Mulan”, defined by Disney ‘quite good but not so good’. 
317 Thus reported, among others, by RUBIN, R. “Box Office: ‘Wonder Woman 1984’ Debuts 
to Robust (for a Pandemic) $16.7 Million”, Variety (2020). 
318 Focusing on the data starting from March 8th, the first day of national cinemas' closure, 
the Italian market decreased by 93% compared to 2019, both in admissions and gross box 
office (GBO). Considering the entire year, GBO and admissions decreased respectively 
more than 71.3% (€M 182.5) and 71% (€M 29) compared to 2019. The UK market decreased 
by -76% compared to 2019, Spain by -72%, France and Germany by -69%. TORLASCHI, V. 
“Un box office da dimenticare”, Box office: il mondo del cinema e il suo bussiness (2021).  
 135 
due to the initial inability to shoot new films and to the fact that some of 
the titles that were to be released during the lockdown were not 
available at the reopening. Some had already been distributed 
elsewhere—such as the already mentioned Disney's “Mulan”. Others, 
for which theatres were confirmed as the first channel, were postponed 
several times in the US and, consequently, in Europe319.  
However, the exhibition market's tragic results in 2020 cannot be read as 
the acceleration of an already on-going phenomenon. On the opposite, 
the 2019 and the beginning of 2020 were particularly positive: European 
exhibition market was proven not only to survive but also to grow in an 
era of digital platforms expansion (figs. 7 and 8)320. The data disclosed 
by the European Audiovisual Observatory show that the trend of GBO 
and admissions has actually been growing in the European market as a 
whole in the last thirty years (figs. 7 and 8). Television did not 
compromise the practice of going to the cinema, nor does the rapid rise 
of the internet321. The generally positive trend is confirmed when 
focusing on the big five (figs 9 and 10). However, it is worth to notice 
that positive and negative years take turns, and the results of a period 
 
319 Among the several films postponed, think to the Marvel's “Black Window” with Scarlett 
Johansson, the last 007, significantly titles “No time to Die”, “The French Dispatch” by Wes 
Anderson and the highly-anticipated “West Side Story” by Steven Spielberg. 
320 In 2019, the growth was primarily driven by a strong year-on-year performance in 
Germany (+12.6%), Italy (+14.2%), France (+6.0%), and Spain (+4.7%). Out of the five major 
EU markets, only the UK registered a decline compared to 2018, still registering the second-
highest admissions level since the 1970s. It is worth noticing that the positive results of 
2019 in Italy's case are partly dependent on the industry’s initiative 'Moviement', aimed at 
ensuring the release of appealing titles during the summer, a period traditionally 'black' 
for the Italian cinema theatres. This way, the industry sought to ensure consistent revenues 
throughout the year and avoiding overcrowding of titles during peak periods, likely to 
generate cannibalization effects (AGCM, Relazione annuale sullo stato della concorrenza nel 
settore della distribuzione cinematografica, 2020, pp. 28 and ff.). It is worth noticing that the 
Italian exhibition market was growing even in the first month of 2020: revenues were 20% 
higher compared to 2019.  
321 The European Audiovisual Observatory—that in 2013 was reasoning about the bad 
results of the European exhibition market in 2012 in this terms «it does seem that cinemas 
are suffering as a result of the big rise in the number of films available on television and 
the internet […]»—did not propose similar explanation after 2013. The reasons behind the 
years with results below the average are quite always the lack of American blockbusters 
or attractive national titles. 
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may differ a lot in one country compared to another. France is the market 
that achieves the most satisfactory results, followed by UK and 
Germany. Together with Spain, Italy is the one that achieves the worst 
results. Still, the Italian spikes (positive or negative) seem to be mainly 
due to the presence or lack of highly attractive titles, rather than to long-
term trends. For example, the notable trend of 2010 was mostly due to 
successful blockbusters and the local light-hearted comedy “Benvenuti al 
sud” by Luca Miniero; the 2016 growth was mostly due to the breakout 
success of one film comedy, “Quo Vado?” with Checco Zalone, which 
became the most successful Italian film of all time. 
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Fig. 7 Admissions and GBO of European cinema theatres during the period 1992-2020. 
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5. The phases of distribution and theatrical exhibition: 
the limits of linking the definition of cinema to theatres 
exploitation 
Despite the inappropriateness to consider cinema theatres a failed 
market, linking the definition of a cinematographic work to its 
exploitation in theatres is problematic for several reasons in Italy.  They 
depend on the current state of the distribution and exhibition phases. 
First, many European companies are only active in the production 
phase: they cannot distribute their works autonomously, and therefore 
they often outsource this stage. They need to find a distributor, which 
acts as an intermediator between production and exhibition, and 
contributes to make the film likely to intercept an audience—facing to 
this end a wide range of marketing decisions, such as how to title the 
film and organize the advertising campaign. 
There are consolidated relations between some producers and 
distributors; sometimes, a producer interacts with its distributors since 
the very moment of the film project's conception. However, this is not 
the case for many Italian producers, for which to find a distributor is not 
a foreseen conclusion—the reason why the pre-purchase of film 
distribution rights could be very useful. Indeed, while the European 
production market comprises many actors, the distribution one is highly 
concentrated, controlled by a few companies with a strong influence on 
films' supply322. This is particularly true in the Italian film industry, 
 
322 As said, only 6,85% of the audio-visual companies operate in the distribution market in 
Italy. At a national scale, there are three types of distributors. First, the independent ones, 
such as Lucky Red, Notorious Pictures, and Leone Film Group. Second, the distributors 
having vertical relations with broadcasters: 01 Distribution, integrated with Rai, Medusa 
Film, with Fininvest, and Vision Distribution, with Sky. The first and the second tend to 
gain together circa half of the Italian distribution companies' total admissions. Finally, 
Italian branches of US major (such as Warner Bros, 20th Century Fox, Universal and The 
World Disney Company), which tend to have an aggregate share of almost 60% of the 
Italian distribution market. For more information about the Italian distribution market, see 
the annual reports on the matter of the AGCM. Even in France, the French branches of US 
majors hold most of the distribution market share. In 2019, consistently with the previous 
years, Walt Disney Company, Warner Bros, Universal Pictures International, Sony Pictures 
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traditionally described as a sandglass, whose narrow neck is represented 
precisely by distributors323. 
However, even if a producer manages to find a distributor, it is not sure 
that the distributor will find an agreement with an exhibitor. Among 
the other reasons, this is because exhibitors find more profitable to 
screen American films. Although less numerous than national titles, 
American films generate indeed most of the box office—not only in Italy 
but in all the big five, as fig. 9 shows. Even in France, where national 
productions usually have the highest capacity to reach an audience324, 
the surplus of US’ titles is evident.  
Fig. 8 Composition of the national market share in the cinema theatres of the big five during the 
period 2015-2018  
Source. EAO, annual reports “World Film Market Trends”. 
 
Home Entertainment achieved alone 50% of the total distribution revenues, despite the 
presence in the same year of 142 active distributors. See CNC, Bilan, 2019, p. 51.  
323 However, note that television companies' forced involvement in film production 
contributes to favour access to cinema for many Italian titles. The two main operators of 
Italian television (Rai and Mediaset) are indeed both vertically integrated, meaning that 
they produce films (Rai trough Rai Cinema and Mediaset trough Taodue) and handle their 
distribution not only on television but also in movie theatres (as well as online, Rai trough 
RaiPlay and Mediaset trough infinities). 
324 On the matter, note that there are concerns for the future. Data show that the audience 
for French films is mainly the elderly public, while French productions do not significantly 
intercept young people, i.e., the public of the future. In 2019, more than 60% of French film 
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UK only achieves results that are similar to the French ones (and, often, 
even better). However, this is because the share of UK films supported 
by American studios' commitment is larger than in the other big fives. 
Indeed, the UK's national market share is mainly due to the success of 
films made in collaboration with the US production network, while 
entirely domestic films have marginal results (fig. 9). 
Source. EAO, annual reports “World Film Market Trends”. 
 
Both the Italian and French States provide, in light of this evidence, 
incentives for exhibitors committed to program national and European 
films, as well as for operators committed to distribute them. France also 
favours theatres’ access to fragile films considered worthy through two 
instruments that do not find an Italian counterpart: the Mediateur du 
cinéma and the engagements de programmation and diffusion. The first, 
whose presence «illustre parfaitement la volonté de la puissance publique de 
ne pas laisser le monde du cinéma sous l'empire de la simple loi du marché»325, 
 
325 LE ROY, M., “Cinéma”. The Cinema Mediator was created by Law no. 652/1982 of July 
29th. Since 2009, the CCIA rules its activity (arts. from L. 213-1 to L. 213-8). The Mediator 
was considered an independent administrative authority until the implementation of Law 
no. 55/2017 of January 20th, which considerably reduced the number of independent 
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Fig. 9 Composition of the national market share in the UK: entirely British and ‘British-
American’ films during the period 2015-2018 
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allows the State to intermediate between distributors and exhibitors, 
affecting their relationship. It is indeed in charge of conciliating disputes 
on films’ access to cinemas arising between distributors and exhibitors 
that opt for appealing to it rather than the judges. It also actively 
participates in the industry’s regulation, since it can prescribe, in the 
event of conciliation’s failure, the appropriate measures to end the 
dispute—e.g., it may order a distributor to provide a film to a theatre to 
ensure a wider diffusion of works and preserve the supply’s diversity. 
The second instrument was devised since the creation of multiplexes326 
and still influences the programming strategies of the strongest 
exhibitors,327 by forcing them to program French and European works, 
as well as art-house and limited audience films. It is up to the operators 
to formulate the commitments (to be renewed every three years328) they 
 
said Law nevertheless calls for the insertion of an art. L. 213-6-1 in the CCIA specifying 
that the Mediator for cinema makes decisions «without receiving instructions from any 
other authority».  
326 Note that, despite representing only 11.3% of existing theatres, multiplexes make 60.2% 
of the total box office revenue. CNC, Bilan, 2019, p. 75 
327 The CNC's President draws up annually the list of operators required to respect 
programming commitment and notifies each of them of the registration decision. 
Typically, operators required to meet programming commitments are any theatre with at 
least six screens (and therefore not only the multiplexes, defined as those with at least eight 
screens); all operators that, taking into account all their theatres, collect alone at least 25 % 
of the admissions of their operational area, provided that they had made at least 0,5 % of 
the box office of such an area during the previous year. 
328 According to the last professional agreement approved by the CNC’s President (which 
dates to May 13th, 2016): a) at least 40% of movie theatre screenings should be dedicated to 
European works, with a particular focus on those realized by independent producers and 
those ‘peu diffusées’; b) each theatre cannot have more than two copies of the same movie 
and cannot reserve to the same work more than 30% of the weekly screen time; c) vertically 
integrated groups must screen a minimum number of movies released in less than 16 Paris’ 
theatres, showing them for at least 2 weeks, regardless of their box office performance; d) 
each theatre should program each year a certain number of films distributed by 
distributors with less than 2 M admissions on average in the previous 3 years; e) each 
theatre must screen short movies and organize evenings devoted to the screening of works 
other than cinema, such as a concerts, opera, etc. According to Marc Le Roy, «Les résultats 
de cette réglementation semblent sans appel» (LE ROY, M., “Cinéma”): even though producers 
complain about non-compliance with the commitments, the market share of national films 
in France is one of the highest in the world—excluding that of countries with national film 
screen quotas (such as Brazil, Greece and South Korea). However, the programming 
commitment system is not perfect. Perhaps surprisingly, multiplexes defend it while 
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intend to follow, which are then notified to the Cinema Mediator, that 
has to verify if they are appropriate329, while the President of the CNC is 
in charge of their final approval. 
However, the introduction of the additional instruments applied in 
France would probably not be effective and conclusive to ensure access 
to cinema theatres of all the Italian films funded by State aid to the 
cinema. Indeed, the Italian cinematographic market is saturated, 
showing a steadily increasing ratio between the produced films and the 
screens, the highest among the big five in the recent years (fig. 10).  
 
It is not by chance that many Italian titles that managed to get access to 
theatres remained programmed shortly—often not long enough for the 
 
arthouse theatres complain about it. Indeed, such a system leads big operators to screen 
low-budget movies, the ones usually exhibited by smaller theatres. This way, multiplexes 
become a greater competitive threat to smaller theatres. 
329 The Cinema Mediator is also in charge of monitoring the implementation of the 
programming commitments each year and, if necessary, to formulate observations and 
recommendations to the President of the CNC. 
Source. Elaboration by the author on data provided by the EAO in its annual reports “World Film 
Market Trends”. For Italy, from 2012 on: Cinetel, “I dati del mercato cinematografico”. EAO 
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Fig. 10 Produced films for every 100 screens in the big five during the period 2010-2018 
 142 
audience to become aware of their existence. Exhibitors are indeed often 
forced to make room for incoming films by dismantling the previous 
ones (or by moving them to smaller theatres or to less-attractive time 
schedules).  
In Italy, asking for a mandatory theatrical distribution to all films funded 
by the State aid to the cinema could be appropriate in the case of solving 
all these difficulties. This can be achieved in two cases, both aimed to 
ensure a number of screens sufficient to show all the funded products 
for an adequate time330: either increasing the theatres or decreasing the 
number of produced films.  
The first path is the one actually undertaken by the 2016 Act331. Still, its 
adequacy is not easily assessable, since many analyses foreseen that 
theatres will be progressively less ‘cultural hubs’, while continuing to be 
important for the release of event-movies, such as American 
blockbusters and art films, likely to win prizes. Therefore, it may be 
inefficient and not forward-looking to invest public money in theatres, 
especially trying to push them to screen national films.  
The second path—producing less films—appear more appropriate. It 
would useful not only to facilitate theatres access but also because 
overproduction may generate underinvestment (fig. 11). Both in France 
and in Italy, the increase of the number of films produced was not 
always followed by an increase in the overall investments, ending up in 
a decrease of works' average costs, which may in turn compromise films' 
chances to encounter an audience. Indeed, the history of cinema shows 
that the higher the production and marketing budgets, the higher the 





330 Some even believe that the State should manage its own circuit of theatres to ensure the 
theatrical distribution of the funded films—provided it keeps require a theatrical 
distribution for all of them. 
331 See par. 6 of Chapter III. 
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Fig. 2 Number of yearly produced films by Italy and France and their average production cost 
during the period 2010-2020 
 
Source. CNC, annual reports “Bilans”, and Anica, annual reports “Tutti i  numeri del cinema 
italiano”. Data in millions of euro. 
 
However, a reduction of the films realized is unlikely to happen. 
Reducing the number of financed works could jeopardize the State’s 
goals of helping the emergence of young new talents and of pursuing 
diversity in the supply. Moreover, if there is no space in cinema theatres 
for the large number of works produced each year, other distribution 
markets have a huge need for national products. It is the case of digital 
platforms, that are required by law to fund and diffuse quotas of national 
and European works. 
All that given, it seems that keeping asking for theatrical distribution of 
cinematographic works is an inefficient and possibly industry-harmful 
way to proceed; and the path to make it sustainable is not easily viable. 
Finally, it is worth to notice that there exist also conceptual arguments 
against linking the cinematographic nature of a work to its theatrical 
release. They emphasize the risk of confusing the product with the 
vehicle that brings it to the audience, which seems to be an outdated 
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influenced by their primal distributional channel: a work intended for 
cinema does no longer appear to be more meritorious than the others; 
there is a growing body of examples of high-quality products with no 
ambition of a theatrical release. Some of them were recognized by a part 
of the industry itself as having cinematographic nature despite not being 
intended for theatrical release, and they participated in film festivals and 
won awards. It is the case, for example, of ‘Roma’ by Alfonso Cuaròn, 
which was awarded with the Leone d’Oro at the 2018 Venice Film 
Festival332 despite having been produced by Netflix for its platform, and 
simultaneously distributed both online an in the cinemas for a short 
time333. 
Moreover, if products not intended for cinemas are considered 
cinematographic, theatres are now multi-purpose containers. With a 
view to renewal, in addition to films, they exhibit previews of television 
series and concerts, works challenging to be defined 'cinematographic'. 
 
332 Opposite to that of Venice was the position of Cannes. In 2017 the films produced by 
Netflix "Okja" by Bong Joon-ho and "The Meyerowitz Stories" by Noah Baumbach 
participated in the Festival. To not have to wait 36 months before being allowed to exploit 
them in its platform, Netflix distributed these films directly online in France, skipping 
theatrical release. As said, the rules on the media chronology in France apply only to films 
released in cinemas. In response to the huge controversy sparked by Netflix's strategy, the 
Festival's board of directors modified the rules: it added the obligation of theatrical release 
to the requirements for admission to the cinematographic competition. It is interesting to 
know that near to Cannes’s position, is that of Spielberg’s, according to whom: «once you 
commit to a television format, you are a TV movie […] You certainly, if it is a good show, 
deserve an Emmy, but not an Oscar. I do not believe films that are just given token 
qualifications in a couple of theatres for less than a week should qualify for the Academy 
Award nomination». Thus, reported by NYREN, E. “Steven Spielberg Doesn’t Think Netflix 
Movies Deserve Oscars”, Variety (2018), and GLEIBERMAN, O. “Steven Spielberg vs. Netflix: 
A Preview of the War for Cinema’s Future, Variety (2019).  
333 Interestingly, Cuarón, in response to the criticisms raised by the distribution of his film, 
brought the audience back at the centre of the debate. Replying to a reporter at the Golden 
Globe ceremony in 2019, he pointed out that through its widespread distribution, Netflix 
allowed many consumers to see his work. According to the director, many would not have 
been able to watch the film, had Netflix not been involved. Because of its characteristics, 
the film would probably have received limited theatrical distribution. «How many theatres 
do you think a Mexican film in black and white, in Spanish that is a drama without stars—
how big of release do you think it will be in a theatrical release? [...]». For a more in-depth 
look at the story, CRESPI, A., Tutte le strade (informatiche e non) portano a Roma. Alfonso Cuarón 
and the debate around his film, in Netflix e Oltre, pp. 108-113. 
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The paradox that arises in leaving the definition of cinema to theatres’ 
exploitation is clear in some of the provisions of the 2018 Italian Decree 
about windows. Think about the ban on event films screening during the 
weekend; or the prohibition, during their screening in theatres, to 
promote works that would be subsequently available on other channels. 
These rules were introduced to avoid the possibility for a product using 
theatres just for the promotion of its later availability on other channels 
to be considered ‘cinematographic’, therefore accessing State aids. 
All that given, it seems preferable to support works regardless of the 
choice of their distribution channel; and to support channels (cinema 
theatres) independently of the works that they convey. Therefore, at 
least for funding purposes, the State should cease to identify audio-
visual works based on the channels they exploit to reach their public, 
and find new and more reliable criteria. According to several audio-
visual operators, a possible criterion should be the 'size' of the work: Sate 
aids should be consistent with the budget and the reference market of 
the works applying for support (high budget work for the international 
market, low budget work merely for the national one).  
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Chapter III – State organization, resources 
and  means to promote cinema 
 
1. Overview 
After highlighting the characteristics of today's film industry due to both 
the free choices of its operators and State’s regulation, it is possible to 
analyse the State action promoting the industry through economic aid. 
They are significant both in Italy and France, consistently with the fact 
that the two States consider the film sector capable of generating a 
significant positive impact for the entire country’s system. 
Indeed, given that the audio-visual industry has intense relations with 
many other markets, a shock (positive or negative) to the audio-visual 
sector spreads significantly to the rest of the economy. The audio-visual 
is the Italian industry that boasts the highest multiplier, second only to 
that held by the construction sector334: for every demanded euro of 
audio-visual services and products, production in the entire Italian 
economy grows almost double, i.e., of 1.98 €335. In addition to the 61,000 
jobs it directly generates, the audio-visual industry indirectly induces 
112,000 jobs in other sectors336. Significantly, the percentage of people 
under 50 directly working within the sector is higher than the national 
average: 77% instead of 73%337––an important evidence for Italy, the 
European country that holds the sad record of the highest percentage of 
young people neither in employment nor in education or training338. 
Even the percentage of females working in the audio-visual industry is 
above the national average: 39% instead of 36%339––another significant 
 




338 EUROSTAT. Statistics on young people neither in employment nor in education or training. 
339 ANICA and CENTRO STUDI CONFINDUSTRIA, Industria italiana del cinema. 
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evidence, considering that Italy is among the European countries with 
the lowest women’s employment rate340.  However, the audio-visual 
industry is not only a great economic engine: it also produces a relevant 
cultural impact, more challenging to measure and express in 
quantitative data. Audio-visual works represent means of artistic 
expression, education, and social communication. They 'mirror' and 
'shape' societies, orienting their values and behaviours as they take part 
in the creation of the national identity. They also participate in defining 
the perception of a country abroad and, for this reason, may contribute 
to attracting foreign businesses and investments and developing 
tourism. 
Par. 2 sets out the range of the State’s actions promoting the industry 
through economic aid. Italian and French States do not have indeed ‘full 
sovereignty’: to comply with the EU competition law, national systems 
of cinema promotion must respect the European rules on State aids 
(actually rather light in the context of culture).  
Par. 3 presents a comparative overview of the administrative 
organization of the two States in promoting cinema. The range of State 
activities is similar in the two countries, but the characteristics of the 
competent institutions are remarkably different. The proposal to adopt 
the French model in Italy, establishing an independent agency for 
managing aids for the film industry—as the CNC—did not pass. 
Par. 4 focuses on the origin of State  resources devoted to cinema. While 
the French State supports the sector mostly with the proceeds of taxes 
on cinema operators, the Italian resources come from the State’s general 
budget. However, the 2016 reform took partial inspiration from the 
French system, introducing a mechanism to parametrize the annual State 
support with the industry's turnover.  
The focus then shifts on the instruments the two States adopt to promote 
the cinema. In Italy, the 2016 Act and its implementing ministerial 
decrees regulate them. In France, they are governed by the CNC’s 
Regulation (RGA), attached to the CCIA. The CNC has great autonomy: 
 
340 EUROSTAT. Women’s employment rate increasing, but remains lower than men’s. 
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the law does neither specify aid's general orientation, nor how the CNC 
should contribute to the industry's strengthening 341. 
Both the States aid all the three phases of a film life cycle—production, 
distribution and exhibition—as well as activities likely to contribute to 
the sector's promotion. Par. 5 investigates aids to production, the most 
supported phase, whose aids’ characteristics and procedural 
mechanisms shape those of the other stages, to which par. 6 is devoted. 
The fact that the two States pursue many, heterogenous goals in 
promoting cinema (sometimes challenging to balance) is the reason why 
the types of instruments adopted are numerous342. While Italy relies 
mainly on indirect and horizontal instruments, most of the French 
support is provided through direct and vertical aid. These different 
approaches testify the different balance between promoting industry’s 





341 As noted in the impact analysis annexed to the Project of Law no. 2488/2019 of 
December 5th, p. 433 («Aucune disposition particulière ne precise dans la loi quelle est 
l'orientation générale de la politique des aides et comment le Centre national du cinéma peut 
contribuer, dans l'exercice de sa mission, à la structuration de la filière»). 
342 The high variety of instruments is particularly true for France: the multitude of existing 
aids makes it a real challenge to acquire systematic knowledge. According to the CNC’s 
website, sixty-six aids to the cinema are currently in operation. However, many other aids 
simultaneously support cinematographic and other types of audio-visual works. 
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2. The range of State’s action: compatibility between 
State aid to the cinema and the EU internal market 
As the Treaty of Maastricht in 1992, the TFUE today establishes that State 
aids to the audio-visual industry should not fall under the prohibition 
foreseen by art. 107(1). Although likely to distort competition within the 
internal market, they are exempted from this ban because of art. 
107(3)(d). It foresees that State aid to promote culture may be compatible 
with the internal market, provided they «do not affect trading conditions 
and competition in the Union to an extent that is contrary to the common 
interest». 
However, neither the Treaty of Maastricht at the time nor the TFUE 
today specified the conditions under which State aid to the film industry 
«do not affect trading conditions and competition to an extent that is 
contrary to the common interest»—a clause extremely vague and subject 
to a broad range of interpretation. The European Commission 
progressively clarified its meaning during its examination activity. 
According to article 108 (3) of the TFUE, Member States have indeed to 
notify any plans to grant or alter aid in all economic sectors to the 
Commission, which is entitled to check their compatibility with the EU 
law.  
The Commission's control (around 20 decisions per year343) began to take 
shape following a 1998 decision on a French aid to film production344. On 
 
343  COMPETITION DIRECTORATE-GENERAL OF THE EUROPEAN COMMISSION, State aid rules for 
films and other audio-visual works, 2014.  
344 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Decision of July 29th, no. 3/1998, Soutien a ̀ la production 
cinematographique.  The Commission censured the French automatic aid to film production 
because it was recognised only to producers who agreed to spend more than 85% of the 
film budget in France. The Commission recognized that the imposition of a minimum 
expenditure in the country granting the aid could help create the industrial environment 
necessary for audio-visual cultural creation. However, it established that the Member 
States had to allow the producer to spend abroad at least 20% of the film's production 
budget. Nevertheless, the Commission did not ask France to reduce the expenditure 
requirement immediately. To prevent France from being subject to stricter principles than 
those followed by the other States, the Commission authorized the French scheme for two 
years. Over this period, the Commission wanted to check whether other countries were 
complying with the rule. However, the Commission did not conclude its examination 
 150 
that occasion, the Commission set out four specific criteria to be 
respected by State aid to the cinema.  Based on those criteria, the 
Commission officially set out for the first time its method of assessing 
State aid to the cinema through the 'Cinema Communication' of 2001345. 
Today,  the 2013 Communication establishes the basic rules to be 
followed by national authorities346. It pursues the same approach of the 
2001 Communication while responding to many trends that emerged 
over time347.  When it assesses aid for the film industry, the Commission 
first verifies whether the aid respects the 'general legality' principle, 
which applies to any State aids, not only to those for the film industry. 
To respect it, the aid scheme should be free of clauses that contradict the 
provisions of the EU Treaty beyond State aid348.  Second, the Commission 
 
within the time limit set and,  at the French Government's request, extended the temporary 
authorization to six years. For a more detailed analysis of the decision, BELLUCCI, L., Cinema 
e aiuti di Stato, p. 285 ss. and FOÀ, S. and SANTAGATA, W., "Eccezione Culturale e diversità 
culturale. Il potere culturale delle organizzazioni centralizzate e decentralizzate", Aedon 2 
(2004).   
345 Communication from the Commission to the Council, the European Parliament, the 
Economic and Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on certain legal aspects 
relating to cinematographic and other audio-visual works  (2002/C 43/04). The assessment 
criteria of the 2001 Communication were meant to remain valid until June 2004. However, 
the Commission extended their validity three times thereafter (in 2004, 2007, and 2009). 
346 Indeed, in 2011, the Commission launched a review of the 2001 Communication criteria, 
which were ten years old at the time. In November 2013, the Commission concluded the 
revision process and adopted a new Communication. 
347 The main change is the enlargement of the scope of activities to which the rules apply. 
The 2001 Communication focused only on aid to film production, although the Member 
States were providing support also for the distribution and the exhibition phases. The 2013 
Communication concerns instead aid to all the three phases of a film life cycle. For an 
exhaustive analysis of the reasons calling for a new communication and the positions 
expressed by the actors involved in the discussion, see EUROPEAN AUDIOVISUAL 
OBSERVATORY, The new cinema communication, 2014. For a detailed analysis of the new 
Communication, see ORSSICH, I., "State Aid for Films and Other Audio-Visual 
Works”, European State Aid Law Quarterly 13.4 (2014): 698-706. 
348 It follows that eligibility conditions and award criteria of State aid to the cinema cannot 
generate discrimination on the grounds of nationality. The aid cannot be reserved only to 
national citizens, for example. In addition, State aid cannot compromise the free movement 
of goods, services, workers and capital, etc. 
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verifies if the aids respect the four specific criteria established since 2001 
for film production. 
1. The first is the cultural test criterion, under which the aid must 
benefit a cultural product. The Commission's scrutiny on the matter 
had been controversial with the Member States349. To limit the 
disputes, and in line with the subsidiarity principle, the 2013 
Communication states that the Member States should ensure that 
the content aided is cultural according to their national criteria. The 
Commission can solely verify whether the States adopted a 
verification mechanism to avoid a manifest error. Such a verification 
mechanism may consist of establishing a list of cultural elements to 
be fulfilled by the work or requiring a committee to select products 
to fund based on cultural considerations. 
2. The second is the aid intensity criterion, which aims to stimulate 
normal commercial initiatives inherent in a market economy. It 
requires limiting the aid intensity to 50% of each film's production 
budget. Such a rule has two implications. First, the Member State 
cannot bear more than 50% of the cost of film production alone. 
Second, while adding to those of territorial autonomies, State aid 
cannot lead the project to be supported by public resources for more 
than 50% of its production cost350. However, the amount of public 
aid can reach up to 100% of the production cost in the case of 
'difficult' and 'low budget' works; 60% in the case of co-production. 
 
349 On the matter, see the Déclaration commune des 15 organismes publics européens en charge 
du cinéma sur la nécessité des aides nationales, a statement resulting from the discussion 
between European national film agencies, undertaken by the CNC and the British Film 
Council. The statement highlights the fallacy of a clear distinction between 'commercial' 
and 'cultural' work, stating that every film is both the result of commercial activity and a 
culture's expression. 
350 Indeed, the Communication specifies that, in determining whether the maximum aid 
intensity is respected, the total amount of national public support shall be considered, 
regardless of whether it is provided from local or State resources. The funds awarded 
directly by EU programmes are instead out of consideration, as even those provided by 
AVMS providers to meet their investment quotas in national and European production. 
Indeed, the EU Court of Justice stated that these types of support, established by the States 
but financed by providers, are not considered public aid. See Judgement of the Court of 
Justice of the EU of July 5th, 2009, Case C-222/07, Unión de Televisiones Comerciales Asociadas 
(UTECA)/Administración General del Estado. 
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This way, the Commission seeks to facilitate the more fragile works 
and those likely to increase the circulation of European 
production351. 
3. The third is the criterion of territorial spending obligations. Said 
obligations occur when operators have to spend a part of the film 
budget in the Member State that grants the aid to benefit from it.  
According to the Commission, these requirements may help develop 
the national film industries by ensuring infrastructure and know-
how within national borders. However, they also affect trading 
conditions and competition within the EU. For this reason, the 
Commission had set out to limit these obligations since 1998, while 
deciding on the French aid to film production. The Commission's 
intention with the 2013 Communication was to reduce territorial 
spending obligations significantly, if not eliminate them. However, 
«during the public consultation on the Cinema Communication, 
many Member States and in particular the film producers ardently 
defended the high level of possible territorial restrictions. […] Yet 
the main stakeholders were concerned that without guaranteed local 
economic benefits, it would have been difficult to convince 
governments and parliaments to agree to make public funds 
available for film production»352. Consequently, the new 
Communication confirmed the possibility to adopt territorial 
spending obligation; however, the Member States have to respect 
stricter principles on the matter353. 
4. The last is the aid supplements criterion, which prevents reserving 
aids for specific filmmaking activities or individual parts of the 
 
351 On the higher ability of coproduction than entirely national films to cross national 
borders, par 6.1. of Chapter I. 
352 EUROPEAN COMMISSION, State aid rules for films and other Audiovisual works. 
353 According to the new Communication, Member States may require, as an eligibility 
criterion, the expenditure of a minimum of the production budget in their territory. 
However, the obligation cannot go beyond 50% of the production budget. To get more 
than 50% of the production budget spent domestically, a State must increase its support 
(this stems from the new provision that it may require that 160% of the aid granted is spent 
in its territory). This way, the Commission seeks to overcome the previous situation, where 
a Member State giving one single euro of aid to a film project could impose the expenditure 
of 80% of its production budget in its territory. In any case, it is confirmed that the producer 
must be free to spend at least 20% of the film budget in the other Member States. 
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production value chain, requiring that the aid contributes to the 
work's overall budget. This way, the Commission wants operators 
to be free to decide which budget items to spend outside the Member 
State that grants the aid. 
As noted, these four criteria entail rather faint obligations for the 
Member States, which have a remarkable autonomy to decide whether 
to introduce support measures for the audio-visual sector, in which 
volume and how. Moreover, the Commission rarely raises objections in 
practice. It tends to qualify aid to the cinema as 'compatible with the 
Treaty', adopting flexibility «rather surprising for who knows the 
rigidity of application of the regulation on State aid in other fields»354.  
Different aspects of the Italian and French aids to the film industry 
confirm these observations. First, despite the cultural test criterion, some 
types of aid provided by the two States seem to rely on the premise that 
the film industry is cultural in and of its own. To verify if the work is 
'culturally eligible' to said aids, the two States adopt criteria so vague 
that it is difficult to imagine projects unable to satisfy them.  
A further element that shows the flexibility of the European control is 
linked to the aid intensity criterion. As said, the Commission establishes 
that the amount of public aid should be limited to 50% of each film’s 
production cost but that it can reach up to 100% of it in the case of 
'difficult' and 'low budget' works.  Following the subsidiarity principle, 
it is up to each Member State to provide a definition of difficult and low 
budget film. According to Italian law, among the works to be 
understood as difficult and that can be entirely funded by the public 
sector, there are those with a production cost lower than €2.5 M355. The 
average cost of Italian films is lower than this figure. It follows that the 
 
354 BRUTI LIBERATI, E., “La regolazione promozionale del cinema, dell’audiovisivo e dello 
spettacolo dal vivo tra logica di mercato e “diversità” culturale”, Rivista della regolazione dei 
mercati 2 (2019). 
355 Among the others works to be intended as difficult and low budget, there are works 
funded through selective aids and defined not capable of attracting private resources and 
films distributed in less than 400 screens at the same time. See art. 4 of the ministerial 
implementing Decree no. 70/2021 of February 5th. 
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Italian State could potentially bear the full cost of many Italian films 
without violating European principles356. 
To conclude, it is worth noting that the EU has relaxed the constraints 
during the pandemic to allow the States to mobilize substantial 
resources supporting domestic industries in the face of the crisis357. 
 
3. The administrative organization: the CNC and the 
DGC 
There is no general directorate for cinema within the French Ministry of 
Culture. Since 1946, the institution in charge of elaborating and 
implementing State policies concerning cinema is the CNC, a separate 
agency under the authority of the Ministry of Culture with financial and 
regulatory autonomy and legal personality358.  Its President shall report 
to a Board of directors made up, for the majority of its members, of 
representatives of the State; a deputy and a senator appointed by the 
Permanent Committee on Cultural Affairs of their respective assemblies; 
members of the Council of State, the Court of Cassation and the Court of 
Auditors; representatives of the CNC's staff359. 
The CNC’s primary task is provide aid for the audio-visual industry. 
However, it exercises several other functions360. It participates in 
elaborating legislative draft and regulatory text about the industry and 
it observes and studies the sector, providing dossiers and reports. 
Thanks to this activity, there are many detailed data on State's actions 
 
356 The French case is different. The public sector cannot bear more than 60% of the 
production costs of difficult works (first and second-time director works) and low-budget 
works (not more than € 1,25 M). The threshold is increased to 70% if the works do not 
benefit from the tax credit. See art. 211-17 of the CNC’s Regulation. 
357 See the Communication from the Commission Temporary Framework for State aid 
measures to support the economy in the current COVID-19 outbreak of March 19th, 2020. 
358 See art. 111-1 of the CCIA.  
359 See art. 112-1 of the CCIA. 
360 For their exhaustive list, see arts. L. 111-2 and 111-3 of the CCIA. 
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and their impact in France—while these resources are limited in Italy. 
The CNC also cooperates with regional authorities to ensure the 
consistency of the support from different government levels and plays a 
role in shaping the French position on European and international 
negotiations. Finally, the CNC is in charge of monitoring the application 
of regulations by the audio-visual actors; of collecting, conserving, 
restoring, and enhancing the film heritage; of managing the audio-visual 
register361; fight against the counterfeiting of audio-visual works, 
reporting the counterfeiting offense and acting as a plaintiff in court362.  
Over time, the CNC lost its double corporate-administrative nature363. 
However, it is still today «une véritable administration de concertation»364: 
professionals' instances did not disappear from its decision-making 
process. For example, any change in the CNC’s regulatory framework is 
preceded by a study report commissioned to a professional responsible 
for gathering opinions from all actors concerned. Cinema professionals 
take also part in CNC's committees responsible for allocating selective 
aids. Moreover: the CNC contributes to the achievement of inter-
professional agreements, reconciliating the often-contradictory interests 
of different professional groups. Concerning several issues, the French 
State—for the medium of the CNC—is more a facilitator than a direct 
regulator.  
During the discussion on the project of law of what will be the Italian 
2016 reform, there was the proposal to establish an independent agency 
in charge of promoting cinema within the Ministry of culture—the 
Centro nazionale del cinema e delle espressioni audiovisive, outlined looking 
at the French CNC. The aim was to make the State's action in the industry 
more responsive and agile by freeing it from the general limitations of 
the Italian public administration: bureaucratic red tapes, limited ability 
to interact with companies, lack of qualified personnel, etc. However, the 
 
361 As in Italy, the register's function is to ensure the publicity of the agreements concerning 
the production, distribution, and exploitation of French audio-visual works. The rights 
resulting from unregistered acts cannot be enforced against third parties. 
362 See art. L. 111-2(6) of the CCIA and art. L. 331-3 of the Code of Intellectual Property. 
363 See par. 2.2. of Chapter I.  
364 Cit. Étude 309, pp. 309-24. 
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Parliament abandoned the project: the State functions concerning the 
film industry continue to be exercised by the General Directorate for 
Cinema (DGC) within the Ministry of Culture, which has been 
responsible on the matter since 1998365.   
Without financial and regulatory autonomy, the Italian DGC exercises 
similar functions to the CNC. First, it allocates aids to the audio-visual 
industry and carries out inspections and controls on the aid 
beneficiaries. It contributes to coordinating the support granted by 
different government levels by hosting the National Coordination of 
Film Commissions and takes part in defining the Italian position within 
European and international institutions. It manages the public film 
register and promotes study and analysis on the audio-visual sector. 
Finally, it carries out the administrative activities related to the movie-
rating system to protect minors—that in France are carried out by the 
Ministry of culture, outside the CNC. 
Although it did not introduce an independent agency, the 2016 reform 
innovated the State organization of cinema promotion. Indeed, it 
established the Higher Council for Cinema and Audio-visual, an 
advisory and scientific body366. Eleven members compose it: eight 
 
365 Unlike France, where the same organization has been responsible for State action 
concerning the cinema since 1946, many different institutions took turns until 1998 in Italy. 
As said in par. 3.1. of Chapter I, the first centralized body specifically responsible for State 
actions related to the film industry was established in 1934: the General Directorate for 
Cinema within the Under-Secretary of State for Press and Propaganda. In the early post-
war years, the Central office for Cinematography, established within the Presidency of 
Council, acquired the competencies related to the State's action in the film industry. In 
1959, the General Directorate of Entertainment within the newly established Ministry of 
Tourism and Entertainment substituted the Central Office. On April 18th, 1993, a 
referendum of the Regions' initiative repealed the law instituting the Ministry of Tourism 
and Entertainment. The following Decree of the President of the Council of Ministers of 
August 2nd, 1995 established within the Presidency of Council the Department of 
Entertainment, which acquired the repealed Ministry's competencies, offices, and staff. In 
fact, the abolishment of the Ministry was in no way attributable to the overcoming of the 
public interests of which it was in charge (as noted by BARBATI, C., Istituzioni e spettacolo, 
p. 7).  Subsequently, the Ministry of Cultural Heritage and Activities, established in 1998, 
acquired the functions, financial and staff resources of the Department of Entertainment. 
366 Art. 11 of the 2016 Act. The Council is in charge of analysing the film and audio-visual 
sector and monitoring and evaluating public actions on the matter; formulating proposals 
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personalities of the audio-visual sector of «particular and proven 
professional qualification and skills also in the legal, economic, 
administrative and management fields», appointed by the Minister; 
three members chosen by the Minister from a shortlist proposed by the 
most representative professional associations of the industry. This way, 
like the CNC, even the DGC should lead a regular exchange with the 
professionals. 
 
4. The provenances of State’s resources for the cinema 
The resources through which a State funds its film industry can come 
from different sources. Depending on the choices made, the system may 
be more or less acceptable for tax-payers and also more or less capable 
of ensuring consisting financing to the industry. In most countries, the 
resources come from the State’s general budget.  
Others countries adopted different approaches. The UK, for example, 
funds the cinema mainly through lottery proceeds. This system assures 
considerable financing to the industry but shows ‘regressivity traits’: the 
revenue from taxes primarily paid by the poorest (the lottery players) 
sustains a cultural product the wealthiest consume more.  
The French model is probably the most complex and sophisticated. The 
State sustains the cinema mostly with revenues from taxes on cinema 
operators: it imposes people outside the industry to contribute to its 
funding only to a limited extent. However, the French system is 
inconsistent with the ‘equalization principle’: the film industry’s 
revenues do not support worthy sectors other than cinema. 
The Italian State asks all citizens to support cinema since it finances the 
industry through its general budget. However, the 2016 reform took 
partial inspiration from the French system, introducing a link between 
the cinema's turnover and the annual State’s expenditure in its favour. 
 
about them; giving assistance regarding the formulation of the Italian position on audio-
visual matters at the European and International level; giving opinions on the criteria for 
allocating resources and on the conditions for their granting; organizing consultations with 
representatives of the sectors and other stakeholders. 
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4.1. The French fund: State’s (and not industry’s) money 
In France, most of State resources devoted to the film industry do not 
come from the State's general budget but from the proceeds of taxes on 
the operators who benefit from the distribution of audio-visual works. 
The principle, which remained unchanged since 1948, essentially states 
that who gains an economic advantage from today's works must 
contribute to creating the future ones. In derogation from the 
universality budgetary principle367, revenues from taxing operators such 
as theatres exhibitors, broadcasters and DVD retailers do not enter the 
State's general budget. They are directly absorbed by the fund of the 
CNC, which then redistributes the sums among the audio-visual 
operators.  
Thanks to this system, the film industry's financing is free from the 
constraints of the ordinary budgetary procedure: the resources for 
cinema neither depend on each year's condition of the State's budget nor 
on the governments' sensitivity to cultural issues. Their level relies on 
the sector's health: the more revenue it generates, the more resources it 
will receive. The system also allows for a better acceptance of the tax 
levy: the tax burden does not affect all citizens, but exclusively those who 
will benefit from the money collected. 
However, the French approach generates several concerns from other 
parts, in particular the US. Since the Uruguay Round, they have 
criticized the French system as anticompetitive. Indeed, the French State 
taxes a part of the value created by all audio-visual works distributed in 
France, including the foreign ones. However, the proceeds of these taxes 
finance the creation of new French and European works only. While 
European Law explicitly prevents discrimination based on nationality 
 
367 The ‘principle of universality’ covers two rules. First, there must not be compensation 
between revenue and expense. Second, income cannot be allocated to specific expenses. 
The allocation of taxes to institutions other than the State deprives the Parliament to vote 
on public expenses. The Parliament had certainly decided said allocations on its own and 
can, in principle, question them or change the tax parameters at any given moment. 
However, this rarely happens in practice. See ECALLE, F., Les taxes affectées, on FIPECO-Site 
d'informations sur les finances publiques, 2018. 
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within the internal market, there is no law imposing to recognize the 
same benefit to non-European operators.  
However, the Americans' request to abolish or open up to all the CNC’s 
aid was not followed up368. France did not comply with said request 
stating that its support scheme is industry-driven and not government-
operated369. Since the amount collected directly goes to the CNC, 
bypassing the general government budget, the French State does not 
finance the cinema with public money. It would limit itself to a 
regulatory function by imposing a forced loan on cinema operators and 
then proceeding through the CNC to redistribute the money thus saved. 
According to this interpretation, France would have one of the lowest 
support programs for cinema in Europe.  
Such a depiction has been continuously reaffirmed. According to two 
French authors of a 1979 study on the film industry, «one cannot say it 
often enough, the French cinema is neither aided nor subsidized. It 
benefits from a system of self-financing that it has invented, for which 
Parliament has made a law»370. Pascal Kamina, one of the French greatest 
experts on public law of cinema, affirms that «State support for the film 
industry does not consist, as sometimes affirmed, in public subsidies (as 
exists in some countries), but in the redistribution to the market players 
of the revenues made by films during their exploitation in the various 
distribution channels»371. According to the film economist Laurent 
Creton, «For the most part, the measures supporting the film and audio-
visual sector do not depend on the State budget […]. There is a 
 
368 WALKLEY, S. E. To what extent, p. 122. 
369 Ibidem, p. 121 
370 ROUX, J. and THEVENET, R., Industrie et commerce du film en France, Editions scientifiques 
et juridiques, 1979, p. 128. 
371 KAMINA, P. “Cadre administratif. Régime juridique des activités cinématographiques”. 
JCl. Propriété littéraire et artistique, Fasc. 1075 (2019)  («Le soutien financier de l'État à l'industrie 
cinématographique ne consiste pas, comme on le pense quelquefois, dans des subventions publiques 
au cinéma (comme il en existe dans certains pays), mais dans la redistribution - automatique ou 
sélective - aux acteurs du marché des recettes réalisées par les films lors de leur exploitation sous 
différents modes. Cette épargne forcée est versée sur un compte spécial du trésor, le compte de 
soutien, géré par le CNC»). 
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mandatory savings system for professionals […]»372. For Dominique 
Boutonnat, the current President of the CNC, «the ingenuity [of the 
French system] is that it does not cost the taxpayer anything—or almost 
nothing […]»373. 
Such a representation is not entirely acceptable. The funds given to the 
film industry by the CNC (worth to be remembered, an institution under 
the Ministry of culture) may not represent a direct monetary cost for the 
State but are an opportunity cost for sure. The State accepts losing the 
sums allocated to the CNC from its general budget, hence agreeing not 
to use them to finance something other than the audio-visual industry. 
This also derogates from the equalization principle, under which the 
most profitable activities should contribute to support the most 
vulnerable ones. Therefore, the resources of the CNC should be 
considered public aid. It is not by chance that the French subsidy 
schemes must meet the criteria established by the European 
Commission, and any change or future development of the system has 
to be notified. Another evidence shows the public nature of these aids: 
on some limited occasions, the State broke the system's principles using 
the CNC's funds to finance expenses in areas other than cinema. 
 
4.1.1. The categories of taxed operators  
Over time, France continuously extended the actors taxed to cover the 
new forms of distributions of audio-visual contents in light of 
technological evolution.  Currently, three taxes finance the CNC's Fund: 
the tax on box office (TSA), the tax on televisions' services (TST), and the 
video tax (TSV), the only one collected by the General Directorate for 
Public Finance of the Ministry of Economic Affairs and Finance, which 
 
372 CRETON, L., L'économie du cinéma en 50 fiches, Armand Colin, 2020, P. 126 («Les mesures 
d’aide au cinéma et à l’audiovisuel ne sont donc, pour l’essentiel, pad dépendantes du budget de 
l’État : ce sont des taxes parafiscales internes à ces filières qui alimentent le fonds. Pour les 
professionnels, il s’agit d’un système d’épargne obligatoire destiné à moderniser, à dynamiser et à 
promouvoir: on accumule des droits utilisable pour produire un film ou pour rénover une salle»). 
373 BOUTONNAT, D., Rapport sur le financement prive,́ p. 195 («L’ingéniosités du dispositif est 
qu’il n’en coute rien au contribuable -ou presque rien […]») 
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then transfers it to the CNC—retaining the 2.5% as operating expenses374. 
On the contrary, the TSA and TST proceeds are paid directly to the 
CNC's accounting agent375.  
The TSA, introduced in 1948, is the most ancient tax. The CCIA discipline 
it376, subjecting movie theatres to a levy of 10.72% of the tickets' price377. 
Still today, most of the TSA comes from American movies since domestic 
films generate a limited part of the box office378. In light of this, the 
system brings the domestic producers to hope US films perform well: 
the more the audience, the more the French movie industry's future 
money. 
The TST was established in 1984. Cinema attendance was falling, and 
more and more people started to prefer television over theaters: the TSA 
was no longer adequate to fund the CNC's programs. Given televisions 
were benefiting from the exploitation of films for cinema, the legislator 
decided to force them to participate in financing the future creation. 
Note that the TSA and the TST combination resulted in national cinema 
being financed by its two rivals: US cinema and French television.  
Since 2008, the TST ceased to regard only televisions editors: the State 
extended it to telecommunications operators that distribute audio-visual 
contents, including internet access providers and mobile telephone 
operators. Therefore, the TST currently consists of two parts: the tax on 
television services applicable to broadcasters (TST-E) and the one 
applicable to distributors (TST-D) 379. 
 
374 See art. 1609 sexdecies B of the Tax Code in connection with art. L-116-1 of the CCIA. 
375 The TSA monthly, the TST monthly or quarterly, depending on the periodicity of the 
operators’ declaration of the value-added tax. See arts. L-115-5 and 115-10(1) of the CCIA .  
376 See arts. from 115-1 to 115-5. 
377 The levy is multiplied by 1.5 times for pornographic works and incitement to violence 
prohibited to minors.  
378 See fig. 8 in par. 5 of Chapter II. 
379 Arts. from 115-6 to 115-13 of the CCIA governed both. Broadcasters established in 
France that during the previous year programmed at least one works eligible for the CNC's 
aid are subject to a levy of 5,15% of their yearly turnover. The TST-D applies to distributors 
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To the TSA and the TST, the Finance Act for 1993 added the TSV, which 
applies to DVD and Blu-ray retailers. This way, the State accounted for 
the increased consumption of movies at home, enlarging the set of 
contributors to the CNC's Fund.  Since 2004, the TSV has also applied to 
French non-linear AVMS providers. The subsequent regulation 
extended the tax even to non-linear operators that offer audio-visual 
contents in France without being established there: in 2016, the legislator 
extended the TSV to the foreign SVOD  (‘Netflix Tax’) and to the foreign 
AVOD (‘YouTube tax’)380. This way, France began to apply funding 
commitments to digital players that usually exploit the difference in 
regulatory regimes between countries to minimize their tax burden381.  
The constant adjustments allowed to secure increasing resources for the 
film industry. As noted, «from 1981 until the present French subsidies to 
the film industry have continuously increased with no notable sign of 
reversing»382. As a result, in 2014, the subsidies were more than three 
times (in real terms) than in the 1970s383. However, at the same time, the 
scope of CNC has gradually extended to support works other than films 
for cinema theaters, such as  works designed for television, internet etc. 
 
4.1.2. Too much money? The 2007-2011 inflation and the 
correctives  
On several occasions, French control bodies criticized the high level of 
the CNC's resources: in the absence of correctives, the French system 
 
established in France, and its percentage depends on their turnover: 0,5% of the turnover 
between €10 M and € 250 M; 2,10% of the turnover between €250 M  and €500 M; 2,80% of 
the turnover between €500 M and €750 M; 3,5% of the turnover over €750 M. 
380 Law no. 1918/2016 of  December 29th. 
381 Still, taxes on digital operators that offer contents in France without being established 
there entered into force only in 2018. The measures were notified to the European 
Commission, which approved them only in July 2017.  
382 MESSERLIN, P. and PARC, J., "The real impact of subsidies on the film industry ", 60. 
383 Ibidem. 
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does not ensure a proportion between the level of State aids and the 
audio-visual industry's actual needs.  
The increase of CNC resources happened in particular between 2007 and 
2012, when the Fund rose from € 512 M to € 749 M (+46%)384. This 
occurrence mostly depended on the entry into force of the TST-D, whose 
proceeds rose from €94 M in 2008 to €279 M in 2012385. As noted by the 
Council for statutory contributions, «the result was an increase in the 
CNC's resources that was unrelated to its needs»386.  Criticisms also came 
from the Court of Auditors387: it pointed out that between 2002 and 2012, 
the volume of direct State aids to the audio-visual industry increased by 
88%; this way, France alone concentrated two-thirds of the aids to the 
film industry provided by all the EU Member States388.  
The Court also remarked that the increase of the CNC's budget had led 
to a kind of 'inflation' within the audio-visual industry. It noted macro-
economic evidence pointing to this direction, such as that the average 
cost of French film production realized between 2002 and 2012 increased 
 
384 See COUR DES COMPTES, Les soutiens à la production cinématographique, p. 24. 
385 Ibidem. 
386 See CONSEIL DES PRÉLÈVEMENTS OBLIGATOIRE, Les taxes affectées: des instruments à mieux 
encadrer, 2018, p. 98 («Il en et́ait reśulte ́une augmentation des moyens du CNC sans rapport avec 
ses besoins»). 
387 COUR DES COMPTES, Les soutiens à la production cinématographique, p. 19. 
388 Ibidem, p. 12. As the Court had already affirmed in the past, while analysing the 
financing of the CNC, «Beyond taking as irrefutable that a sector’s dynamism entails the 
need to allocate always more public money to it and to make this allocation a public 
policy’s priority of a higher rank, the justification for the continued increase of the aids to 
the audio-visual industry is still to be given». Thus reported by the COMMISSION DES 
FINANCES, Rapport d’information fait au Sénat par M. Aymeri de Montesquiou sur l’enquête de la 
Cour des comptes relative a ̀ la gestion et au financement du Centre national du cineḿa et de l’image 
animeé, 2012, p. 19  (« Sauf a ̀ tenir pour irref́utable l’ideé selon laquelle le dynamisme d’un secteur 
emporte la nećessite ́de lui affecter toujours plus d’argent public et donc d’en faire une priorite ́de 
politique publique d’un rang supeŕieur a ̀ toutes les autres prioriteś gouvernementales, la 
justification de cette augmentation continue des aides reste a ̀ et́ablir »). 
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more than the general rate of inflation389. This result was mainly due to 
an increase in the remuneration of actors390.  
Because of the parafiscal systems' faults and the need for more resources 
for the general budget of the State, the Parliament introduced some 
correctives measures in 2013. It prevented public institutions that 
directly received taxes' proceeds to obtain more than a pre-established 
cap each year, requiring them to return the exceeding sums to the State's 
general budget. However, despite its prosperous financial situation, the 
CNC ended up being one of the few institutions partially exempted from 
applying the new rule391. Indeed, only the TST-D product was subject to 
a ceiling (€229 M per year). This way, the recommendation of the Council 
of statutory contributions, which had asked for a ceiling to all the CNC 
resources, was not followed392. 
However, the State broke the CNC's financing logic, based on the 
exclusive allocation to the institution of the revenues from TSA, TST, and 
TSV: it levied on the CNC’s Fund, given the need to support the austerity 
program introduced after the 2007 global crisis393. Since 2008, the 
 
389 Respectively, + 23 % and + 26 %, while the general prices increased of +17%. COUR DES 
COMPTES, Les soutiens à la production cinématographique, p. 75. 
390 Indeed, in disregard of transparency, their compensations were often presented as fees 
paid for 'image rights', registering an increase of 119% in the early 2000s (ibidem, p. 77). A 
well-known French film producer reported that the salary of French actors ranged from 
€500.000 to €2 M when they performed in French films, whereas they ranged from €50.000 
to €200.000 when the very same actors performed in foreign films (MARAVAL, V. “Les 
acteurs français sont trop paye ́s!”. Le Monde (2012)). Note that, faced with these findings, 
the CNC Board of Directors introduced a cap to the actors' remuneration in 2014, 
preventing  productions that pay 'excessive compensations' to benefit from its programmes 
of aid (see arts. 211-44, 211-105 and 211-128 of the CNC’s Regulation, as modified by the 
resolution of the CNC’s Board of Directors November 24th, 2014). 
391 Art. 46 of Finance Act for 2012. 
392 For more information, see COMMISSION DES FINANCES, Rapport d’information fait au Sénat 
par M. Aymeri de Montesquiou. 
393 The Finance Act for 2011 imposed an exceptional €20 M withdrawal on the CNC's Fund; 
that for 2013 detracted €150 M from it; that for 2014 €90 M. The State also asked the CNC 
to support some expenses (worth around €64 M) previously assumed by the Ministry of 
Culture.  See COUR DES COMPTES, Les soutiens à la production cinématographique, p. 26. 
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Minister of Culture also stopped covering part of the CNC’s operating 
by providing it with a subsidy of around € 2.1 M per year. 
 
4.1.3. The current situation and the search for new balances 
Thanks to the correctives adopted, the TST revenues started to diminish 
after 2011 and settled on relatively stable levels in the following years. 
They began to shrink again from 2017, with a peak in 2020, due to 
decreasing advertising resources following the lockdown due to the 
pandemic (fig. 12). Still, the TST continued to be by far the primary 
source of the CNC fund, contributing to its financing for 72%-to-78% 
between 2009 and 2019. However, forecasts suggest that resources from 
traditional televisions will progressively continue to decrease. In the face 
of this evidence, the Parliament decided to support broadcasters by 
reducing their levy in 2020 (from 5.65% of the yearly turnover to 
5.15%394).  
The second leading source of the CNC fund is the TSA (fig. 12). Given 
the positive attendance to French movie theaters395, its proceeds 
remained constant—except for 2020, due to the forced closure of theatres 
and the State’s decision to exempt exhibitors from the TSA's payment 
during the most affected months.  
 
394 See art. 193 of the Finance Act for 2020. The Act also established that television services 
focused on information and broadcasting exclusively programs they autonomously 
produce do not have to pay the TST. 
395 See fig. 7 of par. 4.4. of Chapter II. Note that, before the pandemic, there was a discussion 
about the opportunity to increase the tax applied to exhibitors. Many parts consider indeed 
that cinema theaters (particularly the most important of them) contribute too little to the 
new creation, of which they are the first to benefit in the context of the media chronology. 
The aid they receive from the CNC tends to be more or less equal (if not even smaller) to 
the tax proceeds they pay, indeed (see COMMISSION DES AFFAIRES CULTURELLES ET DE 
L’ÉDUCATION, Rapport d’information présénté par Mme Aurore Bergé, p. 64). A proposal was 
to extend the TSA tax base, taking into account, besides the revenues from selling tickets, 
those from activities such as advertising and selling foods and beverages. They represent 
a significant percentage of the resources of major groups, indeed (See KOPP, P., Le cineḿa a ̀ 
l’eṕreuve des pheńomeǹes de concentration: menace sur la filier̀e inde ́pendante du cineḿa français, 
Centre d’économie de la Sorbonne, 2016, p. 39).  
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The last source of funding is the TSV, which has remained constant over 
the last years, given that the non-linear operators' resources 
compensated for the continuous decrease of those from the DVD and 
Blu-ray market (fig. 12).  In 2019, the TSV’s proceeds recorded a first 
significant growth (+33% on 2018): the application of the tax also to 
foreign SVOD operators began to have effects. A significant increase also 
occurred in 2020, given the digital market's growth during the 
pandemic. In the years to come, the TSV contribution to the CNC's fund 
is expected to continue its increase, due to both the SVOD market's 
growth and the rise of the tax rate on them. Indeed, while reducing the 
obligations on traditional televisions, the Parliament increased the ones 
on digital operators in 2020 (from 2% to 5.15% of the turnover). This way, 
besides fiscal equality, it sought to keep the CNC's fund level constantly 
adequate. The strength of the OTT's contribution should  indeed 
compensate for the reduction of that of traditional televisions and 
retailers of physical contents.  
Still, in the year 2020, the increase of the TSV proceeds does not 
compensate for the reduction of the TSA and TSV (fig. 12). To fill the 
CNC’s financial hole and to allow it to sustain the industry during the 
crisis396, the State broke the system's financial autonomy, transferring 
resources from its general budget to the CNC (tab. 5). 
 
396 All the measures adopted in France to support the audio-visual industry in response to 
the Covid-19 pandemic are collected in the Book IX attached to the CNC’s Regulation.  
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Fig. 12. The proceeds of the taxes financing the CNC’s fund during the period 2009-2020. 
 
Source.  CNC “Bilans” and Commisson de la culture, de l’éducation et de la communication 
“Avis n° 143 presenté au Sénat par M. Jeŕeḿy Bacchi sur le projet de loi de finances pour 2021”, 
p. 7. Data in millions of euro. 
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Net resources of the CNC 694,4 603,1 692,1 
Of where, coming from the TSA, 
TST and TSV 675,5 588,9 667,9 
State funding due to the pandemic  100 165 
Total resources 694,4 703,1 857,2 








It is worth to note that the CNC’s fund does not give an exhaustive 
representation of State’s funding for the film industry, since it finances 
only direct aids. The indirect ones are financed by the State’s general 
budget. Even the resources granted indirectly have progressively 
increased over time (fig. 13). Indeed, the legislator progressively 
introduced new types of indirect aid. To the tax credit for attracting 
private investments in the film industry (established in 1985397) and the 
one for film producers (2004398), the legislator added those for the 
production of audio-visual works (2004399) and videogames (2008400) and 
a tax credit for attracting foreign production companies (2009401). The 
increase was also due to the legislator repeatedly enhancing tax credits 
to raise their competitiveness on foreign fiscal incentives. 
 
397Art. 40 of Law no. 695/1985 of July 11th. 
398 Budget Law for 2004. 
399 Ibidem. 
400 Law no. 309/2007 of March 5th.  
401 Budget Law for 2009. 
Source.  CNC “Bilans”,  Court de Comptes “Les soutiens à la production cinématographique et 
audiovisuelle : des changements nécessaires”, 2014,  and Commission des finances, de l’économie 
générale et du contrôle budgétaire “Rapport d’information  sur l’application des mesures fiscales  
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Fig. 13. Evolution of the State fiscal expenditure in favour of the audio-visual industry during the 
period 2004-2020 in France. 
 169 
4.2. The Italian Fund: a partial adoption of the French model 
Before the 2016 reform, the State funding for the cinema came from 
several sources in Italy. The leading one was the FUS, financed yearly by 
the general budget through the Finance Act402 and meant to incorporate 
all the State funds for cinema, music, dance, and theater403. The FUS's 
overall budget for the entire entertainment sector was relatively constant 
during the period 2010-2016: € 407 M per year, on average404. The 
funding allocated to the cinema also remained relatively constant in 
those years: € 76,8 M per year, on average—around 19% of the FUS’s 
total budget405 (as fig. 14 shows). 
State resources for the film industry also came from the special tax credit 
fund, managed by both the Ministries of Economy and Culture. Tax 
credits were introduced in 2007 as a temporary measure for the three 
years 2008-2011406—with an annual budget of €M 80—then extended 
after its expiration and finally made permanent in 2013407. The 2013 
legislator also made the incentive available to producers of television 
and web-TV works, in addition to the cinematographic ones. On that 
 
402 See par. 3.4. of Chapter I. 
403 Until 1988, each sector received a fixed percentage of the FUS, as determined by art. 1 
of the law establishing the FUS (42% for opera, 31% for music and dance, 25% for cinema, 
15% for prose theatre and 1.5% for circuses). Since 1988 these quotas were abolished, and 
the Ministry of Tourism and Entertainment acquired the task of establishing the Fund’s 
annual percentages allocation to the different sectors. In exercising this task, the Ministry 
should obtain the advice of the ‘National Council of Entertainment’, instituted by the same 
Law establishing the FUS and called to represent all sectors concerned.   
404 CORTE DEI CONTI, La gestione delle risorse del fondo unico per lo spettacolo destinate al settore 
cinematografico (anni 2010-2016), 2019, pp. 15 and ff. For a comprehensive view of the 
evolution of the FUS resources from 1985 to 2016, see OSSERVATORIO DELLO SPETTACOLO, 
Relazione sull’utilizzo del Fondo Unico per lo Spettacolo e sull’andamento complessivo dello 
spettacolo, 2016.  
405 Ibidem.  
406  Budget Law for 2008. The same law also introduced the tax shelter (experiment already 
adopted for the entire entertainment sector during the years 1986-1991). However, the 
legislator reconfirmed only tax credit and not also the tax shelter at their expiry. 
407 Law Decree no. 91/2013 of August 8th, converted by Law no. 91/2013 of August 8th. 
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occasion, the annual budget for tax credit was increased to €M 110, then 
raised to €M 115 in 2015408. 
In addition to the resources provided by the FUS and the tax credit fund, 
other sources of funding were flowing into the film industry—
established by special and extraordinary provisions; among them, a 
percentage of the proceeds from the lottery. As pointed out by the Court 
of Auditors, «the different origin of the resources allocated to the film 
industry compromised the readability of the overall State expenditure in 
the sector and represented an obstacle to assessing the effectiveness of 
the support action [...]»409.  
The 2016 reform overcame the presence of a multiplicity of different 
financing sources, offering an overall and unified vision of the State's 
support to the sector.  Indeed, it established a new fund, which finances 
both direct and indirect aids410. The reform also anchored the extent of 
the resources to defined parameters: it established that the fund should 
have a minimum annual endowment. This way, the industry is partially 
secured from the yearly negotiations on expenditures carried out during 
the adoption of the Budget Law, as well as from changes in 
governments’ sensitivity to culture.   
Initially, the minimum level of the Fund was € 400 M. However, in 2020, 
the State, besides supporting the industry during the pandemic by 
providing the Fund with additional resources411, also established a 
 
408 Stability Law for 2016. 
409 CORTE DEI CONTI, La gestione delle risorse, p. 37 («La diversa provenienza delle risorse 
destinate al sostegno del settore, da un lato, ha costituito un elemento di poca leggibilità ̀ dell’onere 
pubblico complessivo sopportato dal bilancio statale per il cinema, e, dall’altro, un obiettivo ostacolo 
per la valutazione dell’efficacia dell’azione di sostegno con riferimento alla complessiva strategia 
finanziaria di intervento nel settore»). 
410 Art. 13 of the 2016 Act. Its management is regulated by the Decree of the President of 
the Council of Ministers (DPCM) May 20th, 2017. The percentage of the fund allocated to 
each different type of aid is established each year by one or more ministerial decrees. 
411 Indeed, the  Law Decree no. 18/2020 of March 17th established the Fund for emergency 
in the entertainment and audio-visual sector, with an initial endowment of  € 130 M, then 
increased by following provisions.  
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permanent increase: today, State resources to the audio-visual cannot 
fall below € 640 M412. 
Looking at the French system, the 2016 legislator also introduced a link 
between the level of the film industry’s turnover and that of the annual 
State’s support. The higher the sector’s resources, the higher should be 
those made available by the State for future creation. Indeed, the reform 
established that the Fund’s actual endowment must be parameterized 
each year to 12% of the IRES and VAT revenue from the audio-visual 
sector—provided it does not fall below the minimum level. Therefore, 
the link between State expenditure and industry revenues is not 
automatic in Italy. The revenues from the taxes paid by theatre 
exhibitors, production, distribution, home video, television, fixed and 
mobile telecommunications, and Internet access companies are part of 
the State’s general budget and are used to cover the overall public 
expenses. However, the State should consider their proceeds while 
determining the amount of resources to transfer to the film industry413. 
The arrangements introduced in 2016  generated a significant increase of 
State resources for the sector  (as fig. 14 shows). However, the increase 
is less significant than it would appear. In addition to works intended 
for cinema, the new Fund also supports those for television, the internet, 
etc. This way, State direct aid ceased to support only to cinematographic 
works, following the path already initiated in the context of indirect aids.  
 
 
412 Art. 1, par. 583, let. a) of Budget Law for 2021.   
413 Following this mechanism, the Budget Law for 2019 increased the Fund's endowment 
by € 4 M compared to the minimum level provided by the 2016 Act; the following Budget 




5. Aid to cinema production 
Like the other European States, Italy and France aid film production 
asking for compliance with several requirements, referred to both the 
work and the operators involved in its realization414.  
First, besides not having a pornographic nature or incitement to violence 
and hatred, the work must be of cinematographic nature. If this is not 
the case, the applicant should ask for the aids to other audio-visual 
products. As explained, in both countries the distribution channel 
(cinema theatres) determines the work's cinematographic nature415. 
Second, to access State funding, works need to pass a ‘cultural test', 
which operates differently depending on the type of aid concerned. In 
some cases, the work has to meet a minimum score by fulfilling some 
 
414 For an in-depth analysis of the requirements and conditions behind European State aid, 
see  EUROPEAN AUDIOVISUAL OBSERVATORY, Mapping of film and audio-visual public funding 
criteria in the EU, 2019.  
415 See par. 4 of Chapter II. 
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‘cultural criteria’. In other cases, a committee directly recognizes a 
cultural value to the film. 
Finally, the work must have an adequate connection with the country 
that provides the aid. The criteria determining if such a link occurs come 
from the compromise reached between two different tensions: the State's 
desire to favour its national economy, and the need to respect the 
European principles protecting the treaties' fundamental freedoms. The 
Italian State requires the work to be of Italian nationality, i.e., it reaches 
a minimum score calculated on a series of indicators416: they refer to the 
nationality of the artistic and technical cast (a Member State's nationality 
is equivalent to the Italian one); to whether the troupe members are 
subject to Italian tax law; the use of the Italian language or dialects; and 
the realization of activities in Italy.  
In France, a sufficient connection with the country is measured 
according to different criteria specific to each aid scheme. However, the 
regulation provides the need to meet minimum scores related to several 
conditions for every aid to film production417. As in Italy, the conditions 
taken into account are the French/European nationality, the 
establishment of the production company, the nationality of the cast, the 
realization of activities in France, the use of the French language, etc. 
 
5.1. Direct aid 
Italy and France support production with several direct aids, through 
which the State directly transfers money to specific works and 
companies considered worthy.  
According to how the presence or lack of worthiness is measured, direct 
aids can be automatic or selective. In the automatic case, the 
measurement occurs based on objective criteria pre-established by the 
law, and the DGC and the CNC only have to verify if the applicant meets 
 
416 See the DPCM of July 11th, 2017, that implemented the provisions of the 2016 Act on the 
possession of the Italian nationality, and the following DPCM of August 11th, 2020. The 
latter partially modified the former, following the European Commission’s indications 
aimed at avoiding possible distortions of competition in the internal market. 
417 See arts. 211-2 and ff. of the CNC’s Regulation. 
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the eligibility requirements. In the selective case, a committee of experts 
assess whether the project submitted is worthwhile. While operating in 
compliance with the evaluation criteria established by the law, the 
committee has discretionary power in carrying out its assessment. 
Consequently, applicants to selective aids have a mere legitimate 
interest: they are never entitled to the aid; their only right is that the 
committee carries out the selection procedure correctly. 
Automatic and selective aid also differs in respect of a temporal aspect. 
Automatic aids are granted on the basis of past productions: operators 
are ‘awarded’ for the success of their previous work through resources 
to realize the future ones. Selective aids follow a reversed logic, normally 
rewarding a future film’s hopefully meritorious. The producer has not 
yet made a meritorious film but plans to do so, requiring economic 
support to this end. 
 
5.1.1. Automatic aid: rewarding economic success in France, also 
the cultural one in Italy 
Automatic aids are the most ancient instruments both in France and 
Italy418, where they were adopted during fascism in the form of contributi 
sugli incassi. While their characteristics changed over time, their primary 
purpose has remained constant: to encourage successful companies to 
continue their activities. 
Still today, automatic aids represent ex-post success-linked grants, 
recognized to a production company to realize a new film based on its 
previous film’s success. The system is built to compel producers to move 
on to the next project continuously: they lose the aid if do not initiate a 
new film within five years from when the funding has been made 
available, i.e., credited to their deposit account within the CNC/DGC. 
The goal to maintain film production explains why automatic aids are 
given to production companies, not to physical persons: the State does 
not reward screenwriters or directors for their previous works’ success, 
 
418 In Italy, arts. from 23 to 25 of the 2016 Act and the Ministerial implementing Decree no. 
342/2017 of July 31st regulate automatic aid.  In France, arts. from 211-1 to 212-63 of the 
CNC’s Regulation govern them. 
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because it would be challenging for them to ensure the realization of a 
new film with the aid received419.  
The success—and therefore, the amount of granted subsidy—is 
measured according to objective and pre-established criteria. France 
only considers the economic success of the producer’s previous films420. 
Thus, as noted, the French automatic aid «is closer to an industrial policy 
designed to maintain film production in general, than a cultural policy 
to support the production of particular films»421. The Italian case is 
different. Like France, Italy assesses the virtuosity of production 
companies evaluating their previous films' economic success422, which 
however makes up for only 60% of the total score, integrated with the 
producers' previous works' artistic and cultural achievements for the 
remaining 40%423.  
However, to benefit from the Italian automatic aid, it is not necessary to 
reach a minimum threshold for the different types of success, but just for 
the overall score. Therefore, the State may end up rewarding companies 
for the economic success of projects lacking any artistic and cultural 
merit under the criteria of the State itself. It is what happened, for 
 
419 However, the Italian auteur body 100 Authors and the Italian Association of 
Cinematographic, Audio-visual and Multimedia Industries (ANICA) sealed an agreement 
on the matter. It establishes that story writers, screenwriters, and directors who worked in 
a film that generated automatic aid are entitled to a percentage of the aid (1,5% to story 
writers, 1,5% to screenwriters and 1.5% to directors). 
420 More precisely, the amount of the aid depends on the revenues realized by the 
producer's previous film distribution via box office within the first five years following 
release, via the sale of videos and DVDs within six years of release, and via the sale of 
television rights within the first eight years. 
421 WALKLEY, S. E., To what extent, p. 95. 
422 The elements considered are the theatrical and home entrainment revenues and the 
proceeds from the sale of the distribution rights to AVMS providers. 
423 This latter evaluation takes into account many aspects, showing that the State wants to 
reward companies: i) considered meritorious by the industry (criteria related to previous 
prizes awarded at festivals or international events); ii) able of operating at an international 
level (sales of the film's rights abroad, number of countries of the film's distribution); iii) 
likely to favour the emergence of new artists and increase the supply's pluralism and 
diversity (the work being a documentary, a short film, a first-time or second-time film 
director, a film of a young author or directed by a woman, etc.). 
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example, in the case of the production company Filmauro, which 
received € 113.800 to make a new film because of the success of its "Super 
Vacanze di Natale" (2017), that got 111 points for its economic success and 
0 its artistic and cultural merit, neither having attended in festivals, nor 
won prizes, nor involved new talents424. In essence, like France, even 
Italy might end up granting the aid to companies whose previous films 
had controversial artistic and cultural impact. 
Despite these limits, automatic aids are useful to achieve many State 
goals. The choice to reward those who have already succeeded 
(economically and/or artistically) is paradoxical only at first sight. It is 
true that established players are those that need State aid the less: by the 
virtue of their already-established success, they are more likely to secure 
funding from private sources, such as television broadcasters and banks. 
However, among the many goals behind cinema promotion, there is the 
one of strengthening the sector's industrial basis, making it capable of 
generating jobs, local spending, and to attract businesses and 
investments. The solidity of the sector's industrial basis implies 
overcoming the 'small-is-good' approach, and therefore the 
undercapitalization of the companies. There is a need for players with 
financial solidity, large enough to compensate the losses of one year with 
another's incomes and rely on budgets that allow for projects likely to 
competing at the international level. Automatic aids help satisfy these 
needs: they strengthen already established players and push them to 
continue their activities. Still, it is worth to notice that there is no 
evidence that the films financed by automatic aid would not be made 
even in the absence of such aid. 
As fig 15 shows, the level of automatic aid tends to be considerably 
higher in France than in Italy. Between 2017 and 2020 the amount of 
automatic aid yearly recognized for cinema production oscillated 
between €83 M and €86 in France, €19 M  and €34 M in Italy.  
 
424 See Decree of the General Director of the DGC of May 29th, 2019. 
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5.1.2. Selective aid: supporting ‘fragile’ works instead of cultural 
ambition?  
When promoting cinema, States do not merely seek to support the 
general growth of the national film industries, but also to favour new 
players' entering and fostering quality movies that may encounter 
difficulties in funding. These goals are not pursued with automatic aids: 
first, credits are available and can be reinvested once a producer has 
already realized at least one project—thus excluding new operators from 
the support; second, producers of challenging quality films not 
appealing to the large public may have no credits (France) or just a few 
credits (Italy) to call upon.  
To address these issues, Italy and France provide a second direct funding 
mechanism: selective aid425, granted by committees426 in charge of 
 
425 In Italy, art. 26 of the 2016 Act and the Ministerial implementing Decree no. 343/2017 of 
July 31st regulate selective aid. In France, arts. from 211-1 to 212-63 of the CNC’s Regulation 
govern them. 
426 In Italy, the Committee comprises five experts identified from personalities of evident 
international reputation and proven professional qualification in the field, appointed by 
Source. Elaboration by the author of data provided by the CNC in its annual “Bilans” and the 










Fig. 15 Automatic aid for cinema production in Italy and France during the period 
2017-2020 
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selecting movies to fund based on artistic and quality considerations. 
Historically, they appeared later than automatic aids. During the 
authoritative periods of the past, they were meant to allow a State 
control over contents; they acquired their current function during the 50s 
and the 60s, when the two States ceased began to consider also the 
cultural dimension of the film industry. 
In Italy, where at least 15-10% of the Fund's annual resources have to be 
granted selectively427, there are selective aids for all the sub-stages of the 
production phase428. Indeed, the State provides a selective aid for i) 
writing by new and young authors; ii) development and pre-production 
activities realized by small or medium-sized enterprises and newly 
established companies; iii) production of difficult, low-budget films, or 
films of 'particular artistic quality', and by first-time and second-time 
directors, or young authors. The only aid granted to physical people is 
the one for writing, otherwise, only production companies can request 
the contribute for development and production. 
France has a broader range of selective aids. Each of them supports a 
particular aspect of one of the sub-phases of production and is subject to 
a specific regulation429. Many can be requested, rather than by the 
 
the Minister of Culture. In France, there are several Committees. Each of them is 
responsible for granting one of the many existing selective aids to production. In any case, 
the Committees comprise members recognized by the film industry, appointed by the 
CNC's President. 
427 See art. 3(4) of Law Decree no. 59/2019 of Jun 28th, converted by Law no. 81/2019 of 
August 8th, which modified art. 13(5) of the 2016 Act––that originally provided a higher 
percentage of resources to be granted selectively (18-15% of the Fund). 
428 For the sub-stages of the production phase, see footnote 234 of par. 3 of Chapter II. 
429 Their large number generates criticism and discussion. As noted by the Court of 
Auditors in 2012, out of the 83 selective schemes provided by the CNC, ten absorb two-
thirds of the total financial volume. Hence, the concerns about the approach followed: it 
generates high management costs and risks to have limited effectiveness since it ends up 
recognizing a limited monetary amount to most of the lines of support (See COUR DES 
COMPTES, Les soutiens à la production cinématographique, p. 90). However, some film 
operators consider all selective aids fundamental since each of them pursues a different 
specific goal. Among them: help authors to develop their stories (think about l'aide à la 
création de projet, l'aide à l'écriture and à la récriture); aid producers to progress their projects, 
covering costs such as location research and feasibility studies (aide au développent des 
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production company, by authors, directors, and screenwriters. 
However, the ancient and most important selective aid to production is 
the advance on receipts, which supports debuts and high-quality films 
unable to find resources on the free market. It can be requested avant or 
après realization. Unlike Italy, France provides indeed selective support 
not only to fund new films, but also to reward operators which have 
already carried out a worthy film430. 
While selective aid can overcome the limitations of automatic aid, it also 
causes some concern. One question is how the State can assess the merit 
of a film without entailing risks of discretionary judgments. The law 
established principles for the committees responsible for granting 
selective aids to attend, seeking to anchor their judgment on pre-
established criteria, which remain, however, mostly physiologically 
subjective431. There is no objective way to evaluate the cultural and 
 
projets and the aide pour l'élaboration des documents de préparation aux tournages); foster the 
realization of films that promote the culture of French overseas departments and 
contribute to the training of their resident in film professions (aide pour les œuvres 
cinématographiques intéressant les cultures d'outre-mer); contribute to the emergence of new 
directors from all around the world by supporting the works they realize in coproduction 
with France (aide aux cinéma du monde, a 'pillar' of the French system, which expresses 
France's international commitment to cultural diversity); promote the creation of original 
music (aid à la création de musique originale), of works able to foster the emergence of new 
talents from the suburb area of the cities and showing a more faithful representation of the 
French society, compose by many immigrant populations (aide image de la diversité).   
430 Initially, the advance on receipts was awarded only after the films' realization (art. 7 of 
the Decree no. 733/1959 of Jun 16th). Such an initial approach depended on Malraux's 
conviction that cinema was a visual medium and that a script could not indicate the look 
or quality of the completed work: «il n'est au pouvoir de personne au monde de juger un film 
autrement que sur ses images» (MALHARAUX, A., Discours prononcés à l'Assemblée nationale: 
1945-1976, Assemblée nationale, 1996). Producers were allowed to submit also scripts in 
competition since 1963.  
431 Concerning the Italian case, the Decree about selective aid and the calls issued over time 
establish that the Committee must take into account, among other things: «the quality and 
originality of the script»; «its actual feasibility», evaluating the curriculum of the producer, 
the coherence of the work plane, that between the artistic ambition and the costs and 
between the project and the target audience; the «potential of fruition and diffusion of the 
work in festivals and cinemas in Italy and abroad»;  the «vision and the style of the director 
and the cinematic language proposed»; the «quality of the artistic and technical 
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artistic value of a film, without giving rise to disputes. This process will 
always cause examples of films that were not financed but should have 
been, or which benefited from unjustified aid. Think, among the many, 
about the controversy that arose in France on the film "Les Miserables" 
(2019) by Ladj Ly: it did not obtain the advance on receipts, despite the 
high artistic and cultural quality of the project—testified by the fact that 
the film then won the Jury Price in Cannes and four César432. 
However, even before wondering how the State can adequately decide 
what is worthy, one should first wonder if it is legitimate that the State 
substitutes itself to the market in taking such a decision. Without 
addressing the deep philosophical implications of such a profound 
question—which are beyond the purpose of this work and regard the 
concept of industrial policy at its very core—one can still identify some 
risks specifically related to the film industry.  
For example, it is risky to use public money to support niche works that 
have little-to-no demand, which furthermore often comes from the 
richest and more educated part of the society. The risk is to generate an 
regressive redistribution effect. Obviously, an unsuccessful film does not 
necessarily represent a total useless expense of public money, since 
positive effects may still occur: for example, a big producer may stumble 
across a film of little success, acknowledge new talented artists, and 
involve them in future projects. In such a case, the selective aid would 
have achieved its aim of facilitating market access to new entrants. Still, 
it is desirable that the gap between what the State finances with the 
citizens’ money and what the citizens benefit from is as small as possible. 
In the context of Italian selective aid, there is a lack of incentives to push 
or allow operators to shoulder responsibility so that their cultural project 
also pursues an economic goal, seeking for an audience.  
First, Italian selective aids should not be repaid, which seems to testify 
that the State considers the projects supported as economically unviable 
 
participation», assessing the curricula of the artistic and technical team; the need to pursue 
gender equality, which leads to raising the score for projects involving a female direction. 
432 However, given the positive results achieved, the production company benefited from 
the automatic aid after the film realization. 
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from the outset, with no hope for the provided money of being repaid433. 
The French case is different: the advance on receipts is a loan with no 
interest, and therefore it must theoretically be repaid with the profits 
from the film's commercial exploitation, once it achieves a certain 
commercial return (at least € 50 000) 434.  
Second, the Italian law does not require the applicant to show evidence 
of a distribution deal as a condition for the disbursement of the last 
percentage of the subsidy435. Therefore, it is not excluded the possibility 
that the funded work will never be distributed and not benefit society—
as it partially happens also in France436.  
Third, Italian selective aid can be granted only to works with small-
enough budget437. This way, the State avoids to aid projects realized by 
incumbent operators able to find resources autonomously. However, 
such a provision is likely to generate disincentives, since it risks pushing 
operators to keep their budgets low, hindering them from thinking 
ambitiously and managing to succeed.  
Finally, despite the provision of a maximum number of projects that can 
be financed in each session, the budget for Italian selective aids ends up 
being dispersed across many projects—at least compared to France: 
probably too few resources are divided upon too many works438. By 
 
433 However, Italian producers affirm that selective aids are not repayable because of the 
Italian administration's difficulty in managing the procedure of restitution due to the lack 
of specialized and numerically sufficient staff. 
434 Art. 211-115 of the CNC’s Regulation. 
435 However, note that this condition, not provided by the law, is included in the calls: they 
require the applicant to give evidence of a distribution deal (to be submitted within 24 
months) as a condition for the disbursement of the last 20% of the subsidy.  
436 In France, only to benefit from the advance after realization it is necessary a contract for 
theatrical distribution—to be realized with a company having already distributed at least 
three films in the preceding two years. See art. 211-130 of the CNC’s Regulation. 
437 See art. 8 of Decree no. 343/2017. 
438 In 2019, the French advance on receipts was worth €25.2 M and supported 87 films, 
which means an average of €289 for each film (CNC, Bilan, 2019, p. 25). In Italy, selective 
aid for film production was worth €23,7 M and financed 142 films, which means an average 
of € 167 for each film (DGC, Elenco soggetti beneficiari contribute selettivi alla produzione, 2019). 
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trying to simultaneously avoid both displeasing anyone, and the risk of 
giving significant resources to a few inexperienced and novice actors, 
selective aids actually do not appear to be selective439. It would be 
desirable to invest more resources in fewer projects440.  
Selective aids indeed, as things stand now, seem not to seek culturally-
relevant films that deserve support, but rather to back those which 
would not be realized due to insufficient funding. Such an approach 
does not seem consistent with the constitutional ratio of the State 
promotional action and the principle of substantial equality referred to 
in art. 3 of the Italian Constitution. The stated need to remove the 
obstacles to full access equality to the country's working, economic, 
political, and cultural life does not imply that all those who wish to make 
a film should have the right to do so with public funds. 
As fig 16 shows, the level of automatic aid tends to be considerably 
higher in France than in Italy. Between 2017 and 2020 the amount of 
direct selective aid yearly recognized for the audio-visual production 
oscillated between €93 M and €123 M in France, €27 M and €28 M in 
Italy441.  
 
439 The difficulty is due, among others, to the composition of the Committee. The provision 
that its members should not have conflicts of interest makes it difficult for real experts to 
sit in the Committee: it is unlikely that a real expert does not have relations with film 
operators. Moreover, the provision that the members do not receive economic 
compensation for their activity is likely to generate an adverse effect; it can easily make 
unavailable those with effective competencies. Said provision is unfortunately familiar to 
those used to analyse the Italian legislation concerning culture. 
440 This is also because a first work is likely to require more resources to achieve success 
than the one of an experienced director: the less the experience, the more the risk of 
unforeseen, and in turn the more the days of shooting and the costs. 
441 The figure presents the entity of automatic aid granted to produce all types of audio-
visual works, not only the cinematographic ones. This is because the DGC data about each 
year's support do not always distinguish for each type of aid the amount given to the 




5.2. Indirect aid 
Automatic and selective aids are 'imperfect' instruments on their own so 
that each one is called upon to overcome the limitations of the other. In 
addition to their specific risks, they both involve the danger that the 
States interfere with the free evolution of culture. Such a risk is 
particularly evident in the selective aid, through which the State decides 
in place of the market the industry's directions, but may also arise from 
the automatic support. While trying to increase opportunities, the 
legislator may create distortive effects and put new constraints, altering 
the choices of operators interested in qualifying for the conditions to 
obtain support442. 
Partly to reduce the problems intrinsic to automatic and selective aids 
and simplify the public administration's action, the European States 
usually also provide indirect aids to the film industry. Their main 
 
442 Think about the disincentive created by the reference system of the Italian Urbani 
Decree: it ended up pushing operators (interested in reaching higher scores) to resort to 
established actors and authors. This way, the legislator generated a conservative effect that 
reduced the incentives to innovate and diversify (see par. 3.5. of Chapter I).  
Source. Elaboration by the author of data provided by the CNC in its annual 












Source. Elaboration by the author of data provided by the CNC in its annual “Bilans” and the 
DGC. Data in millions of euro. 
 
 
Fig. 5 Selective aid for the audio-visual production in Italy and France during the period 2017-
2020.Source. Elaboration by the author of data provided by the CNC in its annual “Bilans” and 
the DGC. Data in millions of euro. 
 
Fig. 16 Selective aid for the audio-visual production in Italy and France during the period 2017-
2020. 
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characteristic is that their recognition does not require any evaluation: 
through indirect aids, the States create a favourable environment for the 
industry's general development, leaving it free to choose what to 
produce. Actually, both Italy and France, to comply with the cultural 
criterion dictated by the EU, require the work to be 'culturally eligible' 
to benefit from an indirect aid. However, such compliance is measured 
on generic and flexible criteria—to the extent that it is difficult to imagine 
works unable to satisfy them. Shortly, indirect aids seem to rely on the 
premise that the entire industry is meritorious, given it is a cultural 
industry. 
Both in Italy and France, indirect aids to film production aim at 
encouraging production companies to realize new films (par. 5.2.1.), 
companies outside the sector to invest in the film industry (par. 5.2.2.) 
and foreign productions to shoot in Italy and France (par. 5.2.3.).  
 
5.2.1. The internal tax credit: addressing the limits of direct aid in 
Italy and opposing the relocation trends in France  
The French and the Italian States indirectly support film production 
companies through tax credits443. They are relatively new instruments: 
they have been existing in France since 2004444, and in Italy since 2008445. 
They allow charging against the producer's tax liabilities a percentage of 
a film's production costs (40% of the eligible costs in Italy446, 20% in 
 
443 In Italy, tax credit to film production is regulated by art. 15 of the 2016 Act and arts. 
from 14 to 17 of the Ministerial implementing Decree no. 70/2021, which substituted the 
previous Ministerial Decree March 15th, 2018. In France, arts. from 220 to 220f of the French 
General Tax Code and arts. from D. 331-1 to D. 331-18 of the CCIA regulate it. 
444 Budget Law for 2004. 
445 Budget Law for 2008. 
446 For dependent producers and non-European production companies, the rate is 
decreased to 25%. 
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France447), under specific caps448. While Italian producers have to 
reinvest the 80% of the amount received through tax credit within the 
film industry449, the French ones have not. Such a difference can be 
explained by the dissimilar aims of the tax credit instrument in the two 
countries. 
In Italy, the goal behind tax credits is to simplify the management of 
State aids for the public administration and to promote the free 
development and growth of the industry, helping it to realize new films 
overcoming the limits of direct aids. In France, the primary goal of the 
tax credit is more limited and targeted: namely, to disincentive French 
producers from shooting their films abroad. Unlike most of the French 
direct aids, tax credit indeed includes among the eligibility conditions to 
realize filming mainly in France. This way, France seeks to foster 
producers to shoot in France, despite foreign competitive fiscal 
advantage (such as the Belgian tax shelter) or lower labour costs450. 
Accordingly, the assessment of the French tax credit's effectiveness is 
 
447 The rate is increased to  30% for all cinematographic works entirely or mainly shot in 
French or in a regional language in use in France and also for those realized in a foreign 
language but having « forts effets visuels »  (principles introduced in 2016, where previously 
the 30% rate applied only to films that, in addition to being shoot in French, had budgets 
below certain thresholds). 
448 In both the countries, the tax advantage is indeed subject to two ceilings. In France the 
qualifying costs are capped at 80% of the production budget. Second, each work cannot 
benefit from a tax credit of more than € 30 M (it was € 1 M at the time of the introduction 
of the tax credit, raised to €4 M in 2013 and to €30 M since 2016). In Italy, some qualifying 
costs are capped (see art. 3 of the Decree no. 70/2021). Second, each work cannot benefit 
from a tax credit of more than € 9 M––increased to € 18 M if foreign resources cover at least 
30% of the film’s costs. In any case, dependent producers and non-European production 
companies cannot benefit each year from a tax credit of more than € 5 M. 
449 See art. 8 of the Decree no. 70/2021. 
450 For all the discourse, INSPECTION GÉNÉRAL DES AFFAIRES CULTURELLES E INSPECTION 
GÉNÉRALE DES FINANCES, Évaluation des divers crédits d’impôt gérés par le Ministère de la 
culture, 2018. 
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realized by considering the evolution of the number of shooting days 
carried out in France and the subsequent economic impact they entail451.  
Note that the French legislator modified tax credit several times due to 
the increase of international competition, making it more attractive by 
enlarging rates, eligible costs, cap, and easing the eligibility conditions. 
For example, French language is no more mandatory—a choice that 
made the second main goal behind the introduction of the French tax 
credit, i.e., promoting Francophonie, progressively disappear. 
The tax credits should provide companies sure support: since it should 
be sufficient to meet the pre-established eligibility conditions and the 
DGC /CNC should not produce an evaluation assessment, there should 
be no uncertainty on whether a film qualifies for the benefit. However, 
the tax credit is a right for everyone who meets the eligibility 
conditions452 only in France, where its resources are not contingent. The 
requests for tax credits are not satisfied with a percentage of the CNC's 
fund but by additional resources, defined each year within the budget 
law, based on the previous year's requests. Therefore, the actual amount 
of tax credit depends every year on the projects that applied for it. 
The Italian case is different: the resources that fund tax credit are 
contingent, being a percentage of those of the Fund managed by the 
 
451 The CNC evaluates the instrument positively, noticing that 87.1% of French films spent 
more than 70% of their expenses in France in 2019; only 73.8% did so in 2003, the year 
before the entry into force of the tax credit. See CNC, Bilan, 2019, p. 259. 
452 In France, to benefit from the tax credit, the film production must be subject to 
corporation tax and respect the législation social—thus excluding companies misusing the 
'intermittent' work. The film should respect the general conditions to be eligible for aid to 
film production; be carried out mainly on French territory, save exceptions (e.g., artistic 
reasons that require a part of filming abroad);  be shot entirely or mainly in French or a 
regional language in use in France, save exceptions introduced in 2016 (the use of a foreign 
language is necessary for artistic reasons; the work is co-produced and its cost—equal to 
or greater than € 35,000 per minute—is covered for at least 30% by foreign funding); 
contribute to «the development of French and European film and audio-visual creation 
and its diversity». The presence of this last requisite is measured based on very vague 
criteria, suggesting that it can be recognized in every film. Indeed, according to art. D331-
4 of the CCIA, it occurs for «Les œuvres cinématographiques ou audiovisuelles qui, de manière 
significative, compte tenu du genre auquel elles appartiennent et des conditions de leur réalisation, 
sont de nature à promouvoir les talents et à stimuler et consolider la présence des ressources 
humaines et les capacités techniques requises pour la création cinématographique et audiovisuelle».   
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DGC. Therefore, companies having the eligibility conditions453 actually 
‘compete’ for the tax credit, presenting their requests to the DGC454. 
However, despite this budget constraint, the industry perceive its 
funding requests as rights to be satisfied. Although the law expressly 
provides that tax credits are satisfied within the limits of the resources 
actually available each year, some Italian producers assume indeed that 
they will benefit from them, counting tax credit in their projects’ budget. 
This is also because producers know that, although unable to predict 
when, they will benefit from the aid, sooner or later—provided they 
present the eligibility conditions. The Ministry is trying indeed to solve 
the problem of overloading requests in the presence of limited funding 
by seeking new resources. For example, it has increased tax credits' 
resources by limiting those for other aid types. 
However, it is debatable whether detaching tax credit from a closed fund 
would be desirable, since it would entail the risk to give forego tax 
revenues—something that, however, happens for other types of tax 
credits in Italy. Moreover, the State would have to recognize an 
increasing level of support as the industry grows, hence in the absence 
of a real necessity. This is owed to how the tax credit instrument is built: 
the amounts of credit due depends on the eligible production costs, 
 
453 In Italy, the film production company must be independent (in order to benefit from the 
tax credit with the 40% ordinary rate) and have a net worth of at least € 40,000. It must 
have a registered office in the European Economic Area and be subject to taxation in Italy. 
It must comply with the obligations related to social security, taxation, insurance, hygiene, 
and safety at work and apply the existing national collective labour agreements. The work 
must be of Italian nationality and meet cultural eligibility requirements. To this end, it 
must obtain a minimum score concerning criteria referred to both the 'production' and the 
'content' (listed by Tab. A annexed to Decree no. 70/2021). The production criteria refer to 
Italian or European workers' employment and the carrying out of activities in Italy. Those 
related to the content also aim to ensure a link with Italy (setting of the film in Italy, story 
taken from Italian or European opera) and the existence of a cultural value. However, its 
presence is measured based on parameters very vague. For example, the script should 
concern «historical, mythological and legendary, religious, social, fantastic, artistic or 
cultural themes». 
454 Initially, the DGC satisfied the requests based on a chronological order until the 
available resources were exhausted. It then began to recognize a preferential title to 
companies that did not obtain the tax credit in a previous session although eligible to it. 
Then, it began to take into consideration the films' shooting beginning: it recognizes tax 
credit first to the company that began to shoot sooner.   
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whose increase automatically reflects on an increase of tax credits. An 
increase in production costs usually happens when the industry expands 
(a robust industry can produce more films and films with higher 
budgets). Therefore, an industry’s growth generates an increase in the 
tax credit resources granted to it. In light of this, it seems preferable to 
solve the problem by introducing stricter requirements to access the tax 
credit; this would also make it possible to avoid 'shower funds'. 
The most recent regulatory interventions have not introduced structural 
solutions. Neither have they made unlimited the resources to satisfy tax 
credits nor have they introduced significantly more stringent criteria to 
access them. It is true that the 2021 Budget Law significantly increased 
the endowment of the Fund managed by the DGC455––a circumstance 
that should limit the problem of not sufficient resources. However, the 
same Law also introduced a higher tax credit rate456, making permanent 
its enhancement initially established only temporarily to support the 
industry during the pandemic. This last innovation is likely to generate 
an increase in the amount of tax credit required and, therefore, offset the 
results stemming from the increase of available resources. Even some of 
the novelties introduced by the 2021 Decree that currently regulates tax 
credit457 are likely to increase the requests. Indeed, the 2021 Decree 
enlarged the types of works eligible for tax credit (for example, video 
clips can now benefit from it), and also the type of actors; it established 
indeed permanent tax credit (at a reduced rate) for non-European and 
dependent producers458. A modification introduced by the 2021 Decree 
to be welcomed is that about the tax credit's ceilings; although not likely 
to reduce the tax credit requests, it should ensure the certainty of the 
rules. The 2021 Decree provided indeed that the ceiling no longer 
concerns companies and introduced the principle that it applies to the 
 
455 See par. 4.2. of this Chapter. 
456 See art. 1(583) of Law no. 178/2020. 
457 As said, the Decree no. 70/2021 substituted the previous Ministerial Decree March 15th, 
2018.  
458 See footnote 446. 
 189 
works that benefit from the support459. The ceiling on companies, i.e. the 
provision that they could not benefit from more than a certain amount 
of the tax credit each year, was only theoretical.  The Italian film 
industry, extraordinarily ingenious when it comes to finding solutions 
to overcome the regulatory principles that it does not appreciate, 
violated it. Large companies benefited from an amount of tax credit 
above the limits: once they had benefited from the maximum annual tax 
credit admissible, they continued producing through tax credits by 
simply outsourcing the realization of their works to other companies. 
Once the ceiling applies to works, these practices should not occur 
anymore. 
Despite the difficulties due to the two conflicting principles highlighted 
(a budget constraint and an aid built as a tool to be recognized to anyone 
meeting the eligibility conditions), the Italian film industry significantly 
appreciates the tax credit. This is because of its automatic nature and also 
because it can cover a large percentage of a film’s production costs. 
Moreover, it constitutes 'cash flow', since producers can benefit from it 
during the ongoing shooting, and not necessarily as a reimbursement at 
the end of the production. This explains why the tax credit recognition 
procedure comprises two steps: an initial and a final one.  
Before filming commence, the production company asks for the tax 
credit to the DGC, submitting the documentation that testifies the 
eligibility conditions' meeting. If the conditions recur, the DGC informs 
the beneficiary of the temporary recognition to tax credit and transfers 
the approved amounts to the Revenue Agency, which shall charge the 
amounts into the tax boxes of the beneficiaries. Once the film is 
completed, the producer submits its final application, and the credit is 
definitely either confirmed or revoked. However, before the final 
approval and after a certain time from having obtained the temporary 
recognition, companies can start using the credit concerning the eligible 
expenses realized. Therefore, even before the tax credit's final 
recognition, producers can deduct the eligible expenses from the taxes 
they are called to pay. Even in France, producers should obtain a double 
approbation: one before shooting starts, one at its end. The producer that 
 
459 See footnote 448. 
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obtains the agreement is entitled to the tax credit for all expenses 
incurred after the submission of its request for a preventive agreement. 
In both countries, the amount is to be returned in the lack of a definitive 
agreement460. 
It is worth to notice that, to help smaller production companies that do 
not mature enough fiscal debt to exercise the credit, the Italian 2016 Act 
introduced the possibility of transferring the tax credit to banking-
insurance intermediaries, which can use the credit to offset their tax 
debts461. However, such a possibility––envisaged also in France462––is 
proving to be problematic in Italy. Italian banks tend not to accept the 
transferring. Lacking a clearly defined evaluating system based on 
which to assess audio-visual enterprises' reliability, they tend not to trust 
them. Their reluctance is that, if the producer loses the right to tax credit, 
they might be unable to recover the sums advanced and face a loss. 
Banks' reluctance is also because the transferee responds jointly with the 
transferor up to the unduly reimbursed amounts under Italian law463.  
Paradoxically, the tax credit transfer, designed to help small businesses 
without enough fiscal debts, seems easily viable only for large 
companies. Large companies are indeed more likely to have previous 
relationships with banks, based on which banks can assess their 
reliability. 
 
460 More precisely, in France, the tax credit obtained must be refunded if: eight months after 
the date of the recognition of the visa d'exploitation cinématographique, the agrément definitf 
has not been obtained; two years after the end of the financial year for which the tax credit 
was obtained, the film has not obtained a visa (that is the authorization to screen a film in 
theaters, once it has been ranked to protect minors). In Italy, the tax credit must be 
refunded if: the production company does not submit the final request within 24 months 
from the submission of the prior request; the production company does not submit the 
final request within 180 days of the ministerial committee has established the rating of the 
film to protect minors. 
461 See art. 9 of Decree no. 71/2020. 
462 Note that in France, a producer unable to use the tax credit on time (that is, trough the 
taxes due in the year of realization of the eligible expenditure) may also ask the 
administration to reimburse the sums to which it is entitled. 
463 Art. 43bis, par. 2, of Decree of the President of the Republic no. 602/1973 of September 
29th. 
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To conclude, note that, due to the tax credit's ease of application 
resulting from its automatic nature, Italy used this instrument to 
facilitate the resumption of filming after the lockdown. Indeed, it 
enhanced tax credits to allow producers to support the additional costs 
generated by the pandemic464. Before the pandemic, the rate of the tax 
credit for film production was 30% in Italy; the State temporarily 
increased it by ten percentage points up to a maximum of 40% in 2020465. 
The budget law for 2021 definitively increased the tax credit rate to 40%, 
making its enhancement permanent. Moreover: the State has established 
that the costs incurred to comply with hygiene and safety rules due to 
the Covid 19 give the right to a tax credit equal to 100% of their 
amount466. In addition, by way of derogation from the ordinary rules, it 
recognizes the tax credit for the eligible expenses already occurred even 
to companies that do not manage to complete a film's shooting for 
reasons entirely due to the epidemiological emergency467. 
Even France upgraded the tax credit to support the industry during the 
pandemic by establishing a temporary increase in its rate, relating solely 
to expenses incurred in the 2021 fiscal year. With the same goal, the 
French State also granted some aid to film production in advance. 
However, the main support stemmed from a new, temporary 
instrument: the Fonds d'indemnisation contre le risque de Covid-19468. 
Through this fund, worth more than €M 100, the State covered expenses 
incurred by French productions forced to halt filming for reasons 
relating to Covid-19 (up to the value of 30% of their insured capital, with 
 
464 The additional costs were due to both the existence of new expenses to implement health 
regulations on sets (diagnostic and screening tests, sanitization activities, rewrites of scenes 
to avoid crowds etc.) and the higher overall risk of film production. The risk arose because 
the more rules and limitations, the slower the shots; the slower the shots, the longer the 
shooting, and thus the costs. The risk also increased because, while shooting, producers 
could not know where, how, and when they would have been able to distribute the film.  
465 See the ministerial Decree no. 312/2020 of July 8th. It was adopted based on art. 183 (7) 
of Law Decree no. 34/2020 of July 17th, which introduced the possibility of providing 
greater flexibility in the allocation of resources for cinema tax credits in order to support 
the industry during the emergency.   
466 See art. 3, par. 3, let. e) of the Decree no. 70/2020. 
467 See art. 26(3) of Decree no. 70/2020. 
468 Arts. from 911-3 to. 911-13 of Book IX of the CNC’s regulation govern it.  
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a ceiling of €1,8 M). This way, France solved the main problem that was 
compromising the resumption of filming, i.e. the lack of private 
companies willing to ensure producers from the risks arising from the 
pandemic. Said lack also occurred in Italy. To avoid it could compromise 
the resumption of shooting, the Italian State allowed shooting in the 
absence of insurances to cover the risks arising from Covid-19 if said 
insurances were not available on the market469.  
As fig 17 shows, from their introduction to today, the amount of tax 
credit yearly recognized to cinema production companies was quite 
similar in the two countries. It oscillated between €30 M and €142 M in 




469 See the ministerial Decree no. 312/2020. 
Source. Elaboration by the author of data provided by the CNC in its annual “Bilans” and the 













































Fig. 17 State expenditure for internal tax credit to cinema in Italy and France during the period 
2004-2020. 
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5.2.2. Stimulating investments from outside the industry 
The Italian and French States provide indirect aid also to encourage 
individuals outside the industry to invest in film production by reducing 
the risk of their investments. The instruments adopted to this extent are 
guarantees to bank loans and fiscal incentives. 
i. Loans guarantees (and direct loans). The relevant Italian institution 
for guarantees to bank loans is the Special Section for Cinema, which 
should be financed each year by a percentage of the Fund managed by 
the GDC. Envisaged by the 2016 reform, the Section had been established 
in 2018470. It operates within the Guarantee Fund, which has been in 
charge since 1996 to provide guarantees to loans in favour of small and 
medium-sized enterprises471. The Special Section should provide 
guarantees (or counter-guarantees) to the banks that grant loans to small 
and medium-sized production companies (as well as to the companies 
that already guaranteed bank loans). The guarantee should cover up to 
80% of the loan (or the guarantee), provided each company does not 
receive a guarantee of more than €M 2 and covers on its own at least the 
10% of the project's cost.   
In France, where exist banks specialized in credit for the film industry 
with audio-visual experts' teams472, since the 80s the competent 
institution is the IFCIC473. It is in charge of facilitating financing from 
banks for all the companies active in the cultural and creative industries 
(such as fashion, design, publishing, etc.). However, the audio-visual 
industry is the one receiving most of IFCIC's support. Like the Italian 
 
470 See Decree of the Minister of Culture, Economic Development and Economy and 
Finance  March 23rd, 2018, adopted to implement art. 30 of the 2016 Act.  
471 For more informations on the Guarantee Fund, see MOCAVINI, G. and TURCHINI, V. “Il 
sostegno pubblico alle imprese, oggi” in Lo Stato promotore: una ricerca sul mutamento degli 
strumenti di intervento pubblico nell’economia, ed by  Bassanini, F., Napolitano, G. and 
Torchia, L., Fondazione Astrid and Istituto di ricerche sulla pubblica amministrazione, 
2020. 
472 Among them: Natixis Coficine, Cofiloisirs, Neuflize-OBC, BNP-Paribas, and Banque 
Palatine. Note that some of these banks tend to support the realization of films from 
countries other than France, including Italian films. 
473 See par. 2.4. of Chapter I. 
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Cinema Section, the IFCIC reduces the risk of banks' loans to the film 
industry by guaranteeing them a percentage of the provided credit 
(whose rate usually varies between 50% and 70% in the audio-visual 
sector). Unlike the Italian Cinema Section, the IFCIC also supports 
distribution, exhibition, and promotion activities. Moreover, since 2006, 
the IFCIC’s functions have ceased to be only those of a credit facilitator. 
Besides guaranteeing banks' loans, the IFCIC began to provide direct 
loans for projects that required reinforced support, actually introducing 
an additional form of aid to the industry. However, the most of IFCIC’s 
resources (more than 90%) are still used to provide guarantees474. To 
realize its activities, the IFCIC manages a fund financed almost entirely 
by the public sector (the State, the CNC, and others), whose endowment 
is determined each year by the budget law. Since 2017, the EU has also 
begun to finance IFCIC's activities: the program Creative Europe re-
guarantees the IFCIC by an average of €30 M each year. Consequently, 
the IFCIC began to support also non-French films.  
As fig. 18 shows, the quantity of resources by which the IFCIC 
supported the audio-visual industry in the last years are incomparable 
higher than those provided by the Italian Cinema Section. The latter 
received a percentage of the Fund managed by the DGC  (€ 5 M) to 
provide guarantee for the film industry only in 2017. The IFCIC, a much 
older institution and with established operating methods, recognized 
instead to the audio-visual industry an amount of guarantees and direct 
loans annually varying between € 435 M in 2017 and € 382 M in 2019 
(most of which devoted to film production475). Interestingly, the IFCIC’s 
support to non-French films is increasing: in 2019, non-French films 
received €39 M in terms of guarantees and €M 3.6 of loans, respectively 




474 As it appears by analysing the IFCIS’s annual activity reports. 
475 Concerning 2019, out of the overall € 382 M, the film production benefited from nearly 
€236 M, with an average lending rate of  € 4.4 M. The remaining resources supported the 
exhibition phase (€22,8 M), the cinematographic works national distribution (€5 M) and 
export (€5,5 M) and audio-visual products other than cinema. 
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Fig. 9 Resources for the audio-visual industry from the Italian Cinema Section and the French 
IFCIC in  the period 2004-2020.  
 
Source. For Italy, data proved by the DGC; for France, annual reports of the IFCIC. Data in 
millions of euro. 
 
i. Fiscal incentives. Both the Italian and French States provide fiscal 
incentives to private individuals investing in film production. This way, 
the States ensure the restitution of part of the investment, partially 
compensating the possibility of a flop. The approach of the two States on 
the matter differs. Only the French one manages to avoid fraudulent 
behaviours and ensures the State a ‘control’ on the works that benefit 
from the incentive. 
The Italian State allows for a direct relationship between the producer 
and the external investor. Since 2008476, it has recognized to privates 
outside the film sector the possibility to charge against their tax liabilities 
a percentage (30%-to-40%) of their investment in independent film 
production477. France intermediates instead between the producers and 
 
476 Budget Law for 2008. 
477 Art. 20 of the 2020 Act and the Ministerial implementing Decree March 15th, 2018 
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the external investor trough the SOFICAs, that have been existing since 
1985478. They are in charge of private fund-raisings for film production 
in return for a tax advantage. Indeed, the private who subscribes to a 
SOFICA share acquires a tax advantage on income tax up to 30% of the 
subscription amount (increased to 36% and even 48% in some cases). 
Therefore, private individuals do not invest directly in films in France, 
rather they buy shares in the SOFICAs, which will then decide which 
products to finance through the amount collected.  
The public sector strongly frames the constitution, activities, and 
dissolution of SOFICAs. Cinema operators or banks can initiate one of 
them, provided they had obtained the Ministry of Economics’ approval. 
The number of SOFICAs that can coexist is fixed, each of them can 
operate with a maximum authorized fund-raising amount notified by 
the Minister of Economy, and is automatically dissolved five years after 
the constitution. During their activities, SOFICAs are monitored by the 
CNC, the French office for tax and public finance, and the French 
Financial Market Authority.  
The SOFICA's mediation between external investors and producers 
ensures two results, which can be missing in Italy. First, the tax revenues 
foregone by the State to encourage external investments do not finance 
mostly projects with high commercial potential, less risky for external 
investors.  Through its control, the State pushes SOFICAs to invest the 
collected money in ‘meritorious’ but ‘difficult’ projects. Indeed, the more 
a candidate company commits to the goals of supporting independent 
productions, works of first and second-time directors, etc., the more it 
will have the opportunity to receive the permission to operate and the 
more its maximum authorized fund-raising amount will be relevant. As 
noted, «SOFICAs are oriented towards a specific type of production, 
namely that already targeted by the CNC's selective support schemes, as 
 
per year per enterprise, €2 M per group of enterprises and €4 M for collective investment 
groups. The external investor's contribution (80% of which must be spent on national 
territory) shall cover at least 5 % of the film's eligible production cost and shall not exceed 
49 % of it.  This last ceiling aims to ensure that the producer maintains the responsibility 
to gather most production resources. This way, the legislator balances the need to attract 
private investment and that to protect and enhance the role of the film producer.   
478 Art. 40 of Law no. 695/1985 created SOFICAs. Today art. 199unvicied and arts. from 
238 bis HG to 238 bis HM of the French General Tax Code regulate them. 
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a supplement to them»479. However, such an approach does not 
compromise the attractiveness of the scheme: SOFICAs diversify the risk 
investing in several projects, thus mitigating the danger of possible 
losses from works with limited market potential.  
On the opposite, in Italy, where exists a direct relationship between the 
producer and the investor, the State cannot control the projects that 
benefit from the tax credit. However, some 'correctives' encourage 
investments in works that may be less attractive but considered 
'meritorious' by the State. Indeed, the tax credit rate raises to 40% in the 
case of investments in projects funded by selective aid. 
The second result ensured by the French approach is a deficiency of 
fraudulent behaviours . As noted, «in 23 years, unlike other tax incentive 
schemes, no serious disadvantages nor fraudulent transactions have 
been recorded […] Beyond the quality of SOFICAs' managers, this legal 
soundness is essentially due to the legislator's initial choice to set up a 
front public limited company between the subscriber beneficiary of the 
tax advantage and the production company beneficiary of the 
investment. This approach significantly increased the scheme's 
transparency and avoided transactions with only fiscal purposes (as 
occurred instead in other countries). The other key factor of this legal 
success is the controls exercised on the SOFICAs»480. 
On the contrary, the Italian approach limits the State's capacity to avoid 
malpractices. The 2016 reform and its implementing decree modified the 
 
479 BOUTONNAT, D., Rapport sur le financement prive,́ p. 11 («En somme, les SOFICA sont 
orienteés vers un type spećifique de production, a ̀ savoir celle dej́a ̀ cible ́e par les dispositifs de soutien 
seĺectif du CNC, comme un compleḿent de financement a ̀ ceux-ci»). 
480 See CHEVALLIER, P., Les Soficas: rapport de mission, 2008, p. 5 («En 23 ans, contrairement a ̀ 
d’autres dispositifs d’incitation fiscale, aucun incident seŕieux ni, a fortiori, aucune opeŕation 
frauduleuse n’ont et́e ́ constateś, et, pour reṕondre par avance aux inquiet́udes exprimeés lors de 
deb́ats parlementaires prećed́ents, toutes les productions reáliseés avec le soutien des Sofica existent 
reéllement et ont et́e ́diffuseés, en salles et sur les chaînes de teĺev́ision. Cette solidite ́juridique tient 
essentiellement, au-dela ̀ de la qualite ́des gestionnaires, au choix initial du leǵislateur de creér une 
societ́e-́ ećran, sous la forme d’une societ́e ́anonyme, entre le souscripteur, beńef́iciaire de l’avantage 
fiscal, et la societ́e ́ de production, beńef́iciaire de l’investissement. Cela a permis d’augmenter 
consideŕablement la transparence du dispositif, et d’ev́iter des opeŕations dont le seul et unique 
objectif serait de nature fiscale (comme cela a et́e ́le cas dans d’autres pays). L’autre facteur-cle ́de 
cette reússite juridique tient aux diffeŕents contrôles exerceś sur les Sofica»). 
 198 
procedural rules to reduce the distortions that had occurred over time.  
However, the external tax credit's concrete application continued to 
generate elusive behaviours. There are cases in which producers and 
external investors adopt hidden internal agreements to limit the 
investors’ risk. It can happen that producers accept a financial 
contribution from the external investor lower than the one declared; or 
that they ensure a profit to the external investor independently from the 
film's results. In these cases, the investor defrauds the State: he/she 
benefits from a tax incentive introduced to reward a meritorious action 
that he/she does not accomplish––or accomplish to an extent less 
significant than that declared and based on which the amount of the 
benefit is calculated. 
The reason why some Italian producers accept these practices is that they 
need liquidity. Indeed, despite the many existing public aids, they often 
face cash problems. Some forms of support are awards for an already 
realized project (think to the automatic ones). Sometimes there is a delay 
in the granting of the aids. In some others, there is no way to mobilize 
the support in a short time––think of a producer not having sufficient 
tax debts to use a tax credit and unable to find a bank that is available to 
accept its transferring. 
As fig 19 shows, the amount of tax credit yearly recognized for attracting 
investments in the audio-visual industry in the two countries is similar. 
Between 2010 and 2020, it oscillated between €20 M and € 30,3 M in 
France, € 0,1 M  and €35 M in Italy. 
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5.3.2. Competing for attracting major foreign productions 
The Italian and French States adopt indirect aids also to attract major 
foreign film projects in their territories481. Indeed, they both provide a tax 
credit to repay a percentage of the foreign production and post-
production costs incurred in Italy482 and France483.  
 
481 In Italy, the Budget Law for 2008 introduced il credito  d'imposta  per  l'attrazione  in  Italia   
di   investimenti cinematografici e audiovisivi. Art. 19 of the 2016 Act and arts. from 19 to 24 of 
the Ministerial implementing Decree March 15th, 2018 regulate it. In France, the Budget 
Law for 2009 introduced the crédit d'impôt pour dépenses de production exécutive d'œuvres 
cinématographiques ou audiovisuelles étrangères; today, arts. 220quaterdecies and 220z of the 
French General Tax Code and arts. from D. 331-38 to D. 331-64 of the CCIA regulate it.  
482   In Italy, the tax credit rate varies between 25% and 40%. Each company cannot benefit 
each year from more than € 20 M trough tax credits. 
483 In France, the percentage is normally 30%. However, the rate is increased to 40% for 
works of fiction that realize in France at least €2 M of expenses for visual effects. The tax 
advantage is subject to two specific ceilings. First,  the qualifying costs are capped at 80% 
Source. Data provided by the DGC, the CNC, the Cours des Compte and by the Commission des 
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Fig. 19 State expenditure for tax credit for investors outside the industry in Italy and France 
during the period 2010-2020.  
 
Fig. 10 State expenditure for tax credit for investors outside the industry in Italy and France 
during the period 2010-2020.  
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The two States can recognize tax incentives only to companies liable for 
corporate income tax within their national territories. For this reason, the 
tax credit is granted to the national firms that, under an agreement with 
the foreign ones, are in charge of the management of the 
production/post-production activities realized in Italy or France. 
Foreign producers indirectly benefit from the credit by getting an actual 
cost reduction from the national companies484.  
The two States want to attract foreign productions in their country for 
many reasons––similar to those underpinning the support of national 
territories autonomies. First, foreign productions (particularly the large 
Hollywood ones) can bring financial benefits to the local economy: 
consider hotel accommodations, transportations, living costs, etc. of the 
several hundred people involved in such an activity, as well as the local 
jobs for national workers and artists; and the fact that the national 
country usually sources most production materials. Second, foreign 
films shoot in Italy and France can, as a side effect, increase tourism and 
promote the two countries as a whole.  
The will to pursue an economic impact is clear from the eligibility 
conditions provided to access this tax credit and the nature of the costs 
considered admissible: they ensure that foreign companies employ 
national or other European workers and realize a minimum expenditure 
level on the national territory485. In this case, too, there is no assessment 
of the merit of the work that tax credits end up financing. The criteria 
 
of the production budget. Second, each work cannot benefit from a tax credit of more than 
€ 30 M. 
484 Like the procedure for the internal tax credit, even that for obtaining this type of tax 
credit comprises two steps, that of prior and that of final demand. The goal is to allow 
companies to start using the benefit during film production, supporting their cash-flow. 
485 In France, the eligible expenses, increased in 2012, are the recompenses of French and 
European artists and technical industries; transport costs, catering, food, and lodging. The 
films, in addition to not being  eligible for aid to film production and not being a 
documentary, should generate an expenditure in France of at least €250,000 or, if the 
production budget of the works is less than €500,000, of an amount corresponding to at 
least 50 % of the budget. The Italian case is similar: the eligible expenses are those incurred 
on Italian territory, using mainly Italian workers. 
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that assess if a film is 'culturally eligible' are so vague that there could 
hardly be works unable to meet them486. 
However, there are also other types of benefits that foreign production 
can bring. For example, those arising from transfers of technology, 
know-how, and expertise from the foreign operators to the national 
audio-visual workers. Finally, the presence of foreign productions can 
favour the establishment of relations between foreign actors and the 
national ones, thus increasing the possibilities of advantageous 
collaboration for the national industry and the involvement of national 
actors or directors in international projects. 
The competition between countries to attract foreign producers is fierce: 
as the competition intensifies, the States increase their tax credits as well. 
The French case is paradigmatic487. The French international tax credit 
was introduced in 2008 because producers were increasingly shooting 
films based on French stories, characters, and locations outside France 
 
486 In France, the works should count «in their dramatic content, elements related to the 
French culture, heritage or territory» («dans leur contenu dramatique, des éléments rattachés à 
la culture, au patrimoine ou au territoire français»). This requirement is met if the projects 
reach a minimum score in relation to a set of indicators related to the ‘Dramatic Content’ 
(main characters from France, French-speaking country or Europe; story able to valorise 
the French artistic heritage or a period of the French history or story related to political, 
social or cultural issues linked to the French or European society; number of scenes set in 
France etc.);  ‘Nationality of Creators and Creative Collaborators’ (French or European 
professionals in leading roles, or as a majority of the crew); and ‘Production Infrastructure’ 
(use of French shooting or technical production and post-production facilities). In Italy, the 
work is ‘cultural eligible’ if it obtains a minimum score concerning criteria referred to both 
the 'production' and the 'content' (listed by Tab. A annexed to Decree March 15th, 2018). 
The production criteria refer to Italian or European workers' employment and the carrying 
out of activities in Italy. Those related to the content also aim to ensure a link with Italy 
(setting of the film in Italy, story taken from Italian or European opera) and the existence 
of a cultural value. However, its presence is measured based on parameters very vague. 
For example, the script should concern «historical, mythological and legendary, religious, 
social, fantastic, artistic or cultural themes». 
487 For an in-depth analysis of the improvements of the instrument realized to compete 
with other countries and the public debate on the matter, INSPECTION GÉNÉRALE DES 
FINANCES AND INSPECTION GÉNÉRALE DES AFFAIRES CULTURELLES, E ́valuation des divers 
cred́its d’impôt. 
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due to the neighbouring fiscal incentives488. Despite its introduction, a 
strong international tax competition environment led to numerous 
relocations of audio-visual projects outside of France in 2015. Indeed, 
nine new tax credits were introduced in that period, some in countries 
already attractive due to their very low cost of labour (Serbia, Ukraine, 
Montenegro) 489. Other countries revaluated their schemes to make them 
more competitive. This was the case of Ireland, whose tax credit rate 
increased from 28% to 32% in 2015490. To counteract the trend of a 
reduction in foreign films shot in France, the French Government 
increased the ceiling from €20 M to €30 M in 2016, and introduced a rate 
of 40% for works of fiction with strong visual effects that produce in 
France at least €2 M in expenditures of visual effects. This way, the State 
expenditure to satisfy tax credit for foreign production have 
progressively increased (as fig 20 shows). 
Several parts consider engaging in this fierce competition not 
worthwhile. However, although not recent, studies prove that the 
revenues generated by foreign companies shooting in the national 
territory are higher than public spending for tax credits. A study about 
the first years of existence (2008-2011) of the Italian tax credit noted that 
«for every € 1 not collected by the State, an investment of € 1,56 occurred, 
with a € 0,56 net effect»491. A French study of 2014 reports that for € 1 of 
the tax credit, € 7 of expenditures occurred in the audio-visual sector, 
and the State receives € 2,7 as taxes and social receipts492.  
As fig 20 shows, the amount of tax credit recognized for attracting 
investments in the audio-visual industry from foreign production 
 
488 Thus reported by EUROPEAN AUDIOVISUAL OBSERVATORY, Impact analysis of fiscal 
incentive schemes, supporting film and audio-visual production in Europe, 2014, p. 79.  
489 Thus reported by COMMISSION DE LA CULTURE, DE L’E ́DUCATION ET DE LA 
COMMUNICATION, Avis n° 145 présenté au Sénat par Mme Françoise Laborde sur le projet de loi 
de finances pour 2020, 2019, p. 29. 
490 Thus reported by COMMISSION DE LA CULTURE, DE L’E ́DUCATION ET DE LA 
COMMUNICATION, Avis n° 145, p. 30. 
491ANICA, DIREZIONE GENERALE CINEMA and LUISS UNIVERSITY, Le ricadute del tax credit: 
l’impatto economico delle forme di incentivazione alla produzione cinematografica, 2012, p. 101. 
492 CNC and ERNST & YOUNG, Évaluation des dispositifs de cre ́dit d’impôt, 2012. 
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companies is similar in the two country. Between 2009 (the first year of 
application of the measure) and 2020, it yearly oscillated between € 2 M 
and € 56 M in France, € 3 M  and € 50 M in Italy. 
 
6. Aids for distribution, exhibition, and promotion 
In addition to the production phase, which has traditionally obtained the 
most funding in Europe493, both Italy and France support the other stages 
of the film's life cycle. Indeed, support to production alone risks 
stimulating the creation of audio-visual content without ensuring 
appropriate distribution and promotion for the resulting work and 
therefore likely to meet an audience.  
More precisely, based on the same mechanisms adopted to support 
production, France and Italy grant aid for distribution (i) and exhibition 
(ii), as well as for several other activities that contribute to the industry 
promotion (iii). While Italy relies mainly on indirect instruments, most 
French support is granted through direct aid. 
 
493 For the reasons of this occurrence, see par. 3.1. of Chapter II. 
Source. Data provided by the DGC, the CNC, the Cours des Compte and by the Commission des 
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Fig. 20 State expenditure for tax credit for attracting foreign production companies in Italy and 
France during the period 2009-2020.  
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i. Support to distribution. The French State does not seek to support the 
whole distribution sector but mainly to encourage distributors to 
suggest theatres ‘meritorious’ films with little commercial appeal. To 
this end, France provides only direct aids, both automatic and selective, 
not even fiscal incentives.  
Automatic aid are granted to distributors based on the box office 
revenues of the films they have already distributed494. The rate of the aid 
is degressive: the higher the film's revenue, the lower the support. 
Moreover, the films' revenue is capped: distributors do not receive 
support for films whose box office revenues exceed € 6,15 M. Also, the 
support increases if the distributor uses the sums received to distribute 
French films with a production budget of less than € 8 M. This is way  
Marc Le Roy affirmed that «Le but affiché de ce régime de soutien n'est donc 
pas de récompenser le succès mais de limiter les risques de perte d'argent pour 
les distributeurs afin de les inciter à distribuer des films qui semblent peu 
commerciaux»495.  
Selective aids496 are five: aides à la distribution d'œuvres inédites, given for 
the distribution of films funded via selective aids and those culturally 
significant but 'difficult' to bring to the market; aides à la distribution 
d'œuvres de répertoire, which encourage the distribution of old French or 
foreign films; aides à la distribution d'œuvres destinées au jeune public, 
promoting the distribution of films for young audiences, which can be 
less marketable than those appealing to a broader spread of ages; aides à 
la structure, allocated to distributors with financial fragility that realize a 
'quality' activity; aides à la distribution à l'étranger des œuvres représentatives 
des cinématographies du monde, which promote the distribution of films 
co-produced between a European country (not necessarily France) and 
a non-European one. 
 
494 Arts. from 221-5 to 221-23-10 of the CNC's Regulation govern them.  
495 See LE ROY, M., “Cinéma”. 
496   Art. from 221-24 to 221-79 of the CNC's Regulation govern them.  
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The Italian approach is different. As France, Italy provides both 
automatic497 and selective498 aids to distribution. However, only the latter 
aim at supporting the distribution of 'quality films’ with limited 
commercial appeal: they are indeed granted to independent distributors 
for the national or abroad distribution of the types of works supported 
by selective aids to production. The former seek instead to strengthen 
successful distribution companies and incentivize them to continue their 
activity. Their entity depends on the economic, artistic, and cultural 
success of the works that distributors have previously distributed.  
Unlike France, Italy supports distributors also through indirect aid, 
providing a tax credit for the costs related to the national and 
international distribution of Italian works499, thus supporting the whole 
sector, as opposite to France. In the past, the modulation of the tax credit 
allows for higher support to distributors considered by the State more 
meritorious than others: for example, the rate of the tax credit increased 
from 30 to 40% in the case of independent producers that autonomously 
distributed their work. Today, said corrective does not apply anymore: 
the maximum rate of 40% applies in any case500. 
It is worth noticing that both the Italian and French States have increased 
their support for distributors during the Covid-19 pandemic. The central 
support stemmed from the possibility to distribute films financed by 
State aid to the cinema immediately online or in television during the 
forced closure of theatres501. Indeed, postponing a film's release for a 
distributor means postponing the revenues resulting from often very 
substantial investments; and the longer the delay of a film's distribution, 
 
497 Arts. 23, 24 and 25 of the 2016 Act and the Ministerial implementing Decree no. 342/2017 
govern them.   
498 Art. 26 of the 2016 Act and the Ministerial implementing Decree no. 343/2017 govern 
them.  
499 Arts. 16 and 20 of the 2016 Act and the Ministerial implementing Decree March 15th, 
2018 regulate them. They operate based on the same mechanisms of the tax credits to film 
production.  
500 See art. 16 of the 2016 Act, as modified by the Budget Law for 2021 (art. 1, par. 583 and 
584 of Law no. 178/2020). 
501 See footnote 313, in par. 4.3. of Chapter II. 
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the higher the investments required to keep publicizing it without losing 
the promotional effects already generated. The two States granted 
distributors also higher financial aids502; moreover, they allowed 
operators to use some of the aids not only to realize the activities 
required by ordinary rules (such as distributing a new film) but also to 
face pressing liquidity needs arising directly from the consequences of 
the pandemic.  
ii. Support to exhibition. France and Italy pursue the same goals in 
aiding the exhibition sector. First, they encourage the creation of new 
theatres and the upgrade of the existing ones. Second, they incentivize 
the programming of 'meritorious' works with limited commercial 
appeal. If producers are willing to take the risk of realizing films 
considered as difficult or risky, and distributors to promote them, then 
there exists the need for screens for their release. In Italy, the results of 
these aids are somehow questionable: there are not enough available 
screens for adequate time for all Italian films funded by the State503.  
France incentivizes the creation and maintenance of theatres by 
providing direct aid, both automatic504 and selective505. All exhibitors 
benefit from the automatic ones: like producers and distributors, they 
receive an aid based on the revenues of films they have exhibited, to be 
used to renovate and upgrade their facilities. Concerning the selective 
aids, the most important are les aides à la petite et moyenne exploitation, 
granted for the creation and modernization of small and medium-sized 
cinema theatres. Their entity increases if the project concerns 
geographical areas not sufficiently equipped with theatres or art-house 
 
502 The Italian State supported distributors by temporarily enhancing the tax credit in their 
favour (see the ministerial Decree no. 545/2020 of November 30th) and by new direct aid, 
financed by a percentage of the Fund for the emergency in the entertainment and audio-
visual sector (see ministerial Decree no. 26/2020 of January 12th). In France, the CNC 
adopted different support instruments, all regulated by Book IX of the CNC’s Regulation. 
503 See par. 5 of Chapter II. 
504 Arts. from 232-4 to 232-30 of the CNC’s Regulation regulate them.  
505 Arts. from 232-30-1 to 232-42 of the CNC’s Regulation regulate them.  
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theatres, i.e. theatres that program mainly arthouse films506. France does 
not support instead the creation and maintenance of theatres trough tax 
credits.  
The Italian case is different. Italy has supported these activities through 
direct aid only temporarily, during the period 2017-2021, through the 
‘Extraordinary plan for movie theaters upgrade’507. The only permanent 
instrument to incentivize the creation and maintenance of theatres is the 
tax credit, which allows exhibitors to charge against their tax liabilities a 
percentage of the cost faced to this extent 508. As with distribution, the 
Italian State wants to aid the whole exhibition sector. However, the 
modulation of the tax credit rate allows greater support to exhibitors 
considered worthier than others509.  
France uses only direct aid  even to incentivize the programming of 
'meritorious' works—a goal pursued also by regulatory instruments, as 
 
506 The label ‘arth-house theatres’ is granted by the CNC President after the consultation 
with a committee of film professionals and personalities from the cultural sector. 
According to art. D-210-3 of the CCIA, can be qualified as arthouse: films with research or 
novelty nature; unsuccessful films with undeniable qualities; films reflecting the life of 
countries whose film production is little diffused in France; old films with artistic or 
historical interest; short-films able to revamp the cinematographic sector thanks to their 
qualities or particular choices. 
507 It is governed by art. 28 of the 2016 Act and Decree of the President of the Council of 
Ministers August 4th, 2017, then modified by the DPCM march 5th, 2018, and the DPCM 
October 21st, 2020. The plan was worth € 30 M annually during the first three years, € 20 M 
in 2020, and € 10 M in 2021. 
508 Art. 17 of the 2016 Act and the implementing Ministerial Decree March 15th, 2018 govern 
it. 
509 The rate of the tax credit for the creation and maintenance of theaters depends on the 
operator's size and location. It increases if the project is carried out by small and medium-
sized enterprises and for projects realized in municipalities with less than 14 thousand 
inhabitants or without movie theatres. The rate of the tax credit for enhancing the 
cinematographic supply depends on many aspects. Among them: the type of film (for 
example, the rate increases if an arthouse film, rather than foreign, is Italian or European); 
on the operators' nature, since it raises in the case of small and medium-sized enterprises, 
art-houses theatres, and theatres located in small municipalities. 
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said510. To this extent, it provides both automatic511 and selective aid512. 
The seconds include les aides à l'art et l'essai, that reward exhibitors for 
the programming of art-house works, and les aides à la programmation 
difficile, that support exhibitors who carry out difficult programming in 
the face of competition. Even in this case, the Italian approach is 
different. Like France, Italy encourages exhibitors to program 
meritorious films through direct selective aids, granted to theatres 
classified as art-house513; however, the most important instrument in this 
regard is the tax credit for enhancing the cinema supply514. It allows 
movie theaters to charge against their tax liabilities a percentage of the 
revenue from the programming of 'meritorious' but risky films. They are 
Italian and European films; those that, in addition to being Italian and 
European, are documentaries, films by first and second time or by young 
authors, films with a production budget of less than €2,5 M; films that, 
regardless of their nationality, are art-house.  
Note that cinema theaters received a higher support during the Covid-
19 pandemic, too. The Italian State, in addition to temporarily enhancing 
the tax credit instruments515, established the ‘Emergency Fund for 
 
510 The Mediateur du cinéma and the engagements de programmation and diffusion (see par. 5 of 
Chapter II). 
511 Arts. from 231-2 to 231-10 of the CNC’s Regulation govern them. 
512 Arts. from 231-11 to 231-49 of the CNC’s Regulation govern them. 
513 Each cinema shall present its request to be recognized as an art-house theater to the 
DGC, which decides based on the opinion of a committee of experts. As it happens in 
France, the recognition/not recognition of the status of art-house theatre depends on the 
number of art-house films exhibited. According to art. 2, par. 1, let. c) of the 2020 Act, art-
house films are «film di qualità, aventi particolari requisiti culturali ed artistici idonei  a  favorire  
la  conoscenza  e  la  diffusione   di   realtà  cinematografiche meno conosciute, nazionali ed 
internazionali, ovvero connotati da forme e tecniche di espressione sperimentali e linguaggi 
innovativi».  
514 Art. 18 of the 2016 Act and the implementing Ministerial Decree March 15th, 2018 govern 
it.  
515 See the ministerial Decree no. 545/2020. 
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cinema theaters’, worth of € 110 M516. The fund provided a fixed 
contribution of €25,000 to all theaters and a contribution proportional to 
each theatre's losses (until resources exhaustion).  Even the French State 
established the Compensation fund for loss of cinema theater revenue, 
worth €100 M and meant  to provide a contribution commensurate with 
each theatre’s losses. In addition, the CNC supported theatres by 
anticipating the granting of some aid to exhibitors and by incentivizing 
producers and distributors to distribute their works in theatres. Indeed, 
it increased the rate on which is computed the automatic aid to 
producers and distributors stemming from the results of works 
distributed in theatres during their first reopening.  
iii. Support to promotion. Italy and France finance several other 
activities that contribute to promote film culture. Italy does it through 
the ‘selective aids to film promotion’, granted by the same experts in 
charge of allocating selective aid to production and that are financed 
each year with a percentage of the DGC’s Fund517. Both public and 
private institutions can apply for them, as well as universities and 
centres of research, foundations, cultural and trade associations etc. 
France provides instead different types of aid to this extent, both 
automatic and selective, each subject to a specific regulation.  
The range of activities other than production, distribution, and 
exhibition supported are similar in the two countries. Among them, 
those likely to internationalize the sector, thus increasing film export—
one of the main goals of the Italian 2016 reform518, as proven by the fact 
that co-productions receive advantages and facilities in all the different 
 
516  It was financed by a percentage of the Fund for emergency in the entertainment and 
audio-visual sector established by the Law Decree no. 18/2020. 
517 Art. 27 of the 2016 Act and the implementing Ministerial Decree no. 341/2017 of July 
31st regulate them. According to the data provided by the DGC, selective aid to film 
promotion was worth €63,4 M in 2017, €63,5 M in 2018, €63,9 M in 2019 and €87,6 M in 
2020. 
518 Consistently with the limited international penetration of Italian films. See footnote 241 
of par. 3 of Chapter II. 
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lines of aid519. In France, the main instrument adopted to increase films’ 
export is the automatic aid to companies active in selling the distribution 
rights of French films abroad520. The aid amount depends on the box 
offices' success in foreign theatres of the French films previously sold by 
the companies. 
Other activities funded are the realization of festivals, reviews, and 
awards; the conservation, restoration, and fruition of the film cultural 
heritage521; the activities of institutions linked in various ways to the 
State and various ways active in the sector (it is the case of the Italian 
Luce Institute and Venice Biennale Foundation); the activities of schools 
specialized in training to film professions and the activities that promote 
the knowledge on cinema within schools. Interestingly, the 2016 Italian 
Act has established that at least 3 % of the DGC Fund's total resources 
should be devoted each year to this last type of activity. This way, the 
Italian legislator began to show awareness of the necessity to invest not 
only in the supply but also in the development of the demand, 
supporting spectators in addition to spectacles. 
 
7. Discussion 
Italy and France transfer significant resources to their national audio-
visual industries. In Italy, the 2016 Act and the following interventions 
have significantly increased them: today, they account for € 640 M at 
least each year, while they increase if the sector's resources increase. 
However, the French State still transfers much higher resources to the 
industry than the Italian one. In addition to the already considerable 
funds coming from the CNC, there are also those granted through fiscal 
incentives and by the IFCIF to guarantee bank loans and provide for 
direct loans.   
 
519 On the higher ability of coproduction than entirely national films to cross national 
borders, par 6.1. of Chapter I.  
520 Arts. from 721-1 to 721-30 of the CNC’s Regulation regulate them. 
521 To this extent, France provides both automatic and selective aid, regulated by the annex 
V to the CNC’s Regulation. 
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While the extent of the resources differs, the types of instruments 
adopted are similar in the two countries. In Italy, they have been 
reformed by the 2016 Act and its implementing decrees, which have 
sought to inaugurate a new course based on an organic and coherent 
approach.  
As noted, «the public promotional legislation aims to 'functionalize' 
enterprise. It identifies among the possible 'utilizations' of enterprises 
those that are consistent with the interests of the society at a specific time. 
The legislator identifies these interests and, at the same time, the 
behaviours of the enterprises (public and private) likely to allow their 
satisfaction»522. Italy and France pursue different interests in promoting 
cinema; consequently, they seek to incentivise different types of 
behaviour, providing to this extent a wide range of aids and procedures. 
Each of them is partially in charge of overcoming the limits of the others, 
contributing to the determination of the balance between the need to 
develop the cultural dimension of the industry and that to develop its 
economic soundness. 
Direct aids—divided in selective and automatic—support specific works 
and companies that are considered meritorious. Selective aids seek to 
ensure supply’s diversity and ‘quality’, helping the realization of films 
whose making would be otherwise difficult and thus supporting 
projects with ‘cultural merit’ and lowering the entrance barrier to the 
cinematographic market. This way, the State seeks to ensure the 
possibility of artistic expression also to those who, although worthy, 
would not be able to autonomously do it. In this sense, the State 
promotes a ‘substantive’ rather than merely ‘formal’ equality.  
Automatic aids, on the other side, strengthen already-strong operators, 
sustaining their activities to promote the growth and development of the 
sector’s business. This way, the State seeks to increase the industry’s 
 
522 SERRANI, D., Lo Stato finanziatore, p. 209 («La  legislazione di ausilio pubblico è una legislazione 
di funzionalizzazione dell’impresa. Essa ha lo scopo di individuare tra le “utilizzazioni” possibili 
dell’impresa quelle che, in un certo momento, sono conformi agli interessi della collettività. La 
legislazione individua questi interessi e, nello stesso tempo, individua quale tipo di comportamento 
dell’imprenditore – privato o pubblico – è in grado di permetterne il soddisfacimento»). 
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ability to generate jobs, attract investments, foster tourism and be 
competitive at the international level.  
Through automatic aids, France supports only operators capable of 
positive economic results, while Italy supports also those capable of 
positive artistic and cultural results. If France does not take into account 
the artistic and cultural results in the scope of automatic aid, it rewards 
quality ex-post through selective aid (given the existence of both 
an advance avant and après réalisation). Shortly, the space left to 'selection' 
is higher in France, where the State supports quality selectively both ex 
ante and ex post, while Italy supports quality selectively only ex ante, and 
does it automatically ex post.  
In any case, most direct aid to the production, distribution, and 
exhibition of the overall audio-visual sector is granted automatically in 
both countries (fig. 21). This way, the two States seek to avoid the risks 
inherent to the selective instruments, stemming from the potential 
arbitrariness of the assessments. 
  









Italy France Italy France Italy France Italy France
2017 2018 2019 2020
Automatic Selective
Fig. 21 Percentage of automatic and selective direct aid to the production, distribution and 
exhibition of audio-visual works in Italy and France 
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Through indirect aids, the States seek to handle the problems of direct 
aids, renouncing to establish what is worthy of support by creating an 
environment favourable to anyone who wants to produce films. They 
consider the entire industry meritorious, given its cultural specificity. In 
this case, the presence of cultural value is indeed measured on very 
general and vague criteria, to the extent that it is difficult to imagine 
works unable to satisfy them. This way, the State let the industry be free, 
without a public intervention. Indeed, direct aids inherently involve the 
risk of altering the freedom of choices of operators, interested in meeting 
the conditions requested to obtain support. This conflicts with the 
principle that State actions in culture development should not be 
contrary to the culture’s need of self-determination. Art. 9(1) of the 
Italian Constitution—under which public powers should promote the 
development of culture—must be read in conjunction with art. 33(1), 
declaring art's freedom, indeed.  
However, with indirect aids the States do not entirely give up in 
'guiding' the market: by modulating the tax credit rates and other 
correctives, they push operators towards behaviours considered more 
meritorious than others. The French SOFICAs offer the maximum extent 
of State control in the context of indirect aid: by intermediating between 
private investors and producers, the French State can control that the 
external investments that benefit from fiscal incentives are devoted to 
the more 'meritorious' works. Moreover: the French approach allows 
avoiding the occurrence of fraudulent behaviours, i.e. of cases in which 
the individuals outside the industry do not really realize the investments 
based on which they benefit from the tax credits––something that, on the 
opposite, still happens in Italy, despite the modifications introduced by 
the 2016 Act and its implementing Decree. 
In Italy, the resources granted indirectly have been progressively 
increasing in the last years, while the direct ones have been decreasing 
(fig. 22), thus following a common trend with the general Italian 
approach to industrial policy. Although they are quite new instruments, 




Even in France the resources given indirectly have been increasing in the 
last years. This is due to the progressive establishment of new tax credit 
types and the repeated reforms of the instruments implemented to 
increase its international competitiveness (see fig. 13). Tax credits have 
thus gradually gained greater weight among the financing sources for 
films in France. As tab. 6 shows, considering the ten films that obtained 
the highest tax credit for cinema during 2010-2017, it appears that this 
instrument covers an increasing percentage of their production budget. 
In contrast, the budget share covered by automatic aid has gradually 











2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Direct aid Indirect aid
Source. DGC. 
 
Fig. 22 Evolution of the percentage of State resources granted directly and indirectly to the Italian 
audio-visual industry. 
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Tab. 6 Extent of public support in the budget of the ten films that benefited from the highest tax 
credit for cinema production in France during the period 2010-2017. 













the automatic in 
the total budget 
2010  9,3 0,82 8,75% 1,5 16,2% 
2011  8,7 0,8 9,8% 1,4 16,7% 
2012  10,3 1,1 11% 2 20% 
2013  11,8 1,3 11,4% 2 17,7% 
2014  12,4 1,3 10,7% 1,7 14% 
2015  10,9 1,1 10,4% 1,8 16,8% 
2016  16,5 2 12,5% 2 12,5% 
2017  17,6 2,2 12,9% 2,5 14,6% 
 
However, unlike Italy, most of the State resources are still granted 
directly in France (fig. 23). This is also because France supports through 
tax credits only the production phase, while Italy provides it also to 
distribution and exhibition. The French approach is consistent with the 
main goal behind tax credits' institution, namely arresting French 
producers' tendency to shoot abroad—a goal that can be pursued only 
by providing better incentives to film producers. 
Source: Commission des finances, de l’ećonomie geńeŕale et du contrôle budget́aire, Rapport 
d’information sur l’application des mesures fiscales, 2018, p. 49. Data in millions of euros. 
 
 
Source: Commission des finances, de l’ećonomie geńeŕale et du contrôle budget́aire, Rapport 




The different weight of indirect aid in the two countries shows that 
Italy's support system is more 'indiscriminate'; the Italian State 
renounces more than the French one to establish from the above what is 
meritorious and what is not. This approach ends up making the support 
in favour of a cultural sector similar to that in favour of the general 
industry. However, it is consistent with important needs specific to Italy. 
Here, the need for as-automatic-as-possible mechanisms does not stem 
only from the problems proper to the direct support already highlighted 
(jeopardizing the freedom of art, risks associated with discretion in the 
case of selective direct aid, etc.) but also from the exigence to simplify 
the action of the public administration. Unlike France, the Italian State 
does not have an independent agency focused on cinema, with financial 
and reglementary autonomy and adequate structure to manage the aids. 
In Italy, where the State's administration on cinema suffers from all the 
problems that generically affect the national public administration as a 
whole, there is more need for as-automatic-as-possible mechanisms: a 
higher presence of the State involves the risks to generate delays and 
complications.  
Source.  Elaboration by the author of data provided by the CNC, the Court de Comptes and the 
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Direct aid Indirect aid
Fig. 19 Evolution of the percentage of State resources granted directly and indirectly to the French 
audio-visual industry. 
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Despite being the main instrument of support (and although highly 
appreciated by the industry in theory for their non-interventionism), tax 
credits are generating concerns in their application in Italy. The problem 
is due to the presence of an underlying contradiction: on the one hand, 
the resources to satisfy the requests for tax credits are contingent; on the 
other, the industry perceives the tax credit as an aid to be recognized to 
anyone who meets the eligibility conditions. Although the law expressly 
provides that tax credits are satisfied within the limits of the resources 
actually available each year, some Italian producers assume that they 
will benefit from them, counting tax credit in their projects’ budget. 
Several believe that the solution to the problem is to free tax credit 
resources from a closed fund—making them theoretically unlimited—
rather than introducing more stringent requirements to access the aid. 
Such a solution does not appear sharable (although undoubtedly 
consistent with how the instrument was outlined), at least in the long 
term. Indeed, given how the measure is built, it would end up giving the 
industry more and more resources as it progressively grows, in an 
endless loop. 
It is worth noticing how the presence of a direct link between the State's 
support and the film industry's turnover is what happens in France: the 
CNC's fund directly increases as the industry's revenues increase. It is 
difficult to share this approach. First, it is not clear why a sector should 
receive more and more public money as it grows. This derogates from 
the equalization principle, under which the most profitable activities 
should contribute to support the most vulnerable ones. Second, said 
approach may end up to damage even the film industry itself. As shown, 
in certain periods, the French system generated a disproportion between 
the level of State aids and the industry's actual needs, eventually leading 
to a kind of 'inflation' within the film industry. 
Therefore, it is unlikely that the Italian State will do in the long run what 
the French system has been doing until now—namely, to increase the 
support to the industry as it grows and strengthens. On the contrary, it 
should be desirable for the industry, once sufficiently strengthened by 
the State’s support, to emancipate from the aids and operate freely. For 
example, think about the automatic aids, which end up supporting 
already strong operators. They can be successfully used to strengthen 
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the industry in the short run, but once this goal is reached, the State 
should cease to support who is already strong. The risk would be 
otherwise to use public money to support the realization of works that, 
probably, would be realized nevertheless. As said, public incentive are 
effective if they allow the realization of activities that, otherwise, would 
not be made523. 
If there are many solid reasons for government support, there are many 
equally valid reasons against making such support systematic. State 
support always involves several risks.  We are far from the most 
authoritative periods of the past when State support was granted in 
exchange for films accommodating political power's interests. However, 
even for the legislator guided by the noblest goals, there is always the 
risk of adding new constraints while trying to increase opportunities. 
Think about the disincentives produced by the reference system 
introduced by the Italian Urbani Decree: it ended up generating a 
conservative effect that reduced the incentives to innovate and diversify, 
in turn jeopardizing the emergence of new talents524. State support also 
risks producing a ‘napping’ industry, jeopardizing the essential drivers 
for innovation and experimentation, which are inherently nested in the 
competitive dynamic. Think about the 1994 Italian Guarantee Fund’s 
operation, which was likely to take any responsibility off both the banks 
and the cinema operators while transferring the entrepreneurial risk to 
the State525. State support may also produce free riding effects, keeping 
too many and too weak operators in the market, letting to survive 
inefficient activities, thus harming the entire economy. Think how the 
culture purpose of State support has led to granted aids for the 
implementation of specific projects rather than as structural support for 
companies, drifting towards a natalist policy of enterprises and 
medium-low budget films, with little capacity to penetrate foreign 
markets and sometimes failing to find a public even in the country of 
origin526. Finally, State support in favour of culture implies some specific 
 
523 See footnote 13 of the Introduction. 
524 See par. of par. 3.5. of Chapter I.  
525 See par. of par. 3.4. of Chapter I.  
526 See par. of par. 3 of Chapter II.  
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risks. Among them, those related to distributive justice issues.  To 
promote the realization of projects with cultural and artistic value driven 
to the market with a limited extent, the State risks using all citizens' 
money to carry out works that benefit those already wealthy and 
educated, with a regressive distributive effect. This is why one should 
strongly welcome the provision of the 2016 Act under which a minimum 
percentage of funding should be devoted each year to cinema education 
initiatives within schools. Increased education may be an effective 
way—even more consistent with freedom principles—to enhance the 
demand’s 'quality', thus limiting the State's need to enter the market to 




Chapter IV – The State promotion through 
content and investment quotas on AVMS 
providers 
 
1. Preliminary remarks 
Quotas represented the first instrument devised by Italy and France to 
protect their national film industry from the US surplus. Since the end 
of WWI,  Italy established minimum quotas for national films to be 
screened in cinema theatres, while France implemented maximum 
quotas on imported foreign works.  
Over time, the US surplus also developed in television, and the focus on 
quotas shifted to the small screen. To prevent televisions from loading 
their programming with American films only, Italy and France 
introduced content quotas for national works. To ensure national 
production maintenance, the two States also introduced investment 
quotas, requiring televisions to invest a part of their revenues in 
financing new national works. France introduced quotas for television 
in the years of the public broadcaster monopoly. Italy did so in the 
nineties to transpose the TSF Directive, adopted by the European 
legislator to protect the internal market.  
The European legislator amended the Directive’s provisions on quotas 
for European works several times. In 2007, it extended its scope of 
application to non-linear providers. Since 2018, it has allowed the 
Member States to apply quotas also to global digital operators that target 
their audiences without being established there. This way, it prevented 
operators from eluding their duty to promote European productions by 
locating their headquarters in countries whose legislation is looser.  
Over time, the French and the Italian legislators also amended the 
provisions several times to address internal issues and implement the 
European Directive's developments. Still today, both Italy and France 
pursue, on top of protecting the European audio-visual market, the goal 
of promoting national industries: they require providers to finance and 
distribute national works, in addition to the European ones. In both 
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countries, providers' obligatory investments are today one of the 
primary funding sources for the national film industry. 
The previous chapters have already touched upon all these aspects, 
while this chapter analyse them more in-depth. Given the technical 
nature of the quota instrument, the following pages will be technical. 
First, an overview of the legislative framework's development on quotas 
is presented, both at the European (par. 2)  and national level (par. 3).  
Then, the current framework on quotas is analysed, first in Europe (par. 
4), and then, from a comparative perspective, in Italy and in France (par. 
5). The work analyses: 
- content (par. 5.1.) and investment quotas (par. 5.2.) on both 
linear and non-linear providers,  
- what the further restrictions on the AVMS providers 
programming freedom in France are (par. 5.1.3.) 
- which kind of proportionality and flexibility instruments the 
two countries use (par. 5.3.), 
- what the control methods and sanctions adopted are (par. 5.4.).   
The technicality is not an end in itself. The details of the Italian and 
French legislation on quotas conceal precious indications on how the 
two States promote their film industries by regulating the behaviour of 
providers. In addition to showing that a policy of quotas opens to a 
variety of questions, the analysis shows that the French system, 
extraordinarily refined and continually evolving to follow market 
developments, could be a valuable reference for Italy, rich of useful 
suggestions  (par. 6).  
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2. The European regulatory development: from the 1989 
Directive to the 2018 one 
Since the 1989 TWF Directive, the European Law has required 
televisions to broadcast a minimum percentage of European works and 
allowed the Member States to require the broadcasters under their 
jurisdiction to contribute to financing independent European works527. 
The final goal was to maintain the diversity of the supply, in fear of 
European works disappearing in favour of more popular US films. 
The establishment of these quotas generated many criticisms from the 
US and even within the EEC. The Member States with the weakest film 
industries pointed out that the introduction of such obligations would 
have generated discriminatory effects across EEC countries. The 
countries with weaker film industries could struggle to meet the 
requirements with their national production. They would therefore have 
to turn to the Member States with stronger audio-visual industry (such 
as France, Italy, and Germany). In this way, they would have moved 
from one cultural hegemony—the American one—to another, protected 
from American products by virtue of the 'common European culture' but 
still distant from their traditions. Indeed, it is not sure that French films 
safeguard an Irish or a Danish citizen's cultural identity better than 
American films528. 
The text adopted at the end reflects the presence of different positions529: 
the provisions of the Directive of 1989 related to quotas530 represented 
«an almost unique example of language vagueness»531. They required 
 
527 See par. 6.1.1. of Chapter I. 
528 For the whole discourse, DOLORES, M., La promozione delle opere audiovisive europee e la 
libertà di iniziativa economica, in La riforma del mercato audiovisivo europeo, ed. by  Abbamonte, 
G., Apa, E. and Pollicino, O., Giappichelli, 2019, pp. 61-70, p. 63. 
529 Not surprisingly, the leading defender of quotas was France. Besides direct aids, quotas 
were an indispensable instrument for promoting national and European creation and 
avoiding the market being flooded by American products, according to France. 
530 Arts. 4 and 5. 
531 SALVATORE, V., "Quotas on TV programmes and EEC law", Common Market L. Rev. 29 
(1992): 967-990. 
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the Member States to ensure «where practicable and by appropriate 
means» and «on the basis of suitable criteria» that broadcasters 
«progressively» reserve: a) «a majority proportion» of their transmission 
time for European works532; b) at least 10 % of their transmission time, or 
at least 10 % of their programming budget, for European works created 
by producers independent of broadcasters, with «an adequate 
proportion» for recent works.  
Over time, the EU legislator amended the 1989 Directive on several 
occasions. First in 1997533 and a second time in 2007534.  Then, in 2010, «in 
the interests of clarity and rationality», the legislator codified the TWF 
Directive through the adoption of a consolidated version 535. Since this 
moment, the Directive began to be referred to as the  AVMS Directive536. 
Finally, the European legislator modified the Directive in 2018537. 
While the modifications realized in 1997 are not significant concerning 
the topic of quotas, those realized in 2007 and 2018 aimed to extend the 
range of actors to whom the rules apply.  
The 2007 reform represented a first attempt to extend quotas' obligations 
to non-linear providers, thus overcoming the imposition of unequal 
legal constraints. The EEC noted that non-linear providers are 
 
532 Or, if this ‘majority proportion’ could not be attained, a proportion no lower than the 
average for 1988 in the involved Member State. 
533 See Directive 97/36/EC. For its analysis, VOTANO, G., "TV europea senza frontiere atto 
secondo", Diritto dell’informazione e dell’informatica (1997): 985 ss. 
534 See Directive 2007/65/EC.  For its detailed analysis, not limited to the issue of quotas, 
see: BURRI-NENOVA, M., "New Audiovisual Media Services Directive: Television without 
Frontiers, Television without Cultural Diversity", Common Market Law Review. 44 (2007): 
1689-1725; CASTENDYK, O., ET AL. European media law, Kluwer Law International BV, 2008; 
VALCKE, P., STEVENS, D., WERKERS, E. and LIEVENS, E., "Audiovisual media services in the 
EU: next generation approach or old wine in new barrels?", Communications & Strategies 71 
(2009): 103 ss.; MASTROIANNI, R., La direttiva sui servizi di media audiovisivi e la sua attuazione 
nell’ordinamento italiano, Giappichelli, 2011.  
535 See Directive 2010/13/EU. 
536 Note that it modified the referring articles on quotas: it moved the provisions of arts. 4 
and 5 of the TWF Directive to arts. 16 and 17. 
537 See Directive 2018/1808/EU. 
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developed over time and are « ‘television-like’, i.e. that they compete for 
the same audience as television broadcasts»538. Moreover, they «have the 
potential to partially replace television broadcasting. Accordingly, they 
should, where practicable, promote the production and distribution of 
European works and thus contribute actively to the promotion of 
cultural diversity»539.   
However, the 2007 Directive used a ‘calibrated’ approach to extend the 
quotas’ obligations to the non-linear providers540. It established that the 
Member States should have ensured—where practicable and by 
appropriate means—that non-linear providers under their jurisdiction 
were committed to promoting the production of and access to European 
works. The Directive did not clarify how said promotion could have 
been realized. It merely listed some criteria that the Member States could 
adopt as guidelines, either jointly or alternatively541. Therefore, the 
Member States were free to decide whether and how to require non-
linear providers to respect promotional schemes. They might have 
considered them unworkable in emerging markets and a rapidly 
changing technological environment542.  
 
538 Recital 17. 
539 Recital 48. As it is clear from this Recital, the 'cultural' aim of quotas became much more 
explicit in the post-1989 versions of the TWD Directive given the entry into force of the 
1992 Maastricht Treaty, that recognized the EU competence in the cultural field. However, 
the economic reasons for quotas inevitably emerge. Recital 10 reflects them: it explicitly 
mentions, as one of the European legislator's primary goals, the promotion and growth of 
the audio-visual sector through the production of European works so that industries can 
grow, innovate and create jobs. Thus noted by SAMMARCO, P., La produzione audiovisiva 
europea, p. 64 e 65. 
540 See art. 3i. 
541 According to art. 3i(1), «such promotion could relate, inter alia, to the financial 
contribution made by such services to the production and rights acquisition of European 
works or to the share and/or prominence of European works in the catalogue of programs 
offered by the on-demand audio-visual media service». 
542 As noted by KAMINA, P., Droit du cinéma, LexisNexis, 2014, p. 31, art. 3i is the result of a 
compromise between two opposing policies: extending the application of arts. 4 and 5 of 
the TVSF Directive to non-linear services or not subjecting these services to any obligation 
(«L’article 3decies de la directive du 2007 peut être considéré comme un compromis entre deux 
politiques opposées: étendre l’application des articles 4 et 5 de la directive TVSF aux services non 
linéaires ou ne soumettre ces services à aucune obligation de promotion»). 
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The decision to adopt this cautious approach, explicitly expressed by the 
Directive543, depended on two main reasons. First, the EU legislator was 
concerned with avoiding overregulation in a rising sector.  Second, non-
linear providers seemed to ensure greater choice and control for the user 
and have a lower impact on society than the linear ones: if television 
programs are pushed on everyone, the on-demand contents are 
individually pulled544. As the Court of Justice has affirmed several times, 
the principle of 'technological neutrality' (regulators cannot push the 
market towards the structure they consider optimal) does not refrain 
from balancing the rules according to the user's role and the modalities 
of content fruition545. 
However, the approach adopted in 2007 started to show its flaws 
overtime. Not all Member States imposed quota obligations on non-
linear providers. Even when they did, the rules were looser than the ones 
imposed on traditional televisions. Moreover, non-linear operators 
could provide services in the countries that imposed these obligations 
without respecting them by establishing their headquarters only in those 
with lighter financial obligations. The internal market is based on the 
country of origin principle: providers must respect only the law of the 
country where they are established, as harmonized by the European 
Law, and not all the laws of the countries in which they operate.  
This led to two main issues. First, an unequal competition environment: 
traditional operators had to respect much stricter rules than the digital 
ones, freer to decide which content to fund and place on their platforms 
driven by viewer's demands. Second, the presence of fewer resources for 
 
543 Its Recital 42 stated the intention to impose a «lighter regulation on on-demand audio-
visual media services, which should comply only with the basic rules provided for in this 
Directive». 
544 See CAGGIANO, G., Paese di origine, libera circolazione e giurisdizione, p. 34 («La struttura 
normativa bi-livello a carattere asimmetrico intende corrispondere al diverso ruolo dell’utente 
rispetto ai contenuti (“push” e “pull”) ed al diverso impatto sociale delle due tipologie di servizi»). 
545 See CAGGIANO, G., Evoluzione della direttiva televisione senza frontiere e l’ampliamento del 
suo campo di applicazione a tutti i servizi audiovisivi, in La televisione digitale: temi e problemi: 
commento al D. lgs. 177/05, T.U. della radiotelevisione, ed. by Frignani, A. et al., Giuffrè, 2006, 
pp. 139-155, p. 145. 
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promoting European audio-visual production than there could have 
potentially been: the operators with higher revenues were partially 
escaping the investment schemes. 
Given this picture, the European legislator amended the 2010 AVMS 
Directive in 2018. First, it strengthened the obligations of non-linear 
providers. According to the new rules, they have to secure at least a 30% 
share of European works in their catalogues and ensure their 
prominence. While according to the 2007 Directive these were mere 
suggestions the States could implement, they now became mandatory 
measures. Secondly, the new Directive allowed the Member States to 
require providers that target their territories to invest in the creation of 
European audio-visual works, albeit being established abroad. This way, 
providers are disincentivised from locating their headquarters in 
countries whose legislation is looser. In essence, the European legislator 
prioritized the cultural and economic reasons behind quotas over those 
of the internal market liberalization. 
 
3. The national regulatory development 
3.1. The use of quotas before the 1989 Directive  
The EEC established quotas to limit the vast influx of American works 
in 1989. However, quotas date much further back in time both in Italy 
and France. Indeed, quotas represent the first instrument devised by 
France and Italy to protect their national film industries. Since the end of 
WWI, France used quotas to restrict the number of US films that could 
be imported onto the country, while Italy declined them as minimum 
percentages of domestic films to be projected in theatres. In both 
countries, legislators adopted quotas despite the opposition of theatre 
exhibitors, which were interested in screening the more profitable 
American films546. 
At the end of WWII, Italy and France stopped using quotas. Italy 
liberalized the exhibition sector in 1945, under the will of the victorious 
Americans to pour their production onto the Italian market after the 
 
546 See par. 2.1. and 3.1. of Chapter I. 
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previous years' blockade. The legislator then reintroduced quotas in 
1947 and lastly repealed them in 1994. Since this moment, it began to 
recognize tax incentives to exhibitors that autonomously reserved a 
percentage of their projection time to Italian films—something similar  
to what happens today547. In France, the 1946 Blum-Byrnes Agreement 
opened French doors to the US films that were blocked in return for a 
proportion of France's war debt being cancelled. However, while 
accepting not to restrict American imports, France specified minimum 
quotas for French films in national theatres. Today, the French State 
pushes exhibitors to screen national films in exchange for financial aid, 
like the Italian one548. However, it also requires the strongest exhibitors 
to meet engagement de programmation et de diffusion, i.e. quotas of difficult 
and fragile works, including the French and European ones549. 
With the development of televisions, the focus on quotas shifted to 
broadcasters. Both Italy and France imposed quotas to them before the 
1989 TWF Directive introduced quotas for European works. France 
established content quotas for French films in television already during 
the public broadcaster monopoly, in 1971550. Following the liberalization 
process, it extended the same obligations to private televisions, also 
adding investment quotas. 
Even Italy introduced content quotas (not also the investment ones) on 
televisions before the TWF Directive. In 1984, it established that 
broadcasters had to reserve at least 25% of the transmission time they 
dedicated to cinematographic works to Italian or EEC's Member States 
films551. The goal was to limit the practice undertaken by Fininvest to fill 
the programming with American blockbusters, appreciated by the 
audience and less expensive than national films552. However, the 
provision on quotas was not implemented, given the lack of sanctions in 
 
547 See par. 6 of Chapter III. 
548 Ibidem. 
549 See par. 5 of Chapter II. 
550 See footnote no. 57 of par. 2.4. of Chapter I. 
551 See art. 3(4) of Law Decree no. 807/1984 of December 6th. 
552 PERLO, N., Le droit public du cinéma, p. 317. 
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the event of its infringement. Italy will adopt more effective provisions 
only in the 90s, given the need to implement the European Directive. 
 
3.2. The French approach and the current reforms: the 
importance of a differential approach and regular 
evaluations 
Through Act Law No. 1067/1986, France extended the obligations to 
program quota of national works––already applied to the public 
broadcaster––to private televisions. The same Act also introduced the 
obligation for broadcasters to invest a percentage of their revenues to 
produce new national works. 
The 1986 Act still established the fundamental principles governing 
quotas in France. Decrees of the Council of State lay down the detailed 
provisions after consulting the Superior Council of Audio-visual (CSA), 
the Independent Administrative Authority of the audio-visual sector553.  
However, the percentages established in the Law and the Decrees are to 
be regarded as a minimum standard. Each provider's specific obligations 
are determined by an agreement between the provider itself and the 
CSA554. According to the 1986 Act, the agreement should take into 
account «the extent of the area served by the service, its share in the 
advertising market, the need to ensure equal treatment between the 
different services, the peculiar competition situation for each of them 
[…]»555.  This way, in accordance with the minimum percentages laid 
down by the Law and the Decrees, the obligations of each actor are 
determined based on its specificities. Among the elements considered, 
there is also the way the provider uses media chronology: the sooner it 
 
553 See arts. 27, 33 and 33-2 of the 1986 Act. 
554 See art. 28(1) and 33 of 1986 Act. 
555 Art. 28(1) of the 1986 Act («compte tenu de l'étendue de la zone desservie, de la part du service 
dans le marché publicitaire, du respect de l'égalité de traitement entre les différents services et des 
conditions de concurrence propres à chacun d'eux, ainsi que du développement de la radio et de la 
télévision numériques de terre»). 
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distributes a cinematographic work, the higher its investment 
obligations are556. 
Over time, the State modified more than 80 times the 1986 Act to address 
market changes; however, it has always confirmed the system's core 
principles. Still today, it is possible to say that «the French funding 
system can be summarized by one sentence: televisions channels finance 
French cinema»557—not only through the investment quotas but also 
through the TST payment558. Indeed, in France, broadcasters play an 
exceptionally significant role in film financing: their investments 
accounted for circa 30% of total financing volume for French films 
during the years 2009-2018559. The role they have in France is much more 
significant than in most other European countries. This is clearly 
indicated by the fact that European broadcasters’ investments tend to 
account for 24% of total financing volume for European films, compared 
to only 8%  if one excludes French films from the analysis and considers 
only the other major markets (UK, Germany, Italy, and Spain)560.  
The fact that broadcasters are the principal supporters of the national 
film industry looks currently troublesome. The amount of televisions' 
investment in the creation of new films is proportionate to their income. 
Since their incomes are decreasing, the resources for the cinema are 
shrinking as well561. Such a drop is partially because broadcasters have 
 
556 See par. 4.3. of Chapter II. 
557 LE DIBERDER, A., La nouvelle économie de l’audiovisuel, La Découverte, 2019, p. 10 («On 
peut en résumer le fonctionnement en une phrase: le cinéma français est financé par les chaines de 
télévisions»). 
558 See par. 4.1.1. of Chapter III. 
559 See CRETON, L., L'économie du cinéma, p. 98. 
560 EUROPEAN AUDIOVISUAL OBSERVATORY, Fiction film financing in Europe: A sample analysis 
of films released in 2018, 2020, p. 59. 
561 The overall contribution of broadcasters to film production (by means of the TST and 
the investment quotas) decreased by 20% in 6 years (from € 462 M in 2011 to €371 M in 
2017). Between 2017 and 2018, broadcasters' investments fell further by 22.5%, becoming 
the lowest in the last ten years. The reduction of cinema funding is mainly due to Canal+, 
traditionally one of the most important contributors, given the wide range of films pre-
purchased each year––from 115 to 120 (see par. 5.2.1. of this Chapter). Canal+ contribution 
went from € 194.5 M in 2010 to € 153.7 M in 2017. Despite the smaller budget, Canal+ has 
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difficulty reacting to competition from the global digital operators, 
subjected to looser obligations on cinema promotion. France 
implemented the 2007 Directive, thus requiring digital providers under 
its jurisdiction to contribute to the promotion of the European and 
national production. However, the major operators were not subjected 
to said obligations since they provide their services in France without 
being established there. 
In light of this, the French Parliament began to discuss a bill (the Projet 
de loi relatif à la communication audiovisuelle et à la souveraineté culturelle à 
l’ère numérique), aimed at reforming the 1986 Act562. Outlined after years 
of impact evaluations and public consultations563, the Project pursued 
three lines of action: «assouplir, élargir et simplifier»564. First, it aimed at 
easing the constraints on traditional televisions to enable them to return 
to a growth situation. For example, the legislator wanted to make it 
easier for broadcasters to access advertising resources by eliminating 
rules adopted in the 80s to protect entrances to movie theatres, but that 
it appears anachronistic today. Second, the Project aimed at introducing 
more stringent rules for digital providers, particularly for those 
operating in France being established abroad—thus seizing the 
opportunity recognized by the 2018 Directive. Finally, the Project 
pursued the general attempt to simplify the 1986 Act, which has become 
increasingly difficult to understand over time. 
 
continued to buy the same number of films. Consequently, the average budget of the films 
funded by Canal+ decreased (from € 8.58 M in 2008 to € 6.97 M in 2017). According to 
estimates made before the pandemic (that exacerbated televisions' losses), the current 
trend could have led to an overall reduction of cinema funding between 12% and 25%.  See 
BOUTONNAT, D., Rapport sur le financement prive,́ pp. 9, 10 and 19 and Project of Law no. 
2488/2019 of December 5th, pp. 49 and 106. 
562 Project of Law no. 2488/2019. 
563 See, among others: COUR DES COMPTES, Les soutiens à la production cinématographique; 
BOUTONNAT, D., Rapport sur le financement privé; COMMISSION DES AFFAIRES CULTURELLES ET 
DE L’E ́DUCATION,  Rapport d’information preśeńte ́par Mme Aurore Berge,́ 2018; AUTORITÉ DE 
LA CONCURRENCE, Avis 19-A-04 . 
564 As recommended by the COMMISSION DES AFFAIRES CULTURELLES ET DE L’E ́DUCATION,  
Rapport d’information preśeńte ́par Mme Aurore Berge,́ p. 17. 
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The Covid-19 pandemic outbreak disrupted the entire parliamentary 
calendar and the Project was set aside. However, the State did not give 
up its content: rather than a single comprehensive law, different 
regulatory sources will adopt it (and in part already did it565). To speed 
up the process, the Parliament empowered the Government to modify 
the 1986 Act by way of ordinance566. Based on the principles established 
by the ordinance567, new Council of State Decrees will be adopted.  
Some of them have already been approved. They ease the constraints on 
traditional televisions to enable them to return to a growth situation568.  
The central innovation ––the introduction of financial commitments for 
non-linear providers that target France without having a headquarter 
there–– has been implemented by the new ‘SMAD Decree’569, which has 
substituted the previous Decree concerning quotas for non-linear 
providers570. It seeks to ensure that American platforms' involvement in 
 
565 For example, Decree no. 1102/2020 of August 31st implemented art. 36 of the abandoned 
Project of Law. The Decree introduced a Pole of numerical experts, made up of data 
scientists, engineers, and economic analysts. It is set up as an administrative service of the 
State to whom all the public authorities involved in regulating digital platforms can 
address. Therefore, the Pole is at the disposal not only of the authorities operating in the 
audio-visual sector but of also those regulating search engines platforms (e.g., Google), 
online market sellers (e.g., Amazon), connecting platforms (e.g., Blablacar), online hotels 
providers (e.g., Booking, Airbnb), social networks (e.g., Facebook, Twitter), etc. Its 
establishment is of particular interest because it highlights two recurrent virtuous traits of 
the French system—often absent in the Italian one. First, it shows that intensive studies 
and reflections precede each regulatory initiative. The legislator established the Pole after 
many studies have shown that in the field of regulation of digital platforms, public 
authorities as a whole are in a situation of information asymmetry and lack of capacity. 
Second, it highlights that the State seeks an organic approach to avoid overlapping skills 
and dispersing resources (See Project of Law, p. 252 « […] au regard de ce caractère transversal 
et multisectoriel des plateformes numériques, il importe de privilégier une approche a ̀ la fois globale 
et ciblée. En l’absence d’un tel service, le risque serait de voir se constituer progressivement au sein 
de l’État et de ses différents démembrements une multiplication de petits laboratoires isolés visant 
a ̀ répondre de façon fragmentée aux besoins opérationnels»). 
566 See art. 36 of Law no. 1508/2020 of December 3rd (‘Dadue Law’). 
567 Ordinance no. 1642/2020. 
568 See par. 5.1.3. of this Chapter. 
569 Decree no. 793/2021 of Jun 22th.  
570 Decree no. 1379/2010 of November 12th.  
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the financing of national creation does not compromise the traditional 
equilibrium gained in France to protect cultural diversity (think of the 
protection of independent producers' capacity to maintain rights on 
their works571). 
In the following months, based on the ‘SMAD Decree’, new conventions 
between each provider and the CSA572 will be adopted. Interestingly, the 
abandoned Project of Law gave the conventions greater importance than 
they currently receive. Following the principle of limited recourse to the 
regulations, the Project provided that the Law and the decrees should 
have been refocused only on core principles, and co-regulation should 
have been incremented573.  
As affirmed by the CSA, «the increased number and diversification of 
the actors regulated requires a change in regulatory methods […]. There 
is a need to develop a more flexible framework that retains the essential 
principles while using new tools more adapted to the digital 
environment. The variety of players now entering the audio-visual 
regulation scope makes the idea of universal and univocal regulation 
obsolete. In essence, regulation must evolve in such a way as to 
understand the complexity of a globalized sector, subject to sudden and 
hardly predictable developments. In this new heterogeneous 
environment, which brings together actors with a wide range of legal 
 
571 See par. 3.2. of Chapter II. 
572 Note that the Project of Law provided for the merger of the CSA and the Haute Autorité 
pour la diffusion des oeuvres et la protection des droits sur l'Internet (HADOPI) into a single 
independent administrative authority, the Autorité de régulation de la communication 
audiovisuelle et numérique (ARCOM). Such an operation will be carried out anyway, despite 
the abandonment of the Project (indeed, the Parliament is discussing a draft law on the 
matter, the Projet de loi relatif à la protection de l'accès du public aux oeuvres culturelles à l'ère 
numérique). It aims at avoiding ineffective overlapping: the two authorities are both called 
to regulate digital operators, and the objectives of their activities are becoming close. The 
CSA has traditionally been responsible for all matters relating to freedom of 
communication. However, its scope of action is evolving, given the legislator is 
progressively entrust it with new tasks in the fight against information manipulation and 
on-line hatred. On the other side, the HADOPI must remedy the piracy of musical, 
cinematographic and audio-visual works on digital networks. 
573 Art. 1 of Project of Law. 
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statuses, economic models, strategies, or sizes, the regulation’s method 
must be reviewed to encourage 'networked' regulation, in which all 
stakeholders-regulators, public authorities, and companies dialogue and 
provide information. Hence a new way of conceiving the regulator's 
action»574.  
 
3.3. The erratic Italian revisions: proceeding erga omnes and 
reforming based on political contingencies? 
The evolution of the Italian legislation on quotas shows two main 
differences compared to France. First, the way of proceeding is less 
'sophisticated'. Italy does not diversify the rules based on the 
peculiarities of each operator; it has always regulated the matter erga 
omnes, requiring all operators to respect the same obligations. Secondly, 
Italy has shown a less structured approach than France, with frequent 
changes, often resulting in a non-complementary regulation. The 
framework's development did not occur based on a coordinated and 
constant strategy. On some occasions, it seemed to adapt to the 
circumstances rather than carrying out a general plan, suggesting that 
important decisions happen to be taken with very short sight, potentially 
depending on the political contingency and the lobbying activity of the 
moment.  
 
574 CONSEIL SUPÉRIEUR DE L'AUDIOVISUEL, Refonder la régulation audiovisuelle, 2018, p. 8 («La 
diversification et l’extension du périmètre des acteurs reǵuleś impliquent un changement dans les 
méthodes de régulation, y compris pour les acteurs traditionnels. Il est nécessaire de faire émerger 
un cadre plus souple conservant les principes essentiels, tout en recourant a ̀ des outils plus adaptés 
a ̀ l’environnement numérique. La variété ́ des acteurs entrant désormais dans le champ de la 
régulation audiovisuelle rend caduque l’idée d’une régulation universelle et univoque: la régulation 
doit évoluer de manière a ̀ appréhender la complexité ́ d’un secteur mondialise,́ soumis a ̀ des 
évolutions brutales et difficilement prévisibles. Dans ce nouvel environnement het́eŕogeǹe qui 
regroupe des acteurs aux statuts juridiques, aux modèles économiques, aux stratégies ou aux tailles 
très divers, les méthodes de régulation doivent être revues, afin d’encourager une régulation « en 
réseau », dans laquelle l’ensemble des parties prenantes- régulateurs, pouvoirs publics et 
entreprises- dialoguent et fournissent de l’information.  D’où une nouvelle manière de concevoir 
l’action du régulateur»). 
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The first significant provisions on quotas were adopted by the 1990 
Mammì Law575, given the need for Italy to adapt its legislation to the 
TWF Directive. However, since the Mammì Law failed to transpose the 
Directive's provisions on quotas fully, Italy adopted new previsions 
shortly after, in 1998. Besides systematically implementing the 
Directive576, the 1998 Law also recognized for the first time the AGCOM 
the power to monitor broadcasters' compliance with quotas and adopt 
detailed provisions on the matter577.  Over time, the legislator modified 
the system several other times. In 2005, it introduced some marginal 
 
575 The Mammì Law established quotas only for cinematographic works. It established a 
content quota for European cinematographic works (40% of broadcasters' transmission 
time) and a sub-quota for the national ones (at least half of the 50%). It also established that 
broadcasters had to reserve at least 1/5 of this sub-quota to works produced in the last five 
years. The Mammì Law did not introduce instead investment quotas. However, it 
provided a mechanism to push broadcasters to invest in film production: if a broadcaster 
coproduced a film, it could distribute it after one year—instead of two—from its first 
screening in the cinema. The Mammì Law overcame the approach adopted in 1984, when 
the legislator introduced quotas without providing for penalties. It established indeed that 
the infringement of the introduced provisions was punishable with administrative 
sanctions to be applied by the Guarantor for broadcasting and publishing and the Minister 
for Post and Telecommunications. 
576Article 2 of Law no. 122/1998 of April 30th went even further, establishing stricter 
provisions than those dictated by the EEC. It introduced both content and investment 
quotas in favour of independent production. It no longer concentrated on the sole 
cinematographic market, establishing that quotas could be satisfied through the different 
kinds of audio-visual works. Concerning content quotas, broadcasters had to reserve most 
of their transmission time to European works and either 20% (for the public broadcaster) 
or 10% (for private ones) to those realized by independent producers. Broadcasters were 
required to satisfy said quotas «also regarding the hours of highest audience». The 
legislator repealed the sub-quota for national works but established that quotas should 
cover products specifically addressed to minors and films. Concerning investment quotas, 
the law established a higher tax base for calculating the investment share—namely, the 
total broadcasters' revenue instead of their programming budget.  Rai had to invest at least 
20% of its total revenues in European works production, while private operators no less 
than 10%. The legislator established two investment sub-quotas: one for the 
cinematographic works and one for products specifically addressed to minors. 
577 The Authority exercised said power through the Decision no. 9/99/CONS. Note that, 
established the year before by Law no. 249/1997 of July 31st, the Authority had already 
been partially involved in the quota system: it had been in charge to establish the criteria 
to grant national broadcasting concessions—giving prominence, among the programming 
projects submitted by operators, to those likely to guarantee «a significant presence of 
European products» (see art. 3, par. 3, let. a), no. 2) of Law no. 249/1997).  
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changes and transferred quotas provisions in arts. 6 and 44 of the 
Tusmar578, which still regulates quotas. In 2010, it implemented the 2007 
Directive, thus extending the obligations to non-linear providers579. 
Slightly amended again in 2012580, quotas provisions have been further 
organically reformed by the Legislative Decree no. 204/2017, adopted 
based on the delegation granted by art. 34 of the 2016 Act. Indeed, the 
2016 legislator, which has organically reformed all public rules affecting 
the film sector581, has deemed it necessary to reform the quotas' system. 
In 2019, a new government modified the 2017 reform, revising the new 
rules so soon that they were not operational yet. 
Few institutional sources allow to understand the problems that existed 
before the last regulatory interventions (the 2017 reform and its 2019 
‘reshaping’). The only in-depth institutional source is an AGCOM 
survey of 2015582. It shows that the result of the several interventions 
carried out overtime was a complex, messy, and somehow incoherent 
system, likely to make it difficult to implement the rules583—although it 
 
578 Legislative Decree no. 177/2005. The most significant change was the elimination of the 
prime-time obligation. By Decision 66/09/CONS of February 13th, 2009, AGCOM adopted 
a new regulation. 
579 See Legislative Decree  no. 44/2010 of March 15th. In that occasion, art. 6 of the Tusmar 
was repealed and all the relevant provisions were transferred to art. 44 of the Tusmar. 
580 See Legislative Decree no. 120/2012 of June 31st. Following its adoption, two new 
regulations were adopted. First, the Decree of the Minister for Economic Development and 
that of Cultural Heritage and Activities and Tourism of February 22nd, 2013 (the ‘Passera-
Ornaghi Decree’). It provided the definition of cinematographic works of original Italian 
expression and the sub-quotas in their favour (established but not quantified by Tusmar, 
which art. 44(3) asked a decree their quantification, «taking into account their availability 
and the development of the market»). Second, the AGCOM’s Resolution no. 
186/13/CONS of February 29th, 2013, which defined the modalities and criteria for 
carrying out the verification of quotas’ respect by broadcasters. 
581 See par. 3.6. of Chapter I. 
582 AGCOM, Indagine conoscitiva, 2015. 
583 In light of all the changes realized over time, the only relevant provision of the Tusmar 
concerning quotas was art. 44. Broadcasters had to respect two content quotas. First, they 
had to reserve at least 50% of their transmission time to European audio-visual works. 
Second, they had to reserve at least 10% of their transmission time (20% in the case of the 
Rai), to European cinematographic works produced in the last five year. A percentage of 
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seems that broadcasters were overall compliant with said rules584; 
however, doubts in this regard arise from the fact that they self-
certificated on the matter and that they benefited from proportionality 
and flexibility instruments. 
In any case, there was no agreement on the reasons for said complexity 
and the changes needed. Indeed, interrogated on the problems faced, 
broadcasters and producers agreed only on the need to adopt more 
stringent rules for non-linear providers. Concerning all other aspects, 
they asked for opposite legislative actions. Simplifying and polarizing 
the different positions: producers expressed the need for a more incisive 
legislative action, broadcasters for a lighter one.  
According to the producers, it was necessary to ensure greater certainty 
and effectiveness in the application of quotas. They criticised televisions 
 
this quota should be reserved for Italian cinematographic works. In the case of Rai, the 
sub-quota was 20% or 6,5%, depending on whether the channel concerned was or not 
focused on cinema. In the case of private broadcasters, the sub-quota was 30% or 10%, 
based on the same rationale. As regards investment quotas, Rai had to invest at least 15% 
of its annual net revenues in European independent audio-visual works, private 
broadcasters at least 10% of their total annual revenues. They both had to reserve a part of 
this percentage to the investment in Italian cinematographic works. Only Rai had to respect 
an additional sub-quota for animation works for children, while only private broadcasters 
had to reserve a percentage of the quota for Italian cinema to the purchase of recent films. 
Finally, they both had to allocate a percentage of their investment quota in Italian 
cinematographic works for pre-acquisition. The obligations imposed on non-linear 
providers were a lot less stringent, in line with the European Law of that time. The Tusmar 
merely established that non-linear operators subjected to the Italian jurisdiction had to 
promote the European audio-visual production «gradually and taking into account market 
conditions», and asked AGCOM to specify how they could realize said promotion. The 
Authority allowed non-linear providers to choose between content or investment 
obligations to comply with. More precisely, they could alternatively choose between 
reserving 20% of the total amount of hours annually available in their catalogues to 
European works or investing in the European works’ production at least 5% of their annual 
revenues. All the on-demand providers opted for the content quotas (AGCOM, Relazione 
annual sull’attività svolta e sui programmi di lavoro, 2019, pp. 54). 
584 According to the data available (AGCOM, Relazione annuale, pp. 55 ff.), the average value 
of the programming of European works by national televisions was indeed approximately 
17 percentage points higher than the legal threshold. Rai1 transmitted the highest hours of 
European works (98%); Italia Uno the lowest one (27,3%). The average value of the 
investment in the production of independent European works was instead 20.9%, well 
above the minimum thresholds established by law.   
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for adopting strategies to limit the effectiveness of the obligations and 
AGCOM for its attitude, considered excessively favourable towards 
broadcasters. Producers claimed that AGCOM, in charge of controlling 
the respect of the rules, had been allowing broadcaster numerous 
derogations from the obligations and adopting proportionality and 
flexibility mechanisms not provided by the law. This way, the 
transparency of the system was compromised, as well as the 
effectiveness of the obligations.  
On the other side, broadcasters asked for a more market-oriented 
legislative action, affirming that the free negotiation between the parties 
and the competitive encounter between demand and supply could 
generate efficient and competitive scenarios. They pointed out that 
proportionality and flexibility mechanisms adopted by AGCOM were 
essential in a legal framework like the Italian one, characterized by a 
high degree of complexity. Such a framework required televisions to 
comply with several programming and investment sub-quotas in 
addition to the general quota for European audio-visual independent 
works (the one for the program for minors, for recent cinematographic 
works, etc.)585. In principle, sub-quotas did not generate problems for 
generalist channels, interested in financing and transmitting different 
types of products. They were instead problematic for thematic channels: 
to respect sub-quotas, they had to divert investments from their core 
product to fund works that might not be consistent with their editorial 
identity. According to broadcasters, this was the reason for the 
disconnection between programming and investment obligations, i.e. 
the lack of correlation between the films financed and those broadcasted 
by televisions586. Such a disconnection raised criticisms, because 
generated the absence of coordinated support for films trough their 
 
585 See footnote no. 583 of this paragraph. 
586 Said disconnect between investment and programming strategies was particularly 
frequent in the case of Rai. It financed films then considered unable to attract a television 
audience and, for this reason, broadcasted late at night. Another problem was that Rai met 
its investment quotas mainly by automatically funding the film of ‘cultural interest’ 
already funded by the State.  Consequently, there was an overlap of public funding, in the 
form of ministerial contribution and State television investment, which eliminated any risk 
for the producer.  See CUCCO, M. and MANZOLI, G., Il Cinema di Stato, pp. 90 ff. 
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overall cycle of life, i.e. from the development of the idea to the 
distribution.  
Moreover, broadcasters claimed that the protection granted to producers 
through quotas had encouraged the spread of many sub-capitalized 
entities financially dependent on the broadcasters themselves, without 
entrepreneurial capacity and mostly risk-averse. According to 
broadcasters, the 'regulated' system had de facto encouraged the 
perpetuation of the existing circumstances, removing the incentive to 
innovate one's commercial offer, more guaranteed by the stimulus of 
competition. According to the producers on the other side, sub-
capitalisation and the lack of entrepreneurial ability of most companies 
did not depend on the excessive protection they were granted by law, 
but rather on the imbalance of the management of secondary rights. 
Broadcasters buying the almost totality of exploitation rights had been 
preventing producers to accordingly profit from the works on 
alternative markets and therefore had been making them unable to build 
their own consolidated business dimension587. 
In the light of the different interests involved, the 2017 reform has made 
two main choices. First, it has strengthened obligations for non-linear 
providers—as requested by all the operators involved. According to the 
reform, digital providers should respect both content and investment 
quotas rather than having the possibility to choose between them. In 
addition, the reform established that the investment obligations must 
also be respected by the operators that provide services in Italy being 
established abroad. In this regard, Italy has anticipated the 2018 
Directive.  
Second, the 2017 reform, sharing producers' observations, sought to 
increase broadcasters' actual commitment to promoting national and 
European independent production. It increased the percentages for both 
investment and programming quotas and confirmed the application of 
several sub-quotas. At the same time, it introduced some correctives to 
limit the cases of operators having to meet requirements inconsistent 
with their editorial line; this way, the reform sought to reduce the cases 
 
587 See par. 3.2.1. of Chapter II. 
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of operators asking for derogations588. The 2017 reform also established 
higher penalties for the obligations' violation, considering the previous 
ones too low compared to some providers' high revenues. Finally, the 
2017 reform implemented a prime-time obligation to avoid the diffusion 
of European and Italian films merely at lower audience hours. It also 
established that the verification of conformity to said obligation should 
be carried out weekly rather than annually.  
Broadcasters have strongly criticized the 2017 reform589; hence, the 2019 
intervention: before the entry into force of the 2017 reform, a new 
government modified it. First, the Budget Law for 2019 postponed its 
entry into force. Second, the following Law no. 81/2019 of August 8th590, 
besides postponing the entry into force of the reform again, has 
decreased the percentage of programming and investment quotas and 
introduced a more flexible approach. For example, it eliminated the 
prime-time obligation. The result seems to be a more balanced system.  
However, the events testified that important decisions could be taken 
based on the political contingencies and the strength of the lobbies of the 
moment in Italy. As well as through the most disparate regulatory 
sources—such as a Law Decree concerning the personnel of symphonic 
opera foundations591. A long-term overview, despite the limited 
duration of national governments, would be indispensable. Its lack risk 
to jeopardize the activity of national enterprises, deprived of credible 
multiannual horizons. It also risks limiting the availability of foreign 
enterprises to locate assets in Italy. 
 
 
588 See par. 5.3. of this Chapter. 
589 See MANZOLI, G., "Molto rumore per nulla? Il decreto legislativo in materia di 
promozione delle opere europee ed italiane da parte dei fornitori di servizi di media 
audiovisivi", Aedon 1 (2018). 
590 Conversion into law, with amendments, of Law Decree no. 59/2019 of June 28th 
«concerning urgent measures on symphonic opera foundations’ personnel, support for the 
cinema and audio-visual sector and financing of the activities of the Ministry for Cultural 
Heritage and Activities and for the holding of the UEFA Euro 2020 event». 
591 See the previous footnote. 
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4. The current European regulatory framework  
In light of the reforms realized over time, today the AVMS Directive, as 
modified in 2018, regulates quotas. Concerning linear providers, the 
relevant provisions are arts. 16 and 17. They establish that broadcasters 
have to reserve the majority proportion of their transmission time—
excluded that appointed to news, sports events, games, advertising, 
teleshopping, and teletext services—to European works and that the 
Member States can require them to reserve to the independent ones at 
least 10% of either their transmission time or their programming 
budget592. Concerning non-linear providers, the relevant provisions is 
art. 13. Its first paragraph is about content obligations (i), while the 
second concerns the investment ones (ii)593. 
i. Content obligations. According to art. 13(1), the Member States shall 
ensure that non-linear providers under their jurisdiction reserve at least 
30% of their catalogues to European works. They also have to ensure 
‘prominence’ to those works: given the amplitude of certain catalogues, 
the effectiveness of quota for European works will mainly lie in their 
visibility so that viewers can easily access and select them. 
It is worth to notice that the alignment between the obligations of non-
linear and those of linear providers is still today partial. First, the 
percentage of 30% is lower than that applied to traditional 
broadcasters—which, however, do not have to ensure ‘prominence’ to 
the European works594. Moreover, the content obligations risk to be 
 
592 Note that these provisions are quite identical to the 1989 ones: the several versions of 
the Directive adopted over time essentially confirmed them.  
593 It is worth noticing that art. 13(6) provides for mandatory exemptions for companies 
with a low turnover or a low audience from the obligations under art. 13(1), as well as from 
the possible requirements under art. 13(2). The aim is to ensure that the obligations do not 
undermine market development and do not inhibit the entry of new market players. For 
the definition of companies with a low turnover or a low audience, see EUROPEAN 
COMMISSION, Guidelines pursuant to Article 13(7) of the Audiovisual Media Services Directive 
on the calculation of the share of European works in on-demand catalogues and on the definition of 
low audience and low turnover (2020/C 223/03). 
594 Indeed,  as noted, «article 16 provides no indication of how linear providers should 
ensure that a share corresponding to the majority proportion of their transmission time is 
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much more burdensome for the linear operators than for the non-linear 
ones. Allocating an hour to European works requires a broadcaster to 
relinquish the prospect of any alternative programming in that time slot. 
On the opposite, online catalogues have unlimited space, so that the 
inclusion of one more European film does not block out another 
programme. Therefore, content quotas are likely to affect the traditional 
players' editorial freedom much more than that of the digital ones. This 
is why, according to several parts, the maintenance of quotas in the 
digital world is not shareable. The idea is that, because of the situation 
that had arisen, it would have been more appropriate to eliminate 
quotas, thus reducing the obligations on both linear and non-linear 
operators595.  
To conclude on content quotas, it is worth noticing that the Member 
States have substantial room for interpretation in the Directive’s 
implementation. Indeed, the latter provides only a few parameters on 
how operators must fulfil the obligations, while the particularities of 
their catalogues raise many technical questions. More precisely:  
 
reserved for European works; nor does it specify measures that should be adopted so as to 
enable viewers to access them. It follows that certain works can be broadcast in time slots 
with smaller audiences—for example, late at night […]». See APA, E. and GANGEMI, G. “The 
New Audiovisual Media Services Directive and the Promotion of European Works by On-
Demand Media Service Providers.” Media Laws 2 (2019): 93-127, p. 104. 
595 The request to abolish quotas also stemmed from other arguments. Some noted that 
quotas have become obsolete in the digital era because they can no longer modify 
consumers' demand. In the past, ensuring that a certain percentage of films shown were 
European increased the number of European films viewed.  In the digital era, it is no longer 
possible to conditionate consumers' demand: users, being empowered by technology, have 
the freedom to pick the content of their choice at any given time or place. The control over 
the supply does not necessarily lead to control over demand, shortly. However, it is worth 
noting that quotas' purpose cannot be reduced only to make consumers watch movies 
different from what they would have watched otherwise; if we admit that quotas have a 
cultural purpose, their effectiveness cannot be measured exclusively on the supported 
works' commercial results. Another argument against the maintenance of quotas is that 
this instrument has become pointless in the digital era because no longer needed to protect 
cultural diversity. The idea is that, since space scarcity has disappeared and there is room 
on the Internet for films from every country in the world, there is no need to carve out a 
place for European works or any other national audio-visual industry. However, said 
argument appears not convincing either: there is no evidence that an infinite space 
automatically generates a diversified supply (see par. 3.1.1. of Chapter II). 
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- the first question is the timeframe for compliance verification 
(weekly, monthly, or annually). The non-linear providers 
continuously add new works to those already present in their 
catalogues. Consequently, the verification of quota compliance 
should consider the timeframe for which each work is available 
in the catalogue;  
- the second question is how to calculate the attainment of the 
established percentage. For linear operators, the percentage to 
dedicate to the European works is measured on the transmission 
time. This concept cannot be used in the case of a digital 
catalogue. The Member States may decide if to measure the 30% 
on the total number of hours in the catalogue or the number of 
works supplied. Since 2020, the Commission has established 
guidelines to clarify this aspect: the more appropriate way to 
calculate the share of European works is by considering the 
number of titles in each catalogue596. The Commission also 
provided guidelines about what constitutes a title:  in the case of 
feature and TV films, every film should be understood as 
constituting a title in a catalogue; in the case of series, each 
season should be intended as one title.  
- finally, the Directive does not define prominence and offers 
guidance by merely outlining some indicators597.   
ii. Investment obligations. According to art. 13(2), the Member States 
can require providers under their jurisdiction to financially contribute to 
the promotion of European works598; if they do so, they can also require 
 
596 See EUROPEAN COMMISSION, Guidelines pursuant to Article 13, par. 7. 
597 According to Recital 35, «Prominence can be ensured through various means such as a 
dedicated section for European works that is accessible from the service homepage, the 
possibility to search for European works in the search tool available as part of that service, 
the use of European works in campaigns of that service or a minimum percentage of 
European works promoted from the services' catalogue, for example by using banners or 
similar tools».      
598 Note that such a financial contribution should not be necessarily realized by 
independent producers: differing from art. 17, art. 13 does not refer specifically to 
independent works. 
 243 
the providers that target their audience599 being established abroad to 
participate in the funding—thus derogating from the country of origin 
principle. By this way, non-linear providers should no longer be able to 
provide services in several countries while respecting only the 
requirements imposed in the one in which they are established600.  
While allowing a derogation from the country of origin principle, the 
Directive contains different provisions to avoid excessive burdens and 
prevent the single market from being unduly compromised: 
- first, the Member State that imposes a financial contribution on 
a provider established abroad shall base said contribution 
exclusively on the revenues earned within its territory; 
- Second, if the Member State where the provider is established 
imposes a financial contribution, it shall take into account on top 
of that any financial contributions imposed by targeted Member 
States. In other words, the country of origin's power to impose 
obligations to providers under its jurisdiction is limited by the 
new prerogatives of the countries of destination. The aim is 
avoiding the submission of the provider to a double financial 
imposition—the one from the country of origin and the ones of 
the countries of establishment. This burden could indeed restrict 
the freedom to provide services across the EU. However, the 
Directive does not specify which State is responsible for 
applying sanctions if a provider fails to respect the investment 
obligations imposed by the State whose audience it targets while 
being established abroad. It is unclear whether the country of 
 
599 The concept of ‘target audience’ is not defined by the directive, but Recital 38 offers 
guidance by outlining some indicators. 
600 Actually, said provision does not apply only to non-linear providers but also to linear 
ones. However, it is primarily relevant in the case of the non-linear ones, since the linear 
ones are often limited in scope to one or few Member States. For this reason, the initial 
proposal of the Commission was to limit the derogation from the country of origin 
principle to non-linear providers; however, the European co-legislator, in the course of a 
dialogue, decided to extend the rule to include all operators (VIOLA, R., La riforma del quadro 
normativo dell’audiovisivo tra mercato unico digitale e valori fondamentali, in La riforma del 
mercato audiovisivo europeo, pp. 11-23, p. 22-23). 
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origin's jurisdiction or that of the country of destination should 
be applied; 
- finally, the Directive prevents foreign providers from being 
required to contribute to national funds that would exclusively 
benefit national operators601.  
 
5. The current regulatory framework in Italy and France 
Italy and France provide more detailed and incisive rules on quotas than 
those laid down by the European Directive. Moreover: they are the two 
Member States that have adopted the stringiest provisions602.   
In Italy, the main principles are established by the Tusmar; in light of the 
2017 reform and its 2019 'reshaping', the relevant provisions are arts. 
from 44 to 44-septies. The detailed framework should be provided by a 
regulation from AGCOM and one or more decrees jointly adopted by 
the Ministry of Culture and that for Economic Development. Indeed, the 
Tusmar requires these secondary sources to establish the exact 
percentage of quotas, the eventual establishment of additional sub-
quotas, and the details of several aspects. Precisely because of the lack of 
these secondary sources, the new quotas system is not operational yet in 
Italy. Indeed: the AGCOM regulation implementing the Tusmar’s 
reform is still subject to public consultation603; the Ministry of Culture 
and that for Economic Development so far adopted only a Decree 
concerning the definition of Italian cinematographic works604, and they 
 
601 Indeed, according to Recital 36, «media service providers that are required to contribute 
to film funding schemes in a targeted Member State should be able to benefit in a non-
discriminatory way, even in the absence of an establishment in that Member State, from 
the aid available under respective film funding schemes to media service providers». 
602 See EUROPEAN AUDIOVISUAL OBSERVATORY, Mapping of national rules for the promotion of 
European works in Europe, 2019.  
603 See Annex B («Regulation on programming and investment quotas for European works 
and works by independent producers») and C («Definition of the technical and editorial 
criteria for highlighting European works on on-demand audio-visual media services») to 
the already mentioned AGCOM’s deliberation no. 421/19/CONS of October 17th, 2019. 
604 See the Inter-Ministerial Decree no. 47/2021 of January 29th. 
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still have to establish the precise regulation concerning quotas in favour 
of this types of works.   
In France, the 1986 Act establishes the fundamental principles, while the 
Decrees of the Council of State lay down the detailed provisions. There 
is a Decree about the content quotas for linear providers (the 
‘Broadcasting Decree’)605; a Decree about the investment quotas for 
terrestrial Hertzian channels606; a Decree about the investment quotas for 
non-Hertzian channels, such as cable and satellite ones607; finally, a 
Decree about both the content and investment quotas for non-linear 
providers (the already mentioned ‘SMAD Decree’)608. In any case, in 
accordance with the minimum percentages laid down by the Law and 
the Decrees, the obligations of each actor are determined based on its 
specificities by the Convention each of them signs with the CSA.  
Like the other countries, even Italy and France added, on top of 
protecting the European audio-visual market, the goal of promoting 
national audio-visual industries. They require providers to show and 
finance national works, in addition to the European ones. This is possible 
given that the definition of 'European works' allows considering 
intrinsically European the works of all the different Member States'609.  
It is interesting to know how the two countries defined the concept of 
'national cinematographic works' in the framework of quotas: it testifies 
 
605 Decree no. 66/90 of January 17th. 
606 Decree no. 747/2010. 
607 Decree no. 416/2010. 
608 Decree no. 793/2021. 
609 See art. 1, par. 1, let. n) of the Directive, which established that three types of works 
might be understood as constituting European works: i) works originating in the Member 
States; ii) works originating in European third States that are party to the European 
Convention on Transfrontier Television; and iii) works that are co-produced within the 
framework of agreements relating to the audio-visual sector that have been agreed 
between the EU and third countries. Furthermore, the works must be made by authors and 
workers who reside in one or more relevant States (i.e., Member States of the EU and States 
that have signed the Convention), provided that the work is made by, or under the 
supervision of, a producer that is established in a Member State; or, in the case of co-
productions, that co-producers from such States make the most significant contribution to 
the total co-production costs. 
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how sometimes legislators end up putting new constraints, while trying 
to increase opportunities. France defines cinematographic works of 
French original expression as those whose original language is French or 
a regional language used in France610. Historically, at the basis of this 
definition laid the desire to prevent tensions with the EEC. France 
claimed that the quotas in favour of French works were not aimed at 
promoting national audio-visual production but the French language: 
they could have been satisfied not only by French works but also by 
Belgian and Canadian ones.   
Taking inspiration from France, Italy used a similar definition in the past. 
Indeed, the almost sole criterion for defining an Italian cinematographic 
work was the use of the Italian language or Italian dialects611. This 
definition generated distortive effects, namely the reduction of the Italian 
film industry's internationalization and the economic value of Italian 
film: to respect the sub-quota for national cinema, broadcasters had  to 
finance films shot in Italian, which are difficult to export and thus have a 
limited economic value612. An investment in highly successful films such 
as "Tale of Tales" by Matteo Garrone or as "Youth" by Paolo Sorrentino, 
shot in English, could not have been taken into account to verify the 
achievement of quotas in national works613. In front of this situation, the 
2017 Italian reform considered it appropriate to adopt a new definition 
of cinematographic work of original Italian expression. It required 
 
610 See art. 5 of Decree no. 66/1990. 
611 Art. 2 of the Inter-Ministerial Decree of February 22nd, 2013. 
612 See MANZOLI, G. "Molto rumore per nulla?".  
613 Interestingly, similar disincentives occurred in France concerning the music sector. 
Radio channels as well have to respect quotas for French products, defined as the ones that 
use the French language. As noted by MESSERLIN, P. and PARC, J., "In search of an effective 
trade policy for the film industry: Lessons from Korea", Journal of World Trade 52.5 (2018), 
the French legislator has pushed French performers to sing in French since only the ones 
that use French can benefit from the prime-time radio established by the quotas regulation. 
This way, quotas have ended up «limit their horizon to an increasingly smaller and 
introverted domestic market […]». Indeed, performers singing in French attract a 
maximum of 10 M views on YouTube per year for the top stars, while those singing in 
English attract 100-230 M views per year. 
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indeed a Decree jointly adopted by the Ministry of Economic 
Development and that of Culture to lay down a new definition of 
cinematographic work of original Italian expression, considering 
«culture, history, identity, creativity, language or places» as qualifying 
elements»614.  
5.1. Content quotas  
5.1.1. Linear providers 
In Italy, art. 44-bis of the Tusmar regulates content quotas for linear 
providers. In France, art. 7 and ff. of the ‘Broadcasting Decree’ regulate 
them. As it is clear from tab. 7, the two States have adopted more 
detailed rules than the European legislator, which simply establishes 
that the Member States should require broadcasters under their 
jurisdiction to reserve the majority proportion of their transmission time 
to European works.  
The approach of Italy and France is similar. They both require 
broadcasters to meet a quota in European works and a sub-quota in the 
national ones (stricter in the case of public broadcasters), which are both 
higher in France615. Only in Italy there will be two further sub-quotas that 
apply erga omnes—established indeed by the scheme of AGCOM’s 
Resolution to implement Tusmar’s provisions616.  
The main difference is that only France distinguishes between the quotas 
for cinematographic works and those for the audio-visual ones. They 
 
614 See art. 44sexies, par. 1, lett. a), of the Decree no. 204/2017. The new definition is 
provided by art. 2 of the already mentioned Inter-Ministerial Decree no. 47/2021. 
615 For Italy, see art. 44bis (2) of the Tusmar; for France, arts. 7 (I, 2°) and 13 of Decree no. 
66/1990 and art. 9(3) of Decree no. 796/2009 of June 23rd «fixant le cahier des charges de la 
société nationale de programme France Télévisions», which establishes the specific obligations 
of France Television.  
616 See Art. 4(4) of the Annex B to the scheme of AGCOM Resolution, implementing art. 
34(10) of Tusmar that establishes that «The percentage reserved to the transmission of 
European works established by art. 44 shall also include  […] works specifically aimed at 
minors, as well as productions and programs suitable for minors or suitable for viewing 
by minors and adults. The Authority shall determine the minimum transmission time for 
such works and programs». 
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have the same percentages, but that for cinematographic works is 
calculated on the time that providers devote to such works; in contrast, 
the quotas for the audio-visual works is calculated on the time that 
providers devote to works other than cinema. Such an approach 
prevents providers that do not supply many cinematographic works 
from being required to transmit high percentages of national and 
European cinema —and vice versa. At the same time, it ensures the 
broadcasting of a certain percentage of both cinematographic and audio-
visual European and national works. 
In Italy, the French 'corrective' does not apply: the legislator provides 
only quotas for audio-visual works. Before the 2017 reform, it required 
providers to meet a sub-quota for European and national 
cinematographic works. Since said sub-quotas were calculated on each 
provider's general broadcasting time (and not on that devoted to the 
cinema), they could end applying also to operators that did not transmit 
cinema. To avoid these occurrences—and the following requests for 
derogations and criticisms about the uncertainty on the rules’ 
implementation—the 2017 reform repealed the sub-quotas for European 
and national cinema. Today, the Italian sub-quotas (that for national 
works and for works for minors) concern the overall audio-visual 
production: broadcasters can satisfy them with any audio-visual work, 
whether cinematographic or not. 
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Tab. 8 Content quotas for linear AVMS providers in France and Italy 
 
Content quotas shall be met during ‘high audience ratings’ (‘heures de 
grand écoute’) only in France617. The legislator established said rule since 
the very beginning, thus preventing the airing of imported programs 
during the hours of the highest audience and the programming of the 
French ones late at night.   
Articles 7 and 14 of Decree no. 66/1990 establishes what must be 
understood for ‘high audience ratings’ : in the case of cinematographic 
works, between 6 pm and 2 am for services focused on cinema, and 
between 8.30 pm and 10.30 pm for others; in the case of audio-visual 
works, between 8.30 pm and 10.30 pm for services focused on cinema, and 
between 6 pm and 11 pm for others. Over time, France introduced two 
possible derogations from this provision:  
1. First, Law no. 61/1992 of January 18th has allowed the CSA to 
substitute the ‘high audience ratings’ with ‘significant audience 
ratings’ (‘heures d' écoute significatives’), in order to balance the 
prime-time obligation with each provider's characteristics. 
Indeed, the ‘significant audience ratings’ are different for each 
service and are established each year by the CSA, depending on 
each service's audience and programming characteristics, and on 
the relevance and nature of its contribution to the production.  
2. Second, Decree no. 1222/2001 of December 28th has allowed the 
CSA to modify even the ‘significant audience ratings’ during the 
 
617 Art. 27 of the 1986 Act. 
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negotiations of the conventions of each provider. So, if the first 
derogation is established each year unilaterally by the CSA, this 
one is negotiated between the CSA and each provider and lasts 
for all the duration of the convention they sign. 
To simplify, the abandoned Project of Law aimed at eliminating the first 
regime of derogation and conserving only the second one. The rule would 
have remained that providers shall meet quotas between 8.30 pm and 
10.30 pm if they are cinema services, between 6 pm and 11 pm if they are 
not. The CSA could have continued to define a prime time other than the 
one established as a general rule, but only while negotiating the rules 
applicable to each provider. It is still to be known if the change will be 
confirmed, even though the project has been abandoned.  
The Italian case is different. The obligation to meet programming quotas 
during the time slots with high audiences was established for the first 
time by Law no. 122/1998, then repealed by Legislative Decree no. 
177/2005. The 2017 reform reintroduced the prime-time obligation to 
prevent broadcasters from programming national works late at night. 
However, the following Law no. 81/2019, sharing broadcasters' 
complaints, amended the provision introduced in 2017 and established 
that only the Rai has to meet quotas during the time of the highest 
audience618. This way, it left private operators free to broadcast European 
and national works whenever they want. 
 
5.1.2. Non-linear providers 
In Italy, art 44-quater of the Tusmar regulates content quotas for non-
linear providers; in France, art. 27 and following of the new ‘SMAD 
Decree’ regulates them. Both countries require only non-linear providers 
under their jurisdiction to meet content quotas: the Directive allows for 
a derogation from the country of origin principle only concerning the 
investment obligations, not even the content ones.   
As tab. 8 shows, the approach of the two countries is similar. They both 
provide a quota for European works and a sub-quota for the national 
ones, without more sub-quotas. However, French quotas are higher than 
 
618 See art. 44-bis (3) of the Tusmar. 
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the Italian ones: while France requires non-linear providers to reserve 
60% of their catalogue to European works, Italy established a percentage 
equal to the minimal one required by the Directive, namely 30%619.  
Even in this case, the main difference is that only France distinguishes 
between the quotas for cinema and those for the audio-visual sector. 
They have the same percentages, but that for cinematographic works is 
calculated on part of catalogue that providers devote to such works; in 
contrast, the quotas for the audio-visual works is calculated on the part 
of catalogue that providers devote to works other than cinema. 
 
Tab. 9 Content quotas for non-linear AVMS providers in France and Italy 
 
 
As demanded by the Directive, the two State require linear providers to 
ensure prominence to the European works by which they meet quotas: 
they have to grant such works greater visibility so that viewers can easily 
access and select them620.  
 
619 For France, see art. 28 of the Decree no. 793/2021; for Italy, art. 44-quater (1, a) and 5) of 
the Tusmar.  
620 For France, see art. 29 of the Decree no. 793/2021; for Italy, art. 44-quater (3) of Tusmar, 
which put AGCOM in charge of establishing the criteria through which non-linear 
providers must guarantee the prominence of European works. According to the scheme of 
the Authority Regulation (Annex C of AGCOM’s Resolution), non-linear providers must 
ensure prominence by arranging either a dedicated section to European works on their 
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5.1.3. Easing the further traditional restrictions of the 
programming freedom of French broadcasters 
In France, the linear providers’ programming freedom has long been 
limited, besides quotas, by several other rules, adopted in the 1980s and 
1990s to ensure that televisions do not compromise the attendance to 
cinemas621. These rules were mainly two: the obligation to respect a 
timetable for the broadcasting of cinematographic works, aimed at 
protecting theatres attendance (i); the ban on cinema advertising on TV, 
aimed at preserving French cinema from Hollywood large marketing 
budgets (ii). However, the French legislator has recently envisaged 
either an amendment or a repeal of these rules: they were no longer able 
to protect cinema and their main effect was to compromise televisions' 
ability to compete with digital providers. Other rules were modified to 
increase broadcasters' capacity to acquire advertisements' resources, 
helping them return to a growth situation (iii).  
i. The timetable for the broadcasting of cinematographic works. In 
France, televisions cannot broadcast as many cinematographic works as 
they wish, nor can they broadcast them every day of the week. The 1986 
Act has limited total broadcasting time for cinematographic works and 
their distribution on days and at times in which people tend to go to 
the movies the mots622. However, the legislator has recently made the 
limitations less stringent623.  
First, it increased the maximum number of films that televisions can 
programme. Under the new rules, non-cinematographic channels 
 
home pages, or a specific category wherein to search for European works. Moreover, they 
must reserve a share for European works in advertising and promotional campaigns. In 
France, the prominence obligation is regulated by the Convention each provider signs with 
the CSA. Still, according to the law, it can be respected by instruments of content 
recommendation, or by including in the homepage a substantial portion of trailers of 
European and French works or a dedicated section to them. 
621 See par. 2.4. of Chapter I. 
622 See arts. 27(5), 33(8) and 70 of the 1986 Act. 
623 See Decree no. 984/2020 of August 5th, that modified the Decree no. 66/1990, adopted 
to implement the provisions of the 1986 Act. 
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cannot broadcast more than 244 cinematographic works (instead of 192) 
each year and cannot broadcast more than 196 works (instead of 144) 
between 8.30 and 10.30. The channels focused on cinema cannot 
broadcast in a year more than 800 cinematographic works (instead of 
500), which cannot be broadcasted more than seven times in three weeks. 
Second, the legislator abolished the timetable for cinema’s broadcasting, 
aimed at avoiding the programming of cinematographic works on 
television during the slots on which theatres made the most revenues624. 
These bans have become obsolete in the era of the OTTs, which allow 
consumers to view cinematographic works at any time. Their only effect 
was the production of a competitive unbalance between linear providers 
and on-demand ones. The only prohibition confirmed is that to 
programme cinematographic works on Saturday after 8.30 pm. 
However, the prohibition does not apply if the broadcaster has pre-
acquired the film, or if the film concerned is an art-house work.  Also, 
the exceptions are larger for channels focused on cinema: they can 
broadcast cinematographic works on Saturday after 8.30 pm also if the 
concerned work generated less than 2 M admissions in French theaters 
and if its first theatrical release occurred more than 30 years ago. This 
way, the legislator recognizes channels focused on cinema a more 
advantageous framework, considering their higher contribution to film 
financing625. 
 
624 Before 2020, the timetable for cinema’s broadcasting was very precise. It varied 
according to the different nature of the services. For non-cinematographic channels, bans 
applied to Wednesday and Friday evening, at any hour on Saturdays and during the day 
on Sundays. For channels focused on cinema, the rules varied depending on their nature. 
Generic channels could not broadcast cinematographic works: on Wednesday and Friday 
evenings (except for works of art and essays broadcasted after 10.30 pm); any time on 
Saturdays; before 8.30 pm on Sundays. Cinematographic heritage channels could not 
broadcast cinematographic works: on Saturdays between 6 pm and 11 pm; they can do it 
on Sundays between 1 and 6 pm only if the concerned works were in black and white. First 
exclusivity channels could not broadcast cinematographic works on Saturdays from 6 to 
11 pm and Sundays from 1 to 6 pm. First-run cinema channels could not broadcast any 
cinematographic work: on Saturdays, from 6 pm to 11 pm (except those distributed in 
theatres for the first time more than ten years ago and have made less than €1.5 M entries 
during the first year of their exhibition); on Sundays from 13 to 18 hours.   
625 See the following paragraph, par. 5.2. 
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The reduction of the prohibited days and hours should benefit the 
national film industry: by promoting an increase of televisions’ 
revenues, an increase of their investments in favour of future creation 
should arise.  Moreover: as the abandoned Project of law explained, the 
ban on transmitting cinema in certain days and times produced the effect 
of concentrating its broadcasting on the same moments. The 
concentration led to a decline of the audience of cinematographic works 
on televisions and, therefore, to a decrease of their distribution 
profitability. 
ii. The ban on cinema advertising on TV. In 2020, the French 
Government took action also concerning the ban on advertising 
cinematographic works on television626. The ban is established by art. 8 
of the Decree no. 280/1992 of March 27th, according to which «cinema 
advertising is prohibited».  It should be understood as prohibiting the 
advertising of both the film and the products derived from it (such as 
gadgets, etc.). The first prohibition lasts as long as the work is in cinema's 
theatres; once the work begins to circulate on other channels, televisions 
can advertise it. The second prohibition is lighter: it lasts only as long as 
the work is distributed in the theatres in a 'significant' way627. The idea 
is that the product as such may be advertised, but its link with the film 
released in cinemas requires waiting a certain time so as not to operate a 
disguised advertisement for the film; this risk disappears once the film 
is no longer screened significantly in theatres. It remains for the 
companies concerned to assess the scope of the term 'significant'.  
The ratio behind these rules is to ensure the diversity of French and 
European cinema. The promotional marketing budgets of the majority 
of French films are incomparable to those that the American productions 
could mobilize. The latter can invest in the advertisement on the most 
popular television channels, while many national productions cannot 
afford such promotional expenses. The influence of television is 
considered such that the opening up of advertising for films on 
televisions in the course of their exploitation could have the consequence 
 
626 See Decree No. 983/2020 of August 5th. 
627 See the Decision of the Plenary Assembly of the CSA of May 10th, 2006. 
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of directing more light on large productions at the expense of the 
medium and small ones. 
However, in 2020, given the need to allow televisions to return to a 
growth situation and consequently favour an increase of their 
investments in support of the French film industry, the Government 
suspended the ban's applicability for 18 months. In the meantime, the 
Government shall verify the suspension's effects to decide whether to 
definitely repealed the prohibition. Note that the suspension of the ban 
also aims to promote the return of spectators in cinemas after the 
lockdown due to the Covid-19 pandemic. 
iii. Increasing broadcasters capacity to acquire resources. With the 
same aim to increase the income of traditional televisions and create a 
more fair competition between them and digital platforms, the 2020 
legislator also allowed televisions to realize a ‘publicité segmentée’628. This 
way, it recognized them the possibility to realize an advertisement 
strategy targeted at the geographical area or the viewers' profile—an 
approach already followed by digital providers. 
Probably, with the same aim to increase the capacity of televisions to 
gain advertising resources, France will also modify the rules on 
advertising breaks of cinematographic works broadcasted on television. 
Currently, public television channels and those focused on cinema 
cannot make advertising breaks when they broadcast cinematographic 
works; the other channels can make a maximum of two advertising 
breaks if the works have a duration of at least 1 hour629. This provision 
seeks to protect the integrity of films, besides the interests of viewers. 
The abandoned Project of law established that a third commercial break 
could have been authorized during films longer than 2 hours on private 
channels. As explained in the illustrative relation of the Project, «today, 
it is important to allow broadcasters to find increased sources of 
financing […]. The disadvantage of the third cut for viewers is less than 
that of the disappearance of cinematographic works from televisions’ 
 
628 See Decree no. 983/2020. 
629 See art. 73 of the 1986 Act. 
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screens»630. Moreover, the authorization for a third commercial break 
should remove an obstacle to the broadcasting of films longer than 2 
hours, thus benefiting the level of diversity of the cinematographic 
supply on television.  
 
5.2. Investment quotas 
In Italy, investment quotas are all in favour of independent production. 
In France, only a proportion (about ¾) is specifically directed towards 
independent works631. Promoting independent production is an 
additional goal to the more general one of ensuring that those who 
distribute cinematographic works also contribute to creating the future 
ones in France. 
In both the countries, the tax base for investment quotas is the providers' 
previous year's revenues (Italy) and turnover (France) and not the 
programming budget—as in the European Directive632.  The investment 
may consist of: pre-acquisition, a modality that involves broadcasters 
since the beginning and makes it shares with producers both the risks 
 
630 See Project of Law, p. 96. 
631 France introduced the rule that 3/4 of the investment should be allocated to 
independent productions in 1999 to ensure that broadcasters made a real contribution to 
film production. The original regulations of 1986 mandated televisions to set up dedicated 
film divisions to administer their investments in the film industry. As these entities were 
production companies on their own, they too could benefit from the CNC’s support via 
automatic aid. By introducing a proportion to be devoted to independent producers, the 
State prevented broadcasters from supporting projects that would have secured a subsidy 
for themselves at a later date, thus reducing their overall investment in film production 
below the percentage dictated by the law. For the whole discourse, see WALKLEY, S. E., To 
what extent, pp. 106 and 111.  
632 On the matter, the Italian 2017 reform shared the observations of producers. Providers 
had asked to replace the annual net revenues criterion with that of the programming 
budget, considering it more consistent with EU's provisions and likely to ensure greater 
flexibility. However, producers noted that the programming budget criterion could have 
involved circumvention of the obligations; they worried indeed that the transition from a 
budget item drawn up according to standard civil criteria (revenue) to a more 
discretionary one anchored to providers' business choice (programming budget) risked 
introducing aleatory elements and compromising the supervisory activity. See AGCOM, 
Indagine conoscitiva. 
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and potential benefits of the final work; acquisition; co-production; and 
production. In addition to these forms, in France, investments may also 
include adapting works for blind or deaf audiences, funding dubbing 
and subtitling, supporting screenwriting, films’ promotion and authors' 
training, as well as the restoration and valorisation of the French 
cinematographic and audio-visual heritage. 
Through the 2017 reform, Italy repealed the provision that the 
investment may also consist of  'financing' the work: this mean of 
investment was considered too generic and likely to generate not 
virtuous dynamics, i.e. to compromise the actual degree of 
independence of producers in front of providers633. 
 
5.2.1 Linear providers 
In Italy, art. 44-ter of the Tusmar regulates investment quotas for linear 
providers. In France, arts. 1 and ff. of the Decree no. 747/2010 regulates 
those for terrestrial Hertzian channels, whereas arts. 4 and ff. of the 
Decree no. 416/2010 regulates those for other channels.  
As Tab. 9-12 show, both Italy and France established detailed rules, 
while the Directive merely gives the Member States the possibility to 
decide whether to adopt or not measures aimed at promoting 
investment from providers. However, the French system is much more 
complex than the Italian one. 
In Italy (tab. 9), public broadcaster shall invest 17% of its total annual 
revenues in the production of independent European works634; private 
broadcasters at least 12,5% of their annual net revenues635.   There are 
three sub-quotas of this central quota:  the one  for the development of 
national works produced in the last five years—that will be introduced 
 
633 See CASINI, L., ""Il nastro dei sogni"? Il diritto (pubblico) del cinema e dell'audiovisivo" , 
Aedon 3 (2017), and also AGCOM, Indagine conoscitiva, p. 169. 
634 See art. 44-ter (3) of the Tusmar. Before the changes made in 2019, the percentage was 
20%, while before the 2017 reform was 15%.  
635 See art. 44-ter (1) of the Tusmar. Before the 2017 reform, this percentage was 10%. 
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by AGCOM to implement Tusmar’s provisions636; the one, which applies 
only to Rai, for the development of works directed at minors637; the one 
for the development of the Italian cinematographic works638.  
Unlike France, Italy does not distinguish between investment quotas in 
audio-visual and cinematographic works. However, since the 2017 
reform, there should not be cases in which operators that do not program 
cinema or do so to a limited extent could be required to invest in national 
and European cinema. Indeed, the 2017 reform established that the 
investment sub-quota for cinema applies «taking the show schedule into 
account»639. Based on this, the scheme of AGCOM Regulation provides 
that said sub-quota applies only to operators that broadcast more than 
52 different cinematographic works—or over 104 reruns640.  
 
636 See art. 44-ter (1-bis  and 3-bis) of the Tusmar and art. 5 (1-bis and 6-bis) of Annex B to 
the scheme of AGCOM Resolution. 
637 See art. 44-ter (5) of the Tusmar. 
638 See art. 44-ter (2 and 4) of the Tusmar. 
639 Art. 44-ter (2 and 4) of the Tusmar.  
640 Art. 5 (5) of Annex B to the scheme of AGCOM Resolution. 
Tab. 10 Investment quotas for linear AVMS providers in Italy. 
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The French framework (tab. 10-12) is much more complex for several 
reasons. First, France distinguishes between quotas for cinematographic 
works and quotas for audio-visual works even in this case, as said. The 
first apply only to operators that broadcast more than 52 different 
cinematographic works per year or more than 104 broadcasts or 
reruns641.  The second apply instead only to operators who reserve at 
least 20% of their programming time for audio-visual works (or, in the 
case of non-Hertzian channels, even less if their net turnover for the 
previous year is more than €350 M) 642. By doing so, the legislator avoids 
operators from being forced to distract their investment from their core 
product to direct it towards works they will not later be interested in 
distributing; at the same time, it ensures funding for both 
cinematographic and audio-visual national and European works. 
Second, the French system is much more complex than the Italian one 
because French quotas differ depending on if the channel concerned is 
or not focused on cinema. Channels focused on cinema have to meet 
lighter quotas than other channels in the audio-visual production; on the 
opposite, they are subjected to higher investments in cinematographic 
works. 
Concerning the investment quotas in cinema643 (tab. 10), French generic 
channels shall invest at least 3.2% (3.5% for the public broadcaster644) of 
their previous year’s turnover in the production of European 
cinematographic works, and at least 2.5% of it in French works645. Three-
 
641 Art. 4 of Decree no. 416/2010 and art. 1 of Decree no. 747/2010. 
642 Art. 11(I) of Decree no. 416/2010 and art. 7 of Decree no. 747/2010. 
643 Following a proposal of the abandoned Project of law, the Ordinance No. 1642/2020 
allows channel groups to merge the cinema investment quotas of each of the services they 
publish (art. 1(4) of the Project and arts. 11 and 15 of the Ordinance). In other words, the 
cinema investment obligations should be defined globally for the different channels of the 
same publisher––provision already in force concerning the investment quotas for audio-
visual works. This measure should grant facilitation to providers, increasing their room 
for manoeuvre and their capacity to adapt to market developments, while maintaining 
their investment level. Indeed, the CSA must ensure that this option does not decrease 
these services' investment.  
644 Art. 9(2) of Decree No.  796/2009. 
645 Art. 6 of Decree No. 416/2010 and art. 3 of Decree No. 747/2010. 
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quarters of these quotas shall be reserved for independent works646.  
Channels focused on cinema have to respect higher obligations647. 
Depending on the level of their revenues and number of films they 
broadcast, they shall invest from 12.5% to 27% of their yearly turnover 
in the production of European cinematographic works, including a 
minimum of 9.5% to 22% in French works. 
Tab. 13 Investment quotas in cinematographic works for linear AVMS providers in France. 
 
 
It is worth noticing that even the generic channel Canal+, which has  
traditionally been the leading producer of French films, is subject to 
higher obligation than the other channels (tab. 11). Created in 1984, as 
the first private television company, Canal+ accepted indeed to respect 
more stringent rules than those applied to other channels in exchange 
for several benefits. Among them: a reduced rate of value-added tax; the 
right to show films only one year (instead of three) after their theatrical 
release; the authorization to show many more films than the other 
stations (up to 320 instead of 192). To this day, it continues to be subject 
to higher obligations in exchange for some benefits, including the 
possibility to broadcast films before the other channels. According to the 
 
646 Art. 8 of Decree No. 416/2010 and art. 6 of Decree No. 747/2010. 
647 See art. 35 of Decree no. 747/2010 and art. 21 of Decree no. 416/2010. 
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current Convention concluded between the CSA and Canal+648, Canal+ 
must devote 12.5% of its yearly turnover to the purchase of the 
broadcasting rights of European films; 9.5% to the purchase of those of 
French films Three-quarters of these sums must support independent 
works. For at least 85% of its amount, the obligation to purchase the right 
to broadcast French cinematographic works must be devoted to the pre-
purchase of works whose filming has not yet begun.  To promote 
diversity, the Convention establishes  that at least 17% of this percentage 
should be devoted to the purchase of small-budget works. 
Once described the French investments quotas in cinema, it is possible 
to analyse those in favour of the audio-visual production. They vary 
depending on whether the channel is Hertzian or not. Simplifying and 
reporting only the general scheme649: Hertzian channels shall invest at 
 
648 It was adopted on May 29th, 2000, and then amended several times, lastly in November 
2019.  
649 Indeed, the Decrees also establish an ‘alternative scheme’ for free-to-air Hertzian 
channels that accept to invest only in the production of ‘oeuvres patrimoniales’ (see footnote 
652) and a ‘particular scheme’ for musical channels, both Hertzian and non-Hertzian. 
Tab. 14 Investment quotas in cinematographic works for Canal+. 
 
Tab. 15 Investment quotas for non-linear AVMS providers in Italy.Tab. 16 Investment 
quotas in cinematographic works for Canal+. 
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least 15% of their yearly turnover in the production of European audio-
visual works or works of French original expression650; non-Hertzian 
channels at least 14%651. They both have to satisfied a part of this 
obligations  by funding European or French ‘oeuvres patrimoniales’652. As 
anticipated, thematic broadcasters focused on cinema have to respect 
less incisive obligations: they shall invest at least 3.6% of their yearly 
turnover in the production of European audio-visual ‘patrimoniales’ 
works, with a sub-quota of 85% in favour of those of French original 
expression653. All channels must reserve a percentage of these quotas for 
independent production654. The obligations of the public broadcaster are 
higher: it has to devoted at least 20% of its previous year’s net turnover 
to the production of European or French original expression audio-
visual works655.  
 
Tab. 17 Investment quotas in audio-visual works for linear AVMS providers in France. 
 
 
650 See art. 9 of Decree no. 747/2010. 
651 See art. 11 of Decree no. 416/2010 
652 See art. 9 of Decree no. 747/2010 and 11 of Decree no. 416/2010. They include works of 
fictions, documentaries, animation, live performances and video clips (see art. 27, 3, of the 
1986 Act Law). 
653 See art. 40 of Decree no. 747/2010 and art. 27 of Decree no. 416/2010. 
654 See arts. 15 of Decree no. 747/2010 and of Decree no. 416/2020. 
655 See art. 9 (IV) of Decree no. 796/2009. 
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To conclude on investment obligations for linear providers, note that the 
decrease of advertisement resources due to the pandemic generated a 
decrease in televisions' revenues in both the countries. To support 
broadcasters, the CSA adopted a flexible approach in applying the 
regulatory framework, taking particular account of the nature of the 
service, the types of obligations, and the difficulties encountered656. In 
Italy, there is a discussion on how to avoid a drop in the broadcasters' 
investments in the new creation. APA asked the Government not to 
make levies on Rai's license fee. This way, the Rai—traditionally the 
leading producer of Italian films— should cover the gap due to lower 
advertising revenues with the total extra revenue from the license fee, to 
be used to fulfil its commitments in financing new films and audio-
visual works657. 
 
5.2.2 Non-linear providers 
In Italy, art. 44-quater of Tusmar regulates the investment quotas of non-
linear providers. In France, art. 10 and ff. of the Decree no. 793/2021 
regulates them. In both countries, they apply also to providers that target 
consumers in Italy/France without being established there658. Still, in 
France, only providers with a turnover above € 5 M per year and having 
an audience higher than 0,5% of the total French have to meet investment 
quotas.  
As Tab. 13 and 14 show, Italy and France adopted incisive and detailed 
rules, while the European Directive merely establishes that the Member 
States may require non-linear providers to contribute financially to the 
production of European works. In any case, French quotas are higher 
than the Italian ones. 
 
656 See Courrier du Président du CNC, Roch-Olivier Maistre, aux éditeurs de services et aux 
syndicats de radios et télévisions, March 24th, 2020. 
657 For more information on the matter, see PASQUALE, A., L’audiovisivo ai temi della 
pandemia, pp. 50 and 51. 
658 Art. 44-quater (2) of Tusmar. 
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In Italy (tab. 13),  non-linear providers shall invest at least 12,5%  of their 
previous year’s net revenues in Italy659 to produce European 
independent audio-visual works660. AGCOM might increase the 
percentage to 20% if the  provider adopts investment methods 
inconsistent with the balanced growth of the national industry661. 
According to the Tusmar, the AGCOM’s regulation should increase in 
any case the percentage to 4.5% in three cases: if the provider does not 
grant the producer a share of secondary rights proportioned to its 
financial participation to the work; if the provider adopts contractual 
models that make the role of the independent producer purely executive; 
if the provider do not establish an operating office in Italy and do not 
employ there a certain percentage of workers ––a provision that 
AGCOM will not implement, given its contrariety to European rules662. 
At least 50% of the central quota shall be reserved for Italian 
independent works produced within the last five years663. At least 1/5 of 
said sub-quota shall be reserved for Italian independent 
cinematographic works (75% to those realized within the last five 
years)664. This sub-quota applies to all providers, regardless of the 
number of cinematographic works they distribute.  
 
659 Note that, to limit the need to make adjustments and the difficulties in coordinating with 
the other Member States, the Italian legislator established that all non-linear providers are 
subject to investment obligations solely in proportion to their turnover in Italy. In other 
words, this precautionary measure applies both to the providers under the Italian 
jurisdictions and those that distribute in Italy being established abroad. Under the 2018 
Directive, such a limitation is necessary only for the second type of providers, while the 
revenues of those established in Italy could be considered in total —applying corrective 
measures where the provider established in Italy also distributed in other Member States 
that impose contribution obligations. 
660 See art. 44-quater, 1, b) of the Tusmar. 
661 Art. 44-quater, 1-bis of the Tusmar. Law Decree no. 59/2020 introduced this principle: it 
lowered the percentage from 20 to 12.5% and established that the 20% one should apply 
only if the on-demand service is not ‘virtuous’. 
662 See art. 44-quater, 1-bis of the Tusmar. For a definition of a merely executive producer, 
see par. 3.2.1. of Chapter II.   
663 See art. 4-quater (5) of the Tusmar. 
664 Ibidem. 
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Unlike Italy, France distinguishes between the quotas for the audio-
visual works and those for the cinematographic ones even in this case 
(tab. 14). The first apply only to providers that distribute more than ten 
audio-visual works; the second only to those distributing more than ten 
cinematographic works annually665. The provider that offers more than 
ten audio-visual works and more than ten cinematographic works has 
to invest in both audio-visual and cinematographic works. In these 
cases, the quantum to be devoted to the two types of investments 
depends on the type of provider concerned. 
In the case of TVODs and AVODs, the quantum to be invested in cinema 
depends on the time the users of the provider spent watching 
cinematographic works (or on the number of cinematographic works 
they downloaded), and vice versa671.  In the case of SVODs, the quantum 
to be to be invested in cinematographic and audio-visual works will be 
 
665 See art. 20 (I, 1° e 2°) of Decree no. 793/2021. 
Tab. 18 Investment quotas for non-linear AVMS providers in Italy. 
 
Tab. 19 Investment quotas for non-linear AVMS providers in Italy. 
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established by the Convention signed with the CSA by each provider. 
Still, the quantum to be devoted to each sector cannot be less than 20 % 
of the provider total investments (30% in the case of cinematographic 
works if the provider concerned distributes at least one cinematographic 
work released for the first time in theatres in the previous twelve 
months)666. 
France distinguishes between the TVODs and AVODs, on the one hand, 
and the SVODs, on the other one, even concerning the entity of the 
obligations. The TVODs and the AVODs shall invest at least 15% of their 
previous year’s net revenues in producing European works; at least 12% 
of said percentage should be devoted to French works667.  In the case of 
SVODs, the rule is that the they shall invest at least 20% of their previous 
year’s net revenues in producing European works; at least 85% of said 
percentage should be devoted to French works. Still, the investment 
obligations are higher in the case of providers that distribute films on 
their platforms before 12 months have elapsed from their first theatrical 
release668: the sooner a provider distributes a cinematographic work, the 
higher its investment obligations ––as said669.  Still, said rule will be 
operational only once the chronologie des médias will be reformed. Indeed, 
according to the current rules, SVODs have to wait at least 17 months 







666 See art. 14, II, of the Decree 793/2021. 
667 See art. 20 of Decree no. 793/2021. 
668 See art. 14 of Decree no. 793/2021. 
669 See par. 4.2. of Chapter II. 
670 Ibidem. 
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Tab. 20 Investment quotas for non-linear AVMS providers in France 
 
 
5.3. The need for proportionality and flexibility in Italy 
In France, providers have to respect incisive obligations—higher than 
the Italian ones—to promote the European and national film industries. 
However, the obligations do not apply to providers with limited 
revenues. Also, the legislator distinguishes between quotas on 
cinematographic and audio-visual works. This way, it ensures that only 
providers that distribute a significant percentage of cinematographic 
(audio-visual) works have to meet content and investment quotas in 
European and national cinematographic (audio-visual) production. 
With the same aim of parameterizing the obligations on each operator's 
particularities, the legislator also establishes that channels focused on 
cinema have to meet less incisive investment quotas in audio-visual 
production. In contrast, their obligations in favour of the 
cinematographic one are higher than those applied to other operators. 
Furthermore: the legislator mainly provides for quotas in favour of the 
European production and the national one; it establishes erga omnes sub-
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quotas in favour of specific types of works only to a limited extent. This 
is because the specific obligations of each provider are established in the 
convention each of them signs with the CSA. 
The Italian case is different. Here, the legislator has not traditionally 
distinguished between the quotas for audio-visual and those for 
cinematographic works, formulating the seconds as sub-quotas of the 
firsts671.  In addition, the legislator has established—and still maintains—
a system of sub-quotas that apply to all operators. Their existence has 
generated issues in the past.  Sub-quotas do not generate difficulties for 
general channels, which may be interested in financing and distributing 
different types of products. However, they may be problematic for the 
thematic ones, which represent the majority in Italy—as noted by 
AGCOM672. Faced with some operators’ difficulties in implementing the 
rules, AGCOM adopted proportionality and flexibility mechanisms not 
provided by the law. The Authority also granted broadcasters numerous 
derogations from compliance with the obligations. On several occasions, 
their recognition was challenged in Regional administrative tribunals 
and the Council of State, in the second instance. As highlighted by the 
case law developed, some of the derogations recognized allowed to 
avoid that the system of sub-quotas could generate an excessive 
compression of the broadcasters’ editorial freedom—a manifestation of 
the freedom of expression guaranteed by art. 21 of the Italian 
Constitution—and economic initiative—guaranteed by art. 41673. In 
particular, some derogations were recognized to avoid that a provider 
whose editorial line is not to broadcast cinema or works targeted to 
minors was nevertheless required to invest in national and European 
 
671 Concerning today, think about the content sub-quotas for works for minors, the 
investment sub-quota for Italian cinema, and the sub-sub quotas for the recent ones. 
672 See AGCOM, Indagine conoscitiva, p. 167. 
673 See Judgment of the TAR Lazio (Third Section) of May 23rd, 2018, Case no. 8149, through 
which administrative judges confirmed the legitimacy of some derogations issued by 
AGCOM with the resolutions no. 64/16/CONS and 102/16/CONS in favour of thematic 
channels. This way, administrative judges rejected the position adopted by some 
producers' associations, which had required thematic channels to respect the obligations 
to invest in national cinema, even if their editorial line did not include cinema 
broadcasting. See also Judgments of the TAR Lazio (Third Section) of May 23rd, 2018, Case 
no. 8169, and of the Council of State (Sixth Section) of May 12th, 2009, Case no. 4509.  
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works of these types and to program them. However, although useful 
for these edge cases, the wide us of derogations and other instruments 
of proportionality and flexibility undermined the certainty of the rules' 
implementation and the effectiveness of the system. This way, the actual 
commitment of providers in supporting independent European and 
national production was limited. 
In compliance with AGCOM observations and the case law developed, 
the 2017 reform has confirmed the admissibility of flexibility and 
proportionality instruments. At the same time, the reform has sought to 
balance the demand for flexibility and proportionality with the need to 
ensure the system's transparency and proper fulfilment of obligations. 
To this end, it has established two innovations. First, it has regulated the 
flexibility and proportionality instruments—in the past adopted by 
AGCOM in practice, in the lack of pre-established rules. Second, it has 
inserted correctives to limit the requests for derogations, or at least to 
encourage the adoption of stricter criteria for their recognition.  First, it 
eliminated some sub-quotas of the previous system. In particular, that 
for the programming of European and cinematographic works; indeed, 
today the content sub-quotas for linear providers (that for Italian 
national works and for works for minors) can be satisfied with any kind 
of audio-visual works—whether cinematographic or not. Second, it 
introduced the wording «taking the schedule into account», which 
allowed AGCOM to establish in the scheme of its regulation that the 
investment quotas in national cinematographic works apply only to 
operators that broadcast significant percentages of cinematographic 
works. This way, the 'French corrective' will partially apply also in Italy. 
These innovations should limit the cases of operators asking derogations 
to not have to program national cinematographic works and invest in 
their production even though their editorial line does not include cinema 
broadcasting. This way, the certainty of the rules’ implementation 
should increase. 
In the light of the regulatory framework currently delineated in Italy, the 
instruments of proportionality and flexibility are three: the derogations 
(i); the possibility of counting the surplus in terms of engagements of 
one year to reach those of the following year (ii); and that of recovering 
subsequently unfulfilled obligations (iii).   
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i. Derogations. AGCOM recognized for the first time the possibility for 
broadcasters to require derogations from quotas obligations in 1999, 
with fairly vague wording674. Through the following regulations, the 
Authority introduced much more detailed formulations, establishing the 
requirements for the requests' submission and the necessary steps of the 
investigation. Finally, even the ordinary law (the Tusmar) recognized 
the admissibility of derogations. Today, art. 44-quinquies(2) of the 
Tusmar and the applicative provisions established by AGCOM 
Resolution675 should regulate them. According to the Tusmar and the 
scheme of AGCOM’s Resolution, a provider may request the Authority 
to be exempted from content and investment quotas if: it has not made 
any profit in the last two years; it has a market share of less than 1%; it 
has the editorial responsibility of a thematic program/catalogue, and the 
need to respect its editorial line does not allow to source from 
independent European and national producers or to invest in European 
and national audio-visual works676.  
ii. Counting previous surplus engagements to meet the obligations 
due. The 2017 reform has regulated for the first time the AGCOM's 
practice to recognize providers the possibility of counting the 
 
674 See art. 5 of the AGCOM’s Resolution 9/99/CONS of March 16th, which merely 
provided that thematic channels could ask the Authority for total or partial derogation 
from content and investment quotas, setting out their reasons. 
675 Art. 7 of Annex B to the scheme of AGCOM Resolution. 
676 In deciding whether to grant the derogation, the Authority has a wide margin of 
discretion. It may take into account the effects on the economic equilibrium of the 
company—looking, for example, at the average cost of the various products available on 
the market; the relative cost/audience ratio per minute of the program; the negotiations 
attempted or initiated, the existence of limits to the acquisition of rights, the presence of 
exclusivity arrangements, the unwillingness to negotiate by third parties; the actual 
availability on the market of Italian cinematographic and audio-visual works, also 
concerning their capacity to meet the entire market demand aimed at satisfying quotas, 
etc. During the procedure, the Authority may resort to observations from third parties 
(such as producers) «who are deemed to own information proving the truthfulness of the 
documents submitted by the applicant or, more generally, the validity of the application» 
(art. 7(6) of Annex B to the scheme of AGCOM Resolution).  AGCOM has to take a final 
decision within 90 days from the date of submission of the request for a derogation. Where 
there is a need for further in-depth examinations, it may extend this term (to a maximum 
of 60 days). 
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engagements of a year exceeding the obligations due to reach the quota 
due the following year677. The practical effects of this provision are 
significant. Consider the hypothesis of a provider that has to meet an 
investment quota in European works of €10 M annually, which invests 
€15 M in producing an Italian series one year. The aim is to prevent the 
provider from being penalized if it invests less than what is due the 
following year (for example, €9 M), even though it previously spent €5 
M more than it should have: it will be able to take advantage of the sum 
in excess spent in the previous year.  Note that such a flexibility 
instrument is also present in France—only for some types of operators. 
Indeed, the law recognized that the agreement concluded between the 
providers and the CSA may consider the investments made in the 
previous year to reach that due in the following one. However, this 
calculation is admissible within a specific limit, varying between 2% and 
15% of the amount due678. 
iii. Recovering subsequently unfulfilled obligations. The 2017 reform 
regulated for the first time also the possibility of recovering 
subsequently unfulfilled obligations, recognized by AGCOM through 
regulatory practice. The 2019 'reshaping' of the 2017 reform then 
extended the degree of flexibility of this instrument.  Today, a provider 
that did not fully discharge its annual obligations can recover them in 
the following year—provided the fluctuations in the deficit does not 
exceed 15% of the quotas due679. Such a possibility should discourage 
recourse to derogations or at least ensure the adoption of stricter criteria 
for their recognition. Even this instrument is also adopted in France: if 
the CSA finds that a broadcaster did not meet the quotas due, it tends to 
allow it to meet its remaining obligations at a later date. 
 
 
677 See art. 44-quinquies (3) of the Tusmar. 
678 Arts. 14(3) and 30(4) of Decree no. 416/2010 and arts. 14(5) and 43(5) of Decree no. 
747/2010. 
679 See art. 44-quinquies (3) of the Tusmar. Before 2019, the degree of flexibility allowed was 
lower. According to the provisions introduced by the 2017 reform, indeed: the deficit could 
concern the investment quotas only; it could not exceed 10% of the amount due; it was 
necessary to recover the deficit during the following six months. 
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5.4. Controls and sanctions 
In Italy, AGCOM monitors the obligations' proper fulfilment, following 
the procedures it laid down in its Regulation680. According to the scheme 
of said Regulation, the Authority should realise its control by analysing 
the providers' declarations, monitoring their programming, and 
carrying out inspections681. The French case is similar: the CSA uses the 
same verification methods. In favour of the system’s transparency, the 
Authority publishes each year on its website a balance sheet for each 
provider, drawn up based on the data furnished by the providers and 
those gathered by the CSA’s services. The data are examined in an 
adversarial procedure, and providers have the right to be heard.  
Both in Italy and France, the time basis for calculating the respect of the 
obligations is one year. On the matter, the 2017 reform did not take up 
AGCOM's proposal, which suggested introducing a three years 
reference period.  The Authority considered that this more flexible 
approach could have been a strategic component to promote a virtuous 
circuit. Adopting a longer time horizon would have allowed simplifying 
the competitive dynamics of matching supply and demand and a correct 
assessment of the providers' economic context. Moreover, according to 
the Authority, it would have allowed for an effective mechanism for 
recovering any lower investments made in a single year and adopting 
more stringent criteria for derogations. However, although the State did 
not share AGCOM's proposal, the new possibilities regarding exceeding 
commitments and unfulfilled obligations respond to the need for 
flexibility. Moreover, the correctives introduced in 2017 should limit the 
requests for derogations and also encourage stringent criteria for their 
recognition. 
Before 2017, the sanctions could vary from € 10,329 to € 258,228 in Italy682. 
The 2017 reform significantly tightened the penalties: they now range 
from €100,000 to €5 M, or up to 1% of the defaulting provider's annual 
 
680 Art. 44-quinquies(3), of the Tusmar. 
681 Arts. 8 ss. of Annex B to the scheme of AGCOM Resolution. 
682 See art. 51 of the version of Tusmar before the 2017 reform. 
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turnover if it exceeds €5 M. This way, the State wants to avoid that the 
rules on the promotion of independent production could have a merely 
symbolic value—as it risked to be in the previous system, given the high 
revenues of some providers and the provision of low penalties in case of 
violation. 
Like the AGCOM, which never applied sanctions, even the CSA tries to 
limit their application. When it finds that a provider did not fulfil the 
obligations, it sends a warning letter, reminding the operator of its 
obligations. In the event of non-compliance, a letter of formal notice 
follows the warning one. When the operator fails to comply even with 
the second letter, the General Director of the CSA informs a rapporteur 
appointed by the Vice President of the Council of State. The rapporteur 
decides whether the fact justifies the initiation of a penalty procedure. If 
so, he/she shall propose the CSA adopting one of the penalties provided 
by the law or the Convention between the CSA and the defaulting 
provider. It is then up to the CSA to decide whether to impose a sanction.  
 
6. A critic review of the two systems and the open 
questions 
The recourse to a policy of quotas makes way for several questions. Such 
an instrument has been—and partly continues to be—criticized at all 
levels of governments, with different arguments. First, within national 
borders, in the past by cinema exhibitors and today by AVMS providers 
(par. 6.1). Second, at the European level by some Member States (par. 
6.2). Finally, on the international level by the US (par. 6.3). 
 
6.1. The criticisms from providers within national borders: 
useful suggestions from France 
Both in Italy and France, independent producers consider quotas 
indispensable to ensure cultural diversity. By ensuring the financing and 
distribution of their works, quotas prevent the market from being 
‘dominated’ by American products and the national ones realised by 
vertically integrated producers. On the opposite, providers tend to 
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criticize quotas. They claim that the State significantly shapes their 
activity, limiting their editorial and economic freedom and 
compromising their ability to offer to the public the content they want683. 
Their opinion reflects the stance of exhibitors at the beginning of State 
support for cinema: they were contrary to quotas too, as they wanted to 
screen US cinema without restrictions. Providers also note that 
indiscriminate support to all independent producers may keep the 
market too many and too weak operators. Additionally, such strong 
support may jeopardize the essential drivers for innovation and 
experimentation, which is inherently nested in the competitive dynamic. 
The free-market approach of the providers should, in their argument, 
benefit all the operators involved: providers themselves, producers, and 
consumers. The market would autonomously ensure a diversified 
supply, capable of satisfying the needs of the widest possible audience—
both mass and niche.  
In accordance with these statements, some evidence testifies that 
broadcasters may autonomously decide to finance multiple types of 
works, including a significant percentage of the national and European 
ones. It is the case of the French-German station Arte in France: although 
not required to meet quotas (not being subjected to the French 
jurisdiction), it spontaneously invests in French cinema more than 
national channels do684. Moreover: according to a study on the strategies 
of television in France, Arte appears to fund high-quality films, rather 
low budget works—even with no obligation to do so. Consequently, 
«one might wonder what the need for regulation with high transaction 
costs is, without it being demonstrated that it transforms channels’ 
 
683 For Italy, see AGCOM, Indagine conoscitiva. For France, among other, DREYER, E., Droit de 
la communication, LexisNexis, 2018, pp. 301 ff. («Les editeurs de services francais contestant 
beaucoup de ces contraintes qui se traduisent par un renchérissement des couts (qui les fragilise à 
l’égard de leurs concurrents étrangers), mais ells sont defendues par les producteurs, auteurs et 
artistes-interpretes qui y voient un moyen de resister à la concurrence americaine[…]»). 
684 See BENHAMOU, F., Les dérèglements de l'exception culturelle, p. 228. 
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strategies. In the absence of regulation, it is not certain that funding and 
programming choices would be significantly different […]»685.  
However, Arte represents a peculiarity, and foreign experiences show 
opposite results686. Therefore, one cannot be sure that a high percentage 
of European and national works would be satisfied even in the lack of 
quotas and that they should consequently be abolished.  What seems to 
be appropriate is to constantly seek a balance between the different 
exigences involved, i.e. between the declared need to increase cultural 
diversity and that to protect the providers’ economic freedom. This also 
stems from the fact that excessively tight restrictions are likely to damage 
the entire system of a country, in terms of loss of opportunities. 
Countries that adopt intrusive constraints run the risk of excessively 
interfering in the market's dynamic and appearing unappealing to 
investors, resulting in unwanted effects. Since European legislation has 
achieved only a minimal harmonization, the Member States have 
proposed different answers to common problems. Some adopted 
regulations that are very favourable to providers; this way, these 
countries managed to obtain the headquarters establishment of the 
 
685 BENHAMOU, F., GERGAUD, O. and MOUREAU N., "Le financement du cinéma par la 
télévision: une analyse économétrique des investissements des chaînes", Economie 
prevision 2 (2009): 101-112 («On a enfin souligne ́ le cas particulier d’Arte qui, bien que non 
soumise a ̀ la reǵlementation de par son statut de chaîne franco-allemande, apparaît comme 
privileǵiant les films de qualite,́ plutôt a ̀ faible budget. De ce point de vue, on peut se demander 
quelle est la nećessite ́d’une reǵlementation dont les coûts transactionnels sont eĺeveś, sans qu’il ne 
soit deḿontre ́ de manier̀e ev́idente qu’elle transforme les strateǵies des chaînes. En l’absence de 
reǵlementation, il n’est pas sûr en effet que les choix de financement et de programmation seraient 
reśolument diffeŕents des reśultats […]»). 
686 This is the case of New Zealand, «which had committed itself throughout the Uruguay 
Round negotiations to not using quantitative restrictions in the audio-visual sector only to 
regret it afterwards. A study conducted a few years later demonstrated that the proportion 
of local content in relation to total New Zealand broadcasting time had decreased to such 
a point that in comparison with ten other countries, New Zealand was at the bottom of the 
scale with 24% percent of content being local.
 
All this seems to indicate that the problem 
of developing and preserving a shelf-space for the expression of national and regional 
cultures threatens to remain a major concern in the future for several countries, including 
developed countries». See BERNIER, I., “Local Content Requirements for Film, Radio and 
Television as a Means of Protecting Cultural Diversity: Theory and Reality” Chare 
UNESCO sur la diversité des expressions culturelles, 2003, p. 16. 
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biggest international players in their territories, leading in turn to the 
creation of new jobs and new activities within national borders.  
France is the European country that adopted the more incisive rules, 
making broadcasters play an exceptionally significant role in film 
financing. This is clearly reflected by the fact that their investments 
accounted for circa 30% of total financing volume for French films 
during the years 2009-2018687—a figure much more significant than in 
most other European countries688. However, the French approach seems 
to ensure a great balance among the exigences of the different actors 
involved. Indeed, the extreme complexity of the French system should 
allow the obligations of each provider to be commensurate with its 
peculiarities. Obligations—however burdensome—should not 
disproportionately affect anyone, as they are built based on the 
characteristics of each. First, France distinguishes between quotas for 
audio-visual works and those for the cinematographic ones. The 
percentage of the cinema (audio-visual) content quotas is measured on 
the time/part of catalogue devoted by providers to the distribution of 
cinematographic (audio-visual) works, and not on their general 
transmission time/total catalogue. This approach avoids the occurrence 
of cases in which operators are required to meet quotas of European and 
national cinema (audio-visual) production even if they do not supply 
cinema (audio-visual works) in a significant way. Based on the same 
rationale, cinema (audio-visual) investment quotas apply only to 
operators who distribute significant percentage of cinematographic 
(audio-visual) works.  The legislator avoids operators being required to 
distract their investments from their core product to direct them towards 
works that they will not later distribute. With the same rationale, 
broadcasters focused on cinema have to meet less incisive obligations 
concerning the promotion of audio-visual national and European works, 
while their quotas in favour of the cinematographic production are 
higher than those applied to other operators. In addition to ensuring that 
 
687 See CRETON, L., L'économie du cinéma, p. 98. 
688 EUROPEAN AUDIOVISUAL OBSERVATORY, Fiction film financing in Europe, p. 59. 
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the obligations are calibrated to each operator, the French approach 
ensures the commitment of providers in the promotion of both the 
audio-visual and cinematographic European and national production.  
Furthermore, quotas established by the French law, however high, are 
simple: there are quotas in favour of European production and of the 
national one. The precise obligations of each operator are established in 
the convention they conclude autonomously with the CSA. In other 
words, France does not proceed through a system of sub quotas that 
apply erga omnes, but ensures the obligations of everyone to be balanced 
to its peculiarities—provided they respect the common ‘minimum’ 
obligations dictated by law, which are already highly diversified for the 
different types of operators. Moreover, the State is today seeking to 
increase the space left to self-regulation and co-regulation. As a 
consequence, the conventions between the CSA and each provider 
should become increasingly important, while the law and the decrees 
should be refocused only on core principles. As highlighted by the CSA, 
the increased number and diversification of the actors entering the field 
of audio-visual regulation make the idea of universal and univocal 
regulation obsolete; there is a need to develop a more flexible legislative 
framework that retains only the essential principles. 
The French approach could offer useful suggestions for Italy. Here, the 
legislator has traditionally dictated the obligations erga omnes, and the 
actual commitment of AVMS providers in the promotion of independent 
production has been questionable. Among the reasons why it has been 
questionable, the fact that broadcasters managed to obtain several 
derogations from the obligations. Some of them were necessary to avoid 
that operators had to finance and program national and European 
cinematographic works, although their editorial line did not include 
cinema broadcasting. The correctives introduced by the 2017 reform and 
the following new regulation delineated by AGCOM should reduce the 
requests for derogation ––and therefore ensure greater certainty in the 
rules' implementation and increase the providers' commitment to the 
independent production promotion. Today, investment quotas in 
cinema apply only to operators that broadcast a significant percentage 
of cinematographic works. Moreover, broadcasters are not required 
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anymore to program national and European cinematographic works: 
they can meet the content quotas in European and national independent 
works with any work they want, whether cinematographic or not.  
However, the instruments of flexibility and proportionality will 
continue to be indispensable in Italy. Since the obligations are not 
constructed differently according to the operators' diversity and the 
legislator still establishes several sub-quotas that apply erga omnes, it will 
still be up to the derogations and the other proportionality and flexibility 
instruments to avoid the requirements ending up excessively 
compromising providers in the concrete case689. Probably, the 
indispensable need for a margin of flexibility makes the usefulness of a 
detailed range of obligations questionable. In the absence of a set of rules 
targeted on each operator, it could perhaps be preferable to establish 
only general quotas in European and national production (even higher 
than the current ones) and leave each operator free to decide which type 
of product to finance and distribute following its editorial line—in 
compliance with the overall percentages established by the law. In any 
case, there is still no knowledge on whether the new rules on quotas are 
concretely effective or not: to date, the system outlined by the 2017 
reform and ‘reshaped’ in 2019 is not operational yet, as already said. 
Besides showing a strong internal coherence, the French system has 
remained consistent over time. The 1986 Act has been reviewed more 
than eighty times. However, the foundation of quotas has never been 
under discussion: the amendments have been realized to adapt to the 
evolution in technology and accommodate to the European law, based 
on an organic, coherent, and consistent design.  On the opposite, the 
countless reforms adopted in Italy overtime—on top of coming from the 
most varied sources—often seem to adapt to the circumstances rather 
than carrying out a general plan, suggesting that important decisions 
 
689 See the Opinion no. 01868/2017 of October 30th of the Council of State on the Legislative 
Decree no. 201/2017. The Council seems to suggest that derogations are the instrument 
necessary for introducing stricter constraints without unduly affecting providers («(non) 
sembra potersi lamentare la mancanza di flessibilità nella fissazione degli obblighi, atteso che è 
demandata alla fonte regolamentare la fissazione di apposite discipline di dettaglio e resta la 
possibilità di conseguire deroghe in relazione a specifiche situazioni»).  
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happen to be taken with very short sight, potentially depending on the 
political contingency and the lobbying activity of the moment.  
The prime example in that sense is that the 2017 reform has been severely 
altered only two years after its adoption (and even before its actual 
implementation), following the occurred change in government. Also, 
think about the Italian vicissitudes on the prime-time obligation—
introduced since the very beginning and always confirmed in France. In 
Italy, said obligation was established for the first time in 1998, then 
repealed in 2005, re-established by the 2017 reform, and, finally, 
reshaped by the 2019 intervention. To date, it applies only to the public 
broadcaster, while private televisions are allowed to keep broadcasting 
European and national works late at night.  
Understanding the French system's evolution is demanding given the 
high complexity of the legislation. A similar task is perhaps more 
entertaining when it comes to the Italian system: the impression is not 
really that of looking for the intrinsic rationality of the rules’ evolution, 
or of recognising a plan designed by others. It is rather the sensation of 
trying to bring rationality to a body that does not have one, of figuring a 
development system out of elements that have poor connection one to 
another. 
6.2. The criticisms within EU: ending up with discriminatory 
effects between the Member States? 
Quotas were criticized also at the Community level by those Member 
States with the weaker audio-visual industries. During the debate 
leading to the adoption of the TSF Directive, they highlighted that they 
would not have been able to satisfy high percentages of European works 
through their national production. Given that all Member States’ works 
are European by definition, these States had stressed the risk of being 
forced to meet the requirements through products from other Member 
States. In this way, they would have moved from one cultural 
‘hegemony’ (the American one) to another, that of the most robust 
European audio-visual industries.  
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It is difficult not to share their stance. Indeed, the member countries of 
the EU are different in their traditions, customs and history, and it is not 
so easy to identify a robust common European culture. As noticed, such 
a notion implicitly assumes that there is a shared substratum between a 
Swede or a Spanish and a Greek or a German, which makes them distinct 
and distant («I dare say, opposed, interpreting the spirit of the 
legislation»690) from ‘American culture’. This presumption does not look 
so obvious; «a number of exceptions aside, the common European movie 
culture is essentially a US (Hollywood) one»691. 
If the Member States with the weaker audio-visual industries may have 
been forced to meet their quotas for European works through products 
from other Members, the ones with robust film industries may satisfied 
quotas mainly with their national production. In countries such as Italy 
and France, the sub-quotas in favour of national works are established 
as a minimum standard—providers are required to meet ‘at least’ a 
certain percentage of national works. Therefore, providers are 
potentially allowed to fully satisfy the quota for European works with 
products from their own country, which they could consider 
economically more convenient, since closer to their target audience. 
According to data made available by the CNC692, the quota of French 
cinematographic works broadcasted in France is higher than the one 
required by the legislator. As seen, in France, broadcasters have to 
devote at least 60% of their transmission time to European works, 
including at least 40% for French works. However, from 2009 to 2018, 
French films represented between 41.8% and 45.3% of the televisions' 
supply. The European ones were only between 16.0% and 19.7%, the 
American between 33.6% and 38.1%. 
Shortly: quotas may hinder the circulation audio-visual works among 
some Member States instead of promoting it. It is likely to allow those 
with robust industries to adopt regulations that mainly support the 
 
690 GAMBUTO, S., La produzione audiovisiva europea, in La televisione digitale, pp. 363 ff., 365. 
(«Oserei dire, contrapposti, interpretando lo spirito della normativa»). 
691 DE VINCK, S. and PAUWELS, C., Beyond borders and into the digital era, p. 106. 
692 CNC, La diffusion des films à la television en 2018, p. 13. 
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national economic circuit rather than the common European market as a 
whole. Furthermore: «since the adoption of the Directive, all the Member 
States, including those which did not previously have an aid system, set 
up quotas, thus aggravating the separation of the national markets 
[…]»693.  
 
6.3. The US’s criticism: protecting the European economic 
market instead of enhancing cultural diversity? 
The criticism made by the US is that quotas are meant to restrain and 
distort international trade by hindering the access of American works to 
European markets, and this to target the US ability to make the most 
successful films. Since the TWF Directive adoption, the EEC replied that 
the limitation of free trade generated by quotas was justified because 
they have not a merely economic protectionist purpose. The goal of 
quotas is to promote the European culture, safeguarding cultural 
diversity for the benefit of consumers. 
The European argument is not entirely convincing, and the stance of the 
US is to some extent sharable. If the European legislation (as well as the 
French and Italian ones) declare the intention to enhance cultural 
diversity, it lacks any mention on how to measure and verify the 
achievement of such a challenging target—making it difficult to evaluate 
the tools used to pursue it. As long as there is enough space occupied by 
European and national products, the quota regulation is respected694. 
However, one can wonder why positive data in terms of the presence of 
 
693 GAMBUTO, S., La produzione audiovisiva europea, p. 361 («Inoltre, dopo l’introduzione della 
direttiva, tutti gli stati membri, compresi quelli che in precedenza non avevano un sistema di aiuti, 
hanno istituito le quote di riserva e questo ha aggravato la separazione die mercati nazionali […]»). 
694 As it is written in the impact analysis on the 2017 Italian reform of the Legislative Office 
of the Ministry of Culture: «the indicators that will make it possible to verify the degree of 
achievement of the regulation's goals are the numerical ones relating to the programming 
time reserved for European works (or the percentage of European works in the catalogue 
for on-demand providers) and the amount of resources spent by providers to fulfil their 
investment obligations» See UFFICIO LEGISLATIVO DEL MINISTERO DELLA CULTURA, Analisi 
tecnico normativa sullo schema di decreto legislativo recante riforma delle disposizioni legislative in 
materia di promozione delle opere europee e italiane da parte dei fornitori di servizi di media 
audiovisivi, a norma dell'articolo 34 della legge 14 novembre 2016, n. 220, 2016, p. 17. 
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European and national works should be intended as an expression of 
increase in cultural diversity. Quotas are certainly susceptible to slow 
down the decline in the production and distribution of European and 
national works. However, «the higher share of European productions is 
by no means a sign of increased (or existing) diversity of cultural 
expressions»695. Indeed, a policy of quotas does not necessarily ensure a 
diversified creation, since such a policy «does little to prevent the 
increasing homogenization of content and deteriorating quality of 
programmes»696. This is because any program financed with European 
money and realized by a majority of European authors and workers and 
according to certain business dynamics could qualify perfectly as both a 
European and independent work, and thus be used to meet quotas. 
Quotas apply automatically: to benefit from them, works do not have to 
respect quality criteria or a particular expression European themes697.  
The lack of an assessment on the quality or worthiness of the works by 
which satisfy quotas is comprehensible: there are dangers in attributing 
to the public power the task of assessing values difficult to gauge 
impartially. To avoid such risks, the EU and national legislators have 
assumed that the entire European audio-visual industry is worthy in 
itself, given its cultural specificity. Consequently, if it is certain that 
quotas do safeguard the European audio-visual industry, one cannot be 
sure that they are an effective tool for the enhancement of cultural 
diversity.   
 
695 BURRI-NENOVA, M., "New Audiovisual Media Services Directive”, p. 1707. 
696 Ibidem, 1708. 





This work showed how the French State has devised a very sophisticated 
and complex system to promote its film industry over time. However, 
the analysis rarely suggested adopting the French instruments to 
address the yet-to-be-solved problems that affect Italy. In most cases, 
there is no reason to suppose that the French means would prove 
effective in Italy, uprooted from the French institutional architecture. 
 
The straightforward evolution of the French system and the Italian 
fresh start in 2016 
 
The analysis carried out in Chapter I showed that the two States' history 
as promoters of cinema presents several commons elements. They both 
initially addressed the sector with mere security and public order intent, 
adopting a safety and censorship framework, and began to develop 
promotional legislation at the end of WWI. Initially, the aim was only to 
restrict American films' import. Over time, measures of direct support in 
favour of the national film industries appeared. During the 1950s-1960s, 
both France and Italy began to pay attention to the sector's cultural 
dimension: in addition to promoting its economic growth, they have 
sought to favour the realization of works considered worthy and 
artistically meritorious. Interestingly, since they started to finance the 
film industry, the two States have never ceased to do so—unlike what 
happened with other industrial sectors. Therefore, there is no 
counterfactual evidence of what could have happened without State 
funding, neither in Italy, nor in France. 
Apart from these major common elements, the history of the two States 
as cinema promoters sharply differs. Telling the evolution of the French 
system was straightforward: there are five moments in which clearly 
identifiable circumstances led the legislator to intervene, and the sum of 
those interventions shaped the current system. On the opposite, it 
proved difficult to understand why the Italian legislator intervened at 
certain times and why it did not react in front of disruptive 
phenomena—such as the outbreak of private televisions. A somehow 
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'creative' effort was needed to propose a systematization of the Italian 
system's evolution. 
The French State established its promotional system's main features at 
the end of WWI, based on previous extensive study and analysis activity. 
This way, France inaugurated since the very beginning an approach that 
was going to remain consistent over time and still relevant today: 
decisions are based on data and considerations provided by detailed 
research carried out by all the actors involved, from the industry's 
operators to several State bodies (today, mainly the CNC, the CSA—the 
Independent Authority of the audio-visual sector—the Court of auditors 
and the Parliamentary Committees for Finance and Culture). The 
decision-making process rests on two cornerstones. First, an 
independent agency is in charge of elaborating and implementing State 
actions promoting cinema. Second, those who benefit from the 
distribution of today's works must contribute to funding future 
creations. Subsequent legislation confirmed these two principles, mostly 
adapting them to address technological and market evolutions. They 
indeed still exist today and make the French system the most envied by 
the European cinematographic operators. Still, France is currently in a 
new phase: to ensure resources for new creations (and for equity 
reasons), the State is seeking to shift financial burden from traditional 
televisions— whose revenues are decreasing —to digital platforms, 
which are experiencing a boom. 
The Italian system of cinema promotion was developed under Fascism, 
which led to refined support mechanisms —strictly linked to control 
over contents. After the liberalization, the Republican legislator 
confirmed those measures, only repealing their most authoritative 
features. Although State promotion aims have radically changed, even 
several contemporaneous aids have their origin archetype in fascist 
legislation. In the case of the film industry, it is particularly true that 
«[…] if policies can change radically, the instruments are normally 
subject to just incremental changes […] yesterday's choices are expressed 
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today not directly but through organizational architectures, principles, 
and procedures […]»698. 
The evolution of the Italian system appears less linear than the French 
one on many aspects. Think of the structure responsible for promotion 
activities. In France, the same institute has played this role consistently 
since 1946. In Italy, many different institutions took turns—from the 
1934 General Directorate for Cinema to the current DGC. Moreover, to 
support the main responsible institution over time, the legislator set up 
many advisories and consulting bodies comprising experts, 
representatives of other administrations, and stakeholders. Such an 
approach (common to State organisation promoting other industrial 
sectors699) made the administrative apparatus «elefantiaco»700 (huge, of 
the size of an elephant), weighing it and compromising its activities. The 
Italian evolution is less systematically concerning regulatory sources, 
too. France has had a dedicated code containing all the relevant 
legislation on State aid to the cinema since 1956; over time, the CNC's 
Regulation added to it. On the opposite, Italian cinema gained an 
organic and dedicated law only in 2016, when a new, more virtuous 
phase began. 
Indeed, the 2016 Act redefined the scope of responsibilities and functions 
of ministries, related bodies, and independent institutions involved in 
the film industry's governance. Moreover, it established only the 
fundamental principles regarding the relationship between the State and 
the cinema, requiring secondary sources for their declination. This way, 
rules can easily be changed when deemed necessary—particularly 
useful in a fast-changing, technology-intensive industry as the audio-
visual one. The 2016 reform also established to provide a yearly impact 
evaluation of the newly established measures (as well as an annual 
report of the AGCM). Such a novelty should contribute overcoming, for 
cinema, one of the biggest issues that have characterized the Italian 
 
698 LASCOUMES, P., and LE GALÈS, P., Gli strumenti per governare, Bruno Mondadori, 2009, p. 
19 (« […]Se le politiche possono mutare radicalmente, gli strumenti sono, di regola, soggetti a 
cambiamenti incrementali[…] le scelte fatte ieri si esprimono oggi non direttamente, ma attraverso 
architetture organizzative, principi, procedure […]»). 
699 As noted by SERRANI, D., Lo Stato finanziatore, p. 63. 
700ORSI BATTAGLINI, A., L’intervento economico statale per il cinema, p. 92. 
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industrial policy: the lack of ex-post evaluation of the incentives 
provided. Finally, the Act extends direct support from cinema to the 
entire audio-visual sector. This way, the State showed awareness that a 
product's merits today depend less on the commercial practices adopted 
to enhance it on the market––as France was already doing. 
These days, the effectiveness of the equilibria gained over time is shaken 
by common phenomena in the two States. First, the outbreak of the 
Covid-19 pandemic and the subsequent containment provisions, which 
strongly affected the film industries and called for stronger support from 
the States. Second, the appearance of global digital operators, in 
continuous growth701. In addition to the traditional paradigms of the 
industry, these players are affecting cinema promotion policies. Indeed, 
some of their characteristics made outdated and ineffective some 
support instruments devised by national legislators over time. 
Moreover, some of them have undermined for a long time the 
application of the promotional laws of many States through the so-called 
practice of 'jurisdiction shopping'. Indeed, some of these players 
operated in many European countries while establishing themselves 
only in those that do not require AVMS providers to contribute to the 
promotion of the national film industries, or do so only to a limited 
extent. 
 
Beyond the States: the less challenging goals of the European and local-
self-government cinema promotion 
The analysis of the other government levels promoting cinema carried 
out in Chapter I showed how their goals are less challenging than the 
State’s ones, since they are less composite. The main goal of the EU is to 
 
701 Indeed, the VODs’ turnover has multiplied thirty times over the course of ten years in 
Europe: their revenues increased from €388.8 M in 2010 to € 11.6 B in 2020. The SVODs 
mainly drove this trend, exploding from €12 M of revenues in 2010 to € 9.7 B in 2020, with 
a compound annual growth rate of 95%—while the revenues of TVODs rocketed from € 
377 to €1.87 B. See EUROPEAN AUDIOVISUAL OBSERVATORY, Trends in the VOD Market in the 
EU28, 2021. 
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promote better circulation of the European audio-visual products, both 
within and outside the Union. The territorial autonomies' main goal is 
attracting national and international productions to obtain local 
economic development and growth. 
In principle, the fact that different government levels' goals differ should 
prevent inefficient overlapping: sub- and supra-national policies should 
not reproduce State policies on a smaller/larger scale but identify their 
areas and instruments of intervention. However, while in France there 
has always been an attempt to coordinate the activities of audio-visual 
support carried out by the local authorities and the State, the territorial 
support developed with spontaneous and poorly-coordinated processes 
in Italy. A partial change of paradigm began with the 2016 Act. While 
maintaining a centralist approach—unlike what happens today in many 
other industries702—it acknowledged the regions' fundamental role in 
promoting the audio-visual sector and establishes some new forms of 
coordination. 
The fact that the EU and local autonomies pursue identifiable and 
limited goals makes it easier to evaluate their action. There are many 
ways to assess a film's success: the indicators parameters depend on the 
goals pursued by those who financed it. For the EU, a film is successful 
if it meets a significant audience outside its national borders. For a 
region, if it led to significant expenditure on its territory. For 
broadcasters, if companies buy advertisement spaces during its 
programming. It is more difficult to measure the success of a film in the 
context of the State promotional action, which simultaneously pursues 
many objectives. For example, the 2016 Act declares the goal to enable 
the realization of films with exceptional cultural merit, allowing market 
access to new entrants and supporting less market-driven 
productions703. In this sense, their realization should testify to the 
effectiveness of State action. However, the State also declares the goal to 
 
702 As noted by AVERARDI, A., “Gli ausili pubblici al settore cinematografico tra eccezione 
culturale e regole di mercato”, Munus 1(2019): 259-287, p. 282. 
703 See art. 26 of the 2016 Act. 
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promote the highest audience consumption of films704. Consequently, 
the State's action may be regarded as ineffective if those same 
productions do not encounter a large public. Shortly, the very same film 
may appear successful and unsuccessful, depending on the State 
objective taken into consideration. 
 
The current state of the film industry: the problems with the cinema-
theatre link 
Chapter II analysed the current film industry's organization, considering 
how State's regulation affects it. Interestingly, the analysis showed that 
the French State is not a direct regulator about several issues (such as the 
chronologie des médias and the engagements de programmation et de 
diffusion). It mainly establishes the principles based on which the 
industry should autonomously solve matters that involve different 
interests and actors. Once the industry finds an agreement, the State 
makes it binding through law. The State directly intervenes only if there 
is the impossibility to find autonomous solutions. 
The main element that emerged is that the current definition of 
‘cinematographic work’ adopted in the State aid's framework is 
problematic in Italy. The State defines as cinematographic—and, 
therefore, eligible to State funding for cinema—those works intended for 
cinema theatres that do not appear on other distribution channels before 
a specific time elapsed from their first theatrical release. However, 
accessing theatres is challenging for many Italian titles. Among other 
reasons, this is because it is more profitable for distributors and 
exhibitors to screen American films. In light of this evidence, Italy (like 
France) provides financial incentives for operators committed to 
distribute national and European films, and for exhibitors committed to 
program them. Unlike France, Italy does not use also regulatory 
instruments to favour theatres' access to fragile films considered worthy. 
However, French correctives (the engagements and the Médiateur du 
cinéma) would not probably be enough to ensure an adequate theatrical 
 
704 See art. 3, par. 1, let. g of the 2016 Act. 
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distribution to all works funded by State to the cinema in Italy. The 
Italian cinematographic market is indeed saturated, showing a steadily 
increasing ratio between the produced films and the screens, the highest 
among the big five European countries in recent years705. Many Italian 
titles that got access to theatres remain programmed shortly—often not 
long enough for the audience to become aware of their existence. 
Exhibitors are often forced to make room for incoming films by 
dismantling the previous ones (or moving them to smaller theatres or to 
less-attractive time schedules). This is why to keep asking for theatrical 
distribution of all cinematographic works funded by the State seems to 
be an inefficient and potentially industry-harmful way to proceed. The 
path to making it sustainable (increasing the screens theatres or 
decreasing the number of produced films) is not easily viable. 
The need to change the current definition of ‘cinematographic work’ also 
stems from a more ‘conceptual’ arguments, i.e., that linking the 
cinematographic nature of a work to its theatrical release grounds on 
confusing the product with the vehicle that brings it to the audience. To 
date, the quality of audio-visual works is less influenced by their primal 
distributional channel. A work intended for cinema is no longer more 
‘meritorious’ than others—there is a growing body of examples of high-
quality products with no theatrical release ambition. Some of them were 
recognized by a part of the industry itself as having cinematographic 
nature, and they participated in film festivals and won awards. 
Moreover, if products not intended for cinemas are considered 
cinematographic, theatres are now multi-purpose containers: in addition 
to films, they exhibit previews of television series and concerts, works 
challenging to be defined ‘cinematographic’. 
It is worth stressing that the proposal to cease to link the definition of a 
cinematographic work to its distribution in cinema theatres does not rely 
on the premise that cinema theatres are a failed market. Quite the 
opposite: the theatres' results from 1992 to today show that they 
managed not only to survive but also to grow both during the past era 
of the televisions' outbreak and the current one of digital platforms' 
expansion—if one excludes the 2020 dramatic results due to their forced 
 
705 See fig. 10, p. 143 of Chapter III. 
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closure to limit the spread of the pandemic706. Therefore, the proposal is 
not to cease to support cinema theatres, but rather to support works 
regardless of their distribution choices and to support channels (cinema 
theatres) independently of the works they convey. In essence, at least for 
funding purposes, the State should cease to identify audio-visual works 
based on their distribution channels and find new and more reliable 
criteria. According to some audio-visual operators, a possible solution 
could consider the ‘size’ of the work: State aids should be consistent with 
the budget and the work reference market of the work applying for 
support. 
 
Promotion through financial aid: the different balance found between 
vertical, horizontal, selective and automatic approaches 
Chapter III analysed the State action promoting cinema through 
financial aid. Concerning the range of its action, the European principles 
on the compatibility between internal market and State aids to the film 
industry seem relatively light. The Member States have great autonomy 
in deciding whether to introduce support measures, to which extent and 
how. Different aspects of the Italian and French aids to the film industry 
confirm these observations. First, despite the cultural test criterion, some 
aids provided by the two States seem to rely on the premise that the film 
industry is cultural on its own. To verify if the work is ‘culturally 
eligible’ to said aids, the two States adopt criteria so vague that it is 
difficult to imagine projects unable to satisfy them. Second, despite the 
aid intensity criterion, the Italian definition of difficult and low-budget 
films could allow the Italian State to bear many films' total cost. 
Concerning the administrative structure, the analysis showed that the 
CNC and the DGC have similar functions. However, only the first has 
financial independence and regulatory autonomy—showing more 
responsiveness and agility. Its independence is crucial about human 
resources: the CNC can constantly check which professional figure is 
lacking and cover it by addressing the market. The DGC is instead part 
of the Italian Ministry of Culture. Consequently, it suffers from the 
 
706 See fig. 7, p. 138 of Chapter II. 
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limitations that generally affect the Italian public administration: 
bureaucratic red tapes, limited ability to interact with companies, lack of 
qualified personnel etc. 
Concerning the provenance of State resources, most of the French 
funding to the film industry does not come from State's general budget 
but from the proceeds of taxes on the operators who benefit from 
distributing audio-visual works. Said scheme has applied since the very 
beginning. The first tax introduced charged cinema tickets. Since most 
of the theatres’ revenues came (and still come) from American films, 
France transformed the US from the main enemy of national cinema into 
its leading supporter. Still today, the system brings the domestic 
producers to hope that US films perform well: the higher the audience, 
the higher the French movie industry's future money. Over time, even 
televisions began to pay a tax to fund the CNC Fund. This way, the 
French cinema's new main rival, national television, was transformed in 
its turn into its new primary supporter. Progressively, the range of 
operators taxed has been extended to cover new forms of distribution. 
Today, taxes also apply to DVD and Blu-ray retailers and digital 
platforms, including those that target the French audience without being 
established there. 
Since the amount thus collected directly goes to the CNC, bypassing the 
State general budget, many affirm that the French State does not finance 
the film sector, limiting itself to a regulatory function by imposing a 
forced loan on cinema operators and then redistributing the money 
through the CNC. Such a representation is not agreeable: the funds given 
to the film industry by the CNC may not represent a direct monetary 
cost for the State, but are an opportunity cost for sure. The State accepts 
losing the amounts allocated to the CNC from its general budget, hence 
agreeing not to use them to finance something other than the audio-
visual industry. Moreover, while taxes on film operators finance direct 
support instruments, the indirect ones are financed by the State general 
budget. 
In Italy, the State traditionally financed the film industry from different 
sources, compromising the readability of the overall State expenditure 
favouring the sector—and thus generating an obstacle to assessing the 
effectiveness of the support. Such a situation was overcome by the 2016 
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Act, which stated that all the resources that finance the industry come 
from the newly-established Fund, financed in turn by the State general 
budget. However, looking at the French system, the 2016 Act established 
that the Fund's resources must be parametrized to the film industry's 
turnover level—still guaranteeing for a minimum. This way, the 
industry should be partially secured from the yearly negotiations on 
expenditures during the writing of the Budget Law, and from changes 
in governments’ sensitivity to culture. 
Considering all the funding sources, the French State transfers much 
more money to the film industry than the Italian one. In Italy, State 
resources have significantly increased in the last years707; today, all of 
them (both the direct and indirect ones) account for € 640 M at least each 
year, while they increase if the sector's resources increase. In France, 
most of the funding is provided by the CNC; on average its annual 
support accounted for € 685 M in the last twelve years (ranging from the 
maximum level of € 806 M in 2011 to the minimum one of € 576,9 M in 
2020708). In addition to the already considerable funds coming from the 
CNC, there are also those granted through fiscal incentives, which have 
progressively increased over time709, and by the IFCIF to guarantee bank 
loans and provide for direct loans710.  
The range of supporting instruments is instead similar in the two 
countries. They are many, and each of them seems to be in charge of 
limiting the problems opened by the others. 
Direct aids are selective and automatic, and support specific works and 
companies considered meritorious through direct transfers. 
Selective aids seek to ensure supply's diversity and quality, helping to 
realize films whose making would be otherwise complex and thus 
supporting projects with ‘cultural merit’ and lowering market entrance 
barriers. Although useful to meet some goals of State promotion, 
 
707 See fig. 14, p. 174 of Chapter IV. 
708 See fig. 12, p. 169 of Chapter IV. 
709 See fig. 13, p. 170 of Chapter IV. 
710 See fig. 18, p. 197 of Chapter IV. 
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selective aid may generate several risks. First, there is no objective way 
to evaluate a film's cultural and artistic value without giving rise to 
disputes. This process will always cause examples of films that were not 
financed but should have been, or which benefited from unjustified aid. 
Second, selective aids risk to support niche works with little-to-no 
demand, which often comes from the wealthiest and more-educated part 
of society.  
Italian selective aids lack incentives to push operators to shoulder 
responsibility so that their cultural projects also pursue an economic 
goal, seeking an audience. First, selective aids are not-repayable 
subsidies in Italy, which seems to testify that the State considers the 
projects supported as economically unviable from the outset. Second, 
Italian law does not require the applicant to show evidence of a 
distribution deal as a condition for the disbursement of the last 
percentage of the subsidy. Therefore, it is not excluded that the funded 
work will never be distributed, as it partially happens also in France. 
Third, Italian selective aids can be granted only to works with a small-
enough budget—a provision likely to generate adverse incentives since 
it may push operators to keep their budgets low, hindering them from 
thinking ambitiously. Finally, the budget for Italian selective aids is 
dispersed across many projects—at least compared to France: probably 
too few resources are divided upon too many works711. By avoiding both 
displeasing anyone and giving significant resources to a few 
inexperienced and novice actors, selective aids do not appear to be really 
selective. It would be desirable to invest more resources in fewer 
projects. Otherwise, selective aids risk implying that the State does not 
seek culturally relevant films that deserve support but backs the ones 
that would not be realized due to insufficient funding. 
Automatic aids overcome the problems opened by selective aids. They are 
granted to a production company to realize a new film based on its 
 
711 For example, in 2019—the most recent year for which data are available—the French 
advance on receipts was worth €25.2 M and supported 87 films, which means an average 
of €289 for each film; in Italy, selective aid for film production was instead worth €23,7 M 
and financed 142 films, which means an average of € 167 for each film. See CNC, Bilan, 
2019, p. 25, and DGC, Elenco soggetti beneficiari contribute selettivi alla produzione, 2019. 
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previous film's success, measured on non-discretionary assessment. 
They strengthen already-strong operators, sustaining their activities to 
promote growth and development of the industry, seeking to increase 
its ability to generate jobs, attract investments, foster tourism and 
compete at the international level. However, although functional to meet 
some goals of State promotion, automatic aids involve risks too. 
Through them, the State may reward companies for the economic 
success of projects lacking any artistic and cultural merit under the 
State's criteria itself—both in Italy and France. Moreover, automatic aids 
involve the risk of using public money to support the realization of 
works that would probably be still realised without State support. 
With indirect aids (tax credits), the State gives up establishing what is 
worthy of support by creating an environment favourable to every 
producer. This way, the State considers indeed the entire industry 
meritorious, given its cultural specificity. However, it does not entirely 
give up on ‘guiding’ the market: by modulating the tax credit rates and 
other correctives, it pushes operators towards behaviours considered 
more meritorious than others. 
The funds given through the different types of aid allows identifying the 
balance the two States found between the need to support the 
development of the sector's industrial dimension and supporting 
cultural pluralism. The analysis showed that France seems more 
attentive to the second objective than Italy. 
First, it is true that French automatic aid reward only operators having 
achieved positive economic results, while the Italian ones also consider 
the artistic and cultural ones; however, France does not take into account 
the artistic and cultural results in the scope of automatic aid because it 
rewards quality ex-post, through selective aid. Unlike Italy, France 
supports through selective aid both projects still to be realized and those 
already realized. This way, France supports quality selectively ex-
ante and ex-post—while Italy supports it selectively only ex-ante and 
automatically ex-post. 
Second, the French State transfers the majority of its resources through 
direct aids. This is also because it supports only the production phase 
through tax credits, not even the distribution and exhibition ones—an 
approach consistent with the main reason behind tax credit's institution, 
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i.e., arresting French producers' tendency to shoot abroad. On the 
opposite, tax credits represent the main support instrument in Italy. 
Here, the resources granted indirectly have been progressively 
increasing in the last years, while the direct ones have been decreasing712, 
following a common trend with the general Italian approach to 
industrial policy. Although they are pretty new instruments, tax credits 
absorb therefore most of the Italian funds.  
In essence, Italy’s support system is more ‘generalist’; Italy renounces 
more than France to establish what is meritorious and what is not. This 
ends up making the support for the cultural sector similar to the one for 
the general industry—but it is consistent with essential needs. First, 
indirect aid allows limiting the risk that State support affects the 
culture’s natural evolution. In the context of direct aid, companies may 
adequate their activities to appear meritorious based on State 
parameters—the automatic or the selective ones—and thus obtaining the 
support. As said, art. 9 (1) of the Italian Constitution—based on which 
public powers should promote the development of culture—should be 
read in conjunction with art. 33(1), declaring the art's freedom. 
Therefore, the State promotional action should be realized without 
compromising the natural evolution of culture. 
Second, this approach responds to the need to simplify the action of the 
public administration. Unlike France, the Italian State does not have an 
independent agency focused on cinema, with financial and 
reglementary autonomy and adequate structure to manage the aids. In 
Italy, where the administration on cinema suffers from all the problems 
that affect the national public administration, there is more need for as-
automatic-as-possible mechanisms. 
The Italian administration's intrinsic limits explain why the analysis 
rarely suggests adopting the French instruments to address the yet-to-
be-solved problems that affect Italy. Think, for example, of the 
fraudulent behaviours that occurred in Italy with the tax credit to attract 
private investment. France avoids these phenomena thanks to the 
SOFICAs, which intermediate between private investors and producers 
and ensure the State a higher degree of control. They also allow the State 
 
712 See fig. 22, p. 216 of Chapter III. 
 296 
to monitor that the private investments that benefit from fiscal incentives 
are not devoted only to commercial works. However, there are reasons 
to believe that a similar approach could not prove effective in Italy. In 
France, SOFICAs have existed since the 1980s, and the public power has 
constantly monitored them to verify whether corrective measures were 
needed. SOFICAs, to be effective, need a structure capable of managing 
a complex instrument, avoiding delays and complications, and a 
constant evaluation of the effects generated. 
Despite being the main support instrument (and although highly 
appreciated by the industry for its non-interventionism), tax credit 
generated concerns in its application in Italy. The resources to satisfy the 
requests for tax credit are contingent, but the industry perceives this 
instrument as a support to be recognized to anyone who meets the 
eligibility conditions—to the point that producers include them in their 
business plan before having obtained the DGC’s approval. Still, it is 
debatable whether detaching tax credit from a closed fund—making it 
theoretically unlimited—would be desirable. Indeed, this approach 
would entail the risk to forego tax revenues, which happens for other 
types of tax credits in Italy. Moreover, the State would have to guarantee 
an increasing level of support as the industry grows.  
The presence of a direct link between the State's support and the film 
industry's turnover is what happens in France: the CNC's fund directly 
increases as the industry's revenues increase—an approach with many 
concerns. First, it is not easy to understand why a sector should receive 
increasing public money as it grows—this derogates from the 
equalization principle, under which the most profitable activities should 
contribute to support the most vulnerable ones. A virtuous system 
should ensure a proportion between the level of State aids and each 
industry’s actual needs. Second, this approach may even damage the 
industry itself. In specific periods, the French system generated a 
disproportion between State aids and the industry’s needs, eventually 
leading to ‘inflation’ within the film industry.  
In light of this, it seems preferable to solve the problem related to the 
Italian tax credit by introducing stricter requirements to access the 
support—thus also avoiding ‘shower funds’. 
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Promotion through quotas on AVMS providers: useful suggestions 
from France 
Chapter IV analysed how France and Italy, implementing European 
principles, promote their national industry by requiring providers to 
meet content and investment quotas in national and European 
production. Since European legislation has achieved only a minimal 
harmonization, the Member States have proposed different answers to 
common problems. Italy and France are the countries that have 
established the most incisive rules, seeking to involve providers in the 
national production’s promotion.  
In France, where broadcasters play a massive role in film financing713, 
the State has adopted a very refined legislative technique on quotas. The 
1986 Act only establishes the fundamental principles governing quotas, 
based on which several decrees of the Council of State—each focused on 
a different typology of providers—lay down the detailed provisions. 
However, the percentages established in the Law and the Decrees are to 
be regarded as a minimum standard. Each provider’s specific 
obligations are determined by an agreement between the provider itself 
and the CSA. Among the elements considered by the CSA, there is also 
the way the provider uses the media chronology: the sooner it distributes 
a cinematographic work, the higher its investment obligations are. This 
way, the legislation should ensure that the obligations of each actor are 
proportional and adequate. The project of law under discussion before 
the pandemic’s spread also sought to increase the space for co-regulation 
and self-regulation. The State showed awareness that «[…] the variety of 
players now entering the audio-visual regulation scope makes the idea 
of universal and univocal regulation obsolete. […] regulation must 
evolve in such a way as to understand the complexity of a globalized 
sector, subject to sudden and hardly predictable developments. In this 
 
713 Indeed, their investments accounted for circa 30% of total financing volume for French 
films during the years 2009-2018 (see CRETON, L., L'économie du cinéma, p. 98). The role they 
have in France is much more significant than in most other European countries. This is 
clearly indicated by the fact that European broadcasters’ investments tend to account for 
24% of total financing volume for European films, compared to only 8%if one excludes 
French films from the analysis and considers only the other major markets, i.e., UK, 
Germany, Italy, and Spain (see EUROPEAN AUDIOVISUAL OBSERVATORY, Fiction film 
financing in Europe: A sample analysis of films released in 2018, 2020, p. 59). 
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new heterogeneous environment, which brings together actors with a 
wide range of legal statuses, economic models, strategies, or sizes, the 
regulation’s method must be reviewed […]»714.  
In Italy, quotas are regulated by the Tusmar and two secondary sources: 
an AGCOM regulation and one or more joint decrees between the 
Ministry of Culture and the one for Economic Development—both in 
charge of establishing the exact percentage of quotas, the eventual 
additional sub-quotas, and the details of several aspects. These three 
sources provide several quotas and sub-quotas that apply erga omnes. To 
avoid the obligations to result concretely disproportionate, the legislator 
provided proportionality and flexibility instruments, such as 
derogations. In the past, their use proved to be problematic, 
compromising the transparency of the system and limiting the 
providers’ actual commitment to promoting independent national 
works. The problem should ease with the last regulatory interventions, 
which eliminated some sub-quotas and introduced some correctives—
looking to the French case. However, in the lack of a set of rules targeted 
on each operator, it could perhaps be preferable to establish only general 
quotas in European and national independent production (even higher 
than the current ones) and leave each operator free to decide with which 
type of works meet them following its editorial line. In any case, there is 
still no knowledge on whether the new rules on quotas are concretely 
effective or not: to date, the system outlined by the 2017 reform and 
‘reshaped’ in 2019 is not operational yet. 
The French system has remained consistent over time. The 1986 Act has 
been reviewed more than eighty times, but the foundation of quotas has 
never been under discussion: the amendments have been realized to 
adapt to the technology evolution and accommodate European law, 
based on an organic, coherent, and consistent design. Today’s need is to 
reduce traditional television obligations, helping them to go back to 
growth, and increase those of non-linear suppliers, especially global 
ones such as Netflix, Disney, and Amazon Prime. Indeed, the State is 
seeking to transform American digital platforms into the new leading 
supporter of the new French creations, while securing the French 
 
714 CONSEIL SUPÉRIEUR DE L'AUDIOVISUEL, Refonder la régulation audiovisuelle, 2018, p. 8. 
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system's fundamental principles. Just think of the need to ensure French 
producers’ actual independence—a difficult task considering that 
American digital platform, having vertically integrated players as a 
model, tend to buy the entire ownership of the film they contribute to 
fund. 
On the opposite, the numerous reforms adopted in Italy over time—on 
top of coming from the most varied sources—often seem to adapt to the 
circumstances rather than carrying out a general plan. This may suggest 
that important decisions are taken with short sight, potentially 
depending on the political contingency and the moment’s lobbying 
activity. The prime example in that sense is that the 2017 reform has been 
significantly modified only two years after its adoption (and even before 
its actual implementation), following the occurred change in 
government. Also, think about the Italian vicissitudes on the prime-time 
obligation—introduced since the very beginning and always confirmed 
in France. In Italy, this obligation was established for the first time in 
1998, then repealed in 2005, re-established by the 2017 reform, and, 
finally, reshaped by the 2019 intervention. To date, it should apply to the 
public broadcaster only, while private televisions are allowed to keep 
broadcasting European and national works late at night. A long-term 
overview, despite the limited duration of national governments, would 
be indispensable. Its absence risks to jeopardize the national enterprises’ 
activity, deprived of credible long-term horizons, and limit foreign 
enterprises’ availability to do their business in Italy.  
Apart from the differences between Italy and France, the analysis has 
shown that the quotas instrument opens up several questions. The 
European legislation (as well as the French and Italian ones) declare the 
intention to enhance cultural diversity trough them. However, 
legislations lack to mention how reliably measure and verify such a 
challenging target’s achievement—making it difficult to evaluate the 
tools used to pursue it. As long as there is enough space occupied by 
European and national independent products, the quota regulation is 
respected. However, one can wonder why positive data in terms of their 
presence should be automatically intended as the expression of an 
increase in cultural diversity. Quotas are undoubtedly susceptible to 
slow down the decline in production and distribution of European and 
national independent audio-visual works. However, «the higher share 
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of European productions is by no means a sign of increased (or existing) 
diversity of cultural expressions»715. Indeed, a policy of quotas does not 
necessarily promote a diversified creation, since such a policy «does little 
to prevent the increasing homogenization of content and deteriorating 
quality of programmes»716. This is because any program financed with 
European money and realized by most authors and workers from 
Member States according to certain business dynamics could qualify as 
both a European and an independent work, and thus be used to meet 
quotas. Quotas apply automatically: works do not have to respect 
quality criteria or a particular expression of national and European 
themes. This is understandable: there are intrinsic dangers in asking 
public powers to assess values that are difficult to gauge impartially—
as already said concerning State aids. However, this approach implies 
that, if it is sure that quotas do safeguard the European and national 
audio-visual industries, one cannot be sure that they are an effective 
measure for enhancing cultural diversity. 
 
Strengthen the industry and then let it develop autonomously? The 
many risks of State support 
The relationship between the Italian State and the film industry reflects 
the widest one between the State and the national industry, as well as 
the health state of the entire country system. The limits that have 
characterized the Italian State's support for the film industry are the 
same for the industry overall: lack of connection between different 
government levels, lack of assessment of the effectiveness of the choices 
made, lack of long-term vision, and consequently inability to ensure 
stable horizons. 
The 2016 Act and its implementing decrees sought to inaugurate a new 
course and should be welcomed. In adopting an organic and coherent 
approach, the State is pouring considerable resources into the film 
industry, which may have a significant cultural and economic impact on 
the entire country system. However, it is difficult to hope, in the long 
 
715 BURRI-NENOVA, M., "New Audiovisual Media Services Directive”, p. 1707. 
716 Ibidem, 1708. 
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term, for a greater presence of the Italian State in the industry. On the 
opposite, the hope is that the new Act’s instruments will strengthen the 
industry, allowing it to progressively disengage from public support 
and freely develop. Indeed, if there are many solid reasons for the 
government’s support, there are many equally valid reasons against 
making such a support systematic. State support always involves risks, 
whose likely occurrence increases in the lack of both long-term sight and 
systematic policy evaluations. 
We are far from the most authoritative periods of the past when State 
support was granted in exchange for films accommodating political 
power's interests. However, even for the legislator guided by the noblest 
goals, there is always the risk of adding new constraints while trying to 
increase opportunities. Think about the disincentives produced by the 
reference system introduced by the Italian ‘Urbani Decree’, which ended 
up reducing the incentives to innovate and diversify, in turn 
jeopardizing the emergence of new talents—a result in stark contrast to 
the constitutional ratios for public support to culture. Think also to the 
distortive effects generated by the past definition of Italian works in the 
quotas’ framework, namely the reduction of the Italian film industry's 
internationalization and the economic value of Italian film. As noted, 
«the tools are not neutral. They bear the marks of the policies for which 
they were introduced. They enclose values. Nevertheless, they have their 
own dynamics [...] influencing the ends, modifying and distorting 
them»717. 
State support also risks producing a ‘napping’ industry, jeopardizing the 
essential drivers for innovation and experimentation, which are 
inherently nested in the competitive dynamic. Think about the 1994 
Italian Guarantee Fund’s operation, which was likely to take any 
responsibility off both the banks and the cinema operators while 
transferring the entrepreneurial risk to the State. Since operators were 
not risking their capital but gambling with State’s money, the 
mechanism did not incentivize them to make a careful assessment of the 
 
717 CASSESE, S., Preface to Gli strumenti per governare, pp. X and XI («Gli strumenti non sono 
neutri. Portano i segni delle politiche per cui sono stati introdotti. Racchiudono valori. Ma poi hanno 
dinamiche proprie […] effetti propri, che influenzano i fini, modificandoli e distorcendoli»). 
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projects they invested in, as proven by the very poor performance of the 
cultural interest films produced in that period718. 
State support may also produce free riding effects, keeping too many 
and too weak operators in the market, letting to survive inefficient 
activities, thus harming the entire economy. Think how the cultural 
purpose of State support has led to granted aids for specific projects 
rather than a structural support for companies, drifting towards a 
natalist policy of enterprises and medium-low budget films, with little 
capacity to penetrate foreign markets and sometimes failing to find a 
public even in the country of origin. 
Interestingly, the exponents of the industry themselves have been 
highlighting said risks since a long time ago. In 1967, the then president 
of Confindustria, Angelo Costa, noted how «the fact that companies do 
not earn is mostly due to the incentive policy. Of all dishonest policies, 
the incentive is one of the most dishonest. The expedient of the incentive 
can be useful and necessary, but when it becomes systematic is 
destructive. We have sectors in crisis today simply because we wanted 
to create by subsidies unnecessary facilities. A small percentage of 
production more than the absorption possibilities is sufficient to lower 
prices below the cost limits […]»719. 
Regarding the current legislation, an additional risk is that the State's 
action will prove in the long term a mere expense rather than an actual 
investment. The Italian State does not effectively protect the producers' 
 
718 According to CUCCO, M. and MANZOLI, G., Il Cinema di Stato, p. 45, 94% of the films of 
cultural interest financed by the State between 1994 and 2002 did not even make up for the 
amount invested in their production. Moreover:11% of these films have not been 
completed or have not found a distribution channel. 
719 Thus reported by SERRANI, D. Lo Stato finanziatore, p. 38, footnote n. 11. («il fatto che le 
aziende non guadagnino deriva in gran parte dalla politica degli incentivi. Fra tutte le politiche 
disoneste questa degli incentivi è una delle più disoneste. L’espediente dell’incentivo può essere utile 
e necessario, ma quando lo si erige a sistema diventa distruttivo. Noi oggi abbiamo settori in crisi 
solo perché si sono voluti creare impianti sovvenzionati non necessari. Una piccola percentuale di 
produzione in più rispetto alle possibilità di assorbimento, è sufficiente a far ribassare i prezzi sotto 
i limi di costo. Si vuole favorire l’industrializzazione del meridione e si danno incentivi, e poi si 
danno gli stessi aiuti a zone depresse sparse in tutto il paese annullando in tal modo gli effetti della 
prima incentivazione. Unico risultato è che aziende sane non incentivate ne soffrono e con esse tutta 
l’economia»). 
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ability to maintain significant exploitation rights on their works in the 
face of the global digital platforms' tendency to acquire their ownership 
instead of a license for their exploitation. This way, in the long run the 
works financed by Italy may end up enriching foreign companies, 
instead of the national ones. 
Finally, State's support to culture implies some specific risks. Among 
them, those related to distributive justice. To promote projects with 
exceptional and artistic value but with limited market appeal, the State 
uses public money to aid works that may benefit the wealthiest and more 
educated, with a regressive distributive effect. This is why one should 
strongly welcome the provision of the 2016 Act under which a minimum 
percentage of funding should be devoted each year to cinema education 
initiatives in schools. Increased education may be an effective way—
even more consistent with freedom principles—to enhance the 
demand’s 'quality', thus limiting the State's need to enter the market to 
allow 'meritorious' but fragile actors to express themselves. There is the 
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proprio pensiero”. Commentario della costituzione, ed by Branca, G., and 
Pizzorusso, A. (2006). 
RIMOLI, F. “L’arte”. Trattato di diritto amministrativo, ed. by Cassese, S. 
(2000): 1513 ss. 
ZACCARIA, R. “Cinematografia (disciplina amministrativa)”. Digesto delle 
discipline pubblicistiche (1989). 
ZENNARO, R. “Agevolazioni fiscali”. Digesto delle discipline privatistiche 
(1987): 76 ss. 
  
